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Showing 21 to 40 of 391 Records
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2000 (4) TMI 837 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the leamed counsel for the appellant that the memorandum of second appeal itself reveals that he has preferred appeal against both the appellate orders where it records both appeals, case No. 237 of 1977 and 93 of 1978. Hence High Court was not right in holding that no appeal was preferred. Leamed counsel for the respondent could not dispute this but submits that no second appeal lies against the appellate order in the proceedings for the grant of Succession Certificate, only a revision lies. However, it is not necessary for us to go into this question as this is for the appellants to make such submission as permissible under the law and it is for the respondent to raise such objection, as he deemed fit and proper in this regard. In view of the aforesaid findings we set aside the High Court order dated 26th September, 1989 and remand the case to it for deciding afresh on merits, the second appeal, in accordance with law. The present appeal is allowed. Costs on the parties.
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2000 (4) TMI 836 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... e respondents have siphoned off the funds of the company. The respondents have made counter allegations that the petitioners had collected money on behalf of the company and had not accounted for the same. The allegations from both the sides are devoid of full particulars/materials. In view of this, we do not propose to deal with these allegations. 11. The petition is disposed of with the finding that the allotment of 180 shares is void and that the petitioner-directors have not vacated their office as directors in terms of Section 283(1)(g). Accordingly, we direct the company to rectify the register of members by deleting the names of those to whom shares were allotted on 15.9.1997 and refund the money invested by them in the shares. We also direct that the 1st and the 2nd petitioners should be given notices for all the board meetings of the company by registered post with sufficient notice period. The same directions will hold good in respect of general body meetings also.
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2000 (4) TMI 835 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... til, JJ. ORDER Delay condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed.
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2000 (4) TMI 834 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ature is competent to levy a tax on entertainment, which is what the entertainment duty in the present case is. The State enactment does not encroach upon the Parliamentary enactment namely, the Cable T.V. Network Regulation Act, 1995. The Legislature in structuring the levy has maintained the element of nexus required to ensure that the tax does not encroach upon a prohibited area. The measure of the tax does not disturb the element of nexus in the present case. Like other forms of business, Cable T.V. is exigible to taxation. The State Legislature has been cognizant of new forms of technology which provide fresh avenues of entertainment. The Court in the exercise of the power of judicial review cannot question the wisdom or the policy of taxing statutes. We do not find any substance in the challenge to the constitutional validity of the entertainment duty in the present case. 44. The petitions will stand dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2000 (4) TMI 833 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lowed to continue. This is because the civil court is competent to decide the question of title as well as possession between the parties and the orders of the civil Court would be binding on the Magistrate. In this view of the matter the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order is set aside. In our view, the S.D.M. was right in discontinuing the proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. The Order passed by the S.D.M. on 9th of June, 1999 is restored. Before we part it must be mentioned that in the impugned Order the High Court has passed strictures against the S.D.M. The High Court has also directed the District Magistrate to transfer the proceedings from the S.D.M. who passed the Order dated 9th June, 1991. In our view the strictures were uncalled for. We hope that in future the High Court would not pass such strictures. Two views are always possible. Merely because the High Court takes a different view is no ground for passing strictures against the lower court.
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2000 (4) TMI 832 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rform the contract was extended by the Appellant till August 10,1974 so the failure date should be taken as 10th August, 1974, as such the suit will be within limitation, has to, be mentioned only to be rejected for reasons more than one. First, it is a new point which was never argued be fore the trial court or the High Court; and secondly, the suit is not based on failure of the Respondent to perform his part of the contract in which case it would not be case of frustration of the contract but would be a case of breach of contract which does not entitle the Respondent to claim refund of the bid amount. There fore, there would be no cause of action for the suit itself. It is a self-defeating argument. 17. For all these reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court confirming the judgment of the trial court is set aside. The suit of the Respondent shall stand dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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2000 (4) TMI 831 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are not put before the Advisory Board, we are afraid the necessary consequence must follow and the detention would then be liable to be vitiated. 25. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised a further interesting question that the basis for the detention order is inability on the part of the detenu to discharge the onus under Section 123 of the Customs Act. According to the learned counsel, the detention order must depend upon the tangible material. available to the detaining authority and not on the legal principle fixing the onus on the detenu. Ordinarily, we would have gone into this question. However, since on the earlier two questions we have already expressed our opinion, we do not deem it necessary to go into this question and we leave that contention open. In that view, the petition must succeed. 26. The impugned of detention is quashed and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith unless he is required in any other matter by any other authority.
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2000 (4) TMI 830 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ods forthwith. Since the goods and the vehicle were detained even after the petitioner executed a bond with sureties, we direct respondent No.2 to pay by way of compensation a sum of ₹ 10,000/- to the petitioner. This amount shall be paid by Shri Banger personally and shall not be debited to the State account. The petitioner will also be entitled to have his costs which are assessed at ₹ 2,000/-. 4. Copy of this order be sent to the Financial Commissioner (Taxation)-cum-Secretary, Excise and Taxation Department, Government of Punjab, Civil Secretariat, Chandigarh for information conveying our displeasure at the manner in which Shri Banger has discharged his duties which has resulted in un-necessary and avoidable harassment to the public. 5. Before parties, it may be observed that this order relates only to the release of goods and nothing said herein will preventable authorities from proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law if it is so called for.
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2000 (4) TMI 829 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... go behind the order to find out the real foundation of that order. Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & Anr. JT 1998 (8) SC 585, which has been decided by Brother Jagannadha Rao, J., was also a case where the services of a probationer were terminated. As we have already seen above, there has been total non-compliance with the provisions of Para 541 of the U.P. Police Regulations and services of the appellant were terminated without ever issuing him any notice intimating the grounds on which his services were proposed to be terminated nor was his explanation ever obtained. The services were terminated because he was found involved in a quarrel between two other Police Constables. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal is restored, but without any order as to costs. rights are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2000 (4) TMI 828 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an Nigam Ltd. and Others 1999 (8) SCC 381 is inappropriate since, the consideration therein was in the light of statutory rules for absorption and the scope of those rules. The claim that he need not be a graduate for absorption and being a service candidate, on completing service of 10 years he is exempt from the requirement of possessing a degree need mention, only to be rejected. The stand of the respondent department that the absorption of a deputationist being one against the direct quota, the possession of basic educational qualification prescribed for direct recruitment i.e., a degree is a must and essential and that there could no comparison of the claim of such a person with one to be dealt with on promotion of a candidate who is already in service in that department is well merited and deserves to be sustained and we see no infirmity whatsoever in the said claim. For all the reasons stated above, we see no merit in this appeal which shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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2000 (4) TMI 827 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ority hears the objections to the fixation of rateable value and acts in quasi-judicial capacity. Is orders are appealable. It cannot act in arbitration fashion ignoring principles of law laid by the Court. It cannot fall back on the spacious plea that it has no means to act on the principles of law laid by this Court. Even notice for enllancement of rateable value has to be based on reasons which must exist on record and the owner is entitled to be apprised of those reasons. High Court lent its support to the plea of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi which is contrary to the principles laid by this Court. The appeals are allowed with costs. Judgments of the High Court in both the appeals are set aside. Matter will go back to the Assessing Officer of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to arrive at the rateable value in accordance with law keeping in view the principles laid by this Court in the case of Dr. Balbir Singh and Others v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Others .
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2000 (4) TMI 826 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... olve of its liabilities when it was really using the canteen management as its instrumentality and agent. The cloak apart, the voice definitely is that of Jacobs. Consequently, we could neither find any error of law or other vitiating circumstances in the judgment of the Division Bench nor any infirmities in the process of reasoning or gross unreasonableness and absurdities in the conclusions arrived at to restore the Award, so as to justify and warrant our interference in the matter. The claim of the appellants to consider the question of awarding compensation than to allow them to be reinstated, does not also appeal to us. The canteen services have to be necessarily provided throughout for the staff and the Bank can always utilise the services of the workers for the purpose and there is no justification to deny them of the hard earned benefits of their service. For all the reasons stated above, we see no merit in the appeals and the appeals shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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2000 (4) TMI 825 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... left forearm (Ex. DE). Even the defence witnesses (DW5 and DW6) said that Amrik Singh had suffered cuts and lacerations. Furthermore, the plea was taken by these accused for the first time in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Finally, no such plea of self-defence was put in cross-examination to any of the prosecution witnesses. The High Court, in the circumstances, rightly rejected the plea of self-defence as an afterthought. For all these reaons, we allow the appeal of the complainant by setting aside the order of acquittal and restoring the decision of the Sessions Court and dismiss the appeals filed by Shisha Singh, Baksha Singh, Amrik Singh and Jaswant Singh. Consequent upon our allowing the complainant's appeal, all the appellants are also convicted under Section 302/449 IPC. If any of the accused is on bail he shall surrender to his bail bond and be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentences imposed upon him.
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2000 (4) TMI 824 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r quashing the letter of the State Government dated 16.8.96 is upheld. The direction to the Mahatama Gandhi University to consider the application of the appellant for final affiliation or continuance of affiliation is confirmed and this is to be done on the basis of the approval granted by the AICTE dated 30.4.95, or any other relevant factors in the University Act or its statutes, which are not inconsistent with the AICTE Act or its Regulations. The appeal is allowed and disposed of as stated above. There will be no order as to costs. M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J. The petitioner was not a party in the High Court of Kerala and this Special Leave Petition was filed with leave of this Court. We find that the petitioner has already filed a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court namely CWP No. 952 of 1998 and the same is pending. It will be for the petitioner to have the said matter disposed of by the High Court of Delhi. Therefore, this special leave petition is dismissed as premature.
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2000 (4) TMI 823 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... -cautious and took more monies from VE than was actually required. This has resulted in an excess of ₹ 9,85,000. Merely because the assessee had not utilised these amounts for making the excise duty payments, it cannot be stated that the assessee is liable for penalty in respect of this amount. This amount had also been taken for the purpose of effecting advance excise duty payments. It is not the case of the income-tax authorities that these amounts were not taken for such purpose. The mere fact that in the ultimate analysis it transpired that the assessee had taken more monies than were actually required for making the excise duty payments does not, in our view, authorise a different treatment to be accorded to the excess amount than what has been accorded to the amounts which were actually utilised for making excise duty payments. For the aforesaid reasons, we cancel the penalty and allow the appeal. The penalty, if any, already collected is directed to be refunded.
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2000 (4) TMI 822 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ER Delay condoned. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2000 (4) TMI 821 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ration of the tenancy so much of such land as he may be entitled to purchase under Section 41. That period of one year cannot be changed by holding that sub- section (2) would be applicable and such purchase is to be postponed for an indefinite period i.e. after two years from the date of cessation of disability of the landlord. If this contention is accepted, such purchase would be postponed for a period of two years after happening of uncertain eventuality, namely, minor landlord becoming major, widow ceasing to be owner or in case of disabled person, till cessation of mental or physical disability. That is neither the intention of the legislature nor it is provided. What is provided for is to such purchase Sections 41 to 44 mutatis mutandis shall apply. In the result, in our view, the reasons recorded by the High Court do not call for any interference and therefore, the appeal requires to be dismissed. The Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2000 (4) TMI 820 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... eversed should be of that period and not the credit subsequently earned by the respondents. 4. We have perused the records and have considered the submissions made by both the sides. Rule 57F(4)/57F(13) provides for grant of cash refund of outstanding modvat credit on inputs used in the production of the exported goods. The exports in the present case had taken place in 1996. Therefore, the relevant credit for the purpose of refund would be of that period. This is the position clarified by the Board also in its clarificatory letter dated 12.12.97. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no justification for denying the refund to the respondents or in asking them to reverse the credit earned on purchase of inputs during a subsequent period. The impugned order being in conformity with the instructions of the Board, it is not open for the Revenue to challenge it before us. In the circumstances, we are not able to find merit in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly rejected.
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2000 (4) TMI 819 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... count the experience only from the date of acquisition of superior educational qualification because such interpretation will violate the very purpose to give incentive to the employee to acquire higher education. See D. Stephen Joseph vs. Union of India at page 755 The Court in D. Stephen Josephs case was also of the view that the decision in Suresh Nathan was an exception to the accepted principle of interpretation of the rule on the plain language. In the last mentioned case, namely, Anil Kumar Guptas case, the essential qualifications for appointment were (a) Degree in Civil Engineering and (b) two years professional experience. The Court interpreted the language to mean that the two years professional experience need not entirely be experience gained after obtaining the Degree. Given the meaning of the words, the principle involved and the weight of precedents, the view of the High Court must be upheld. The appeal is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.
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2000 (4) TMI 818 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Tribunal has realised the operative force of para 5(2) to some extent but it has failed to give full effect to its realisation of the scope of Section 5(2). In para 12 of its judgment in R.P. No. 1595/1983 the Tribunal has stated that since the amended rule refers to para 5(2) of the Presidential Order 'it will no longer be open to the petitioners to attack the amendment as was done in respect of the earlier amendment in the previous R.P.'. The Tribunal has thus noticed that the amended rule has been brought about by the government in exercise of its powers under para 5(2) but it has failed to draw the logical inference following therefrom.'' Following the decision in the case of State of A. P. v. Sadanandam (supra), we reject the arguments of counsel for the respondents. For the aforesaid reasons these appeals deserve to be allowed. We accordingly set aside the judgments and orders under appeal. The appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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