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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 65 Records
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1958 (9) TMI 91 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ct to the learned Judge, the matter is much more serious than merely the question of this particular vacancy of 1956 not being relevant to the vacancy which is the subject-matter of the requisition order. On a writ petition, as we have already said, the petitioner has not merely to show good faith, but he has not to suppress any facts and has also to show that justice lies on his side. If the learned Judge had taken these circumstances into consideration and then had come to the conclusion that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the landlord, then undoubtedly we would not have interfered with the order passed by the learned Judge. 36. The result, therefore, is that the appeal will be allowed, the order of the trial Judge will be set aside, and the petition will be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs of the petition and no order as to costs of the appeal. 37. Liberty to the appellant's attorneys to withdraw the sum of ₹ 500 deposited in Court.
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1958 (9) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... opportunity was given to the committee and I cannot agree with the learned Advocate- General that the inquiry by the Deputy Collector at an earlier stage for a different purpose had in effect given an opportunity to the committee. It is not known what were the charges for which that inquiry was held. The record discloses that the inquiry was held by a subordinate officer-there is nothing on record to show that the Government authorised either the Collector or the Deputy Collector to make the inquiry in connection with the fast of Dhurmal Daga. In my view, the inquiry cannot presumably take the place of reasonable opportunity to be given by the Government for the proposed action under s. 53-A of the Act. In the result, it follows that the Order of the High Court should be set aside and that of the Government appointing the Executive Officer quashed. I do it accordingly. ORDER PER CURIAM This appeal is dismissed with costs, in this court and the courts below. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (9) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... intended to buy and did buy and what he paid for. (3) The words di right, title and interest " occurring in s. 155 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code have the same connotation as they had in the corresponding words used in the Code of Civil Procedure existing at the time the Bombay Land Revenue Code was enacted. (4) In execution proceedings it is not necessary to implead the sons or to bring another suit if severance of status takes place pending the execution proceedings because the pious duty of the sons continues and consequently there is merely a difference in the mode of enjoyment of the property. (5) The liability of a father, who is a managing director and who draws a salary or a remuneration, incurred as a result of negligence in the discharge of his duties is not an avyavaharika debt as it cannot be termed as " repugnant to good morals ". In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. SINHA J.-I agree to the order proposed. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (9) TMI 88 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the particular business, and when look upon this deposit and the relation it has to the business of the assessee, it is clear that the deposit was made not for the purpose of acquiring any capital asset of an enduring nature or acquiring a new business, but it was made solely for the purpose of earning profits in the course of the business. The Privy Council also points out that the question that should be posed is--" what is the object of the expenditure?"--and they proceed to answer that question by saying--" it must be answered from the standpoint of the assessee at the time the deposit was made." From the point of view of the assessee in this. case there cannot be the slightest doubt that the deposit was looked upon as a business expenditure and if the deposit was forfeited it was a business loss. The result is that we must answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (9) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... de by the respondent in the application dated December 17, 1953, and the affidavit dated December 21, 1953, at their face value, we have already expressed the view that they amounted to something more than a mere intentional, personal insult to the Magistrate; they scandalised the court itself and impaired the administration of justice. In that view of the matter s. 3(2) of the Act did not stand in the way and the learned Judges of the High Court were wrong in their view that the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated February 9, 1955. In our view, the High Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the act complained of and the case must now be decided by the High Court on merits in accordance with law. It is only necessary to add that the act complained of was committed as far back as 1953 and it is desirable that the case should be dealt with as expeditiously as possible. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (9) TMI 86 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er it was accumulated only for the purpose of the promotion of the game or whether it has been diverted to any other purpose. These are questions of fact which remain undetermined and as to which the assessee furnished no evidence. The assessee does not seem to have paid any regard to the new section at all and did not provide the material on which a decision could be come to in its favour, even if the other points were decided favourably to it. Indeed, so far as the facts are concerned, the case is singularly bare with respect to all the three years and the assessee seems to have relied solely on the objects professed by it. About what it was actually doing besides holding the exhibition matches and tournaments there is no statement or evidence at all. For the reasons given above, the answers to the questions referred must, in my opinion, be as follows Question (1) Yes. Question (2) Yes. The Commissioner of Income-tax will have his costs of this reference. Guha, J.-I agree.
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1958 (9) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... test prescribed by s. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. Alternatively it held, on a consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, that the document in question was in fact and in law a certified copy under s. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. These points do not arise for our decision in the present appeal. Mr. Doabia, however, relies on certain observations made in the judgment of the -nigh Court and it may be conceded that these observations seem to suggest that according to the High Court the provisions of ss. 33(5) and 36(7) do not preclude proof by other means of the fact that the name of the candidate is on the relevant electoral roll. These observations are clearly obiter. Even so we would like to add that they do not correctly represent the effect of the relevant provisions of the Act. The result is the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the election petition filed by respondent 1 is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (9) TMI 84 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as not void in its inception, provided that it was capable of being done by trie principal himself. In the present case, however, the notification of 12th February 1958 does not purport to ratify any act of the Additional Director but it only confers powers of the State Government under Section 42 of the Punjab Consolidation Act on him in general terms and there is no mention of any unauthorised act or acts which were being ratified. Delegation of powers is something quite distinct and different from an act of which ratification is permissible under the Law of Agency. 10. For all the reasons given above, I would; unhesitatingly answer the question in the negative. 11. Counsel agree that no other point arises for decision in the petition and therefore it can be disposed of without being remitted to the learned Single Judge. The petition is consequently allowed and the impugned order quashed. There wilt no order as to costs. G.D. Khosla, J. 12. I agree. S.S. Dulat, J. I agree.
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1958 (9) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ssrs. Gainda Mall Hem Raj and that in the eye of the law the vacancy arising on the closure of the business by Messrs. Army and Navy Stores still remains unfilled. The applications of the appellants and other applicants were for a grant of L-2 license for 1954/ 1955. That year has gone past and accordingly in the changed circumstances we direct the Chief Commissioner to fill up the vacancy caused by the closure of the business by Messrs. Army and Navy Stores by inviting applications from intending licensees including the appellants and Messrs. Gainda Mall Hem Raj and granting the same to the most suitable party. We, therefore, accept this appeal, reverse the order of the High Court and issue a mandamus to the effect aforesaid and also direct the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 to pay the appellants' costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the High Court out of which this appeal has arisen. Messrs. Gainda Mall Hem Raj are to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (9) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ents made on the evidence by the learned Advocate for the appellant, but those comments were with reference to unimportant matters and were not at all relevant. In an appeal by special leave it is not ordinarily permissible to make submissions on questions of fact. The principal matter with which we have been concerned in this appeal was whether the confession of Prem had been corroborated in material particulars regarding the general story told by him and in material particulars tending to connect the appellant with the murder of the deceased. We have no hesitation in saying that the confession of Prem has been amply corroborated in both respects. Recovery of the ornaments of the deceased at the instance of the appellant incriminated him to the fullest extent and lent the strongest corroboration to the confession of Prem from which it was apparent that no other person than the appellant could have murdered Nirmala Devi. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (9) TMI 81 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rs and discharge such duties as may be assigned to it by and under the Act" and by the Rule framed under Section 17 of the Act the Central Government has conferred the power of collection on the Coal Board. There is thus no substance in this contention of the appellant. 33. For reasons given earlier, the appellant's contention on the construction of Section 8 (1) (a) of the Act succeeds. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment and order of Sinha, J. are set aside. The appellant's application under Article 226 of the Constitution is allowed to the extent that a writ of mandamus will go to the Respondent, directing it to forbear from levying and collecting any duty of excise under Section 8 (1) (a) of the Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Act, 1952, on coal taken from the appellant's colliery at Jaykaynagar to its power-house at the same place and within the same compound for consumption therein. 34. There will be no order for costs. 35. I agree.
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1958 (9) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es have riot been duly notified by respondent I under s. 5(1) of the Act. If that be so, it was incumbent upon the appellants to have given the requisite notice under s. 53 before instituting the present suit. The requirement as to notice applies to suits against a Central Board in respect of their acts as well as to suits for any relief in respect of any waqf. It is not denied that the present suit would attract the provisions of s. 53 if the argument that the Darga and the offerings are not notified is rejected. The result is that the suit is not maintainable as a result of the appellant’s failure to comply with the requirements of s. 53. We would accordingly confirm the finding of the High Court that the appellants’ suit is barred by time under s. 5(2) and is also not maintainable in view of the fact that the appellants have not given the requisite notice under s. 53 of the Act. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (9) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pin Behari Sarkar denied ownership of the wrapper. His explanation was not that the burnt marks on the wrapper were there before December 18. This wrapper had blood-stains. They were too small in quantity to enable a Serologist to determine their origin, but it is remarkable that wherever the bloodstains were found on the wrapper an attempt had been made to burn out those marks. Unfortunately, for the appellant, his attempt to burn out the bloodstains on the wrapper was not entirely successful. This was in our opinion, an incriminating circumstance against this appellant. The circumstantial evidence taken as a whole leaves no room for a reasonable doubt in our minds -about the guilt of this appellant. In our opinion, the High Court rightly found the appellants guilty under s. 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. It could not be said that the sentence of death for a murder of the kind proved in this case was unduly severe. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1958 (9) TMI 78 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion (5) of section 66 of the Act. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax (2), is to the same effect. Their Lordships, in the course of the judgment, remarked that the High Court should have raised a question which arose as a corollary to the answer given by them to another question. Since that was not done by the High Court, the Supreme Court reframed a question by restoring the question suggested by the assessee. There are also other decisions which express the same view, but it is unnecessary to multiply citations. Suffice it to say that the High Court has ample power to recast or amend the questions so as to bring out the real controversy between the parties, if they are warranted by the statement of the case. In the result, the questions referred to us are answered in favour of the Department. The respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner, which we fix at Rs. 150. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (9) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court was wrong in its view that the award disclosed an error on the face of it
Whether the portion of the award which held that his dismissal had no effect on his status and that he continued to be a professor was merely consequential and hence a surplusage and therefore an error disclosed in it would not vitiate the award?
Whether the appointment of Professor Saha as the sole Arbitrator was illegal?
Held that:- We are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the High Court. There is no doubt that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced. Section 21, Cl. (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and the second illustration under this clause given in the section make it so clear that further elaboration of the point is not required. It seems to us that the present award does purport to enforce a contract of personal service when it states that the dismissal of the appellant " has no effect on his status", and " He still continues to be a Professor of the University ". When a decree is passed according to the award, which if the award is unexceptionable, has to be done under s. 17 of the Arbitration Act after it has been filed in Court, that decree will direct that the award be carried out and hence direct that the appellant be treated as still in the service of the respondent. It would then enforce a contract of personal service, for the appellant claimed to be a professor under a contract of personal service, and so offend s. 21 (b).
We are also clear in our mind that the contention about the offending portion of the award being a mere surplusage affords no assistance to the appellant for it was not said on his behalf that the offending portion was severable from the rest of the award and should be struck out as a mere surplusage. It, therefore, has to remain as a part of the award and so long as it does so, it would disclose an error on the face of the award and make it liable to be set aside as a whole.
All considerations that apply to an award under the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be said to apply to an award made under the Arbitration Act. Furthermore, under s. 45 of the University Act, the arbitration held under it is to be governed by the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the validity of an award made under such an arbitration has, therefore, to be decided by reference to the rules applying to that Act, one of such rules being that the award should not disclose an error on its face. For these reasons, in our view, this argument is unfounded.
It was said that the respondent claimed to appoint Professor Saha the sole arbitrator under s. 9 of the Arbitration Act but that section could only apply where the reference was to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party, while the proper interpretation of s. 45 of the University Act was that the arbitration was to three Arbitrators, one nominated by each of the parties and the third by the Chanceller of the University. This point was decided against the respondent by the High Court. As, however, the appeal must be dismissed for the reason that the award contains an error on the face of it, as we have earlier found, it becomes unnecessary to decide the point raised by the resp.ndent.Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (9) TMI 76 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cessive delegation of legislative power. These observations of their Lordships, which are binding on us, are applicable to the present case. The very fact that the Tribunal to be constituted was to sit in revision over the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax by itself gives some indication that the person or persons to be appointed to such Tribunal should have the requisite capacity and competency to deal with revision petitions of such nature. In my opinion, therefore, it must be held, following the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said case there is sufficient indication in the present Act as to the type of persons who have to be appointed to discharge such duties as at present. The result, therefore, is that this contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner must also fail. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Each party will bear and pay its own costs of this petition. SOMNATH IYER, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (9) TMI 75 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lls within the provisions of law he has to allow it, and he is not entitled to allow any other deduction. In substance, this is the view which has prevailed before the authorities below and we would say generally that what is claimed in this case by way of deduction is not really the sale price less any sum allowed as cash discount according to trade practice but merely a concession which the applicants have shown to their customers. In these circumstances we are unable to accept the contention raised by Mr. Tamhane on behalf of the applicants. 4.. This would be enough for a decision in these cases, but if an authority is necessary to support the view which we are taking, it is furnished by a decision given by the Nagpur High Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Anwarkhan Mahboob Co. 1956 7 S.T.C. 197. With respect, we are in agreement with that view. In the result, therefore, these applications fail and will be dismissed. Applications dismissed.
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1958 (9) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Character of the grant under Exhibit B - whether it amounts to a new Patni with reference to the Chaukidari Chakaran lands as contended for by the appellant, or whether it incorporates those lands in the Patni of lot Ahiyapur, so as to make them part and parcel of the lands comprised therein, as is maintained by the respondents?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Exhibit B creates a distinct Patni, that the sale thereof on May 15, 1937, is valid, and that the plaintiff has therefore acquired a good title to the suit lands under the grant dated February 13, 1941. In this view, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the point that was the subject of considerable argument before us as to whether it is open to the defendants to raise the invalidity of the sale held on May 15, 1937, in answer to this action, they not having taken steps to have set it aside, as provided in s. 14 of the Regulation.
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1958 (9) TMI 73 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the application for the restoration of the revision petition on its merits without declining such jurisdiction merely on the ground that the Board of Revenue had already dismissed the revision petition for default. In the result, this writ petition has to be allowed although not on all the grounds which were urged by Mr. Ullal in support of it. In my opinion, although we should hold that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had the competence to dispose of the application presented by the petitioner for the restoration of his revision petition, we must quash his order which is now brought up before us on the ground that he declined to exercise his jurisdiction in the manner in which he did. His order is therefore set aside and the application made by the petitioner is remitted to him for disposal according to law in the light of the observations contained in this order. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs. MALIMATH, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
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1958 (9) TMI 72 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not a dealer, but the respondent contends that he is. The present petition must in my opinion be dismissed-(a) because another remedy equally adequate and efficacious is available (b) because it has not been alleged, far less proved, that the respondent has exceeded his jurisdiction (c) because our attention has not been invited to any error which is apparent on the face of the record and (d) because facts are in dispute which ought primarily to be decided by the administrative authorities concerned. The validity of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, was challenged when the writ petition was first presented, but this challenge was given up when the petition came to be argued before us. For these reasons I would dismiss the petition but would make no order as to costs. This order also disposes of Civil Writs Nos. 744, 745 and 746 of 1957, and Civil Writ No. 313 of 1955 as the main points involved in all these petitions are common. DULAT, J.-I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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