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Showing 21 to 40 of 232 Records
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1986 (4) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on whether the several under takings carried on by the same company are separate or not which necessarily turns on the question whether they are distinct or inter-dependent. Here we are concerned with the meaning of the words 'assets in relation to the textile under taking' appearing in sub-s.(2) of s.3 of the Act which must be construed in a generic sense looking to the context in which they are used. The Court has to interpret these words keeping in view that they occur in a legislation which provides for A the taking over of management of a textile undertaking under sub-s.(l) thereof pending nationalisation of such textile undertaking and matters incidental or connected therewith. On the view that we take, the other contentions do not really arise. In the result, the appeals must succeed and are allowed with costs. me judgment and order of the High Court dated June 13, 1983 are reversed and the Writ Petition filed by the respondents is dismissed. Appeals allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 9; in the clause 'this application is granted but on payment of costs of ₹ 100......' in the order permitting the withdrawal of the suit cannot in the circumstances be construed as imosing a condition precedent for the filing of the fresh suit. There is no warrant for taking a hypertechnical rigid view which results in denying to a person access to justice and deprives him of his legal rights more so when it is possible to take a liberal view which promotes the ends of justice. The trial court in obeisance to this principle repelled the unjust plea urged by the defendant. But alas, the High Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction tripped into reversing the justice oriented conclusion reached by the trial court. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the order of the trial court. The trial court will now proceed to dispose of the suit in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tipulate for affording any opportuniry to the employee, the principles of natural justice would be attracted and the employee would be entitled to an opportunity of explanation, though no elaborate enquiry would be necessary. Giving an opportunity of explanation would meet the bare minimal requirement of natural justice. Before the services of an employee are terminated, resulting into forfeiture of his right to be considered for employement, opportunity of explanation must be afforded to the employee concerned. The appellant was not afforded any opportunity of explanation before the issue of the impugned order consequently the order is rendered null and void being inconsistent with the principles of natural justice. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and also the order of termination and direct that the appellant shall be treated in service and be paid his back wages and other benefits. The appeal is allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rent would ordinarily be well to do people and they would not be so much in need of protection and can without much difficulty look after themselves." o p /o p These observations were made in 1974 soon after the amendment of the Act in 1973. They were made in a different context and not in the context of a challenge to the vires of the provisions as violative of Art. 14. As we pointed out earlier, the argument based on protection of the weaker sections of the community is entirely inconsistent with the protection given to tenants of non-residential buildings who are in a position to pay much higher rents than the rents which those who are in occupation of residential buildings can ever pay. We are, therefore, satisfied that section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has to be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. A writ will issue declaring sec. 30(ii) as unconstitutional. o p /o p P.S.S. Petitions allowed. o p /o p
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1986 (4) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ame into being. That is not the case with Section 17-B. Here it is not the conferment of a new jurisdiction but the codification in statutory form of a right available to the workmen to get back-wages when certain given conditions are satisfied. There are no words in the Section to compel the Court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively. Before Section 17-B was introduced there was no bar for Courts for awarding wages. Of course the workmen had no right to claim it. This Section recognizes such a right. To construe it in a manner detrimental to workmen would be to defeat its object. In our considered view, therefore, the High Court was in error in holding that the legislature did not intend to give retrospective effect to Section 17-B. We hold that Section 17-B applies even to awards passed prior to August 21, 1984, if they have not become final. We set aside the Judgment of the High Court and allow this appeal with costs, quantified at ₹ 3,000. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e and notify it to the candidates who are going to appear for such examination. In fixing such standard, he will bear in mind the observations made in this Judgment and what has been held therein. For the purpose of this Appeal the Respondents have been compelled to come to New Delhi to appear before this Court time and again and also had to spend money on their board and lodging. The Appellants will, therefore, pay to each of the Respondents a sum of ₹ 1,500 by way of costs of this Appeal. As the Respondents are not represented by any Advocate, the Registry will communicate this order to the Respondents without claiming the cost thereof from the Respondents. Before parting with this Appeal, the Court just once again express its deep sense of appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered to it by Mr. V.A. Bobde, Advocate, who appeared as amicus curiae, and without whose assistance it perhaps may not have been possible to reach the above conclusion. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the University from time to time. We are happy to note that the University acted watchfully and wakefully, issuing timely warnings to those seeking admission to the institution. We are sure many must have taken heed of the warnings issued by the university and refrained from seeking admission to the institution. If some did not heed the warnings issued by the university, they are themselves to blame. Even so if they can be compensated in some manner, there is no reason why that may not be done. We are told that the assets of the institutions, which have sprung out of the funds collected from the students, have been frozen. It is up to the State Government to devise suitable ways, legislative and administrative, to compenstate the students at least monetarily. The appeal filed by the society is dismissed with costs which we quantify at ₹ 10,000. The writ petition filed by the students is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. Appeal and Petition dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 342 - SUPREME COURT
the consequences of difference between public notices and statutory Orders - banning of beef tallow by Public Notice would not amount to any contravention of the order passed under the Act.
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1986 (4) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not given any valid reason as to why we should hold that the impugned notification was not in the public interest. As mentioned earlier the appellant, Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. established its factory after entering into an agreement with the State Government as regards the regular supply of raw-material from the forests in the State of Kerala for production of newsprint and that the said factory was employing a large labour force. The other two concerns in whose favour the exemption is granted by the impugned notification are the concerns of Kerala Government itself. We have no material in this case to hold that the impugned notification was not in the public interest. We accordingly set aside the finding recorded by the High Court on the validity of the notification also. In the result, we allow the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petitions filed in the High Court. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 340 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it is necessary to give a second show cause notice against the punishment before the same was imposed on the respondent and to furnish him with a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer in view of the amendment of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India by the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976 and the consequential change brought about in Rule 15(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965?
Held that:- Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were not justified in holding that the order of dismissal was vitiated as the respondent was not given a second opportunity to make representation against the punishment of dismissal before the same was imposed on him.
In the circumstances, we set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court but, as in disposing the appeal the Division Bench has not considered the judgment of the learned Single Judge on merits of the case, we send the case back on remand to the Division Bench for the disposal of the appeal on merits after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard. This appeal is allowed
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1986 (4) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
License ob bottling of liquor - Held that:- The necessity for obtaining licences under the Bottling of Liquor Rules by the persons to whom the bottling contracts had been awarded was also realised by the Government and it was for that reason that Rule 3 came to be amended. We are unable to understand how despite the prohibition contained in s.13(1)(e) anyone can engage himself in the business of bottling liquor without obtaining a licence under the Rules. It is true that s.13(1)(e) uses the expression 'bottling liquor for sale' and the expression 'to bottle' is itself defined to mean 'the transfer of liquor from a cask or other vessle to a bottle for the purpose of sale'. But there is no justification for the implication sought to be read into section 13(1)(e) read with the definition of 'to bottle' that only a bottler who himself sells the liquor bottled by him is subject to and governed by s.13(1)(e) and the Rules and not a bottler who merely bottles liquor for others. Bottling liquor for sale may be for selling the liquor by the bottler himself or by someone else for whom the bottling has been done by the bottler.
In either case it is bottling liquor for sale. ALL that is necessary is that the liquor must be meant for sale. It may be that occasionally liquor may be bottled not for sale but for private consumption. Manufacture of liquor for private or domestic consumption may be permitted under the Excise Laws and where so permitted, the liquor may be bottled without obtaining a separate bottling licence but where the liquor which is bottled is intended to be sold whether by the bottler or by someone else at whose instance the bottling is done, the bottler must necessarily have a bottling licence without which he cannot engage himself in the business of bottling liquor meant for sale. Bottling of liquor meant for sale by whosoever is without doubt regulated by the Bottling of Liquor Rules. Though considerable argument appears to have been advanced before the High Court on the question of locus standi, the question was rightly not raised before us. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 338 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a charge should be framed or not?
Held that:- It is difficult to understand as to how over 600 employees working in the Taj Group of Hotels suddenly came to know must a little prior to 31st March 1981 that three trusts had been floated by the respondent when they were executed and registered only a few days before that. How is it that within 4 or 5 days over 600 employees of the Taj Group of Hotels came to know about the existence of these trusts and how did they come to know that these 3 trusts were established for the purpose of undertaking programmes of rural development in the rural areas of Konkan Region. It is also stated in the minutes that Ajit Kerkar in his capacity as the Managing Director reported that the trustees of these 3 trusts were very eminent public personalities. We wonder whether the respondent's wife and Sheroo Kanuga could be said to be "very eminent public personalities". It Is also strange that though a large sum of ₹ 26 lakhs was being paid by way of donations, J.J. Bhabha did not even bother to inquire as to who were the eminent public personalities who were trustees of these three trusts. It is prima facie difficult to accept the explanation offered by Ajit Kerkar. We do not think we would be unjustified, on the material on record, to take the prima facie view that these donations of ₹ 26 lakhs were also connected with the negotiations which took place on 25th March 1981 between Ajit Kerkar on the one hand and Gavai and the respondent on the other.
We must therefore hold that a prima facie case has been made out on behalf of the prosecution for framing 23rd, 24th, 25th, 41st, 42nd and 43rd draft charges against the respondent. The learned Trial Judge in our opinion fell into an error in discharging the respondent in respect of these charges.
Before we close we may make it clear that we have examined the evidence on record merely for the purpose of deciding whether the evidence is of such a nature that, if unrebutted, it would warrant the conviction of the respondent. It will be open to the respondent to rebut this evidence and to make out his defence when the trial proceeds against him on the charges already framed by the learned Trial Judge and the additional charges which we have directed to be framed against him.
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1986 (4) TMI 337 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ovisions contain words and phrases similar in content. The above case applies on all fours to the facts of the case. We would have elaborated our opinion in the case but for the fact, on facts the case on hand is covered by the ratio in the above decision on all fours. The bank has not violated any term of the order in the letter of the Sales Tax Department dated October 4, 1979, when it had allowed Nunna Venkata Krishnayya to encash Rs. 12,800 on January 1, 1980. We, however, state we are only applying the ratio of the case in Income-tax Officer v. Budha Pictures 1967 65 ITR 620 (SC) AIR 1967 SC 1547, to the facts of the instant case. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Since we have followed the decision of the Supreme Court, we see no substantial question of law of general importance arises for consideration in this case for the decision of the Supreme Court. Therefore, oral request for leave to Supreme Court is rejected. Writ petition allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 336 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the rulings of the Supreme Court relied on by Sri Srinivasan do not really bear on the validity of the notifications. 46.. We have earlier set out section 6(3) of the 1984 Amendment Act in full (vide para 7 supra). This section incorporates new items 4 to 17 from 1st April, 1982. While the I notification regulates the period from 1st April, 1982 to 31st March, 1983, the II regulates the period from 1st April, 1983 to 24th October, 1984. The last regulates the taxes from 24th October, 1984, and onwards. We are of the view that on the very terms of section 6(3) of the 1984 Act and the Act, as originally enacted, the three notifications are authorised, legal and valid. 47.. As all the contentions urged for the petitioners fail, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions and discharge the rule issued in these cases. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 335 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t of reasonable opportunity of hearing the petitioner. However, the quantum of penalty imposed by the Deputy Commissioner, respondent No. 2 herein, needs a reconsideration, in the light of our finding on question No. (1), i.e., in view of our holding that the deduction of Rs. 74,506 is allowable under section 2(r)(ii) of the Act. 6.. In the result we allow the petition and, in modification of the impugned orders (annexures C and D), passed by the Sales Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax respectively, allow the deduction of Rs. 74,506 the cost of the packing material under section 2(r)(ii) of the Act and in the light thereof, we direct respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to reconsider the quantum of the amount of penalty only in the matter of wrongful deduction in the quarterly returns with regard to the raw material. 7.. The petition is disposed of as indicated hereinabove. No order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit be refunded to the petitioner.
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1986 (4) TMI 334 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... definition before the amendment, extracted hereinbefore, we are inclined to take a view that copra , i.e., dry coconut, was an oil-seed and thus being covered within the purview of that definition, it was assessable to sales tax at 3 per cent only. We need not venture upon to give our reasons as we adopt the reasons given in the three decisions of the different High Courts and, to shorten the matter, will simply content ourselves by falling in line with the reasons given by the learned Judges in those cases. 9.. The result of the above discussions is that the answer to be given is that copra is an oil-seed within the meaning of section 14(vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and, therefore, taxable at 3 per cent only under section 6(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959. In short, the answer is against the revenue and in favour of the dealer. Since the dealer has not turned up to contest the matter, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1986 (4) TMI 333 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 4 of the Act, it is difficult to hold that the notification was meaningless and would have no application to the specified articles mentioned by a separate item so as to confine the exemption to the manufacturers of transformers within the State of Bihar alone, thus withdrawing the exemption on transformers manufactured outside the State of Bihar. In our view, this was a deliberate and purposeful inclusion to give the transformer manufacturers of Bihar an edge over the manufacturers of outside the State, and in that view of the matter we reject the contention just noticed above. The answer to the last question, therefore, is also in favour of the department and against the dealer. 10.. In the result, the answer to questions Nos. (1) and (3) go in favour of the department and that of question No. (2) in favour of the dealer. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances, however, we shall leave the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1986 (4) TMI 332 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s could not be audited because of the stay order in some cases and other cases which were pending here, but there was no stay order, then the assessing authority should be instructed that if the return alongwith the audit report is filed by the petitioner within a period of four months then they should not be subjected to penalty under section 271B or interest under section 139(8) for this delay. Mr. R. Krishna Murthy, appearing for the respondent, submits that such direction will be issued to the assessing authority that if the returns are filed with audit report within 4 months from the date of dismissal of the writ petitions then the petitioners should not be subjected to any penalty or interest. It is directed that no interest or penalty will be charged from the petitioners for delay in filing the return if same is filed within 4 months from the date of this order. Consequently, all the writ petitions are dismissed without any order as to costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 331 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ve discussion, we make the following orders and directions (i) We dismiss these writ petitions in so far as they challenge section 21(2) of the KST Act (ii) We quash the show cause notice No. SMR 183/83-84 dated 5th March, 1984 (annexure A in W.P. No. 5112 of 1984) for the reasons set out in paras 28 to 33 of our order (iii) We dismiss all other writ petitions without examining the validity of the notices issued by the DC. But, we however grant one month s time from this day to the petitioner to file its objections before the DC and if they are so filed within that time, then the DC shall dispose of them in accordance with law and the observations made in this order. 43.. Writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. 44.. Let this order be communicated to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration), respondent 2, within 10 days from this day. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1986 (4) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the closure of the slaughter house on seven days specified in the two standing orders puts a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The closure of slaughter house on seven days specified in the two standing orders in any way put an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner-respondent under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution - judgment and order of the High Court dated 3rd March, 1970 are set aside.
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