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Showing 21 to 40 of 118 Records
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1975 (8) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication. In the present case, however, besides the long delay that has already taken place, since the law laid down by this Court was not very clear at the time of the award in casting a duty upon the labour court to decide the preliminary issue and also in view of the submission of the appellant that it is prepared to pay the entire salary of the workman upto-date it will meet the interest of justice if the order of reinstatement is converted to one of compensation in terms of his entire salary from the date of dismissal to the date of this decision except for what has already been paid to him instead of remitting the. matter to the labour court for disposal in the light of this judgment by setting aside the award. In the result the appeal is dismissed with the above modification of the relief There will be, however, no order as to cost. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ef of the provisions of section 13(1)(e), namely, t that he has sublet. The language is that if the tenant has sublet, the protection ceases. To accede to the contention of the appellant would mean that a tenant would not be within the mischief of unlawful subletting if after the landlord gives a notice terminating the tenancy on the ground of unlawful subletting the sub-tenant vacates. The landlord will not be able to get any relief against the tenant in spite of unlawful subletting. In that way the tenant can foil the attempt of landlord to obtain possession of the premises on the ground of subletting every time by getting the sub-tenant to vacate the premises. The tenant's liability to eviction arises once the fact of unlawful subletting is proved. At the date of the notice, if it is proved that there was unlawful subletting, the tenant is liable to be evicted. The High Court rightly rejected the revision petition. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... every item of activity set out in Schedule V, from washing soiled clothes on a broad stone to using a central place as a posh restaurant. The cumulative result of the multiple submissions we have been addressed is that the impugned resolution is invalid. We do not bar the door for the Municipality or the State to pursue other ways to tax hotel-keepers, acting according to law and under the power to tax in Entry 49, List II, of the Seventh Schedule, while dismissing the appeals The legal controversy in this case is stricken with more than marginal obscurity and indeed, has exercised our minds on the diverse aspects of law considerably. Moreover, the battle is between a local authority which is in need of financial resources to fulfil its functions and a host of hoteliers who flourish in private business. Bearing in mind the conspectus of circumstances, we regard this case as one where the proper order will be that parties do bear their own costs throughout. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Desai, J. in Cr. Appeal 695 of 1969. That judgment has no application because it arose out of the Bombay Act and the question before Desai, J. was whether section 4(1) of the Bombay Act was mandatory or directory. That section, as noticed earlier, provided that the notification "may" also be published in the regional language of the area in a newspaper circulated in that area. The High Court, in the instant case, was concerned with section 6(5) of the Act which has made a conscious departure from the Bombay Act in important respect. The High Court did not even refer to the provisions of the Act and it is doubtful whether those provisions were at all brought to its notice. Everyone concerned assumed that the matter was concluded by the earlier judgment of Desai, J. For these reasons we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Godhra. Fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place. Applications under Article 226 will similarly lie either at Lucknow or at Allahabad as the applicant will allege that the whole of cause of action or part of the cause of action arose at Lucknow within the specified areas of oudh or part of the cause of action arose at a place outside the specified oudh areas. The answers given by the High Court to the first three questions are correct save as modified by our conclusions aforesaid. The answer given by the High Court to the fourth question is set aside. The meaning of cases arising in oudh areas will be found out by appropriate courts in the light of this judgment. The answer to the fifth question is discharged. The matters are sent back to the High Court for disposal in accordance with this judgment. Parties will Pay and bear their own costs. Appeal partly allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Wade has observed "In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus standi. It contains an element of the actio popularis.This is because it looks beyond the personal rights A of tho applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper working order by presenting inferior tribunals and public authorities from abusing their powers." (Standing and Justiciability bid, p. 175) The possible apprehension that widening legal standing With a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system. In this very case, to grant an exclusionary windfall on the respondents is to cripple the Bar Council in its search for justice and insistence on standards. I have been long on a short point, but brevity, where there is some thing to speak, is not the soul of wit but a sign of something different. P.B.R.
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1975 (8) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n of the agreement it still continued to be in force. Apart from the fact that the decision of this Court was with reference to the termination of the award under section 19, it is clear that the termination of the agreement in this case was accepted by the union. It sought to challenge it by the institution of a suit. It is clear that the suit was in relation to the enforcement of a right created under the Act. The remedy in Civil Court was barred. The only remedy available to the workmen concerned was the raising of an industrial dispute. It was actually raised, and, as a matter of fact, shortly after the institution of the suit the disputes were referred by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal in I.T. No. 33 of 1972 on the 25th January, 1972. For the reasons stated above both the appeals are allowed, the judgments and orders of the courts below are set aside. But in the circumstances we shall make no order as to costs in either of the appeals. P.B.R. Appeals allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the excise license granted to the appellants rendered them lube to pay the stipulated lump sum mentioned in the licence?
Held that:- The scheme or remission in the present case is that if the liquor contractor purchased liquor of the value, the excise duty whereof equalled the price of the exclusive privilege, the; liquor con tractor is to be given credit therefor. The agreements give the liquor contractors an exclusive privilege to sell country liquor in a specified area for the period fixed for a stipulated sum of money for enjoying the privilege. If the contractors do not sell any liquor they arc yet bound to pay the stipulated sum. IF they sell liquor they are given the benefit of remission in the price of the exclusive privilege. The measure for this remission is the excise duty leviable to the extent that the liquor contractors can neutralise the entire amount of exclusive privilege in the excise duty payable by them. If the contractors fail to lift adequate quantity of liquor and thereby fail in neutralising the entire price of exclusive privilege the contractors are not called upon to pay excise duty.
For these reasons the contentions of the appellants fail
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1975 (8) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the pro visions of rule 3(b) were mandatory and therefore the failure to issue the notice to the department concerned as enjoined by the rule was fatal to the validity of the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act?
Held that:- We think that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the requirement of the rule was mandatory. We quash the proceedings of the Collector (Special Land Acquisition officer, 2nd appellant) under s. SA(2) as also the decision of the Government on the basis of the report of the Collector under the sub-section. The result is that the notification under s. 6 has to be quashed and we do so. But we sec no reason to quash the notification under s. 4. We direct the Collector (2nd appellant) to proceed with the inquiry on the basis of the objection already filed under s. 5A after giving notice to the department concerned viz., the Education Department and after allowing it an opportunity to file an answer to the objection.
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1975 (8) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the lease is of the building, the fittings and other fixtures merely making for the beneficial enjoyment of and ancillary to the building, as urged by the tenant or whether the building provides a bare, though appropriately designed, enclosure to house an enterprise, dominant purpose or real subject of the lease being the cinema, apparatus and fittings, including subsidiarily and incidentally, though necessarily?
Whether the cinema, to fall within the exclusionary clause added by the Amending Act, must be actually a going concern with all the licenses for showing films and running the theatre being in the name of the lessor?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The lease sued on does not fall within the scope of the definition of 'accommodation'. The appellant is, therefor, entitled to a decree for eviction, in allowance of his appeal.
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1975 (8) TMI 120 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d not object to the claim of the petitioner-company that the sales were of the nature of inter-State sales and were not liable to tax under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. In the result, the prayer of the petitioner-company to quash the impugned assessment order to the extent that it seeks to levy tax under the U.P. Sales Tax Act on the sales of naphtha is granted and the assessment order is accordingly quashed in part. The petitioner-company has further prayed for a refund of the tax to the 10C so that the same may in turn be refunded to the petitioner by the 10C. In our opinion, this prayer is also a reasonable and proper prayer and we have no hesitation in granting the same. We accordingly direct the Sales Tax Officer concerned to modify the impugned assessment order in the manner and to the extent indicated above and refund the tax on the turnover of raw naphtha to the 10C. The petitioner is entitled to the costs which we assess against respondents Nos. 1 to 4. Petition allowed.
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1975 (8) TMI 119 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to what extent. It is thus not possible for me to give any relief to the petitioners in these writ applications. Needless to add that when they submit their returns under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, the petitioners may claim exemption in respect of such business which they claim to be a part of their business as hoteliers and if they are able to establish such a fact before the department, certainly they would be entitled for exemption in respect of such part of the business only such an exemption the commercial taxes authorities would surely grant to them in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. 1972 29 S.T.C. 474 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1131. 10.. As the position stands, however, I do not find any merit in these applications. These applications are, therefore, dismissed with the aforesaid observations. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. S.N.P. SINGH, C.J.-I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 118 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Court in the case of Commissioner of Taxes, Assam v. Prabhat Marketing Co. Ltd 1967 19 S.T.C. 84 (S.C.). and is a question, which is certainly within the jurisdiction of the respond. ent, the assessing authority. Merely because, in an application under article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has made a statement which is not controverted by counter-affidavit or an affidavit-in-opposition by the respondents, the jurisdiction of the respondent-officer to determine that question is not ousted. In that view of the matter, there is nothing in the notice issued which calls for interference in this application under article 226 of the Constitution. In the premises, the rule nisi is discharged. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Interim orders are vacated. The order, however, will not prejudice the right of the petitioner to take all legal grounds before the assessing authority. Let the operation of the order be stayed for a fortnight from date. Rule discharged.
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1975 (8) TMI 117 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed. Appendix The judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of VEERASWAMI and RAMAPRASADA RAO, JJ., in Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Coimbatore Division v. Kothari Textiles Co-operative Stores Ltd. (Tax Case No. 81 of 1968) delivered on 10th July, 1968, is printed below ) Infra. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, COIMBATORE DIVISION v. KOTHARI TEXTILES CO-OPERATIVE STORES LTD. The judgment of the Court was delivered by VEERASWAMI, J.-On the facts found, Ramalakshmana and Company v. State of Madras 1968 21 S.T.C. 35. clearly applies. On the identical turnover, tax has been levied and collected from the principal. The transactions are one and the same and should bear but one tax. There is therefore no force in the contention for the State on this matter. As regards the penalty, S.G. Jayaraj Nadar and Sons v. State of Madras 1968 21 S.T.C. 180. is against the State. The tax case is dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 116 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ht or that the accounts maintained in the ordinary course of business are not in an intelligible form. There is also no finding that the assessee did not maintain a true and correct account of his purchases as well as of stock showing quantity and value for verification of the accuracy of his turnover. In the absence of these findings, neither section 12 nor rule 72 seem to have been contravened by the assessee. The statutory provisions or the Rules do not provide that cash sales must always be vouched by cash memos or by contemporaneous entries in the cash book. Method of account-keeping is left to the choice of the assessee and, so long as the method adopted by the assessee is a recognised method of account-keeping, his account books cannot be rejected. For all these reasons, we answer both the questions in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1975 (8) TMI 115 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... les Tax Rules. That was retrospectively deleted with effect from 1st April, 1959. When a question came up as to the applicability of section 10 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act this court took the view that in view of the omission of the exemption provision with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1959, excise duty could never be deemed to have been exempted from inclusion in the taxable turnover and that, therefore, no question of its exemption under the Central Sales Tax Act arose. If there was no exemption under section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act then section 10 is not applicable at all. These two decisions therefore have no application to the present case. We accordingly hold that in view of the provision contained in section 10 of Central Act 28 of 1969, the respondent-assessee is entitled to exclude the disputed turnover from the taxable turnover. These petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 each. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 114 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Under section 16(2) of the Act, the assessing authority has no jurisdiction to impose penalty by a separate and independent order.
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1975 (8) TMI 113 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here is no basic difference between these three kinds of tractors and this classification would only be referable to the use of the tractors for a particular purpose. 8.. In this view of the matter, it is necessary to further examine whether tractors as a class fall within the ambit of the main entry, which is taxable or they fall within the ambit of the exception mentioned in the said entry. In our opinion, if tractors cannot be classified into different kinds because of any structural difference in manufacture, the only classification would be according to the different use. This aspect was not considered by the said Division Benches. We, therefore, feel that this aspect needs a further consideration and, therefore, we refer the present cases to a Full Bench, which will consider and decide all matters in relation to the first question referred to this court by the Board of Revenue. The record of the cases be placed before the Chief Justice for constitution of a Full Bench.
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1975 (8) TMI 112 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t his genuine need for the forms is greater than sanctioned by the Sales Tax Officer and also that the forms previously issued to him had been properly accounted for, the appellate authority can give him the necessary relief. It is not open to this court to entertain and decide such disputes. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the proper course for the petitioner is to approach the appellate authority. We make it clear that, in the meantime, if the petitioner bona fide utilises the forms already issued to him and if he genuinely needs more forms, he can make a demand from the Sales Tax Officer and we have no reason to believe that the Sales Tax Officer will not issue more forms. At the end, the learned counsel made an attempt to challenge subrule (4) of rule 85. No such ground has been taken in the writ petition and, as such, we are not inclined to permit him to raise this ground. With these observations, the petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (8) TMI 111 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no ground whatsoever has been made out by Mr. Nanavati, which would justify invocation of Chelaram s(1) ratio to the facts of the present case. In the result, we must answer the reference by holding that the Tribunal was not right in holding the transactions in question as sales and as not amounting to works contracts but the Tribunal should have allowed the alternative contention and proceeded on the footing that the transactions were divisible, consisting of two separate contracts of photographic services in taking a photograph, developing the negatives and retouching the negatives and in preparing the first print, and it is only the second bargain, which should have been held to be a sale of photographic prints which attracted sales tax levy. In other words, the two contracts should have been severed as laid down in Camera House decision(2). The reference is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Reference answered accordingly.
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