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Showing 181 to 200 of 733 Records
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2009 (9) TMI 896 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the preamble of the Seeds Act, 1966 clearly suggests to us that both the statutes operate in totally independent and different fields and one has no relation, link or inter-dependence with the other. The 2005 Act, being a fiscal statute, operates in a totally different and independent field and exempts levy of tax on seeds of all kinds. The expression, seeds of all kinds , used in entry 52 of Schedule I to the 2005 Act, clearly, unmistakably and unambiguously takes away from the liability of paying tax seeds of all kinds . It does not make rejected seeds, inferior seeds or superior seeds, liable to pay tax. The Legislature, by using the expression, seeds of all kinds , has clearly manifested its intention of including actually each and every kind of seeds, except of course oil-seeds, from the imposition of tax liability. The Tribunal was justified in its view with which we fully concur and find no merit in this petition, which is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 895 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Whether the impugned order has been passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 11(3) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948?
Held that:- No doubt is left that the order dated April 16, 2004 purported to have been passed under section 11(10) of the Act and rule 39C of the Rules flagrantly violates the principles of natural justice. Such an order cannot be regarded an order in the absence of its communication to the petitioner. Therefore, the respondent cannot take any support from such an order and the impugned order dated March 31, 2005 (P9) is set aside as it is beyond the period of three years prescribed by section 11(3) of the PGST Act. Petition allowed.
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2009 (9) TMI 894 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
No valid service of order of assessment - Held that:- In view of the finding to the effect that there is no endorsement by the person from the respondent Department, it has to be noted that there is no proper service of the order of assessment on the petitionerCompany in terms of rule 52(1) of the TNGST Rules. In that view, it has to be taken that the order of assessment was served on the petitionercompany only on November 18, 2004. In such circumstances, the impugned order has to be held as bad in law and is accordingly set aside.
As it is a fit case where the delay has to be condoned and the matter should be directed to be heard on merits. In view of the above finding, the impugned order is set aside, the delay in filing the appeal before the first respondent stands condoned and the first respondent is directed to issue notice to the petitioner and hear the appeal and decide the same on merits and in accordance with law.
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2009 (9) TMI 893 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
... ... ... ... ..... ment. The impugned assessment order is therefore liable to be set aside giving liberty to the assessing authority to make the fresh assessment giving the dealer opportunity of being heard. Denial of opportunity to rebut the evidence in course of assessment proceeding as found in this case does not make an assessment proceeding void ab initio as suggested by the learned advocate Mr. Bhattacharya. In the result the application succeeds. Hence, it is ordered that the application is allowed on contest without cost. The impugned assessment order stands set aside giving liberty to the assessing authority to hold the proceeding afresh as per law particularly, supply of the material contents of the investigation report and documents to be acted upon in making up the assessment and giving opportunity to rebut any evidence to be used against the dealer. The petitioner shall appear in the forenoon of September 16, 2009 for obtaining the date of hearing. The assessment file be returned.
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2009 (9) TMI 892 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Dispute between a Government undertaking and a Government Department of U.P. - Held that:- Without going into the merits of the present litigation, it may be mentioned that it is neither appropriate nor permissible for two Departments of a State or the Union of India to fight litigation in a court of law.
Thus direct that the revisionist and the Trade Tax Department should sort out the dispute involved in the present revisions through Secretary Level Committee at the earliest in view of abovementioned G. O. dated January 16, 1991. Until final decision taken by the Committee, the recovery proceedings shall remain stayed pertaining to the present revision
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2009 (9) TMI 891 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 2003, are set aside and the matter is restored to the file of the assessing officer on the petitioner paying costs quantified at Rs. 10,000 in favour of respondent No. 2, within 2 weeks from today. The petitioner to remain present before the assessing authority, on September 29, 2009 at 11 a. m. who thereafter will proceed with the matter and complete the proceedings not later than 6 months from that date. Rule made absolute accordingly. We make it clear that we have not set aside the order of attachment, which will continue till final order passed by the assessing officer and recovery is made, of any dues if any, in terms of the fresh orders that may be so passed. We make it further clear that the assessing officer to proceed to dispose of the proceedings without considering the time-limit, if any, under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 and Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal, 1956. Both the parties have no objection to the same, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case.
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2009 (9) TMI 890 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Whether the respondent-company can be termed to be a "pipeline industry" to derive the advantage of the notification dated July 21, 2000
Held that:- It has not been disputed by the appellant, Government of Pondicherry, that the Commercial Taxes Department, by its letter dated September 19, 2000, held that IMFL units would also be eligible, if they satisfy the other conditions specified in G.O. Ms. No. 36/2000/F2 dated July 21, 2000. It has also been seen that such exemptions having been given to other IMFL companies.
Apart from the fact that the company has been provided with "no objection certificate" for construction of the distillery, registration certificate, etc., it will be also evident that the respondent-company filed its monthly return in form A2 of the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Pondicherry, reporting its turnover and claimed exemption on the same. The assessing authority originally issued provisional assessment notice dated December 11, 2000 and February 2, 2001 for the month of September to December, 2000, proposing to disallow the claim of the exemption on the ground that the exemption was made available in view of notification dated March 30, 1999. In response to the said notice, the respondent-company, through their letter dated February 12, 2001, filed its objection and claimed exemption under notification dated July 21, 2000. Thereafter, no order of provisional assessment was made, but, however the assessing authority chose to issue pre-assessment notice dated August 13, 2000 proposing to disallow the claim for exemption for the year 2000-01, which was confirmed by assessment order dated October 1, 2000. Thereby, the authority did not choose to apply its mind with regard to exemption to which one or other industry was entitled under G.O. Ms. No. 36/2000/F2 dated July 21, 2000. Appeal dismissed.
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2009 (9) TMI 889 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Levy of penalty imposed under sections 15A(1)(q) and deleted the addition made under section 7(4) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 cancelled by Tribunal
Held that:- As the assessee has already furnished sufficient evidence to prove that the goods have crossed the border of the U.P. and were never sold in the U.P. The Tribunal is a final fact finding authority as per the ratio laid down in the case of Kamala Ganapathy Subramaniam v. Controller of Estate Duty 2001 (2) TMI 132 - SUPREME Court] thus find no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's impugned order which is hereby sustained along with the reasons mentioned therein. No question of law emerges from the impugned order of the Tribunal. Appeal dismissed.
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2009 (9) TMI 888 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reassessment proceedings - Held that:- As find from the record that to the show-cause notice issued by respondent No. 2 the petitioner had filed its detailed objection. But the Additional Commissioner, respondent No. 2, had not given any reason whatsoever nor has dealt any of the objections raised by the petitioner in his reply, thus the said order passed by the Additional Commissioner cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside
The impugned order dated December 18, 2007 (annexure 5) passed by the Additional Commissioner, Grade 1, Trade Tax, Kanpur Zone, Kanpur and the consequential notice dated January 4, 2008 (annexure 6) issued by the assessing authority for initiating reassessment proceedings for the assessment year 2002-03 are set aside. Appeal allowed.
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2009 (9) TMI 887 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Rectification application accepted by tribunal - Held that:- In the present case, second application under the caption "misc. application" was filed on December 8, 2001. That clearly after two years of the appellate order and even after two years of the rejection of the first rectification application on October 19, 1998. The second application, assuming second application lay, was clearly barred by limitation. Therefore, the Tribunal had no power to entertain it. The impugned order therefore has to be set aside.
The matter be remanded back to the Tribunal for rehearing rectification application No. 73 of 1997 filed by respondent No. 2 but only regarding the contention of respondent No. 2 that the Commissioner and the Tribunal ought to have given prospective effect to the order of the Commissioner under section 52(2) of the Act. We make it clear that the points already decided in rectification application No. 73 of 1997 shall stand concluded and would not be reopened, but on remand the Tribunal would only consider the issue regarding prospective effect to be given to the order of the Commissioner under section 52(2) of the Act. The Tribunal shall consider the same independently and without being in any way influenced by any of the observations in the impugned order dated February 28, 2002 which is hereby set aside.
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2009 (9) TMI 886 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Exemption from payment of purchase tax on purchase of raw materials - Held that:- The notification of the Sales Tax Department cannot act in contravention of the Industrial Policy. Once the policy defines the purpose, aims, objects, and the sweep, the notification of the Sales Tax Department must in a subservient manner ensure effective implementation of the policy. We are in no doubt that in case of any apparent or real conflict between the dominant policy decision and the notification of the Sales Tax Department, the latter shall yield to the former, and will have to be read down in case of doubt or difficulty. The latter can be read only in the manner it advances the aims and objects of the Industrial Policy, and any attempt to reduce its efficacy has to be discouraged, and, if necessary, shall be declared to be repugnant to the policy.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated March 7, 2000 (annexure 5), passed by the learned Commercial Tax Tribunal, is set aside. It is held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of exemption from payment of purchase tax on purchase of raw materials for manufacture of its products in Bihar, and sold in Bihar or outside Bihar. The petitioner shall be entitled to refund of the amount, if any, deposited by it along with interest at 15 per cent from the date of deposit(s) till the date of payment
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2009 (9) TMI 885 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Input tax credit on stocks rejected being timebarred - Held that:-T he dealer-appellant(s) in these appeals have filed their respective statements of claim of input tax credit on May 23, 2005 (in V.A.T. Ap. No. 17 of 2008) and May 20, 2005 (in V.A.T. Ap. No. 5 of 2007), their cases are squarely covered by the judgment rendered in the case of City Petro [2009 (1) TMI 789 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] . These appeals are allowed and concerned designated officers are directed to consider the claims of the dealer-appellant(s) for input tax credit afresh in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order
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2009 (9) TMI 884 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Refund application of unadjusted input tax credit under section 58(4) of the OVAT Act, 2004 read with rule 66 of the Orissa Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 rejected
Held that:- While the petitioner's refund application was not processed even after the Assistant Commissioner's request to the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to withhold the refund was turned down by the Commissioner on December 10, 2008 with a further direction to him to dispose of the refund application after necessary enquiry. This fact clearly indicates mala fide in exercise of quasi-judicial authority.
We allow the writ application and quash the order dated March 9, 2009 (annexure 8) rejecting the petitioner's refund application, and direct the opposite parties to effect the refund amount claimed by the petitioner under annexure 2 within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order along with interest due to the petitioner in terms of section 59 of the OVAT Act, 2004.
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2009 (9) TMI 883 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Levy of penalty under section 9B(3)(a)(ii) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 for the periods 2000-01, 2001-02 and 2002-03 - Held that:- In the present case, the petitioner has acted clearly in consonance with his lawful obligation both for collection and deposit of sales tax and the allegation that the petitioner had collected excess OST and surcharge over and above his liability under the Sales Tax Act, is preposterous. The OET Act itself permits "set-off of entry tax against the sales tax dues" and such set-off can only be made possible after the petitioner collects the OST from its purchasers and not at any time prior thereto.
Therefore, the Sales Tax Officer's notice for levy of penalty is wholly unfounded both on facts as well as law and is, therefore, without jurisdiction. We, accordingly hold that the petitioner was justified in claiming set-off of entry tax paid by him (at the time of purchase) from the tax payable under the OST Act and such claim of set-off cannot form a lawful basis for issue of a notice for levy of penalty under section 9B(3)(a)(ii) of the OST Act, 1947. Appeal allowed.
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2009 (9) TMI 882 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
When the revisional authority had already passed, on May 27, 2002, an order holding that since the alleged transportation of taxable consignments had taken place prior to February 28, 2000, was recourse to section 32(1)(a) not permissible in law?
Whether a Superintendent of Tax is empowered to issue a notice of demand for payment of a sum, which has been held, by the revisional authority, to be not recoverable?
Held that:- The revisional authority's order can be challenged, under the scheme of the TST Act and the Rules framed thereunder, before the Tribunal as envisaged under the statute in question. So long as the order, passed by a revisional authority remains in force, this order would be binding both on the assessee as well as the authorities, who are subordinate to the revisional authority. If an order passed by a revisional authority is bad in law the remedy lies either in challenging the order before the Tribunal as aforesaid or by taking recourse to rectification proceeding as envisaged by section 12 of the TST Act.
When one reverts to the case at hand, it becomes clear that even if the conclusion reached by the revisional authority in its order dated May 27, 2002, was illegal or incorrect, the Superintendent of Taxes concerned could not have passed any order and issue notice of demand, such as the one, which stands impugned in this writ petition, and/or pass any such order, which stands impugned in this writ petition. Thus while the notice of demand dated May 12/13, 2004, and also the impugned order dated May 14, 2004, are hereby set aside and quashed, the respondents are left at liberty to take recourse to such provisions of law as may be permissible for the remedy of their grievances.
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2009 (9) TMI 881 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
When the "transporters", as a class, do not fall within the definition of the term "dealer", in a given fiscal statute, whether it is constitutionally permissible to impose legal obligations on the functioning of the "transporters" so as to ensure that the acts or omissions of transporters" do not help evasion of tax by "dealers"?
Whether contravention of such statutory obligations, imposed on the "transporters" can be made offences?
Whether it is permissible for the Legislature to make such provisions, in such a fiscal statute, as would enable a "transporter" to opt for composition of such offences by making payment of such sum(s), which may be recoverable as the taxable liability of the "dealer", whose taxable consignment had been carried by the "transporter" or whose taxable liability the transporter has helped escaped assessment of?
Whether it would be permissible for the State to recover tax, which is, otherwise, payable by a "dealer", by making payment of such taxable amount as a condition for composition of an offence, which a "transporter" may have committed?
Held that:- In the present cases, apart from the fact that the composition amount could not be shown to be unreasonably high or oppressive, the impugned orders state that the petitioners had opted for composition of the offence under sections 29(4), 29(5), 29(6) and 29(12). The petitioners, as "transporter", contend, at the time of hearing of these writ petitions, that they had not opted for composition. It, thus becomes a disputed question of fact as to whether the petitioners had, or had not, as a matter of fact, opted for composition. Such a disputed question of fact cannot be decided and determined in a writ proceeding, such as, the present one, and the resort, in such a case, must be taken by a person within the scheme of the statute itself. Considered in this light, it becomes clear that if it is the contention of the petitioners that they had not opted for composition, they have to take remedial option provided in the statute itself and not by way of a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been done in the case at hand.
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2009 (9) TMI 880 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Legislative competence of the State of Meghalaya to enact section 106 of the Meghalaya Value Added Tax Act, 2003 questioned
Held that:- Legislative competence of the State of Meghalaya to enact section 106 of the Meghalaya Value Added Tax Act, 2003.
Consequently, the State-respondents or the person or persons or body responsible for making tax deduction at source shall hereafter deduct the advance tax at the rate of 12.5 per cent only from the taxable turnover of the value of the works contract of all the petitioners of these 13 (thirteen) writ petitions. Excess payments, if any, on account of the tax deductions at source made by any of the respondents heretofore in terms of the interim orders of this court shall be refunded to all the petitioners at once along with the interest admissible under the law.
Conversely, if there is any deficiency in the collection towards deduction of tax at source in terms of the interim orders, it shall be open to the Staterespondents to recover the same from each of the petitioners in the manner permissible by law. The writ petitions are disposed in the above terms, but without costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 879 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Applicability of the DVAT Act to the transaction of hiring of Maruti Omni cabs by the respondent to a company, M/s. New Delhi Power Limited (hereafter "the NDPL")
Held that:- The present appeal is not entitled to succeed because neither the transactions in question are sale of goods as envisaged in article 366(29A)(d) nor can the composite contracts be split up by taking from it the value of the goods for the purposes of taxing the same under the DVAT Act.
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2009 (9) TMI 878 - SUPREME COURT
interim injunction - Held that:- Interim orders of this Court dated 08th June, 2009 and 31st August, 2009 are vacated and substituted by the following directions.
The respondent shall be entitled to sell its product but it shall maintain an accurate records/accounts of its all India and export sales.We are appointing a Receiver to whom the records of such sale shall be furnished every fortnight by the respondent and the same shall be signed and authenticated by a responsible officer of the respondent. A copy of the same shall be given to the appellant also. We are requesting the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to forthwith nominate a Receiver in the matter to whom the sale records/accounts will be submitted by the respondent fortnightly, and the Receiver will verify the said sale records/accounts and thereafter submit his Report to the learned Bench of Madras High Court where the suit is pending. A copy of the same will be sent to the parties also. This direction will continue till the pendency of the suit. The remuneration of the Receiver will be fixed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice.
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2009 (9) TMI 877 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Whether the assessee is entitled to claim deduction of ₹ 67.06 crores incurred in connection with swapping of foreign currency funds in the year under consideration, i.e., the assessment year 1995-96?
Held that:- Normally the ordinary rule is to be applied, namely, revenue expenditure incurred in a particular year is to be allowed in that year. Thus, if the assessee claims that expenditure in that year, the Income-tax department cannot deny the same. However, in those cases where the assessee himself wants to spread the expenditure over a period of ensuing years, it can be allowed only if the principle of matching concept is satisfied, which up to now has been restricted to the cases of debentures.
The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is to answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the revenue
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