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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 43 Records
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1963 (10) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... see A.C. Dutta v. Mst. Bibi Ahmedi Begam 1954 A.L.J. 622. There is nothing to show that when the assessee filed the return he was aware of his right to object to the validity of the notice on the ground that it permitted him a period of twenty four hours only to furnish the return. The burden lay upon the State to prove all the facts constituting waiver. There is no finding from which it can be inferred that that burden has been discharged. Indeed, it seems that the Revision Board did not apply its mind to this aspect of the question. It concluded from the mere fact of the assessee filing a return that he had waived his objection to the defect in the return. Question No. 3 must, therefore, be answered in the negative. We direct that a copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Revision Board under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 100. Costs of counsel are assessed at ₹ 100.
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1963 (10) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e impossible to do so. In our opinion, all the necessary conditions and ingredients for the operation of the third proviso to section 16(1)(c) are clearly present, and the assessee would not be within the mischief of the main provision. The Tribunal appears to have been obsessed with the view that the assessee had devised a plan to avoid taxation. No subject is compelled to pay tax unless he falls clearly within the scope of the taxing enactment, and, the avoidance of tax, which goes by the name of "tax planning" in modern times is quite legitimate provided it is done without any subterfuge or fraud. It is open to a taxpayer to keep out of the taxing enactment and so to order his affairs in such a fashion as to achieve that purpose. We may observe that we see nothing improper in it. In the result, the question is answered in favour of the assessee. He will get his costs from the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1963 (10) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ppeal, the appellant does not in such an event really dispute the order as to costs for it is the natural order that is ordinarily made following the decision as to the main subject-matter in dispute and if he himself succeeds in the appeal in regard to the main subject-matter, automatically he will expect to succeed with regard to the costs." 23. We therefore hold that the amount of pendente lite interest decreed is not to be included in the 'amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute in appeal' for the purposes of art. 1 of Schedule I of the Act unless the appellant specifically challenges the correctness of the decree for the amount of interest pendente lite independently of the claim to set aside that decree. The appellant here has not specifically challenged the decree in that respect and therefore the High Court is right in holding the memorandum of appeal to be sufficiently stamped. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. 24. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (10) TMI 30 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ording to every known method of accounting, the fictitious debit of ₹ 1,74,827 in the goods account had necessarily to be transferred to the profit and loss account, from which the conclusion must necessarily be drawn that there was a loss of stock-in-trade during the relevant year of account to that extent." The difference between cases of embezzlement and cases of bad debts is that there is an admitted liability even when it is uncertain how much is going to be realised, whereas in the present case there was nothing like an admitted liability for the loss and only a shadowy hope of recovering all or any substantial portion of it. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the matter was correctly decided by the majority of the Appellate Tribunal and that the answer to the question propounded must be in the affirmative. The assessee will have his costs from the Commissioner. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. HARBANS SINGH J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (10) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ment, the proceedings against the accused are to be before a Magistrate. According to s. 549 of the Code and the rules framed thereunder, the final choice about the forum of the trial of a person accused of a civil offence rests with the Central Government, whenever there be difference of opinion between a Criminal Court and the military authorities about the forum where an accused be tried for the particular offence committee by him. His position under ss. 125 and 126 of the Act is also the same 1/SCI/64-60 It is clear therefore that the discretion to be exercised by the military officer specified in of the Act as to the trial of accused by Court Martial or by an ordinary court, cannot be said to be unguided by any policy laid down by the Act or uncontrolled by any other authority. Section 125 of the Act therefore cannot, even on merits, be said to infringe the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The writ petition therefore fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (10) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... High Court must be set aside. It has been urged on behalf of the respondent that as the Magistrate dealt with the matter on the looting that the opinion of the Corporation was conclusive and non-justiciable it should be given an opportunity to show before the Magistrate that the opinion of the Corporation that the purpose for which the premises in this case were used was dangerous to life, health or property or was likely to create a nuisance was wrong. It is also urged that the point whether the impost in this particular case was a fee properly so called or a tax which was taken before the High Court arises in this case and opportunity should be given to the respondent to raise this point before the Magistrate. In view of this contention we set aside the order of the Magistrate also and remand the case to him for decision according to law, including the above two points. The parties will be at liberty to adduce such relevant evidence as they think fit to do. Case remanded.
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1963 (10) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of prohibition with a view to scotch the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer and to avoid a probe into the application of the income of the alleged trust. The petitioners are merely crying before they are hurt. If their contentions are well- founded they can urge them before the department itself, and, if they fail, they still have a remedy before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and a further remedy by way of reference to this court under section 66 of the Act. In our opinion there is no jurisdictional error on the part of the Income-tax Officer and that, therefore, these writs of prohibition are wholly misconceived and unsustainable. In the result, Writ Petition No. 1393 of 1961 is allowed and the rule nisi is made absolute. Writ Petitions Nos. 276 to 282 fail and they are dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged in each of these petitions. There will be no order as to costs in any of these petitions. W.P. No. 1393 of 1961 allowed. W.P. Nos. 276 to 282 of 1963 dismissed.
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1963 (10) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the first respondent. Though the High Court quashed the order of the Tribunal, the observation in the judgment clearly shows that the Tribunal could reconsider the matter. Indeed, learned counsel for the first respondent conceded that fact. The appellant would have every opportunity to establish that the first respondent has no workshop at Chidambaram. Instead of following the straight course, he is trying to shut out further enquiry to arrive at the truth. In the circumstances I am of the view that this is not a case which calls for the exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction to set aside the order of the High Court. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed and the Writ Petition filed by Respondent No. 1 is dismissed. Respondent No. 1 to pay the costs of the appellant in this Court. Respondents 2 and 3 to bear their own costs.
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1963 (10) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the common order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh rejecting applications to review an earlier order by that court, is correct on the facts?
Held that:- The reasoning, therefore, of the learned Judges in the order now under appeal, is no ground for rejecting the applications to review their orders of September, 1959. We therefore consider that the learned Judges were in error in rejecting the application for review and we hold that the petitions for review should have been allowed.
In the result the appeal is allowed and the common judgment of the High Court in the three appeals is reversed and the petitions for review--C.M.Ps 4672, 4673 and 4674 of 1959 on the file of the High Court are allowed.
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1963 (10) TMI 24 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... possession. But Manubhai being entitled to the accumulation of surplus income in any event notwithstanding his death before attaining the age of twenty-five, the decision in Power s case 1906 2 I. R. 272 cannot apply and the present case must be held to fall within the ratio of the decision in In re Jones Will Trusts Soames v. Attorney-General 1947 1 Ch. 48. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the interest of Manubhai under the settlement was an interest in possession and that such interest extended to the whole income of his one-half share in the said 160 shares. This being the position, the principal value of one-half share of Manubhai in the said 160 shares was rightly added to the principal value of the estate for the purpose of calculation of estate duty on the death of Manubhai. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us will be in the affirmative. The applicant will pay the costs of the reference to the respondent. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (10) TMI 23 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ven by the operation of section 4(6) of the Act, the very basis of the liability sought to be imposed therein having disappeared. In the instant case, the first sales, which were made to the applicant, were liable to tax because they were inside sales. They were not taxed because, in view of the declarations made by the applicant, the one-point tax could be recovered subsequently when, as undertaken, the applicant sold the timber by actual delivery in this State for the purpose of consumption in this State. Having purchased the timber cheaply, that is, without the tax being included in the price paid by him, he cannot escape his liability under section 4(6) ibid if he acted contrary to his declarations and so prevented the State from recovering the tax subsequently. 5.. In the view we have taken, we answer this reference in the manner indicated above. We also direct that the applicant shall pay all costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (10) TMI 22 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the sale of the goods, the turnover relating to which has been dealt with by exhibits P-1, P-2 and P-3 orders. These orders held that no tax is imposable on the goods for the years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60. But there was a suo moto revision after notices, exhibits P-4, P-5 and P-6 for the three years to which the assessee filed a reply, exhibit P-7. Notwithstanding the reply, by exhibit P-8 order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax, Central Zone, Ernakulam, sales tax was imposed. In the light of what is stated above, no sales tax can be imposed on this commodity which would admittedly fall under the term spirituous medicinal preparations . I therefore quash exhibit P-8. I direct the parties to bear their costs. I make it clear that the orders, exhibits P-1 to P-3, in so far as they impose sales tax on the turnover relating to other commodities than that dealt with in exhibit P-8 will stand unaffected by this order. Petition allowed.
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1963 (10) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ne year in one case and for two years in another case. The best judgment estimate of the turnover made for the year 1952-53 could not be said to be unreal as it was arrived at on the basis of the average of the turnover for the three years previous to it and these turnovers were not best judgment estimates but were those actually found. If the best judgment estimate for the year 1952-53 was real, then it follows that the estimate of the turnover made for the two subsequent years, which took into account the estimate of the turnover for the year 1952-53, was also real and not arbitrary. 5.. For these reasons, our answer to the first question, which is purely a question of fact, is in the affirmative. Our answer to the second question is that the estimate of the turnover and the deductions for the two years in question were neither arbitrary nor without any basis. The assessee shall pay costs of this reference. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (10) TMI 20 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the lengths in which they come out from the rolling mills but also to rolled steel sections which are joined together by rivetting so as to form a greater length. This approach to the consideration of the question also therefore, lends support to the view that rivetted baling hoops which are nothing but pieces of rolled steel sections joined together by rivetting fall within entry 4 in Schedule AA. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Tribunal that rivetted steel baling hoops did not fall within entry 4 in Schedule AA and were therefore covered by the residuary entry 80 in Schedule B, is erroneous. Rivetted baling hoops fall within entry 4 in Schedule AA and sales tax must, therefore, be charged on the sale of rivetted baling hoops under that entry. Our answer to the question referred to us will, therefore, be in the affirmative. The respondent will pay the costs of the reference to the applicants. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (10) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the English Act but the definition does support the view that we take of the meaning of manufacturer as used in the U.P. Sales Tax Act, e.g., that a manufacturer must carry on the business of producing oil from oil-seeds his business, as we said earlier, is that of hiring out his mill to anybody who wants any crushing to be done on it. Coming to the second question it has been conceded by counsel that the answer must be in the affirmative in view of the decision of this Court in Chandausi Oil Mills v. Sales Tax Commissioner 1961 12 S.T.C. 310. Our answers to both questions are in the affirmative. We direct that copies of this judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Considering that each party succeeds in part, we order that cost of this reference shall be borne by the parties themselves. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (10) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessment was made not against a firm registered as a dealer under the Act but against a firm which failed to get itself registered as a dealer under the Act. The petitioner s contention that no assessment can be made against a firm after its dissolution is, therefore, unsubstantial and must be rejected. 16.. For the foregoing reasons, our conclusion is that the assessment order made by the Sales Tax Officer, Raipur, assessing the firm M/s. Chhotalal Keshaoram and Co., Rajnandgaon, to tax in the sum of Rs. 6,125 is legal and valid. The petitioner s prayer, therefore, for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing that order and the decisions of the appellate authorities and notices of demand for payment of tax amount must, therefore, be rejected. The result is that this petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (10) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, sets a time-limit for making an order under section 23(3) of the Act revising an order of assessment?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As reached the conclusion that the impugned orders of assessment were barred by limitation, having been made more than 36 months after the expiry of the period for which the tax was assessed. We hold therefore that the High Court was right in quashing the several orders of assessment.
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1963 (10) TMI 9 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
Exemption - small scale producers of straw-board ... ... ... ... ..... emsp In the instant case the production capacity is the primary consideration in making the classification and the grounds which prevailed with their Lordships in declaring the legislation to be bad do not manifestly support the contention of the petitioners counsel. Here, the exemption is made within well defined categories and its foundational basis is that the small producers deserve consideration from the hands of the Executive Government to enable them to withstand the competition of larger producers. 24. emsp In our view, the petitions must fail as no case of discrimination under Article 14 has been made out, though we would repeat that there may be some hardship to the petitioners in respect of the exemptions granted to the units producing between 3000 to 5000 metric tons and beyond this observation there is nothing which calls for interference by this Court. The petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1963 (10) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Bhavnagar War Profits Act is covered by the word " any law relating to tax on profits of business " ?
Held that:- The Bhavnagar War Profits Act is within the words " any law relating to tax on profits of business " in paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order. We hold that the High Court has rightly decided that the depreciation availed of by the assessee under the Bhavnagar War Profits Act was a deductible amount in computing the written down value of the assets. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (10) TMI 4 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Smuggling - Confiscation of - Conveyance - Intent ... ... ... ... ..... e sustained, for there was no real opportunity given to the petitioner to state what he had to say. 6.Though I have stated earlier that the question of guilty intent is not relevant, that observation is limited to the liability of confiscation of the car. Mens rea may otherwise become relevant in considering the quantum of the penalty, that is, the redemption fine, which the authority is competent to impose. Support for this view is found in a decision of this court in Syed Cassim v. The Collector of Central Excise Madras, (1) LXXV L.W. 276. It would be open to the Collector of Central Excise to examine the contention of the petitioner and to determine whether even in inflicting the penalty of confiscation, the quantum of the redemption fine should not depend upon the extent to which he found the petitioner to have been a party to the offence of smuggling. 7.Subject to these observations, the petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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