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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 482 Records
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2000 (12) TMI 911 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reasing the capacity of the godown from 1,84,000 to 2,06,656 bags, nor has our attention been drawn to any primary material in support of the order. In the circumstances the contentions raised by the learned counsel for Corporation that notice is vague and it has been issued without due application of mind and the grounds stated in the order are based on no material, have to be accepted. From the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs it is clear that the order passed by the assessing officer and confirmed by the appellate authority and the State Government are clearly unsustainable. The High Court was in error in dismissing the writ petition summarily by passing an unreasoned order as has been done in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with costs. The order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition is set aside. The writ petition is allowed and the orders passed by the assessing authority, the appellate authority and the State Government are quashed.
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2000 (12) TMI 910 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... he immediately preceding year. 14.3 On the other hand, the learned DR relied upon the orders of revenue authorities on the point at issue. 14.4 We have given a careful consideration to the rival submissions and the facts and circumstances of the case. We find that this issue was never raised before CIT(A) that there some confusion whether the matter of deduction under section 80-IA relates to Chemical Division or Formulation Division. From the orders of revenue authorities, there appears to be no such confusion. In fact, on the point at issue, the CIT(A) has followed his order for the immediately preceding year. It has not been pointed out to us that CIT(A)’s order for assessment year 1995-96 was not accepted by the assessee and an appeal is pending in the Tribunal. We, therefore, hold that no interference is called for in the order of CIT(A). The appeal of the assessee, being devoid of merit, fails on this issue as well. 15. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed.
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2000 (12) TMI 909 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ld appear from a statement made by learned counsel for the Revenue before the tribunal that in respect of these question an application under Section 256 (2) had been moved but counsel for the Revenue cannot tell us what happened thereafter. And the assessee has filed an affidavit to state that it has no information in this behalf. Having regard to the fact that, under these circumstances, the earlier decisions of the Tribunal on the same question remain unchallenged, these appeals and the special Leave Petitions are dismissed with costs.
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2000 (12) TMI 908 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... year (1990-91) as enjoined by Rule 25. The increased license fee will also be applicable to the licenses issued on or before 1-4-1990 i. e. the date on which the impugned GO had come into force. " (5.) We are in complete agreement with the above view. In fiscal matters, the provisions are required to be strictly construed and there is no scope for looking to the unexpressed intendment. (6.) We , accordingly, uphold the finding of the High Court to the effect that enhancement of the license fee by GOMs No. 160 dated 3-3-1990 becomes effective only from 1-10-1990 and that enhanced license fee can be collected from the respondents' w. e. f. 1-10-1990 notwithstanding the fact that the block of 5 years for which they had obtained license, had not yet expired. The impugned judgment is well considered and sound. We do not find any reason to interfere with the same. (7.) These appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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2000 (12) TMI 907 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is entitled to the benefit of only reasonable doubts. We have found, in this case, on facts that this circumstance is fully proved and does not create a doubt, much less a reasonable doubt so far as the commission of the crime by the accused is concerned. We have no doubt in our mind that the appellant had made confessional statement to PWs 2 and 6, made voluntary disclosure statements, led to the recovery of the weapon of offence and chadar (sheet) which was concealed by him in his house, Kassi studded with an hair which was compared with the hair taken from the body of the deceased and upon analysis was found to be of human hair and his chadar (sheet) was stained with human blood. o p /o p The aforesaid circumstances were sufficient to connect the accused with the commission of crime for which he was rightly held guilty, convicted and sentenced by the trial court which was confirmed by the High Court. There is no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed. o p /o p
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2000 (12) TMI 906 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on. The decision was rendered on the facts and circumstances of the case particularly the fact that the plea of delay was not taken by the management in the proceeding before the Tribunal. In the case on hand the plea of delay was raised and was accepted by the Tribunal. Therefore, the decision cited is of little help in the present case. Whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of delay or it should be appropriately moulded is at the discretion of the Tribunal depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt the discretion is to be exercised judicially. The High Court on consideration of the matter held that there was no ground to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal. We are not satisfied that the award of the Tribunal declining relief to the petitioner, which was confirmed by the High Court suffered from any serious illegality which warrants interference by this Court. Accordingly the special leave petition is dismissed.
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2000 (12) TMI 905 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h the stand of the respondents. Next objection is that there is an agreement with the contractors who are to maintain the car parking areas and they have an obligation to maintain proper cleanliness in the car parking areas and the expenditure in regard to the same will have to be borne by the licensee. Inasmuch as the notification issued under the Contract Labour (Abolition & Regulation) Act, 1970 covers the Sweepers employed in respect of buildings owned or occupied by the establishment, it is unnecessary to examine this aspect of the matter. Inevitable conclusion is that the judgment rendered in Civil Appeals Nos. 2987-2989 of 1997 following the decisions in Air India Statutory Corporation etc. v. United Labour Union & Ors., etc., 1996 (9) SCALE 70, and Masih Charan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. in Writ Petition (C ) No. 219 of 1995 dated March 10, 1997, is applicable to these workmen also. We clarify that position and allow the applications accordingly.
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2000 (12) TMI 904 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... l, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2000 (12) TMI 903 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bmitted to this Court by the three expert bodies on the basis of scientific/technological research of a very high order. The amount of hard work done by these three bodies is commendable. But for these expert reports it would have been very difficult for this Court to resolve the complicated scientific issues involved in this case, with confidence. It will be open to the three expert bodies (1) National Environmental Appellate Authority, New Delhi (2) The University Department of Chemical Technology (Autonomous), Matunga, Bombay headed by Dr. Bhowmick and (3) The National Geophysical Research Institute, Tarnaka, Hyderabad, to submit their list of expenses or fee, if any, to the State of Andhra Pradesh, through the appellant Board. If any claims for monies are made, the same shall be paid by the State of Andhra Pradesh. Appeals are allowed as stated above. No costs. List the matter after 4 months, after the Report of the State of Andhra Pradesh as directed above, is received.
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2000 (12) TMI 902 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... annot take away the benefit of gratuity which otherwise is required to be given to the respondent-employee. He further argued that on superannuation, he has retired in 1996 and therefore simply because he has continued upto 1996 after completing 58 years of age, is no ground to deny the benefit of gratuity. 10. After considering the aforesaid submissions of the parties and looking to the reasoning given by the Authorities, I am satisfied that no exception can be made to the view taken by the Authorities. I do not think that there is any substance in this petition. Considering pages 35 and 36 of the compilation. I cannot substitute the aforesaid finding of fact while deciding the Special Civil Application. The judgment of the Supreme Court which was cited by Ms. Pahwa was regarding the Factories Act and the scheme of that Act is absolutely different. 11. I find no substance in the petition and the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. No costs.
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2000 (12) TMI 901 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed in Nagendra Nath Dey and anr. vs. Suresh Chandra Dey and ors. (AIR 1932 PC 165) cited by the learned counsel do not help in the present context as it related to the scope and interpretation of Article 182 of the old Limitation Act. The serious departure made by the Parliament from the said article to the present one cannot be lost sight of while considering the decisions rendered under the former article. So the end result is this The decree became enforceable on 1.8.1973 when the appellate court passed the decree which superseded the decree of the trial court. As no decree was passed by the High Court in the second appeal the decree of the first appellate court remained unaffected and the enforceability once commenced remained undisturbed for a period of 12 years therefrom. The execution process initiated by the appellant long after the expiry of 12 years from 1.8.1973 is thus irretrievably barred. Hence no interference is called for. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2000 (12) TMI 900 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... therwise not, inasmuch as it falls short of the number of minimum of employees for the applicability of the Act under Section 1(3)(b) of the Act. We are not impressed with this argument. The two establishments have more than 20 employees and the exemption granted under Section 17 of the Act is subject to the condition that such exclusion will not apply to the appellants unit because the same would not be covered under another scheme for subscribing to the provident fund. When the entire establishment is covered by the Act, only part of the establishment is excluded and condition of exclusion being applicable only to a part, we fail to understand as to how the appellant can rely upon the said letter to claim non- applicability of the Act on the ground that it falls short of the number of employees. We do not find any good reason to interfere with the order made by the High Court affirming the view taken by the Provident Fund Commissioner. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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2000 (12) TMI 899 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the evidence of defence witness the Court ought to have considered that as there was some altercation between Pawan Kumar and SI Baljit Singh, the accused has been falsely implicated in the crime. In our view, if there was any altercation or dispute between Pawan Kumar and SI Baljit Singh, there was no reason for the prosecution to involve the appellant. If they wanted falsely to involve Pawan Kumar, who is the owner of the van, they could have done so easily because from the van owned by him 8 bags containing 320 kg of chura-post (poppy husk) were found. Further, it is to be stated that the accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. has stated that he was falsely implicated at the behest of Head Constable Om Prakash. As against this, witness Pawan Kumar has stated that there was dispute with Baljit Singh. In this view of the matter, no credence can be given to the defence. In the result, we hold that there is no substance in the appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed.
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2000 (12) TMI 898 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion was capital asset on the date of transfer. On being moved, aforesaid four questions have been referred. There is no appearance on behalf of the assessee. However, we have heard the learned counsel for the revenue. 3. We find that the Tribunal has considered factual aspects after analysing in detail the provisions contained in the Municipal Act and the Faridabad Complex Act. It has found as a matter of fact that in all essential matters, such as its composition, constitution, powers, functions, duties, etc., the Faridabad Administration Complex is akin to a municipality. According to us, the Tribunal has analysed the factual position keeping in view the correct position in law. Therefore, our answer to the first three questions is in the affirmative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 4. In view of the aforesaid answer to the first three questions, question No. 4 referred by the Tribunal is of academic interest. The reference applications stand disposed of
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2000 (12) TMI 897 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... main batch of petitions has to be quashed, and it is ordered accordingly. The Tribunal has also issued some specific directions in favour of the applicants in O.A. No. 37144/90 and other connected matters considered by it in the impugned judgment. These directions are also issued consequent to its finding in the main issue, namely, the retrospective regularisation of Andhra Engineers. If the said retrospective regularisation is valid, as held by us, then the applicants in the above connected cases also will not be entitled to any such directions as have been issued in the impugned orders. Therefore, the directions issued in these cases also will have to be set aside so far as they are dependent on the question of retrospective regularisation of the concerned Andhra Engineers. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed, the judgment and orders impugned in these appeals are set aside and the applications/petitions from which these appeals arise are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2000 (12) TMI 896 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... tood, to the company. A sale involves the idea of consideration and when the firm's assets became the property of the company by virtue of s. 575 of the Companies Act, it is difficult to visualise the same as a sale. The transaction clearly does not fall under the expressions such as discard, demolishing and destruction. Therefore, the assets held by the firm till 7th Nov., 1995, will be entitled to depreciation. 20. The decision of the Supreme Court in ALA Firm (supra) cited by Mr. Kedia is not applicable to the facts of the case before us because in that case the principle laid down was that on dissolution the firm's assets have to be valued only at market value. 21. For these reasons, we hold that the assessee-firm is (i) not liable to any capital gains tax either under s. 45(1) or s. 45(4) and (ii) is eligible for depreciation on the assets held till 7th Nov., 1995, as the conditions laid down in s. 43(6)(c)(i)(B) have not been violated. 22. The appal is allowed.
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2000 (12) TMI 895 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2000 (12) TMI 894 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sector financial undertakings. The public in general and crores of policy-holders in particular look forward to prompt and efficient service from the Corporation. Therefore the authorities in-charge of management of the affairs of the Corporation should bear in mind that its credibility and reputation depend on its prompt and efficient service. Therefore, the approach of the Corporation in the matter of repudiation of a policy admittedly issued by it should be one of extreme care and caution. It should not be dealt with in a mechanical and routine manner. With the above discussions and observations regarding the questions raised before us, we dispose of the appeals with the direction that the sum, as directed by the learned Single Judge in favour of the claimant, will be paid by the Corporation expeditiously, if it has not already been paid. In view of the above order/direction, it is not necessary to proceed with the case pending before the High Court any further. No costs.
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2000 (12) TMI 893 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he ITI certificate in the year 1994 and, therefore, did not possess five years of experience as required under the relevant rule. If his qualification as a diploma holder in Mechanical Engineering is taken note of, he has not completed three years of experience as he got the same in April, 1996 and on relevant date he did not possess such qualification. Indeed in prescribing qualification and experience, it is also made clear in the general information instruction at Item No.6 that experience will be computed after the date of acquiring the necessary qualifications. Therefore, when this requirement was made very clear that he should have experience only after acquiring the qualification, the view taken by the High Court to the contrary either by the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench does not stand to reason. Therefore, we allow these appeals, set aside the order made by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court. No costs.
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2000 (12) TMI 892 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the trial court as well as the High Court that prosecution has proved that appellant has received gratification from PW1. In such a situation the court is under a legal compulsion to draw the legal presumption that such gratification was accepted as a reward for doing the public duty. Of course, the appellant made a serious endeavour to rebut the said presumption through two modes. One is to make PW1 and PW2 speak to the version of the appellant and the other is by examining two witnesses on the defence side. True PW1 and PW2 obliged the appellant. The two defence witnesses gave evidence to the effect that the appellant was not present at the station on the date when the alleged demand was made by PW1. But the trial court and the High Court have held their evidence unreliable and such a finding is supported by sound and formidable reasoning. The concurrent finding made by the two courts does not require any interference by this Court. In the result we dismiss this appeal.
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