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Showing 21 to 40 of 263 Records
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1989 (7) TMI 328 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... were also issued to the Commissioner, who in consequence thereof, withdrew the circular and filed an affidavit tendering apology. With the withdrawal of circular the necessity to examine its validity does not survive. And in view of affidavit the notice is discharged. In the result all the petitions succeed and are allowed. Notices issued either for reassessment or provisional or final assessment treating galvanised pipes as unclassified item are quashed. Similarly assessment orders and recoveries in pursuance thereof to the extent they relate to galvanised pipes assessed as unclassified item, are quashed. In other matters such as where proceedings are pending after remand or in respect of recognition certificate, etc., the authorities are directed to proceed treating galvanised pipes as declared commodity and not as unclassified item. Although each petitioner is entitled to its costs but the petitions having been decided together, the costs are made easy. Petitions allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 327 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hases. During the proceedings under section 22, the assessee relied on the said circular. The question is whether in view of the circular the point whether the basis for levying penalty is the purchase tax or sales tax is debatable or not. Learned Standing Counsel urges that the circular is dated 10th November, 1982, and is, therefore, not applicable to assessment year 1981-82. The question whether the said circular is applicable to the pending matters or not is itself debatable. Therefore, the quantification of penalty under sub-section (6) has become debatable in view of the aforesaid circular, which was specifically relied on by the assessee before the assessing officer under the proceedings initiated under section 22. On these facts no action be taken under section 22, which takes within its ambit only the mistake apparent from record. In the result, the revision is allowed and the order passed under section 22 is quashed. No order as to costs. Revision petition allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 326 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... , at least in some cases, accumulated over the years. It may be difficult for many to clear the arrears all at once in order to be entitled to the declaration forms. Rule 27AA empowers Commercial Tax Officer to grant time to pay up the arrears in lump or in instalments. Since the extent of arrears in each case and the financial capability of the applicants are not precisely known to us, we are not in a position to say whether instalments should or should not be granted in individual cases. But we expect and hope that the appropriate Commercial Tax Officers shall consider the merit of each case and sympathetically consider the question of granting instalments for the purpose of issuing declaration forms if and when prayers in that behalf are made. 25.. With the directions as above, the applications are dismissed. We make no orders as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1989 (7) TMI 325 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ion had, in fact, purchased the same goods in the same form from a registered dealer in West Bengal and if he has any doubt about it the selling dealer claiming exemption must satisfy his doubts by production of sufficient evidence. We also direct that if the Commercial Tax Officer is satisfied from other facts and other evidence on the record, it will not be necessary that the selling dealer should produce a declaration in the form required under rule 27A(Ib) for being entitled to a deduction. However, we do not exclude the production of declaration which may be produced as an evidence of purchase as contemplated in section 5(2)(a)(vd). 31.. Accordingly, the applications, i.e., the writ petitions, are only partly allowed, being disposed of in the terms and with the directions indicated above. There will be no order for costs. All interim orders shall stand vacated. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Writ petitions partly allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 324 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... evision petition is accordingly allowed in part. (ii) The finding of the Tribunal that the transactions of sale of coffee to the STC are not sales in the course of export covered by article 286 of the Constitution to be exempt from taxation, is confirmed. But in respect of the turnover of Rs. 1,07,88,760 the assessment order as affirmed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), and the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded to the assess. ing authority only to the limited extent of consideration of the claim of the petitioner based on C and D forms. (iii) The petitioner is at liberty to produce within a period of one month from today, C and D forms for the period in question and claim the benefit of concessional rate of taxation which shall be duly considered by the assessing authority. In all other respects, the assessment order as affirmed by the appellate authority and the Tribunal remains undisturbed. Petition partly allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 323 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e aforesaid analysis there is no substance in the petitioners challenge to section 2(c) of the amending Act, particularly explanation II in the said section. 13.. As noticed earlier, the petitioners in the writ application have neither clearly pleaded the facts nor specifically indicated the basis for their contentions that the amending Act suffers from hostile discrimination or it is violative of the provisions under articles 19 and 301 of the Constitution. In the absence of specific allegations in this regard the petitioners could not be permitted to raise these contentions. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for them did not press and in our view rightly, these points. As such, it is not necessary to burden this judgment with discussions on these points. 14.. On the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. Parties will bear their respective costs of this proceeding. A.K. PADHI, J.-I agree. Writ petition dismissed.
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1989 (7) TMI 322 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by end of 1981. On account of illegal refusal, petitioner was temporarily deprived of his property. Mr. Roy has brought to our notice that the National Savings Certificates were to mature in the year 1984. From 1984, till the date of return of the certificate, however, petitioner is deprived of the use of his property and is entitled to compensation. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that grant of interest at 6 per cent per annum on Rs. 850 from the date of maturity of the certificates till refund of the same, would adequately mitigate the prejudice of the petitioner. 9.. In the result, writ application is allowed. Annexures 7 and 8 are quashed. The Sales Tax Officer is directed to refund the National Savings Certificates pledged with him with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the amount of security from the date of maturity of the certificates till the date of refund of the same. No costs. J. DAS, J.-I agree. Writ application allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 321 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... turnover of the assessees in question. 7.. There is an additional question raised in T.R.C. No. 60 of 1989 based on rule 9(g). The contention is that the sale of rubber trees is akin to sale of business as a whole and therefore the specific exemption available under rule 9(g) to all amounts realised by the sale of the rubber trees should be allowed as deduction. The Tribunal held that this argument is far-fetched and that the provision contained in rule 9(g) will not apply to the sale of rubber trees by an agriculturist. Rule 9(g) has no application to this case, where rubber trees are sold by an agriculturist as there is no sale of his business as a whole. The argument that the land is a warehouse of trees and the sale of rubber trees is a transfer of business as a whole has no direct bearing on rule 9(g) and cannot be accepted. We find no sufficient ground for interfering with the orders of the Appellate Tribunal. The tax revision cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (7) TMI 320 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order of the Sales Tax Officer was communicated to him. Had an opportunity been given by the Sales Tax Officer, he could have satisfied that he had sufficient cause for not making an application for renewal. 4.. In view of the aforesaid, we remit the matter to the Additional Commissioner for consideration afresh. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was not standing to gain by his default. It was in his interest that he should have made the application, which he could not do due to his illness which incapacitated him from March, 1986. We, therefore, direct that the petitioner shall have an opportunity before the Additional Commissioner for filing such other documents as he considers appropriate. The petitioner is directed to appear before the Commissioner on the 7th of August, 1989, when a date of hearing shall be fixed by the Additional Commissioner. 5.. With the directions aforesaid, the writ application as well as the Misc. case is disposed of.
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1989 (7) TMI 319 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... mitation Act, 1963. Section 29 of the Limitation Act in substance provides that the provisions of sections 4 to 24 shall apply to a case where the application of the provisions of this Act are not expressly excluded by any special or local law. It follows, therefore, that section 21(2) does not expressly exclude the application of the section 5 of the Limitation Act although it may perhaps be contended that the application is by implication excluded. But since the specific provision of section 29 of the Limitation Act did not expressly exclude local or special law, section 5 would be attracted, we are not inclined to throw out this application on the technical ground pressed by Mr. Majumdar. Facts being admitted or at least not controverted we allow the application for condonation of delay. The application is admitted. Affidavit-in-opposition within 3 weeks and reply, if any, within 1 week thereafter. Fix August 14, 1989, for settling a date of hearing. Application admitted.
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1989 (7) TMI 318 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... orresponding value returned therefor, the transaction remained a transaction of sale. The refund in such cases must have to be treated as a rebate or discount. Consequently, the amount refunded, will be excluded from sale price but the amount forfeited must have to be treated as part of sale price and, therefore, liable to levy of sales tax. 16.. Upon a consideration of all the materials before us, we find that the export pass fee paid by the applicant in advance amounting to Rs. 17,472 is liable to be deducted from the turnover for the relevant year. As regards the security deposits, we find that so much of the security deposits as are remaining in the hands of the applicant after refund, are liable to be treated as sale price of bottles and consequently liable to levy of sales tax thereon. 17.. The case, therefore, succeeds in part. There will be no order as to costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. Ray (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application allowed partly.
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1989 (7) TMI 317 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mmissioner is misconceived. The expression to assist him cannot be read in isolation. It is descriptive of the officers other than the Commissioner who are described as persons appointed to assist him. But the law makes it very clear that such persons shall exercise all the powers conferred on them. The power of assessment having been conferred on the Superintendent of Taxes the same has been exercised by him as such. The Superintendent of Taxes admittedly being an officer appointed to assist the Commissioner, the Commissioner can exercise power of revision in respect of order passed by him. The submission of the learned counsel on this score, therefore, is without any substance and, is therefore, rejected. In view of what is stated above, the petitions are allowed. Proceeding for suo motu revision under section 21(1) of the Act, in all the eight cases, pending before the Commissioner of Taxes, is quashed. No order as to costs. J.M. SRIVASTAVA, J.-I agree. Petitions allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 316 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rcise of statutory powers, affect the writ petitioner, we are constrained to quash the same. However, it is made clear that, if the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer has any other right in law to recover the amount from any of the partners/proprietor of M/s. Jagresree Mines and Minerals, he is free to do so according to law. It will be noticed also that the writ petitioner came to know of the impugned proceedings dated 23rd March, 1989, in view of the communication of letter S.Tax/9795 dated 24th March, 1989, by the Sirpur Paper Mills Limited to the writ petitioner. Further, it is the case of the writ petitioner and the Sirpur Paper Mills Limited that they have no independent account of Sri K. Srihari Rao, partner of M/s. Jagresree Mines and Minerals, with them. Therefore, the impugned proceedings dated 23rd March, 1989, issued by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Kaghaznagar, are quashed and the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Writ petition allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 315 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... also average suppression of purchases was to the tune of Rs. 80,000 each. The position would have been otherwise, if each form were seen and if from the investigation of each form the conclusion was reached that there was suppression to the extent of Rs. 80,000. There being no conclusive evidence that under the remaining forms also there was suppression of purchases to the extent of Rs. 80,000. I am of the considered view that the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), made an error in estimating the sales of such watches at Rs. 13,00,000. Considering the totality of the circumstances, sales of watches purchased from outside can be reasonably estimated at Rs. 10,00,000. In the result, the revision is partly allowed, the assessing officer is directed to work out the tax taking the sales of watches purchased from outside at Rs. 10,00,000 instead of Rs. 13,00,000, as determined by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) and the Tribunal. No order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 314 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ect of the matter. Accordingly, we hold that section 26A of the Act does not violate the provisions of articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and is valid. In view of the statements made by the learned Advocate-General that they are prepared to review the cases of the petitioners in the light of the decision of this Court and if any action has been taken under section 26A before a dealer was deemed to be in default, to modify the same, it is not necessary for us to go into the facts of the cases and/or to set aside/or quash the impugned notices under section 26A. We, therefore, direct the respondents to re-examine the impugned notices by giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners in the light of the observations made above and till such examination is made, not to take any further action in pursuance of the same. With the above observations and directions the petitions are disposed of. Parties to bear their own costs. J.M. SRIVASTAVA, J.-I agree. Petitions disposed of.
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1989 (7) TMI 313 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) is not attracted. See 1988 69 STC 187 (Orissa) (Konark Steel Industries v. Sales Tax Officer), 1988 69 STC 202 (Orissa) (Konark Steel Industries (P.) Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer), 1988 69 STC 231 (Orissa) (B. Agarwala v. Sales Tax Officer), 1988 70 STC 228 (Orissa) (Utkal Steels Limited v. Sales Tax Officer). This Bench in O.J.C. No. 2114 of 1980 decided on 6th November, 1987 Konark Steel Industries (P.) Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer , had also taken the same view. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in 1967 20 STC 430 (Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab) was considered in one of the decisions and the decision was distinguished. 5.. In view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the question of law arising out of the order is answered in the negative in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. H.L. AGRAWAL, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1989 (7) TMI 312 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ndamus against the State of Punjab and the Excise and Taxation Officer requiring them to make refund of tax and statutory interest. The plea of the State is the same, i.e., rectification applications are pending. In these circumstances, it is difficult for us to refuse the relief. The petitioner is entitled to the refund of tax and the statutory interest accrued thereon. If and when the rectification is allowed, the State can claim it back in accordance with law. Thus we allow this petition and grant the relief directing the State of Punjab to make the aforementioned payments to the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner shall have his costs which are quantified at Rs. 1,000 per petition. Petition allowed.
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1989 (7) TMI 311 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 976 SC 281, the controversy before the Supreme Court related to the factum whether 5 per cent sugar was required in every carbonated water or in a sweetened carbonated water as provided in the proviso to item A-01-01 of Appendix A. While holding that every aerated water is not required to have sugar but only sweetened aerated waters are required to have 5 per cent sugar, the Supreme Court had indirectly supported the inference that carbonated water and aerated waters are interchangeable terms. Thus, the ratio of Bhim Sen s case AIR 1976 SC 281 does not help the petitioner in holding that carbonated water is different than the aerated water. If that is so, then the case of the assessee would certainly fall in entry No. 32 of Schedule A of the Act pertaining to aerated waters. Thus, the question referred to this Court is answered in the affirmative. There is, however, no order as to costs in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1989 (7) TMI 310 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ng residential house and used for residence, be valued on land and building method instead of rent capitalisation method ? 2. Whether the Tribunal s conclusion to value the residential house at 14, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi, for the years mentioned in the aforesaid question on land and building method, is based on evidence and material or is vitiated as being based on no evidence or on irrelevant evidence and surmises ? 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified while valuing the fully let out premises at 12, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi, in not valuing the same on rent capitalisation method ? 4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the valuation of the fully let out property at 12, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi, should have been done on rent capitalisation method and reliance on the sale of such property to the tenant subsequently is vitiated in law The petition is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1989 (7) TMI 309 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, the same would not be liable to be taxed as salary. As these assessees are foreign technicians and were required to stay away from their homes, we are of the view that the daily allowance given to them was relatable to the extra expenditure the asses sees were required to undergo on food, etc., which was wholly, necessarily and exclusively for the purpose of duties, and as such the allowance was in the nature of reimbursement which would exclude the same from the net cast by the Act. But in so far as rent-free accommodation is concerned the same would be perquisite within the meaning of section 17(2)(i) of the Act. Section 10(14) does not cover perquisites within the meaning of section 17(2) of the Act. Our answer to the questions referred to us are, therefore, as below Questions Nos.1 to 5-No. Question No. 6-Yes. The reference is thus disposed of by answering questions Nos.1 to 5 in favour of the assessees and question No.6 against the assessees. W.A. SHISHAK J.-I agree.
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