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Showing 21 to 40 of 150 Records
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1976 (4) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l 16, 1973. The High Court made light of this long and inexplicable delay with a casual remark that the contention was "without any force". It overlooked that in June, 1974 it was setting aside an appointment dated March 1962 of a person who had in the meanwhile risen to the rank of a Superintending Engineer. Those 12 long years were as if writ in water. We cannot but express our grave concern that an extraordinary jurisdiction should have been exercised in such an abject disregard of consequences and in favour of persons who were unmindful of their so-called rights for many long years. For these reason we allow the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct that the writ petitions shall stand dismissed. Patnaik and Mishra will pay to Krishna Moorthy the costs of the petitions and of these appeals which we quantify at ₹ 2000. They will each pay a sum of ₹ 1,000. There will be no order as to the costs of the Government. Appeals allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 213 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... herefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated December 16, 1975 and restore the order of the Magistrate issuing process against respondents 1 and 2. At the time of granting the special leave, we has directed the Sessions Judge who was trying the original case resulting from the F.I.R. lodged before the police to stay proceedings to the extent that the judgment was not to be pronounced until this appeal was disposed of. We understand that the Sessions case is now concluded before the learned Sessions Judge and arguments have also been heard. 1 view of the order of the Magistrate issuing process against respondents 1 and 2 which has been confirmed by us, the respondents will have to face a supplementary trial and it is not conducive in the interests of justice to allow the other trial to be stayed any further. The Sessions Judge is therefore directed to dispose of the Sessions Case and the stay granted by this Court earlier is Vacated. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 212 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... olutely no legal justification at all for the Central Government to go back upon its earlier order. The earlier order of the Central Government stood unvaried and unvacated and the State Government was bound to implement it and, therefore, the Central Government was in error in upholding the action of the State Government rejecting the revision application filed by the appellant and thus silently condoned the lapse committed by the State Government. For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that the order impugned passed by the Central Government cannot be allowed to stand and must be set aside. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Central Government dated February 17, 1968 rejecting the revision application of the appellant and direct the State Government to implement the order of the Central Government dated November 21, 1964 for granting the mining lease to the appellant. The appellant will be entitled to his costs throughout. 1976 SUPPLEMENTARY
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1976 (4) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT
Article 21 furnishes the guarantee of "Lex", which is equated with statute law only, and not of "jus"
spheres of executive and legislative and judicial powers with regard to personal liberty and preventive detention.
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1976 (4) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 could not be resorted to for recovery of the sum as the claim was time-barred?
Held that:- Section 7 only provides a special procedure for the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. The word "payable" in section 7, in the context in which its occurs, means "legally recoverable." Admittedly a suit to recover the arrears instituted on the day the order under section 7 was made would have been barred by limitation. The amount in question was therefore irrecoverable. This being the position, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1976 (4) TMI 209 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... must be held that the time-limit prescribed therein is only in respect of duties and charges and not in respect of penalties. I further observe that is case of any refund arising out of an order in appeal, the Assistant Collector is normally required to prepare the refund bill immediately after a decision to pay the refund is known. Records do not disclose why this procedure was not adopted in these cases. In view of the above observations, I set aside the two orders of the Assistant Collector and direct that refund of the penally may be made to the appellants in accordance with the normal prescribed procedure. The appeals are accordingly accepted.
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1976 (4) TMI 208 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... view of the fact and circumstances of the case I hold that this is an appropriate case in which duty was short levied either through ‘inadvertence’ or ‘error’. I, therefore, hold that the demand in respect of which appeal No. 131-CE/Appl/DLH/75 has been filed and which has been raised under rule 10 is in order and is upheld. The demand in respect of which appeal No. 132-CE/Appl/DLH/75 has been filed, has been raised under rule 10A and is held to be not legally tenable. Considering my above observations and discussions I order as below - (l) The assessable value of the subject goods will be arrived at on the basis on which they are sold by the brand name owner to the wholesale dealers less admissible discount. (2) Because of time - bar the demand forming the subject matter of appeal No. 132-CE/Appl/DLH/75 is not legally sustainable. The order against which appeal No. 132-CE/Appl/DLH/75 has bean filed, is set aside and the appeal is accepted.
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1976 (4) TMI 207 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... sustained only for the periods which are not more than one year old from the date, on which the duty was paid or adjusted in the owner’s account and that demands for the earlier period are not legally tenable under Rule 10 and hence are set aside. 9. To conclude all the pleas of the appellants except the plea of time bar under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules have been found to be untenable. The plea of time-bar has been found to be tenable to the extent indicated above. I. therefore uphold the orders of the Assistant Collector and reject the appeals but grant relief to the extent indicated in the aforesaid para i.e. that the demands which are more than one year are set aside but the demands which should have been made within a period of one year from the date of payment of duty or adjustment of duty will stand. The Assistant Collector will work out the demands which are more than one year old and which are within one year and then raise fresh demands of duty.
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1976 (4) TMI 206 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... eived under letter No. 80/CHEM/Yarn/C/74/CLC/668, dated 27-9-1974 from the Chemical Examiner of the Central Excise, Delhi and the sample of yarn NES ”failed". The actual composition of the yarn as found by the Chemical Examiner has not been communicated to the appellants. In the interest of natural justice it was necessary that the same should have been communicated to the appellants. Under the circumstances I hold that the Asstt. Collector’s order is one which has been passed by denying natural justice to the appellants. It is necessary that appellants may be made aware of the details of the test report of the Chemical Examiner and the re-testing should also be permitted and the appellants be asked to deposit the necessary fee in this connection. In view of the above position I set aside the order of the Asstt. Collector without going into its merits and direct him to redecide the matter after making good the above lacunae in the subject Adjudication Order.
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1976 (4) TMI 205 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Limitation Act. Hence the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Madras, cannot be held to be a court for applying the provisions of Section 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act. See Nityanand v. L.l.C. of India (AlR 1970 S.C. 209). I may add that under similar circumstances, a Learned Judge of this Court in writ petition 2207 of 1972 has taken the same view. This writ petition must fail on this ground alone. However, on a consideration of the orders of the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority, l am satisfied that the appellate as well as the revisional authorities did not find any valid or justifiable ground for condoning the delay and entertaining the appeal. On merits. Hence the orders passed by the authorities below cannot be quashed on this ground also in a writ petition. Judged from any angle, I am satisfied that there is no merits in this writ petition. 3. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs, Advocate’s fee ₹ 100/-
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1976 (4) TMI 204 - SUPREME COURT
What is the correct amount of import duty chargeable on pot motors when imported separately from Rayon Spinning frames: do they fall within Item 72(3) or Item 73(21) of the First Schedule to the Indian Customs Tariff?
Held that:- There can be no doubt that on a plain grammatical construction, the words "not otherwise specified" qualify "machinery" and not "component parts" and, there- fore, the pot motors imported by the appellants, which satisfied the other requirements of Item 72(3) could not be held to fall outside that Item, because they were otherwise specified in Item 73(21). Item 72(3) is a specific Item which covers these pot motors as against Item 73(21)which is a general item and hence it must be held that these pot motors were assessable under Item 72(3) and not under Item 73(21). The original assessment of these pot motors made by the Assistant Collector was, in the circumstances, correct and the subsequent, demand of differential duty made by the Assistant Collector and confirmed by the Collector in revision and by the Government of India on further revision, was unjustified. The orders made by the Assistant Collector, the Collector and the Government of India confirming the demand for differential duty would, therefore, have to be quashed and set aside and the amount of differential duty recovered from the appellants pursuant to these orders would have to be refunded to the appellants.
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1976 (4) TMI 203 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... har, the transactions were treated as intraState sales. The court held that the movement of crude oil from the State of Assam to the State of Bihar was an Incident of the contract of sale and, therefore, the sales to the refinery at Barauni were sales in the course of interState trade. The Bihar State had no jurisdiction to tax the sales under the sales tax law of that State. The rule in the aforesaid case has full application to the present facts. Undoubtedly, the transactions are inter-State sales and the assessments in question, therefore, are without jurisdiction. 4.. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sales effected by the assessee are in the course of inter-State trade and accordingly are not exigible to Orissa sales tax. The assessee shall be entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Consolidated hearing fee is assessed at rupees two hundred. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (4) TMI 202 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rred on TEMM (new manufacturer). Further, in our view, rule 6(d) contemplates the transfer of the business as a going concern and not a case of transfer of some of the assets alone. (underlined by us.) Here italicised. The above passage clearly goes to show that that was not a case where there was a transfer of the business as a whole or as a going concern. In both the cases, there were only transfers of certain materials. With reference to one of them, part of the materials had been retained. Based on these distinguishing features it had held that the exemption under rule 6(d) did not apply. That is not the position in the case before us. We have already extracted the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and it is clear therefrom that the business in Ooty was sold as a whole. It was also sold as a going concern. Consequently, the above decision has no application to the present case. In the result, the tax revision case is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 201 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amendment, in sub-section (8) of section 36. In view of this, we are clearly of the opinion that the statute contemplates the Tribunal passing different orders, one under sub-section (3) of section 36 when it originally disposes of the appeal and the other under sub-section (6) of section 36 when it disposes of the application for review one way or the other, and section 38(1), as it stood prior to the amendment by Tamil Nadu Act No. 31 of 1972, provided for a revision to this court only against an order of the Tribunal passed under section 36(3) and did not provide for a revision to this court against the order passed by the Tribunal under section 36(6). In view of the fact that the present order passed by the Tribunal under section 36(6) is admittedly prior to the Tamil Nadu Amending Act No. 31 of 1972, no revision was competent to this court under the law as it stood. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed as incompetent. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 200 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in 1971. It is presumed that the legislature is aware of the needs of its people and keeps abreast with the changes and developments in the society. An item of luxury with the passage of time becomes an item of necessity. It appears that it was more to clarify than to classify that perfumed oil was with effect from 1969 included as one of the articles under the heading cosmetics and toilet requisites . For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us by saying that perfumed hair-oil appertains to the class of cosmetics and toilet requisites taxable at 10 per cent under Notification No. ST-7094/X-10121965 dated 1st October, 1965. Our answer to the second question is that the turnover of Rs. 8,000 of perfumed hair-oil was taxable at 10 per cent. As the question was not free from difficulty, we do not think it expedient to burden the assessee with costs. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (4) TMI 199 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fabrics, which includes rubberised cotton fabrics for the four quarters of the year 1970. The assessment in respect of the turnover relating to cotton fabrics, which includes rubberised cotton fabrics , for the four quarters of the year 1970 is struck down. In view of my above findings, the respondents cannot proceed with the assessment or demand for any subsequent period of assessment from the first quarter 1971 to 6th April, 1975, only in respect of cotton fabrics which includes rubberised cotton fabrics and, in the circumstances, a writ in the nature of prohibition do issue limited to the extent of cotton fabrics including rubberised fabrics alone. It is made clear that this will not prevent assessment in connection with the rest of the total turnover in respect of any assessment of returns as filed by the petitioner. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus and prohibition issue. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1976 (4) TMI 198 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the sales in the canteens is to be included in the taxable turnover of the assessees, and not with the inclusion of their purchase turnover. As we have held that the assessees cannot be said to be carrying on business within the meaning of the Sales Tax Act, so far as the transactions in the canteens are concerned, the references are answered accordingly and the Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 214 of 1968, 251 of 1971, 350 of 1972 and 278 of 1975 are allowed. The notice dated 4th March, 1968, from the Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 20(3) of the Sales Tax Act impugned in Civil Writ Petition No. 214 of 1968 is quashed. The assessment orders impugned in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 251 of 1971, 350 of 1972 and 278 of 1975 in so far as they levied sales tax on the proceeds of the transactions in the canteens in question are also quashed. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in all the matters. References answered accordingly and Petitions allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 197 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wn by the Supreme Court in the said case, there is no question of two sales coming within the scope of section 5(1) and it is only an export sale, i.e., a sale between an exporter and the foreign buyer that will come under the definition of sale in the course of export, and all other sales even if interconnected or integrated with the export cannot be treated as sales in the course of export. There being no room for two or more sales being in the course of export and the only sale which can be said to occasion the export being the sale which itself results in the movement of the goods from the exporter to the importer, the theory of integrated activity cannot any longer be invoked to make the sale between two local dealers a sale in the course of export. Therefore, the assessee in this case cannot succeed in his claim that the disputed sales are sales in the course of export. The tax case is, therefore, allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 196 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y collected, a smaller penalty was called for. On the other hand, the view of the Tribunal is that resort to the provision for imposition of penalty itself could not be had because compounding fee has already been collected. Such a conclusion is patently erroneous in law and cannot be sustained. The learned counsel for the assessee contended that we can reduce the penalty ourselves or we can remit the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration as to the quantum of penalty imposed by the assessing authorities. That question does not arise in the present tax revision case, which has been filed by the department against the finding of the Tribunal, that no penalty whatever could be imposed under law in view of the collection of compounding fee already made. Accordingly, the tax revision case is allowed and the order of the Tribunal, in so far as it deleted the penalty imposed by the taxing authorities, is set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 195 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y reasons beyond his control, he is not entitled to produce them before the appellate authority or Tribunal and request that authority to receive them and modify or set aside the assessment. Then only there will be justification and jurisdiction to receive the C forms or direct the assessing authority to receive the C forms. 8.. Sub-rules (4) to (9) were added to rule 12 of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules only in 1973. Hence sub-rule (7) has no application to the facts of this case and its scope is not considered here. 9. Therefore, we consider that the case must be sent back to the Tribunal for reconsideration of the appeal in the light of the observations made above. The assessee will be given a full opportunity before any decision is taken to explain the circumstances under which the C forms could not be produced before the assessing authority. 10.. This revision case is ordered on the above terms. There will be no order as to costs. Case remanded.
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