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Showing 21 to 40 of 473 Records
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2000 (1) TMI 1011 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r families would suffer. Sri Dayananda Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner-landlord submits that any reasonable time may be given. This eviction proceeding is pending right from the year 1991. In the meantime, one of the petitioners also died. In these circumstances, it would be just and appropriate to grant only 12 months from today to vacate and handover vacant possession of the premises. Even that may be little longer, but having regard to the fact that the respondent is running the business for over 20 years in the said premises and he should be given some time to shift, I do not think that granting of 12 months would be unreasonable. Therefore, the respondent-tenant is granted time to vacate and handover vacant possession on or before 31-1-2001, subject to the payment of rent promptly and regularly. It is made clear that if there is any default continuously for two months in the payment of rent, the petitioners would be at liberty to execute the order of eviction.
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2000 (1) TMI 1010 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 31, 133(6) and 142(2). It is further held that any wrong mention of provision on the requisition memo will not be material. In our considered opinion, the decision rendered in the aforesaid reference case needs no change. We find no compelling reason to make a departure. Interpretation as argued on behalf of the assessee, if conceded to, would only defeat the object sought to be achieved. We would, however, like to add that the report collected from the Valuation Officer about the cost of construction is a piece of evidence and the assessing authority would continue to exercise discretion either to accept it or to reject it if it is otherwise not convincing. 16. Consequently, our answer to the questions raised is in the affirmative. The Tribunal apparently erred in holding that the assessing authority has no powers to refer the valuation of a capital asset to the Valuation Officer for the assessment of the cost of construction of the hotel premises. 17. No order as to costs.
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2000 (1) TMI 1009 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the payment of interest is not received, from the four year onwards it will be treated as on the doubt full loan and will be added to the income only when it is actually received.” In view of the above observations, we are of the vies that the change over of the method of accounting by the assessee, w.e.f. assessment year 1987-88, from a purely mercantile system to t6he present hybrid system viz., mercantile system in respect of other matters and case system of accounting only in respect of interest on certain types of doubtful loans, can be considered to the be a bona fide and acceptable one and the present system followed by the assessee can be considered to be a valid system. The Tribunal was right in holding that no interest accrued to the assessee in this year on loans classified under suit filed accounts, claims lodged accounts and accounts provided for bad and doubtful depts. Reference is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee and against the department.
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2000 (1) TMI 1008 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... pelled to live in rented accommodation from 1982 till 1994 at the rate of ₹ 1600/- per month. Instead of making that award, the National Commission directed the appellant to pay interest at the rate of 18 per annum on the amounts that had been deposited by the respondent from time to time from 1979 onwards till a new plot could be allotted to him and possession thereof could be delivered. Given the facts, we see no justification in interfering with that direction and, consequent upon the dismissal of the appeal and the vacation of the stay order, that direction must now be fully complied with. 2. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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2000 (1) TMI 1007 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iately before the commencement of this Act, before any Court, Tribunal or other authority shall abate; Provided that this Section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the principal Act in so far as such proceedings are relatable to the land possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority. 4. In the counter-affidavit not a word has been said about the possession of the surplus land. In fact, it is maintained by the appellant that the possession is still with the appellant who was also granted an interim Order regarding "status quo" 5. Since there is nothing on record to indicate that the State had taken possession over the surplus land, the present proceedings have to be abated and are hereby abated under Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. 6. The appeals are disposed of finally.
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2000 (1) TMI 1006 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ies on the commercial activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Govt., of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. Kasturi Lal’s decision, therefore, cannot be pressed in aid. o p /o p Moreover, we are dealing with this case under Public Law domain and not in a suit instituted under Private Law domain against persons who, utilising their official position, got a room in the Yatri Niwas booked in their own name where the act complained of was committed. o p /o p No other point was raised before us. The appeal having no merit is dismissed with the observation that the amount of compensation shall be made over to the High Commissioner for Bangladesh in India for payment to the victim, Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon. The payment to the High Commissioner shall be made within three months. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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2000 (1) TMI 1005 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... t been satisfactorily explained. It added that even on merits it did not find any ground to interfere. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that all the grounds in the special leave petition were directed to the merits and there was no averment in regard to the refusal to condone the delay. 4. We do not think that, in the circumstances that can be a reason to decline to pass the order that seems to us appropriate. We think that the appropriate course that the High Court should have passed and which we propose to do, was to condone the delay and make an order of costs in favour of the respondents. 5. Accordingly, the civil appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. Delay in filing the appeal before the High Court is condoned and the appeal (L.P. A. No. 202 of 1997) is restored to the file of the High Court to be heard and disposed of on merits. 6. The appellants shall pay to the respondents the costs of the appeal, quantified at Rupees five hundred only.
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2000 (1) TMI 1004 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ity even though its attention was drawn to its two earlier decisions (cited supra) on the ground that those Explanations introduced with effect from the assessment year 1985-86 were concerned with the payment of interest and not with commission paid for services rendered by the partner. Therefore, so far as payment of salary is concerned, the principles of partnership law continue to apply where the interpretation of section 40(b) is involved. This is what we have sought to do. 18. We confess that at one point of time, we thought that the order of the Commissioner should be upheld, but on a closer and deeper examination of the legal position, such as the impact of the partnership law on the income-tax law and the judgments of the Supreme Court on the subject, we came to the conclusion that the disallowance under section 40(b) cannot be upheld. 19. For the above reasons, we set aside the order of the Commissioner and restore that of the assessing officer and allow the appeal.
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2000 (1) TMI 1003 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ction 2(1) cannot be applied in the context of Section 20(l)(a) or Section 20(l)(b). We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the State that an application for exemption can be maintained only before the excess is determined, under Section 10. In our view, the scheme of the Act is to the contrary. The view taken by the High Court following the decision of this Court in T.R. Thandur v. Union of India and Ors., 1996 3 SCC 690; Darothi Clare Parreira (Smt.) and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 1996 9 SCC 633 and State of A.P., represented by Secretary to Govt., Revenue Department, Hyderabad v. Vallum Venkateswara Rao, (1997) 3 ALT 417, does not call for any interference. We dispose of the Special Leave Petition accordingly. We do not consider it necessary to interfere with the judgment of the High Court which held that Section 20 application is maintainable even if filed after an order of vesting of excess land passed under Section 10.
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2000 (1) TMI 1002 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... money and benami investments in the names of ladies or minors will be doing so at their own risk. The reference to "tax payers" in the above reply is obviously to the relatives of the ladies and minors. Therefore, in the instant case, the returns of the minors having been accepted, assessee, in view of the clarification to question No. 31, can be said to be under a bona fide belief that the loans given to it by the minors were from their own income. The assessee would not be blamed if it could not go further to show the credit worthiness of the minors. The Department did not overcome the presumption that the income declared in the names of minors belonged to the relatives of the minors. Therefore, in our opinion, to treat the credit of ₹ 2,70,000 as the income of the assessee was quite unjustified, and hence, we delete the same. Consequently, disallowance of interest on the said loans is also deleted. 22. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2000 (1) TMI 1001 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... transfer of a depreciable asset in all circumstances. The speciality attached to section 50 is to be restricted to only for the method of computing the capital gain and not for determining the nature of capital gain. In that view of the matter section 50 provides that the gain arising on sale of a depreciable asset, whether long-term or short-term, is short-term capital gain whereas section 54E provides for the non-chargeability of the amount, fully or partly, in case the gain arises on transfer of a long-term capital asset. Both stand together in their respective field. In such a situation in our opinion the benefit should be given to the assessee and it should be left open to him as to which provisions of the law he wants to invoke. The assessee has invoked and claimed deduction under section 54E and that in our opinion is to be granted to it because the gain is arising on transfer of long-term capital asset. We direct accordingly. 20. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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2000 (1) TMI 1000 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... plea. She also rejected the original plea on the ground that there was no supporting evidence to prove the claim. Further aggrieved, the assessee is in appeal before us. o p /o p 10. The learned counsel submitted that the minor children are regularly assessed to tax and the deposits in their savings bank accounts are incorporated in their respective capital account. On the other hand, the learned Departmental Representative submitted that there is no evidence to show that the money to deposit the amount was available with the minors. o p /o p 11. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. There is no evidence before us to suggest that the minors have their own funds to deposit the impugned amount. In the circumstances, we dismiss the appeal filed by the assessee and uphold the order of the CIT(A). o p /o p 12. In the result, the appeal of the assessee for the assessment year 1985-86 is allowed, while his appeal for the assessment year 1987-88 is dismissed. o p /o p
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2000 (1) TMI 999 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... when adequate alternative remedy is available, But in the special facts of this case when the demand was raised and the same had been challenged on the ground that it was barred by time and where the demand is nearly of 46 lakhs of rupees which will have to be deposited before any appeal can be filed, we are of the opinion that the high court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction and determined the questions which were raised in the writ petition on merits. In dealing with contentions raised by the appellant, the High Court would necessarily have to consider the contentions of the respondents as well. We, accordingly, allow these appeals, set aside the order dated 19/07-1999 of the High court and remit the case in the High Court which should then decide Special Civil Applications Nos. 1746 of 1999 and 1754 of 1999 in accordance with law. The interim order which was passed by this Court will continue till varied and the matter is disposed of the High Court Appeal allowed.
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2000 (1) TMI 998 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cacy to the litigant public. It is in this perspective that we do feel it expedient to record that by mere tendering of unconditional apology to this Court would not exonerate the contemnor in the contextual facts but having regard to the nature of the act of contempt, we do deem it fit to impose a fine of ₹ 2,500 each so as to sub-serve the ends of justice against the respondent-contemnors in default of payment of which they (each of them) will suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The fine, be realised within a period of four weeks form the date of this order and shall be paid to the (Legal Service Authority of this Court) Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. The Contempt Petition is disposed of, accordingly. No order as to costs. As regards the second petition for direction to the Central Bureau of Investigation for examination of documents, we do not feel it inclined to pass any order. As such, the said application stands rejected without any order for cost.
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2000 (1) TMI 997 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... learned Counsel for the appellant. In view of the decision of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 4405 of 1997 in which the land value has been fixed at ₹ 16,750.00 per bigha for lands covered by the same notification, there is no reason not to adopt the same value as for the land involved in this appeal also. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and reduce the land value to the above extent. The impugned order stands modified accordingly. No order as to costs.
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2000 (1) TMI 996 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... e expenditure. The ground is rejected. 10. The next ground is that the CIT(A) erred in confirming the disallowance of ₹ 53,260 under the provisions of section 43B, out of which an amount of ₹ 8,273 related to Provident Fund contributions. 11. Before us, it is claimed that the Provident Fund contribution has to be allowed as a deduction in the subsequent year, when it is paid. We agree with this contention. The deduction for this amount may be allowed in the next assessment year. It is claimed that the balance of ₹ 44,987 is allowable as a deduction, as it has been paid before the due date for the filing of the return and so the benefit of the first proviso to section 43B has to be allowed in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1997 224 ITR 677. We agree with this contention also. The deduction for ₹ 44,987 may be allowed. Subject to these remarks, the ground is allowed. 12. The appeal is partly allowed.
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2000 (1) TMI 995 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would not have failed to mention it in the search memo (Ex. P.W. 4/D). The search memo (Ex. P.W. 4/D) is conspicuous by the absence of recovery of any gunny bag containing the contraband from the appellant's possession. The omission of the said material fact in the search memo (Ex. PW. 4/D) has raised considerable doubt on the Seizure Memo (Ex. P.W. 4/B) regarding the alleged recovery of the contraband from the appellant's possession. Thus the network constituted by the aforesaid circumstances leaves a gap of varied dimensions through which the appellant can get out with equal facility. Consequently, the appellant's conviction and sentence under Section 18 of the Act cannot be sustained in law. 7. In the result the appeal is allowed and the appellant's conviction and sentence under Section 18 of the Act is set aside. The appellant is in custody. He be set at liberty forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. Fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant.
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2000 (1) TMI 994 - ITAT MUIMBAI
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... ... ..... 377; 20 per share and work out the full value of consideration as under - Cash consideration for 2,70,000 shares..Rs. 6 Full value of other benefits accruing to the..2,70,000 × 20 Group as per Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the 54,00,000 Agreement Total consideration per share .. 54,00,006 2,70,000 20.000022 Value for 81,150 81,150 × 20.03 .. 16,23,00,170 Say .. 16,23,000 28. Before we wind up, we may clarify that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese (supra) and that of the Bombay High Court in the case of Babubhai M. Sanghvi (supra) are inapplicable to the facts of this case. It has been established from the records that apart from monetary consideration described in the agreement certain other benefits have accrued to the assessee group which forms part of full consideration for purposes of determination of capital gains. As such the decisions referred to above are not applicable. 29. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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2000 (1) TMI 993 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ade by the Assessing Officer on account of ex-gratia payment." 17. It is seen that similar issue arose in the case of the assessee for the Assessment Year 1987-88 and ITAT Bombay Bench 'E' as per its order dated 21st March, 1997 in ITA No.2154/B/91 allowed the assessee's claim of deduction. Respectfully following the order of the Tribunal in the assessee's own case, we reject this ground of appeal. 18. Ground of appeal No. 4 is as under "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the learned CIT(A) erred in deleting the disallowance of ₹ 1,36,231 made by the Assessing Officer under section 37(3) read with rule 6B." 19. It is seen that this issue is covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Aliana & Sons (P.) Ltd. (1995) 216 ITR 690 in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Hence, this ground of appeal is also rejected. 20. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed.
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2000 (1) TMI 992 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... after January, 2001. It is pertinent to mention here that the Assessing Officer read the folder of appeal before an objection is filed. It is not understandable as to how they could not care to file cross-objection when the case was adjourned at their request on 20th April, 2001 in which they have also mentioned that the case of assessee is linked with ABCL. The department has taken 7 months to file this application when the argument has already started. In order to fill the lacunae it seems that the department had filed this application. The department could not explain any reasonable cause for the delay in filing the cross-objection. Therefore, in our opinion, this cross-objection cannot be admitted at this stage. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that no sufficient reason had been given for condonation of delay. The same is dismissed. 104. In the result, appeals filed by the assessees are allowed and the cross-objection filed by the department is dismissed.
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