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Showing 21 to 40 of 80 Records
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1969 (4) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. But it was not decided in Major S. S. Khanna’s case(1964 4 S.C.R. 409) that every order of the Court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and the Trial Court is directed to proceed and dispose of the suit. We trust that the suit will be taken up early for hearing and disposed of expeditiously. We recommend that the form of the issues Nos. 11, 12 and 13 will be rectified by the learned Trial Judge. Filmistan will pay the costs of the appeal in this Court and in the High Court. G.C. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (4) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rgument advanced at the last stage by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Banks that, in any case, matters covered by issues Nos. 2 and 3 referred to the Tribunal could have been competently decided by the Registrar, and the reference in respect of those two issues at least should be held to be incompetent. We do not think that at this stage there is any need for us to decide this question, because such a point was not raised at all in the petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. In those petitions, the competence of the reference to the Industrial Tribunal as a whole was challenged on the ground that it was barred because of the jurisdiction of the Registrar to deal with the dispute under section 61 of the Act. Consequently, we need not deal with the question whether a particular issue forming part of the reference has been,.competently referred or not. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (Act No. 45 of 1968) is constitutionally valid?
Held that:- the provisions held to be invalid are not inextricably bound up with the remaining provisions of the Act. It is difficult to hold that Parliament would not have enacted the impugned Act at all without including that part which is found to be ultra vires. The Act still remains substantially the Act as it was passed, that is, an Act to provide for the control, production, manufacture, supply, distribution, use and possession of gold and gold ornaments and articles of gold. In the result we hold that the following provisions of the impugned Act are invalid.
Sections 5(2)(b), 27(2)(d), 27(6), 32, 46, 88 and 1 00.
The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to a writ in the nature of mandamus under Art. 32 of -the Constitution commanding the respondents not to take any steps to implement any of the invalid provisions of the Act. Writ Petitions 282, 407 and 408 of 1968 are allowed to this extent.
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1969 (4) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court could interfere under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution with the order of the appellate court in proceedings under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, when a petition for revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, against the same order had been previously dismissed by a single Judge of that court?
Held that:- On the assumption that the order of the appellate court had not merged in the order of the single Judge who had disposed of the revision petition we are of the view that a writ petition ought not to have been entertained by the High Court when the respondent had already chosen the remedy under Section 115 of the CPC. If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions. Appeal is allowed and the judgment of the division bench of the High Court is hereby set aside
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1969 (4) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
Interest exceeding the principal of the loan - Held that:- Section 9 of Madhya Pradesh Money Lenders Act 13 of 1934 prohibits the Courts from awarding interest exceeding the principal of the loan. Counsel for the appellants contends that if all the amounts deposited from time to time by the debtors be aggregated, it will appear that an amount exceeding the loan was paid. But the prohibition of the statute is against the making of a decree for arrears of interest exceeding the amount of loan. In the present case the decree awards interest amounting to ₹ 746-30, whereas the principal is ₹ 33,866-51.
The Court is concerned at this stage to pass a decree absolute for sale in a mortgage suit. It is not concerned to determine the respective rights of the mortgagees inter se. The mortgagees' interest is fully represented before the Court. Whether or not the Custodian of Evacuee Property is entitled to the money or that the evacuees have a subsisting interest is a matter which cannot be decided in this appeal. That was made clear by the judgment of the High Court in the application filed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property by order dated November 12, 1962, when the High Court observed. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the application made by the appellant under s. 34 of the Act before the Calcutta High Court was an application in a reference within the meaning of s. 31(4) of the same Act?
Held that:- The application for stay under s. 34 of the Act cannot be treated as an application in a reference under s. 31(4) of the Act. Therefore, the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi was right in holding that the application under s. 20 of the Act was maintainable in his Court and for making a reference of the dispute to the arbitrator mentioned in the agreement. Accordingly we set aside the order of the Punjab High Court and restore the order of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi dated January 29, 1963 allowing the application filed by the appellant under s. 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The appeal is allowed
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1969 (4) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is reasonable ground for believing that selection board was likely to have been biased?
Whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings?
Whether mere fact that one of the members of the Board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the entire proceedings?
Held that:- Unable to accept the contention that in adjudging the suitability of the candidates the members of the board did not have any mutual discussion. It is not as if the records spoke of themselves. We are unable to believe that the members of selection board functioned like computers. At this stage it may also be noted that at the time the selections were made, the members of the selection board other than Naqishbund were not likely to have known that Basu had appealed against his supersession and that his appeal was pending before the State Government. Therefore there was no occasion for them to distrust the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. Hence the board in making the selections must necessarily have given weight to the opinion expressed by Naqishbund.
What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
As seen earlier Naqishbund was a party to the preparation of the select list in order of preference and that he is shown as No. 1 in the list. To that extent he was undoubtedly a judge in his own case, a circumstance which is abhorrent to our concept of justice. Now coming to the selection of the officers in the. junior scale service, the selections to both senior scale service as well as junior scale service were made from the same pool. Every officer who had put in a service of 8 years or more, even if he was holding the post of an Assistant Conservator of Forests was eligible for being selected for the senior scale service. In fact some Assistant Conservators have been selected for the senior scale service. At the same time some of the officers who had put in more than eight years of service had been selected for the junior scale service. Hence it is not possible to separate the two sets of officers. For the reasons mentioned above these petitions are allowed and the impugned selections set aside.
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1969 (4) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
whether the power of legislating on relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation or buildings would -appropriately fall in Entry 21 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India 3SupCI69- 15 Act, 1935, or in the corresponding Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution?
Held that:- The power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of landlord and tenant of buildings is to be found in Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not in Entry 18 of List 11, and that that power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under Entry 3 of List I. Appeal dismissed
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1969 (4) TMI 100 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 15 S.T.C. 445., a person undertook to vend on a railway station platform and along the train side, food packets, refreshments and beverages prepared by the administration at the vegetarian refreshment room under an agreement. The agreement provided that that person would employ his own servants for the vending and he would sell the edibles at the prices fixed by the administration and shall be paid a commission on the sales made by it. It was held that he was not a dealer. The learned judges pointed out that the existence of a right to give directions in the performance of duties and of a power to take disciplinary action on default showed that that person was nothing more than a servant and not a dealer. In our opinion, the respondent was not a dealer falling within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Act. No case has been made out for directing the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan to state the case. The applications are, therefore, rejected with costs. Applications rejected.
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1969 (4) TMI 99 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed, it is necessary that the relevant authority should comply with the restrictions laid down in the proviso to section 51 where a decree for payment of money is executed by detention in prison. It is not contended before us that the restrictions contained in that proviso have been transgressed. For the purposes of this writ petition and confining ourselves to the contentions raised before us, it is sufficient for us to say that the respondents are competent to recover the sales tax assessed on the firm by taking recovery proceedings against the petitioner and that those proceedings may include the arrest and detention of the petitioner in prison. If the authority concerned has not complied with the restrictions imposed under section 51 in the matter of the execution of a decree for payment of money, it is open to the petitioner to raise that question before that authority. With these observations, we dismiss the petition but we make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 98 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sales Tax, M.P. 1969 24 S.T.C. 1 1969 M.P.L.J. 228., where at page 231 it is observed that in the notice which is issued in Form No. XVI, the extent of escaped turnover has to be specified. The only point directly decided in that case was that best judgment assessment can also be made under section 19(1) of the Act. The notice issued under rule 33 which was considered in that case mentioned the extent of the escaped turnover and no question arose as to the effect of not specifying in the notice the amount of turnover escaping assessment. Esufali s case 1969 24 S.T.C. 1 1969 M.P.L.J. 228. cannot therefore be taken as an authority that the assessing authority must specify the amount of turnover escaping assessment in the notice. The observations relied upon were made In a different context. 7.. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100, if certified. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 97 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ior to the suit that is made in the plaint relates to a very short period. We are of opinion that no valid ground or principle has been made out by the appellant to persuade us not to award interest during the pendency of the suit or for the short period for which it is claimed prior to the institution of the suit. No exception can be taken to the principle that restitution implies the payment of interest at a reasonable rate in order to put the person entitled to restitution in the position which he would have occupied but for the illegal retention of the money. We are of opinion that the decision in Mothey Gangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1965 16 S.T.C. 205. cited by the learned Government Pleader rests upon the special facts of that case and does not establish any principle justifying the disallowance of interest in the present case. For the reasons set out above, we are of opinion that the appeals fail and they are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 96 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... otification the dealer contended before the sales tax authority that inasmuch as besan, the turnover of which is sought to be taxed, was locally purchased, it was not taxable. The assessing authority rejected the submission and made the assessment. The Assistant Commissioner (J.), however, allowed the appeals of the dealer relating to the years mentioned above. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, filed revision applications before the Judge (Revisions). The same were dismissed, but as already said earlier, at the instance of the Commissioner, Sales Tax, these two references have been made. Besan is nothing but fine gram flour. In our opinion, therefore, it is comprehended in the word atta as used in the aforesaid notification. Our answer to the question referred is in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Commissioner, Sales Tax. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, shall pay the dealer a sum of Rs. 100 by way of costs of these references. References answered accordingly.
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1969 (4) TMI 95 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lea that the amendment is bad for want of assent of the President also does not stand on any firm ground. Article 200 relied on does not support the contention that it is obligatory on the Governor to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President. Article 304 which in its proviso refers to a Bill or amendment to be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State only with the previous sanction of the President, has no application to this case at all. Article 304 would have come up for consideration only if the conditions of article 301 were fulfilled. The other contention that the impugned legislation is out of the purview of entry 54 in the State List is devoid of all force. Nor is there any occasion in the facts and circumstances of the case to allege any infraction of right under articles 14, 19 etc. We are of the view that there are no merits in these writ petitions. We accordingly dismiss the same with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the petitioners in these cases under section 21-A of the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937, shall not be included in the assessable turnover for purposes of exigibility to tax under section 3(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. There will be no order as to costs. W.Ps. No. 2988 to 2991 of 1966 are dismissed, but the assessing officer shall reassess the dealer for the years in question bearing in mind the principles enunciated in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. T.Cs. Nos. 102 to 104 of 1967 are allowed in part and the assessing officer shall reassess the dealer for the years in question bearing in mind the principles enunciated in this judgment and in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. T.Cs. Nos. 194 and 195 of 1967 are allowed in part. The assessing authority shall cause a revision of the assessment for the years in question following the principles laid down in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1969 (4) TMI 93 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er part of the energy therefrom has been spent. Coal in our view is either recovered from the bowels of the earth as coal or is manufactured as such by burning it as charcoal. It is unnecessary for us to reiterate the chemical processes which have been noticed both in the Allahabad and Madras High Courts decisions except to say that coke is completely a different product from coal though coke is the residue left at the bottom when coal is subjected to intentional and controlled distillation in retort without access of air. It is got out of a process of burning and filtration of coal after certain properties have been removed therefrom. The residual coke thrown out and quenched by water is collected. Cinders certainly are not obtained by that process and, therefore, they cannot be termed or cannot come within the definition of coke or any form of coke . In this view, the order of the Tribunal cannot be interfered with. The revision is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 92 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he first sale. To take an illustration, suppose khandsari sugar is pledged with a bank by its manufacturer and it becomes necessary for the bank, in order to realise its debt, to sell the sugar. Such a sale indeed would be the first sale but would not be taxable in the hands of the bank because the bank cannot be said to be its manufacturer. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.R. Somaraju(1) relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel is distinguishable. In that case jaggery was liable to sales tax only at the stage of first sale in the State. Under the notification with which we are concerned, the sale of khandsari sugar is liable to tax not at the point of first sale, but at the point of sale by the manufacturer. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Commissioner of Sales Tax. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (4) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... however bear in mind the principles in this judgment while disposing of the proceedings before it. There will be no order as to costs. W.Ps. Nos. 1602 of 1966, 927 and 3875 of 1967, 874, 900, 1600, 1724, 2069 and 2080 of 1968 praying for the issue of writs of certiorari are dismissed. If it becomes necessary, the assessing authority will reassess at the instance of the assessee in the light of the observations made above. There will be no order as to costs. W.Ps. Nos. 3872, 3873, 3876 and 3878 of 1967 praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus are also dismissed. The assessing authority, however, shall, at the instance of the assessee, revise the orders of assessment already passed in the light of this judgment. The question of refund of any tax, however, may be considered independently and on proper applications made in that behalf and subject to the entitlement of the assessee to such refund in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1969 (4) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 - Collector's order granting permission to convert agricultural land to non-agricultural use as building site
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1969 (4) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the impugned transactions were not purchases within the meaning of section 2(13) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953?
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the impugned purchases were effected by the respondents outside the State of Bombay and that they were not inside the State of Bombay as per Explanation to article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution of India?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Out of the two questions, only one has been answered and the second has not been answered. Even if the judgment of the High Court is communicated as required under section 34(5) of the Act, the Tribunal cannot proceed to dispose of the case consistently with the judgment of the High Court, because there is no judgment of the High Court answering the second question. Set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct that the High Court do hear and dispose of the reference according to law
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