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Showing 21 to 40 of 79 Records
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1964 (4) TMI 124 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e again. When the notice was not invalid and the assessee had submitted his return in compliance with the notice given, the Income-tax Officer had a duty to complete the assessment in accordance with law. He could not ignore the return which was complete in itself. Of course, the mere issuance of a second notice would have been immaterial if the Income-tax Officer purported to act upon the return filed in pursuance of the first notice; but that he has not admittedly done, for he has categorically stated before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that he concluded the supplemental assessment on the second notice. That being the case, the assessment on the basis of an invalid notice cannot be effective. It cannot be said to be a valid assessment. Our answer to the question therefore must be in the negative. We answer the reference accordingly. The department shall pay the costs of the assessee. The advocate's fee is fixed at ₹ 100. Question answered in the negative.
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1964 (4) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ws in force". Firstly, to hold otherwise, would restrict the operation of the first clause in such ways that none of the things mentioned in the, first definition would be affected by the fundamental rights. Secondly, it is to be seen that the second clause speaks of "laws" made by the State and custom or usage is not made by the State. If the first definition governs only cl. (2) then the words "custom or usage", would apply neither to cl. (1) nor to cl. (2) and this could hardly have been intended. It is obvious that both the definitions control the meaning of the first clause of the Article. The argument cannot, therefore, be accepted. It follows that respondent No. 1 cannot now sustain the decree in view of the prescriptions of the Constitution and the determination of this Court in Bhau Ram's case) 1962 supp. 3 S.C.R. 724 The appeal will be allowed but in the circumstances of the case parties will bear their costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 9;s fundamental rights must therefore be rejected. The last ground urged in support of the appeal. viz., that the impugned Act contravenes Art. 20(t) of the Constitution, is based on the assumption that the new rates of wages became payable on the 1st January 1959 even as regards the past period. If that assumption were correct it would no doubt be also correct to say that the combined effect of ss. 3 and 4 of the impugned Act was to make the employer liable to conviction for offences for violation of a law which was not in force at the time of the commission of the act charged. We have already held however that on a proper construction of ss. 3 and 4, the new rates of wages for the past period became payable not on the 1st January 1959 but on the 21st June 1962. The attack on the validity of the sections on the ground of Art. 20(l) of the Constitution therefore fails. All the points raised in the appeal fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 121 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conclusion has not been challenged before us. The department found, by comparing the cases of manufacturers, that the gross profits can be estimated at 20 per cent. But the Tribunal reduced that estimate by 5 per cent. as the assessee- company was only an importer and not a manufacturer. The assessee insists that the results disclosed by the books of account should be accepted. That shows a gross profit of 8.1 per cent. Having regard to the fact that the assessee's method of accounting did not meet with the approval of the income-tax authorities, the book results could not reasonably be adopted. The question being one for estimate, we cannot say that the Tribunal was acting without any material when it based its conclusion as to the assessee's profits at three-fourths of the manufacturer's profit. Our answer to the third question will be in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Advocate's fee ₹ 150.
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1964 (4) TMI 120 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... use of the word "presumably" made by him indicates that he was also not certain as regards the material which was before his predecessor. If the predecessor of the Income-tax Officer did not apply his mind to the question of the deduction of interest amount, and his successor did, that does not mean that the successor-Income-tax Officer came into possession of information justifying the reopening of assessments under section 34(1)(b). On the other hand, the justification of "application of mind" for the issue of a notice under section 34(1)(b) only indicates that the notice was issued because of change of opinion. In our judgment, there was no justification whatsoever for reopening the assessments for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55. Consequently, the second question must be answered in the negative. We accordingly answer the two questions in the manner stated above. The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 150.
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1964 (4) TMI 119 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me-tax, if that figure be taken into consideration, is indeed not inconsiderable. In these circumstances, it admits of little doubt that the main purpose of the transfer of assets directly or indirectly to the assessee was a reduction of liability to income-tax by claiming depreciation with reference to an enhanced cost. That being the case, the proviso to section 10(5)(a) is inevitably attracted. In these circumstances, the Income-tax Officer had power to go behind the agreement and sale deeds, etc., and make his own estimate having regard to all the circumstances of the case, subject of course to the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. That is what has been done by him. That is how in further appeal the Tribunal has determined the actual cost. In our opinion the question referred must be answered in the affirmative. We answer it accordingly and direct the assessee to pay the costs which are fixed at ₹ 100. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (4) TMI 118 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urt in K. Ramakrishnappa v. Agricultural Income- tax Officer, Chikmagalur 1963 47 I.T.R. 884 is wholly inapplicable to the facts of these cases. Therein, we were dealing with a case where the assessee had played fraud on the assessing authorities. For the reasons mentioned in that decision, we declined to exercise our discretion under article 226 in his favour. That is not the case here. If the petitioners have escaped assessment--which question we have not gone into--it is not because of any fraud played by them, but because of the errors committed by the taxing authorities. An assessee is entitled to avail himself of the benefit of the errors committed by the income-tax authorities. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow these petitions and direct the respondent not to proceed with the proceedings initiated by him against the petitioners in pursuance of the notices issued by him under section 148 of the Act and impugned in these proceedings. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ctory and not mandatory. We are therefore of opinion that the fact that some of the Councillors received less than three clear days' notice of the, meeting did not by itself make the Proceedings of the meeting or the resolution passed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. As already stated, nineteen of the twenty Councillors attended the meeting. Of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no-confidence against the appellant. There is thus absolutely no reason for thinking that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially affected by the "irregularity in the service of notice." We have therefore come to the conclusion that the failure to give three clear days' notice to some of the Councillors did not affect the validity of the meeting or the resolution of no confidence passed there against the appellant. In the result, we dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e in the second paragraph must depend upon two factors-(i) that it is in respect of the year of erection or installation that the initial allowance is permissible; and (ii) the building or the machinery is used for the purposes of the business. If it is a predicate of admissibility to initial allowance that the machinery must be new and a self-contained unit in the particular business in the carrying on of which the initial allowance is claimed, the fact that in certain conditions that machinery may be regarded as self-contained for the purpose of another business in which it is used, would furnish no guide in ascertaining whether initial allowance is permissible as a deduction in the assessment of taxable income of the business in which it is actually used. In my view the appeal should be allowed and the question referred for opinion should be answered in the negative. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ssession of Land and Bricks would be possession of Raghuvanshi and a suit by Raghuvanshi to eject Land and Bricks would be meaningless. But, that is not the appellant’s case. It appears from the High Court’s judgment that the plaintiff’s counsel made it plain before the court that it was not his client’s case that the plaintiff’s real lessor was Raghuvanshi Private Ltd., and not Land and Bricks Ltd. In the present appeal before us also Mr. Desai argued on the basis that Land and Bricks and Raghuvanshi were distinct entities and that the lease of Land and Bricks under Raghuvanshi was a real subsisting lease at the time of Suit No. 3283 of 1955. In our judgment, the appellate Bench of the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the decree in Suit No. 3283 of 1955 was procured collusively. The suit was therefore rightly dismissed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ermination before us. that is, whether the appellate Court can make an order under the Act in cases in which the trial Court on the date of conviction could not have made an order under the Act did not arise for decision in that case. This question, is very different from the question whether an appellate Court can make an order under the Act when it alters the conviction of an appellant to an offence with respect to which an order under the Act could have been made by the trial Court as arose in Ramji's Case( 1963 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 745.). I am therefore of opinion that the High Court could not have made an order under the Act in this case and that therefore this appeal should fail. I would accordingly dismiss it. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, we set aside the order of the High Court and direct it to make an order under s. 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, or, if it so desires, to remand it to the Sessions Court for doing so. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 113 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed in respect of the second question. Accordingly, we answer that question in the affirmative. The assessee contends that the gain of ₹ 19,59,258 is not chargeable as capital gains under section 12B because the instant case is covered by the terms of the third proviso to section 12B. That proviso protects profits or gains from the levy of tax under section 12B where there is a distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm. It has been found in the instant case that the assessee was not dissolved on the date of the sale and there was no distribution of its capital assets between the partners. The third proviso to section 12B, therefore, does not apply. Accordingly, we answer the third question in the affirmative. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. The Commissioner is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 200. The counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200.
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1964 (4) TMI 112 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ax liability assessed against the firm without a notice of demand served upon the partners. Learned counsel for the appellant finally contends that the appellant was not shown as a partner in the partnership deed in force at the time when the assessment proceedings were taken and that consequently no proceedings could have been taken against the appellant without an opportunity to him to show cause why he should not be treated as a partner in the firm, and in support of this argument he relies upon Pt. Deo Sharma v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1961 41 I.T.R. 235. This point was never raised before the learned single judge and we cannot allow it to be raised at this stage. We, therefore, hold that the appellant was liable to pay the tax liability assessed upon the firm, and that the respondents were entitled to proceed against him for recovery of the tax liability. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 111 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 26 are such other instances. There is no provision in the Act fastening on the successor receiver the liability to be assessed in respect of the income received by his predecessor in office in the previous year relevant to the assessment year. That being the position, in our opinion, the mere fact that there may be continuity of the office of receiver would not by itself be sufficient to enable the Income-tax Officer to assess the court receiver as he has purported to do in the present case. For the reason stated above, we find it difficult to sustain the view taken by the Tribunal. In the result, the answer to the first question is in the negative and the answer to the second question is in the affirmative only in respect of that portion of the 1/3rd share of the property which is required to be held for the purpose of giving effect to the dispositions made in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause 4 of the will. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1964 (4) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... It is also possible that the expression ’mesne profits’ has been used in the present plaint without a proper appreciation of its significance in law. What matters is not the characterisation of the particular sum demanded but what in substance is the ,allegation on which the claim to the sum was based and as regards the legal relationship on the basis of which that relief was sought. If is because of these reasons that we consider that a plea based on the existence of a former pleading cannot be entertained when the pleading on which it rests has not been produced. We therefore consider that the order of remand passed by the learned Additional District Judge which was confirmed by the learned Judge in the High Court was right. The merits of the suit have yet to be tried and this has been directed by the order of remand which we are affirming. The appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the present proceeding is one to enforce a right arising from the contract of the parties?
Whether by reason of the fact that the words "other proceeding" stand opposed to the words "a claim of set-off" any limitation in their eaning was contemplated
Held that:- Whether we view the contract between the parties as ;a whole or view only the clause about arbitration, it is impossible to think that the right to proceed to arbitration is not one of the rights which are founded on the . agreement of the parties. The words of s. 69(3) "a right arising from a contract" are in either sense sufficient to cover the present matter.
The words 'other proceeding' in subs. (3) must receive their full meaning untramelled by the words 'a claim of set-off'. The latter words neither intend nor can be construed to cut down the generality of the words 'other proceeding'. The sub-section provides for the application of the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (2) to claims of set-off and also to other proceedings of any Kind which can properly be said to be for enforcement of any right arising from contract except those expressly mentioned as exceptions in sub-s. (3) and sub-s. (4). Appeal allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 108 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... In the present cases, if these writ petitions happen to be pendIng in this Court, say, for an year, and thereafter the cases go back to the Appellate Tribunal and stay there, say, for another year and eventually return to the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes for disposal on merits, an inordinate period of time would have been gained by the assessees in the matter of paying up the tax. It is to avoid this possibility that I have hastened to dispose of these writ petitions. For the same reason, I would expect the Tribunal also to dispose of them expeditiously so that the attempt, if any, on the part of the assessees to play for time is effectively combated. In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal is directed to deal with the cases of the petitioners on the basis that the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes did not determine, under section 19 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, the amount of tax payable by them. Ordered accordingly.
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1964 (4) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the discriminatory levy of tax on goods imported from other States, to a position which relates to Article 14. Article 14 has been explained in numerous decisions. It has been held that a classification germane to the purpose of the enactment is not prohibited by Article 14. If such a classification has a real connection and is necessary to carry out the purpose of the Act, the classification cannot be attacked as discriminatory. Enough has been said with regard to the classification of dealers as licensed and unlicensed to show that classification is necessary for the purpose of the Act and has an integral connection with its underlying policy. It is impossible, therefore, to agree that the distinction between licensed and unlicensed dealers and the different rates of tax imposed upon transactions by them can be hit by Article 14. The contentions of the petitioner fail. The petition is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 106 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assed could have subsequently become void merely because the order of assessment was set aside. 3.. Mr. Ghosh invited our attention to the decision of the Kerala High Court in M.O. Paily v. Additional Income-tax Officer, First Circle, Trichur, and Another 1959 35 I.T.R. 488., where, while construing similar provisions occurring in section 45 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the learned Judges held that penalty may be imposed even though the original order of assessment was set aside on appeal and that the correctness of the levy of penalty should be judged as on the date on which the order was passed and not in the light of subsequent events. This decision is directly against the contention of Mr. Rath. 4.. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the Certificate Authority was right in holding that the levy of penalty was not void. The application is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 (Rupees one hundred only). MISRA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... adequate or efficacious remedy. The Kerala Full Bench decision is a case directly in point and if in that case not only the assessment but also the appellate and revisional orders could have been quashed, there is no reason why the present assessment order should not be quashed as the C Forms were admittedly filed before the assessment was completed and there would be no justification in depriving the petitioner of the benefit of section 8(4) of the C.S.T. Act and subject him to tax at seven times the amount provided under section 8(1) of the C.S.T. Act. For the reasons given above a writ in the nature of certiorari will issue quashing the assessment order dated 30th December, 1963, and the Sales Tax Officer is directed to make the assessment afresh in accordance with law. The counsel for the petitioner has undertaken not to raise any question of the bar of limitation to the making of such an assessment. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Petition allowed.
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