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Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 291 Records
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1987 (8) TMI 111 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Appeal - Pre-deposit of penalty or duty - Undue hardship ... ... ... ... ..... cash and furnish bank guarantee for Rs. 4,50,000/- as a pre-condition for entertaining his appeal, as stated in the order of the Tribunal dated May 6, 1986, stands allowed. The prayer in the second writ petition (Writ Petition No. 504 of 1987) for disposing of the petitioner s appeal on merits, without requiring him to deposit any amount or furnish any security, has, in view of what has been stated above, become redundant. 9. It was urged before us that while considering the question under the proviso to Section 129-E of the Act, the Tribunal is also required to go into the prima facie nature of the claim put-forward by the appellant. Some decisions were sought to be cited by Shri A.P. Mathur before us in this respect. We did not permit him to do so because we feel that this plea, and the precedents should be placed more appropriately before the Tribunal. 10. Both the writ petitions shall stand disposed of finally in these terms. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 110 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Refund - Excess production rebate - Limitation for Refund ... ... ... ... ..... orth the claim for refund. Refund presupposes quantification and that is feasible only after the base period and the base clearances are determined and approved by the second respondent. That alone could be the proper construction to be put on and the proper way to work the notification and in this view, I am not able to sustain the reasonings expressed in the impugned order of the second respondent that the limitation has come in the way and hence it will be futile to fix the base period and base clearances. Limitation will run only from the date of determination and approval of the base period and the base clearances. Hence, these writ petitions are allowed and the matter is remitted to the file of the second respondent for him to determine and approve the base period and the base clearances for the years in question as per the notification, so that there could be quantification of the refund claim of the petitioner and their rights worked out. I make no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 109 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Stay/Dispensation of prior deposit - Time bar demand ... ... ... ... ..... petitioner appellant before the Tribunal, had failed to impel it to take the view that it was because of undue hardship to the petitioner. Having, however, regard to all the factors the Tribunal directed that the petitioner should deposit Rupees one lakh apart from the security for the remaining amount. 3. Normally, we could have not interfered with the order passed by the Tribunal but for the fact that inspite of our specific direction that the Tribunal should record a conclusion, even though in a prima-facie manner, on the question of demand being barred by limitation, the Tribunal has failed to do so. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Tribunal dated July 21, 1987 and direct it to reconsider the matter in the light of our order passed on May 22, 1987 1987 (31) E.L.T. 883 (All.) expeditiously. The writ petition is disposed finally with the aforesaid observations. 4. Let a copy of this order be made available to the parties within a week on payment of usual charges.
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1987 (8) TMI 108 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
Jute yarn - Cess - Captive Consumption - Central Excise ... ... ... ... ..... levy of cess is sustainable under the amended Rules 9 and 49. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that a new dimension as to the effect of amended Rules 9 and 49 should not be permitted to be projected at this stage. We are unable to appreciate this. We cannot gloss over the impact of amended provision introduced on 20-2-1982 with retrospective effect. The jute yarn is an intermediary product utilised in the manufacture of end product and used for captive consumption within the factory of production. The manufactured commodity bearing excisable character by itself is exigible to levy and the removal of such commodity from the premises of the factory is not necessary. The jute yarn by itself is a marketable commodity and as such excisable entity exigible to duty in view of amended Rules 9 and 49 though jute yarn is utilised in the production of jute products within the precincts of the factory. In the result, writ petitions dismissed. No costs. Oral leave refused.
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1987 (8) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Prosecution of company officials without violation of Excise Law ... ... ... ... ..... y offence. The main clause of the complaint which is the subject matter of the dispute is Clause No. 5 which may be extracted thus - 5. That the accused No. 3 is the Manager of accused No. 2 and accused Nos. 4 to 7 are the Directors of accused No. 2 and as such they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of accused No. 2 at the time of sampling. 4. There is no such averment in the impugned complaint Annexure P.2. The material part of the same, i.e., paragraph 7, has already been reproduced above. In the absence of any averment that petitioner No. 3, Mr. Arora, was even the Manager of the Company, the learned Counsel does not appear to be justified in drawing any support from the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above noted case. 5. In the light of the discussion above I allow this petition and quash the complaint and the proceedings against the petitioners now pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar.
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1987 (8) TMI 106 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Imports - Words and phrases ... ... ... ... ..... , it comes to this whether it is an additional licence or whether it is a REP or imprest licence, essentially all these relate to certain facilities whereby the importer can import certain items. When importers have to import those items, naturally, current policy becomes relevant. If, under the Current Policy, it is not possible for the importers to import items which they want to import though the same may be permissible under the early policy, the importers have no choice. I, therefore, hold that the Petitioners cannot find fault with the show cause notice issued by the respondents. 17. In the result, the petition will have to be dismissed. I, therefore, pass the following order The petition stands dismissed. Rule discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost. At this stage, at the request of the petitioners, the status quo, as envisaged in the interim order, dated April 28, 1987, to continue for a period of four weeks from today.
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1987 (8) TMI 105 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... . In the circumstances of this very case, it was possible after considering the nature of the involvement of the detenu, the detaining authority may have thought of not passing the preventive detention order. The question is not whether the detaining authority would have still passed the detention order but the question is of principle which is that the detaining authority must know as to what action, if any, has so far been taken against the detenu. In view of the abovesaid Division Bench judgment (supra) I am, therefore, of the view that on both the aforesaid grounds this is clearly a case where the detaining authorities failed to apply its mind before passing the detention order. That vitiates the detention order. In view of the aforesaid observations, I need not go into the merits or otherwise of the other contentions of Mr. Trilok Kumar. The petition is allowed and the detention order is quashed. The detenu shall be released forthwith unless required in some other case.
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1987 (8) TMI 104 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Detention order ... ... ... ... ..... ing the procedure to be adopted in that event is provided under Section 7 of the Act and before the detaining authority can take a stand in court that the warrant could not be executed as the detenu was absconding it must show that it did make attempt to execute the warrant by taking resort to Section 7 of the Act. If the detenu in the present case was really absconding, one would expect the authority to take steps for his arrest as envisaged by Sec. 7 of the Act. If this is not done the indifference in execution of the warrant needs no further proof. I am, therefore, of the view that there is undue and unexplained delay in the present case in execution of the detention order and there is no direct nexus between the detention order and the purpose sought to be achieved. In view of these observations, the petition has to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed. The detention order is quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith from the detention unless otherwise wanted.
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1987 (8) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Prosecution - Cost/compensation ... ... ... ... ..... can recover compensation in a Civil Court. The words any loss means a loss that can be compensated in money including some substantial detriment from a worldly point of view. Sub-section (3) of Section 357 is a new provision and provides for payment of compensation by the accused to a person who has suffered any loss or injury even in a case where fine does not form part of the sentence imposed by a court. The compensation is payable for any loss or injury whether physical or pecuniary and the court shall have due regard to the nature of injury, the manner of inflicting the same, the capacity of the accused to pay and other relevant factors. The bare reading of this provision goes to show that it does not apply to the case in hand. The imposition of cost/compensation by the court below is thus not legal or justified. 12. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I hereby accept the revision petition and set aside the order of the Addl. Sessions Judge, dated 7th October, 1986.
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1987 (8) TMI 102 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Valuation - Packing - Taxable event ... ... ... ... ..... mitation as per Section 11A of the Act for the period anterior to 18-4-1977, taking the date of the initial show cause, namely, 10-10-1977, as the date of service of notice as per Section 11A. However, Mr. T. Somasundaram, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, would answer this contention by stating that is a case of suppression of facts and hence the time limit could be five years and in this view the present demand even for the above period could not be stated to have become barred. Mr. Somayaji, points out that there has been no plea, at any point of time earlier to the filing of the counter-affidavit by the respondent in this writ petition, which happened only in July 1987 that the petitioner was guilty of suppression of facts. There is no need to go into this question, because I have sustained the primary contention with regard to the very untenability of the basis for the demand. For the reasons expressed above, this writ petition is allowed. No costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 101 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Countervailing duty - Words and phrases - Refund - Natural rubber - Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... evy and collection in respect of the concerned goods. I make no order as to costs. 7. Coming to W.P. Nos. 1642 and 1643 of 1983, Mr. M. Uttama Reddi, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submits that there was, in fact, a notification under Section 25(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, exempting the levy and collection of the Customs duty and the additional duty in respect of natural rubber of the quantity of 400 tonnes. There is no dispute about the same. If so, by the very force of the notification under Section 25(2) of the Customs Act, there could not be levy and collection of additional duty on this quantity. With reference to the residue, the principle discussed above will govern and these writ petitions are allowed as prayed for. No costs. I am told that some of the petitioners have furnished Bank guarantees to cover the proposed levy. In view of the fact that the writ petitions have been allowed as above, the Bank guarantees, if they are still alive, shall stand cancelled.
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1987 (8) TMI 100 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Detention order - Double detention ... ... ... ... ..... emains unexplained. 18. Useful reliance can also be placed on the judgments reported as Sk. Abdul Munnaf v. The State of W.B., AIR 1974 S.C. 2066 Laxman Khatik v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 S.C. 1264 Rabindra Kumar Ghosel v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 S.C. 1408 and Md. Sahabuddin v. The District Magistrate, 24 Parganas and others, 1975(4) S.C.C 114. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the case in hand, I have no hesitation to hold that the detaining authority has not acted swiftly in the matter and there was no proximity between the prejudicial activity and the detention order. There is no worthwhile explanation for the delayed action. On this ground alone, the petition must succeed. 19. No other point has been urged nor requires going into. 20. As a result of the above discussion, I accept the petition and quash the order of detention. The petitioner be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be detained under any order of a competent court or authority.
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1987 (8) TMI 99 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Revision - Evidence - Additional evidence ... ... ... ... ..... hat the gold bangles were ornaments, and that they were not primary gold. The Petitioners were acquitted. This circumstance, among other considerations, weighed heavily in the Administrator making the order dated 13th December, 1979. After six years of seizure of the goods, and much after criminal trial and adjudication proceedings in accordance with law, samples are again referred to another authority, and on a report obtained, after conclusion of all those proceedings, the Central Government propose to exercise their power of revision under Section 82 of the Act. Law cannot countenance such proposals. It is impermissible to test propriety or legality of an order of an adjudicating authority on the basis of material not even placed before the subordinate authority. The revisional authority has no jurisdiction to do so. 10. The impugned Notice dated 21st July, 1980 (Annexure-1) is quashed. Rule is made absolute. Writ Petition is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 3,000/-.
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1987 (8) TMI 98 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Estoppel - Promissory estoppel - Taxation ... ... ... ... ..... an be raised by the appellants and that it must be upheld, it is not necessary to deal with the subsidiary contentions that were raised on behalf of the appellants. 33. Before we conclude we must record our appreciation of the assistance given to us by counsel on both sides. 34. The appeals are allowed. The respondents shall levy additional duty on the viscose staple fibre imported by the appellants and which arrived at the port of Bombay on or before 31st December, 1979 at the rate of Rs. 1.32 per kg. The respondents shall refund to the appellants excess additional duty, if any, collected from them upon the said imports within 8 weeks from today. 35. In Appeals No. 960 of 1983 and 655 of 1984 the bank guarantees furnished by the appellants pursuant to interim orders shall stand discharged. 36. No order as to costs. 37. Mr. Bulchandani applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Having regard to the judgment in Pournami Oil Mills case we are unable to grant such leave.
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1987 (8) TMI 97 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Exemption notifications cannot provide norms or standard for classification of article - Plastics - PTFE sheets
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1987 (8) TMI 96 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Iron and steel products - Classification of goods - Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... ies is perverse. The forged products which undergo the further process like machining, polishing and drilling holes to make them identifiable as machine parts leave the factory gate in a form known to the commercial community as machinery parts. 34. The learned single Judge rightly held that the transformation takes place by further process of manufacture and as such the appellants are liable to pay duty of Central Excise under Tariff Item 68 in addition to duty under Item 26AA(ia) at the stage of forging. The Counsel for the appellant, however, stated that Central Excise duty is not payable under Tariff Item 26AA(ia) on account of exemption notification issued by Government of India from time to time. This is for the respondents to decide in accordance with law. We are not concerned with this question in this appeal. 35. For the reasons stated above, I would dismiss the appeal. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 95 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Demand - Show Cause Notice for short levy - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... Assistant Collector of Central Excise who will now proceed to reconsider and redetermine the demand under the show cause notice dated 2nd February 1979 (Exhibit F) strictly in accordance with the period of limitation applicable thereto being six months i.e. from 3rd August 1978 to 25th August 1978. (c) The petitioner through its learned Counsel Mr. Parikh gives undertaking to this Court here recorded to the effect that on the Assistant Collector redetermining the amount payable by the petitioner in accordance with this period, the same will be paid by the petitioner within thirty days of written intimation thereof to the petitioner. This undertaking is accepted by this Court. (d) In view of the aforesaid undertaking and its acceptance by this Court, the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner will stand cancelled. The same duly cancelled should be returned to the petitioner. 10. Rule is made absolute in terms aforesaid but, in the circumstances, with no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 94 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Confiscation - Misdeclaration - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... were served at the address of the petitioners in Bombay. He, therefore, submitted that this being an integral part of the cause of action and the notices and Orders having been received by them in Bombay, it could necessarily be said that this Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain this case. He also submitted that the petitioners were affected by the orders inasmuch as they paid the fine and penalty in Bombay. 18. In my view, having regard to these circumstances it can be said that a part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, I must hold that this Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain this case. 19. It is not necessary to refer to various other judgments cited across the bar. 20. I, therefore, pass the following order Rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b). Amounts to be refunded within a period of eight weeks from today, However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Licensed premises - Change in ground plan - Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... Supreme Court. I think, I will give suitable directions in this behalf. 9. I, therefore, pass the following order Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). I direct that the respondents should approve the revised ground plan as contained in their letter dated August 30, 1984 being Ex. A within a period of six weeks from today. I, further direct the petitioners that till such time the Supreme Court decides the question relating to caps and capping charges and as to whether they are excisable (which question is pending in the Metal Box case) the petitioners will have to maintain proper accounts in respect of capping operations. I further direct that the petitioners will give inspection of the said accounts once in a month as and when called upon by the respondents. However, I make it clear that the respondents will have liberty to inspect the premises where the capping operations are carried on. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 92 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Refund - Duty paid under mistake of law ... ... ... ... ..... Court can pass an order for refund for those items also. However, in my order I would give suitable directions with regard to those items. 5. I, therefore, pass the following order Rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b). However, with regard to items set out in Ex. P. I direct that the petitioners should furnish all the particulars of the claims together with the necessary documents in support of their claims within a period of four weeks from today. The respondents to verify as to the correctness of the items imported and also the amounts claimed by way of refund and such scrutiny should be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date the petitioners furnish the requisite information. After scrutiny the respondents should refund the amounts due and payable in respect of those items as also in respect of the other three refund applications within a period of eight weeks thereafter. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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