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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 41 Records
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1956 (9) TMI 57 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tutory provision of this kind cannot be regarded as violative of the constitutional provision relating to equal protection of the laws. The moneys claimed by the State in the present case are moneys which are due from the insolvent in respect of licence fees which were to be paid by the insolvent under the provisions of the appropriate Excise Acts. The power of issuing licences under excise laws is clearly an exercise of police powers. It is impossible to hold that the debt which is sought to be recovered in the present case accrued to the State while it was acting in its capacity as a private juristic person or while it was engaged in commercial activities. 6. For these reasons I am of the opinion that neither a State nor a Government can fall within the ambit of the expression 'person' appearing in Article 14 of the Constitution. Let an appropriate answer be returned to the question which has been referred to us by the learned District Judge. Khosla, J. 7. I agree.
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1956 (9) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
Forthwith within the meaning of section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950 - Preventive Detention - Delay - Held that:- It is obvious that the Commissioner was not sleeping over the orders which he had passed or lounging supinely over them. The delay such as it is due, to causes not of his making, but to causes to which the activities of the petitioners very largely contributed. We have no hesitation in accepting the affidavit, and we bold that the delay in sending the report could not have been avoided by the Commissioner and that when they were sent by him, they were sent "forthwith" within the meaning of section 3(3) of the Act.
What a person is likely to do in future can only be a matter of inference from various circumstances, and his past record will be valuable, and often the only, record on which it could be made. It was finally contended that what was alleged against the petitioners was only that they advocated hartal, and that was not a ground for making an order of detention. But the charge in these cases was that the petitioners instigated hartal bringing about a complete stoppage of work, business and transport with a view to promote lawlessness and disorder, and that is a ground on which an order could be made under section 3(2). All the contentions urged by the petitioners therefore fail, and these petitions must be dismissed
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1956 (9) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ficulty. But as this is a taxing statute, if we can reconcile section 11 and section 14 and reconcile it in a manner which is beneficial to the subject, then it is our duty to do so. We do not and cannot accept the argument of Mr. Joshi that we must construe section 11 independently of any other section of the Act. After all section 11 is only one section of the Business Profits Tax Act. We cannot ignore or shut our eyes to the other sections, and if the other sections help us to construe section 11 in a reasonable manner, it is our duty to do so. It is in this light that we have come to the conclusion that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that it did. We will therefore answer question (1) in the negative, after deleting the words " without having recourse to section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act " from it. We will also answer question (2) in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. Questions answered in the negative.
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1956 (9) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
Whether residence within the Town Area is a necessary condition for the imposition of the tax under clause (f)of the United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914 ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In view of the words and expressions used in section 14 of the Act, it cannot accepted the argument that clause (f) should be read as entirely independent of and unconnected with the other clauses and a different condition, namely residence within the-Town Area, must be read as a necessary part of clause (f). The assessment of the tax on the appellant under clause (f) of subjection (1) of section 14 of the Act was legally valid.
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1956 (9) TMI 53 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Act was enacted at the time the amendment was made. The Act which sanctioned the imposition of sales tax had existed since 1948 and the policy of imposing sales tax had been declared and legalised in 1948. The tax had been levied from traders and had been paid by them regularly without protest. The validity of this Act was never challenged and when in 1952 the defect was removed, if there was any invalidity attaching to the Act it must be deemed to have been removed retrospectively. Therefore it cannot be said that by virtue of Central Act 52 of 1952 the Punjab General Sales Tax Act of 1948 became invalid. The removal of a defect retrospectively does not render the Act invalid. I am therefore of the opinion that the Act is intra vires and that the levy of the tax from the appellants cannot be held to be illegal merely because of the provisions of the Central Act 52 of 1952. This appeal must fail and I would dismiss it with costs. BHANDARI, C.J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (9) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Appellate Tribunal on appeal fixing the liability to tax in a particular year does not operate as res judicata or estoppel so as to prevent that decision from being reopened in assessments for subsequent years. Compare Commissioner of Income-tax v. Massey and Co.1928) 56 M.L.J. 451.. Even in respect of the same year s assessment, power is given to the assessing authority to bring under assessment any turnover that might have escaped tax at the time when the order of assessment was made. See rule 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules. Therefore, it is not right to treat an order of assessment to sales tax as it stood on the same footing as the judgment of a court in every respect. After the receipt of the opinion of the Full Bench the Court delivered the following judgment Judgment The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, C.J.-Following the Full Bench decision in this case, this revision is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Revision dismissed.
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1956 (9) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ely constitutes an offence and makes it punishable and does not prescribe the procedure for the trial of that offence. The offence created by section 14(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act is an offence as defined in section 4(1)(o) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Consequently, to the trial of an accused for an offence under section 14(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, the Criminal Procedure Code is applicable and all its provisions have, therefore, to be given effect to. These appeals are, therefore, competent as having been filed under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As a result we allow both these appeals, set aside the orders of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate and convict the respondent in both the appeals for offence punishable under section 14(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. He is sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50 in each case. In default of payment of fine, the respondent shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months in each case. Appeals allowed.
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1956 (9) TMI 50 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncilability of these. An application of these will lead to those using materials and those not using materials for execution of works being dealt with on a common footing. Contracts for execution of works are of varied types and there is no uniformity in the stipulations in all contracts. The contractor may in some be paid only for his services in advantageously utilising the articles secured by the other party for performance of the work and receive payment. The presumption generally attaching to validity of laws cannot be extended to justify provisions tending to such anomalies, inequalities and arbitrariness as persons being taxed on notional considerations shutting them out from representing the true nature and value of their transactions. This is repugnant to the principles of natural justice and Article 14. The orders of assessment are, therefore, quashed. As the point involved is novel and rather intricate, we direct parties to bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1956 (9) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ortunity being given, the authorities can- not take action under section 9(2), that is to say, they cannot proceed to assess the assessee to the best of their judgment. The assessment therefore is not valid. In the circumstances of this case the respondent cannot be prosecuted for not paying the tax due on an assessment which has not been validly made. No prosecution can therefore lie in the circumstances of this case and the acquittal of the respondent is therefore justified though not for the reasons given by the learned Magistrate but for the reasons indicated by me in this judgment. The appeal is dismissed. This does not prevent the authorities from calling upon the respondent to prove the correctness and completeness of the return sub- mitted by him by issuing another notice and giving him a reasonable opportunity to prove the correctness and completeness and if he fails to do so, the authorities can proceed to assess him to the best of their judgment. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (9) TMI 48 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ame articles, as those who sell them in certain places and those who do not, cannot be assumed to be rational or have a just relation to the object. Section 11 is not open to this objection as the ban on dealers and restrictions on registered dealers in the collection of the tax are applicable uniformly to persons of the respective class. The identical question whether the differentiation under a similar provision in the Madras Sales Tax Act is not repugnant to Article 14 arose in the Madras High Court before a Division Bench. The decision reported in Krishna Iyer v. State of Madras(1) was that the proviso to section 3(1)(b) which is the same as in the Mysore Act is void and unenforceable as it offends the Article of the Constitution. The petitioners may be taxed, if at all, under section 3(1)(b) and not under the proviso. The proviso is invalid and cannot be availed of for levying the tax. We order accordingly and direct parties to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1956 (9) TMI 47 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... een given to him. The assessment to the best of the judgment cannot therefore stand under the circumstances. This lower court acquitted the respondent on the ground that there was no basis for the assessment on Rs. 50,000 as turnover. It is not correct in holding that there is no basis. But in that case I have pointed out that the previous assessment was not a valid one and the assessment on the basis of the previous invalidated assessment cannot therefore be held to be valid in this case also. For both the reasons I must hold that the acquittal was justified. But it does not prevent the assessing authorities from giving the respondent an opportunity to produce the accounts and if he fails to produce the accounts within the time allowed, and if the authorities are satisfied that he is evading to produce the accounts, then they can proceed to assess under clause (2) of section 9 of that Act. The acquittal is there- fore justified and the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (9) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed and all actions taken by any officer in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction or powers conferred by the principal Act were validated the authorities may be entitled to collect the taxes in respect of returns before the 1st of April, 1954, including the sales tax on the turnover. But the proviso has been specially provided for not prosecuting those who were not liable if this Act were not passed. It seems to me that the only restriction that has been placed upon the authorities by the proviso is that they cannot prosecute a person if he has not paid tax as assessed by the authorities that is based on the turnover including the sales tax if they have already passed orders taxing him on that basis. But certainly they are entitled to collect it in other ways than by prosecution. The lower court was, therefore, justified in holding that the authorities cannot prosecute him for the offence. The acquittal is justified and the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (9) TMI 45 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hers (O.P. No. 191 of 1955)Since reported at 1956 7 S.T.C. 731., I see no reason to order notice on this petition. 4.. In Clements and Marshall Pty Ltd. v. Field Peas Marketing Board(1947) 76 C.L.R. 401., Dixon, J., said We should consider the commercial significance of transactions and whether they form an integral part of a continuous flow or course of trade, which, apart from the theoretical legal possibilities, must commercially involve transfer from one State to another. and the passage was quoted with approval by Das, J., in The State of Travancore-Cochin and Others v. The Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory and Others 1953 4 S.T.C. 205 at p. 240 A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 333 at p. 349. I am quite prepared to look at the transactions purely from the point of view of their commercial significance. Even then it is impossible to say that they form an integral part of a continuous flow or course of inter-State trade or commerce. 5.. The petition is hereby rejected. Petition rejected.
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1956 (9) TMI 44 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not- is a collection which has to be handed over to the State under the pro- visions of the Act. In other words, we see no reason to depart from the view that one of us has taken in Mathew v. Sales Tax Officer, Alwaye(6) . We see no reason to depart from the conclusion reached in that case. It was also submitted to us on behalf of the petitioner that even on the assumption that Kunju Moideen Kunju v. State of Travancore-Cochin(4) and Mathew v. Sales Tax Officer, Alwaye(6), are correctly decided, the petitioner will still escape liability as the facts and circumstances of the case are different from those involved in those two (1) 1956 7 S.T.C. 148. (4) 1954 5 S.T.C. 462. (2)A.I.R. 1956 Hyd. 124. (5) 1954 5 S.T.C. 382. (3) 1956 7 S.T.C. 510. (6) 1954 5 S.T.C. 58. decisions. We make it clear that the petitioner, if so advised, will be free to move this Court afresh, if and when proceedings are commenced by the Department on the basis of the said decisions. Ordered accordingly.
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1956 (9) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee was a second dealer?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is true that the High Court observed that the order of remand made at an earlier stage restricted the scope of the enquiry to the merits of the dispute between the parties and no fresh questions could be raised before the Tribunal. Assuming that the High Court was not strictly right in the view that it took, if the Tribunal did not allow the assessee to raise the questions which it sought to raise, there is no ground on which this Court will be justified in allowing those new contentions to be raised and to remand the case to the Tribunal for hearing on those questions. It is true that a question as to the vires of section 40(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1957, was raised, but it is now settled by decisions of this Court that the question as to the vires of a statute which a taxing officer has to administer cannot be raised before him.
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1956 (9) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF PEPSU
Shares warrants and entries in register of members ... ... ... ... ..... and it certainly follows that he alone is liable for share calls or to be put on the list of contributories in case the company is wound up. The dispute in the present case is entirely between the company and a shareholder whose name appears in its register of members, and the dispute relates to the non-payment of a call in respect of the shares entered in his name for which he alone was liable. They were his shares which the company forfeited. The company, therefore, cannot now he heard to say that the respondent was not the holder of those shares at the time they were forfeited. Consequently, Mr. Batta shall be deemed to be holding the shares on August 15, 1947. No other point has been urged. The appeal is consequently dismissed with costs. Counsel fee shall be Rs. 32. The question involved being one of some importance and not covered by any direct authority, I accept the prayer orally made by Mr. Tuli for grant of a certificate under section 52 of Ordinance 10 of 2005 Bk.
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1956 (9) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... 178 of the Companies Act but I do not think that that section has any relevance in this connection. An objection was also raised on behalf of the petitioner that no notice was given to the official liquidator by the Industrial Tribunal before hearing the reference. The argument is not right, for annexure E shows that notice was given to the official liquidator on the nth of January, 1955. It may be that notice was given late, but the award of the Industrial Tribunal was made on the 25th of March, 1955, long after the notice. I do not think there was any lack of jurisdiction and the argument of the petitioner on this point must be rejected. For these reasons I hold that there is no case made out on behalf of the petitioner for grant of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution. In my opinion this application must be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 200 to be shared equally between opposite parties 1 and 2 on one hand and the opposite parties 4 to 23 on the other hand.
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1956 (9) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Consequences of voluntary winding up and Winding up – Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof
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1956 (9) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN
Savings of pending proceedings for winding up and Court – Jurisdiction of ... ... ... ... ..... ., that the District Court has no jurisdiction, cannot stand. No transfer can be ordered on that basis. Finally it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that if the proceedings are transferred to this court expeditious disposal can be expected and that though 8 frac12 lakhs of rupees have been received from Government and deposited in a bank at a low rate of interest no concrete action to make the same available to creditors has been taken. I do not think that this will be a ground to justify the transfer. The company is situated at Trichur. The liquidators and parties will find it much more convenient if the proceedings continue in the District Court of Trichur. There is some force in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the liquidation proceedings are not being expeditiously dealt with. The District Judge will cure that defect. But as pointed out before no ground for transfer exists. Hence the petition is dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs.
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1956 (9) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Compensation for loss of office ... ... ... ... ..... inition is to be applied when the company is wound up, and that therefore in that case the surplus in the hands of the liquidator resulting from the sale of the debentures purchased by the company in course of its business represented profits out of which the claimants were entitled to be paid, and his view was shared by Cozens-Hardy M.R. and Farwell L.J. With this view I am in respectful agreement and I therefore consider that any surplus which remains in the hands of the liquidator after the sale of the company s existing assets, and as a result of any further payment which Government may have to make as a result of the arbitration proceedings, amounts to profit in the hands of the liquidator and that in equity A.N. Goela is entitled to 10 per cent. of this amount whatever it may turn out to be and I order accordingly. Since I have upheld almost the whole of A.N. Goela s claim I also order that he should receive his costs from the official liquidator. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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