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2004 (11) TMI 605 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... at the full trial, such as in a case like this, can really fathom. 76. As for the question whether the company can be prosecuted or not, it still remains a disputable issue awaiting final decision by the Apex Court and I believe, we may afford to leave it at that and proceed with the case to settle the dispute or claim of the complainant at the appropriate stage of the trial in the interest of both the parties. 77. In the result, the revisional application succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dated September 2, 2003, is hereby set aside and the learned Magistrate is directed to issue process to all the accused persons, proceed with the trial and dispose of the case on the merits in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. 78. Let a copy of this order together with the L.C.R. be sent down to the learned Court below at once. 79. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties.
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2004 (11) TMI 604 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ... ... ... ..... s-declaration, in our view, cannot be taken too seriously. Further, on coming to know that the goods shipped were not as per their order, the importers abandoned the goods. We note that in the case of CC, ICD, TKD, New Delhi Vs. Sewa Ram & Bros. reported in 2002 (53) RLT 563 (CEGAT-Del.)-2003 (151) ELT 344 (Tri.-Delhi), the Tribunal has held that no penalty is imposable where the importers have abandoned the goods. Inasmuch as in the present case, the importers have abandoned the goods as soon as the mix up came to light, we are of the considered opinion that the importers cannot be visited with penalty. We, therefore, following the ratio of the cited decision, set aside the penalty of ₹ 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) imposed on them and allow their appeal. 8. Operative portion of this order allowing the appeal of the importer viz. M/s. Ashtalakshmi Marketing and partially allowing the appeal of the other appellants was pronounced in the open Court on 2.11.2004.
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2004 (11) TMI 603 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... in May, 1996. Even when auditor's report comes on 27th November, 1996 his name would still be shown in the Balance Sheet as on 31st March, 1996 as a creditor. It can not be claimed by that creditor that the amount is still due as auditors have acknowledged the same on 27th November, 1996 What is emphasised from the above illustration is that auditor's report merely affirms the state of affairs prevailing as on 31.3.1996 and cannot be treated as the position existing on the date of report as well i.e. 27th November, 1996. This is made clear in the auditor's report itself. In para d (i) it is stated that ''in the case of balance sheet, of the state of affairs of the company, as at 31st March, 1996''. Therefore, the auditor's report is not the acknowledgment of the debt. It is the Balance Sheet only, which can be relied for this purpose and that is of 31st March, 1996. The claim is, therefore, time barred. This petition is accordingly dismissed.
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2004 (11) TMI 602 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... mstances therefore the classification made is not reasonable and justified wrongly separating the Engineers from the Architects for the aforesaid purpose." 8. In the above circumstances we are not inclined to accept the case of the petitioners that the Architects Act restricts practice of architect to persons registered under the said Act. Therefore qualified engineers who cannot themselves call as Architects may still be free to do the work which is ordinarily done by the Architects and it would be open for the Corporations to regulate licensing in favour of such qualified engineers. 9. In the result, petitions are partly allowed and, it is declared that the architects registered under the Architects Act, 1972 would not be required to obtain licences under the MPMC Act are byelaws made thereunder and the respondent Corporations are restrained from insisting upon the Architects for obtaining such licences. Petitions are disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2004 (11) TMI 601 - COMPANY LAW BOARD CHENNAI
... ... ... ... ..... tal to the tune of ₹ 16,00,000/-; (iv) In view of the strained relationship between the parties and since the petitioner is the majority shareholder of the Company, viz. holding nearly 75 shares, I direct that the respondents will go out of the Company by selling their shares to the petitioner at par value with 15 simple interest from the date of investment till the date of payment, (v) The petitioner shall further pay a sum of ₹ 25,00,000/- on account of the services rendered and contribution made by the respondents towards the promotion; progress and growth achieved by the Company; (vi) The respondents 2 & 3 shall deliver the original share certificates together with the blank transfer forms in respect of their holdings to the petitioner within twenty one days on receipt of the amounts in terms of this order from the petitioner. With the above directions, the company petition stands disposed of. All the interim orders passed by this Bench are made absolute.
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2004 (11) TMI 600 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of terms and conditions of Notices Inviting Tenders [NITs] for supply of High Security Registration Plates to motor vehicles - guidelines circulated by the Central Government for implementing the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the Act') and the newly amended Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ('the Rules')Interpretation of Rule 50 and the statutory order of 2001 - HELD THAT:- On the basis of the submissions made on behalf of the Union and State authorities and the justification shown for the terms of the impugned tender conditions, we do not find that the clauses requiring experience in the field of supplying registration plates in foreign countries and the quantum of business turnover are intended only to keep out of field indigenous manufacturers. It is explained that on the date of formulation of scheme in Rule 50 and issuance of guidelines thereunder by Central Government, there were not many indigenous manufacturers in India with technical and financial capability to undertake the job of supply of such high dimension, on a long term basis and in a manner to ensure safety and security which is the prime object to be achieved by the introduction of new sophisticated registration plates.
The notice inviting tender is open to response by all and even if one single manufacture is ultimately selected for a region or State, it cannot be said that the State has created monopoly of business in favour of a private party. Rule 50 permits, the RTOs concerned themselves to implement the policy or to get it implemented through a selected approved manufacturer.
The terms of the tender prescribing quantum of turnover of its business and business in plates with fixation of long term period of the contract are said to have been incorporated to ensure uninterrupted supply of plates to a large number of existing vehicles within a period of two years and new vehicles for a long period in the coming years. It is easy to allege but difficult to accept that terms of the Notices Inviting Tenders which were fixed after joint deliberations between State authorities and intending tenderers were so tailored as to benefit only a certain identified manufacturers having foreign collaboration. Merely because few manufacturers like the petitioners do not qualify to submit tender, being not in a position to satisfy the terms and conditions laid down, the tender conditions cannot be held to be discriminatory.
In interpreting the rule, the object of the scheme providing for affixation of high security plates has to be kept in view. Where the RTO himself is not making the supply of plates, an approved registration plate manufacturer can be selected for supply. The legal obligation on the registering authority under Rule 50(1)(v) to issue specified kinds of registration plates implies issuance of such registration plates through a selected approved plate manufacturer.
Paragraph 2 of Clause (v) of Rule 50(1), if reasonably construed, does not indicate any prohibition of selection of an approved plate manufacturer for assisting the registering authority to implement the scheme of affixation high security registration plates to existing vehicles and new vehicles. Such an interpretation fulfils the object of the scheme. The interpretation sought to be placed by the petitioners on the said para of the rule would result in frustrating the high security aspect and object of the scheme of affixation of high security registration plates on vehicles.
Registration plates are not manufactured by the manufacturer of motor vehicles but for maintenance and operations of motor vehicles, registration plates are necessary. Therefore, manufacturer of registration plates can be subjected to certain standards by a statutory order to be notified and published in accordance with Sub-section (3) of Section 109 of the Act. Any restrictive interpretation of the said sub-section is neither called for from the language of the sub-section nor the object of the provision. Reference is made to the opinion of learned Brother G.P. Mathur J., in these cases.
Thus, in our opinion, the statutory order of 2001 and Clause 4(x) thereof cannot be held to be beyond the purview of Sub-section 3 of Section 109 of the Act. Clause 4(x) of the statutory order of 2001, could be issued under Section 109(3), as an aid to the fulfillment of provisions of high security registration plates contained in Rule 50. Such power of the State to issue order containing Clause 4(x) is not only supported by Sub-section 3 of Section 109 but by Rule 50 itself. Clause 4(x) of the statutory order of 2001 is merely enabling one and re-states what Rule 50 contemplates. We also find force in the alternative submission made on behalf of the respondents that the statutory order including Clause 4(x) can be supported as having been issued in exercise of executive power of the Central Government which is co-extensive with its legislative power.
Thus, all the challenges made to the provisions of the rule, statutory order or the tender conditions fail. All the petitions directly filed in this Court and transferred to this Court from High Courts are, hereby, dismissed.
\In the circumstances, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs in all these cases.
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2004 (11) TMI 599 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... above claim for contribution of corporation tax from the Trustees. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has accepted our suggestion that for the past period, the respondent will not make a claim for contribution of owner's share of the corporation tax. To that extent, the respondent agrees not to press its above claim. 42. In the written arguments dated 25.10.2004, the appellants herein have filed their Statement of Account. A bare perusal of the said Statement indicates the claim for interest 8.33 per annum on monthly basis. We do not find any basis for such claim. The entire Statement is for recovery of occupation charges and interest. The items mentioned in the Statement do not fall within the purview of the oral lease agreement dated 16.8.1980. In the circumstances, it is not possible for this Court to grant relief under Article 142 of the Constitution, as prayed. 43. Subject to the above, the appeal fails and is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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2004 (11) TMI 598 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... We see no reason to interfere The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (11) TMI 597 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
Oppression and mismanagement - Removal of the Managing Director and Director - Exclusion of the petitioners from the day-to-day affairs of the Company - Non-payment of the balance amount under the agreement - breach of the contractual obligations arising out of the agreement - Whether the present company petition satisfies the ingredients of sections 397 & 398 - HELD THAT:- The releifs sought by the petitioners seeking directions against the respondents (a) to purchase the shares of the petitioners in terms of the agreement dated 24.10.2003 or at a value which may be determined by an independent valuer; and (b) to discharge the petitioners group from the personal guarantees furnished in favour of the bank are directly arising out of the alleged breach of the agreement dated 24.10.2003 on the part of the respondents group. The prayer for amending the Articles of Association of the Company entitling the petitioners group for the proportionate voting rights in a general meeting of the Company and for the proportionate representation in the Board of the Company is incidental to the main reliefs claimed in the company petition.
The grievances and reliefs undoubtedly flowing from the agreement dated 24.10.2003, in my considered view, must be agitated in a competent civil court having jurisdiction over the matter. Any remedy for the alleged breach of the agreement and consequential reliefs do not lie before the CLB. Since the alleged acts of oppression and mismanagement do not make out any cause of action under the provisions of sections 397 & 398, neither the inherent power of the CLB nor the decision in State of Orissa v. Klockner & Co. (supra) would go to the aid of the petitioners. These past acts, forming part of the agreement reached between the disputed parties and the remedy under section 397/398 being of a preventive nature, as borne out by several decisions cited supra, the CLB cannot take cognisance of such acts under the provisions of sections 397 and 398. The company petition, to my mind, is intended for the purpose of recovering the money due by the respondents under the settlement agreement, which is not an object contemplated in section 397.
Thus, the company petition is dismissed, without going into the merits and the interim reliefs are declined, however, with liberty for the petitioners to enforce the agreement dated 24.10.2003 in a competent court of law. With these directions, the company petition and the company applications stand disposed of.
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2004 (11) TMI 596 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... pposition. Who are the persons propounding and supporting a will as against the person disputing the will and the pleadings of the parties would be relevant and of significance." In the present case, the propounders of the will have proved that the will was signed by Siva; that at the time of execution of the will, he had a sound disposing state of mind; and that he had reasons to exclude the plaintiffs who did not care for him in his old age. Lastly, as stated above, the onus to prove forgery, undue influence or collusion was on the plaintiffs who have alleged that Ex.B/8 was forged. In the absence of such a plea, the lower appellate Court had erred in holding that the will was forged. We are satisfied on examination of the evidence that execution, attestation and genuineness of the will has been proved as held by the impugned judgment and in the circumstances, we find no merit in this appeal. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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2004 (11) TMI 595 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... reason to interfere. The Civil Appeals are dismissed.
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2004 (11) TMI 594 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... cient to discharge the land value, simple interest for the balance amount alone is payable. 33. A perusal of the order impugned in this Civil Revision Petition shows that it is not a speaking order. The learned Sub Judge had simply accepted the statements filed by the decree holder and passed orders. So, I am of the view that the entire matter requires reconsideration. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the executing Court dt. 19th Oct., 2002, quantifying the amount due to the claimant/decree holder and also the order proclaiming the property for sale are hereby set aside. The EP is remanded to the executing Court. The learned Sub Judge shall calculate the amount in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders. The parties are directed to suffer their costs. IT Appeal No. 2411 of 2003 shall stand dismissed. The registry shall forward copies of this order to all Subordinate Judges' Courts for information and compliance.
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2004 (11) TMI 593 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... these petitions only on this ground, namely, that without considering the binding decisions of the CEGAT itself the learned Single Member had dismissed the Appeals. Therefore, the impugned order Annexure J, dated 24-7-2003, passed by the learned Single Member of CEGAT is hereby quashed and set aside. Once that order is set aside then the subsequent order passed by the CEGAT on Modification Application at Annexure L, dated 16-3-2004 has to be quashed and set aside. 5. Accordingly, both these petitions are allowed and by setting aside the impugned orders at Annexure J, dated 24-7-2003 and Annexure L, dated 16-3-2004, passed by the CEGAT, both the matters are remanded to the CEGAT for deciding the Appeals of both the petitioners in accordance with law after considering the decisions cited before it. 6. Rule made absolute in both the petitions. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Interim relief granted earlier stand vacated in both the petitions. No order as to costs.
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2004 (11) TMI 592 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e order dated 16-3-2004, whereby the entire order dated 12-12-2002 has been recalled cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the appeal (IT Appeal 491 of 2004) is allowed and the Tribunal's order dated 16-3-2004, is quashed and set aside. 5. The result of this is that, the order impugned in IT Appeal 662 of 2004 would not survive as the order of the Tribunal is without jurisdiction and consequently, the appeal (IT Appeal 662 of 2004) itself has become infructuous and is disposed of as such. 6. The learned counsel for the assessed submitted that in view of the order made by the court today, he may be given liberty to revive the appeal being IT Appeal No. 168 of 2003 challenging the order made by the Tribunal on 12-12-2002. It goes without saying that after the answer which we have given with regard to the question raised by the revenue, the order made by the Tribunal on 12-12-2002 will remain and, therefore, the appeal (IT Appeal No. IT Appeal No. 168 of 2003 List on 6-12-2004.
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2004 (11) TMI 591 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Town Planning Act, 1966 would come into play, we leave this question open for the parties to agitate, if and when it become necessary, in view of our judgment as above. Civil Appeal No. 6143 of 2002 The High Court allowed the writ petition of the First respondent, Agricultural Produce Market Committee only for the reasons stated in its judgment in Writ Petition No. 2768 of 1992. By our judgment delivered in Civil Appeal No. 6142 of 2002, we have set aside the judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2768 of 1992, Even otherwise, we are satisfied that there was no ground, whatsoever, for the High Court to interfere with the orders passed by the revenue authority, Tehsildar, for conversion of 75 acres of land for non-agricultural use, which order was upheld by the Sub- Divisional Officer, Additional Collector (Appeals) and the Additional Commissioner, Nasik. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. No order as to costs.
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2004 (11) TMI 590 - SUPREME COURT
Re-assignment of unused acquired land - Applicability of Board's Standing Order No. 90(32) and Section 54-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act - Whether direction could be given to the appellants to re-assign unused land to the respondent which was duly acquired by the authorities and the acquisition proceedings had become final except that the reference is pending before the Reference Court only with regard to enhancement of compensation - HELD THAT:- If at the time of sale, anybody puts forth his claim in respect of any field either as an adjacent owner or as an original owner, the sale of that field should be stopped and his claim investigated and disposed of in the manner specified in sub- clauses (i) and (iv) of Note (2) of the Board's order 90(32). If it is found that his claim is not proved, the field should be sold by public auction. In the case on hand, there is nothing on record to show that the part of the acquired land which remained unused was relinquished by the Government.
A letter of Resident Engineer stated that the unused land was no more required cannot amount to relinquishment of the said land by the competent authority. In order to make a claim under para 32 of the said Board's Standing Order in the first place, it was necessary that the competent authority had subsequently relinquished the unused land. After such relinquishment of the land, the land had to be notified for sale in public auction. If at the time of sale of such land, the original owner made a claim, sale could be stopped and his claim could be investigated and thereafter the land was to be disposed of in the manner specified under the said paragraph. Added to this, by virtue of the amendment to para 32 brought about by G.O.Ms. No. 783 dated 9.10.1998, the land for the public purpose shall be utilized for the same purpose for which it was acquired as far as possible and in case the land is not used for the purpose for which it was acquired due to any reason, the land shall be utilized for any other public purpose as deemed fit. It appears this amendment was not brought to the notice of the High Court.
As in the present case, mere letter of Resident Engineer that the unused land is no more required is not enough. When the land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act which is vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances, the question of reconveying the land as claimed by the respondent could not be accepted in view of the clear position of law stated in the decisions of this Court aforementioned. Whether the unused remaining land out of the acquired land was sufficient or not for the purpose of construction of Mandal Revenue Office could not be decided by the High Court. It was for the competent authorities to decide about the same. The High Court, in our view, was not right in saying that the proposal to construct the Mandal Revenue Office in the unused land acquired was an after-thought. No material was placed on record to attribute any mala fides on the part of the authorities or to support the case that the proposal to build a Mandal Revenue Office was an after- thought.
Thus viewed from any angle, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned order. Consequently, it is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.
In the view we have taken in Civil Appeal No. 6546/1999 dealing with the Board's Standing Order No. 90(32) and Section 54-A of the Act and keeping in view the settled position of law, this appeal is also entitled to succeed. Under the circumstances it is unnecessary to deal with other contentions. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the suit filed by respondent no. 1 (plaintiff) is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2004 (11) TMI 589 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 77; 39,039 representing unclaimed liabilities written off was not taxable for the assessment order 1973-74?" 2. The Tribunal appears to have decided the reference relying on the decision in the case of J.K. Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT 1966 62 ITR 34 (Bom.). 3. The learned counsel for the revenue fairly stated that in view of the decision in case of CIT v. Sugauli Sugar Works 1999 236 ITR 5181 (SC) the reference is required to be decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In view of this, we answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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2004 (11) TMI 588 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... bunal. Moreover, in view of the period of limitation of one year, as prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 2 1 of the U.F. Act. had expired, recourse to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the U.P. Act cannot be taken as the said proviso is not applicable in the present case. 27. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the proceedings initiated under Section 21 of the U.P. Act by issuing notice dated 16th January. 2002 and according approval to the Trade Tax Officer, Kanpur-respondent No. 2 under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the U.P. Act to initiate proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Act vide order dated 25th January, 2002 are wholly without jurisdiction and therefore, they are liable to be quashed. 28. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The notice dated 16th January, 2002 and the order dated 25th January, 2002 are hereby quashed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (11) TMI 587 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... such case, the record so considered would naturally include the entries in the Confidential Reports/Character Rolls/Vigilance Reports, both favourable and adverse. There cannot be any justification for interference by this Court in such cases. We have decided the case on hand on the facts and circumstances of the case with reference to the relevant Rules, original records such as Confidential Reports, Vigilance Reports and other annexures filed along with the writ petitions. A number of judgments were cited by the counsel on either side. We are not inclined to refer to all those judgment and make this judgment a voluminous one as according to us the judgments cited by both the parties are distinguishable on facts and on law. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 4019 of 2002 filed by the Registrar of the High Court of Gujarat and the State of Gujarat is allowed and Civil appeal No. 575 of 2003 filed by Mr. C.G. Sharma stands dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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2004 (11) TMI 586 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... its own opinion and record its satisfaction before initiating the penalty proceedings. Merely because the penalty proceedings have been initiated, it cannot be assumed that such a satisfaction was arrived at in the absence of the same being spelt out by the order of the assessing authority. Even at the risk of repetition we would like to state that the assessment order does not record the satisfaction as warranted by section 271 for initiating the penalty proceedings." (p. 571) 2. In view of the aforesaid, the appeal is required to be dismissed as no substantial question of law arises. Ordered accordingly.
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