|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 472 Records
-
1998 (9) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n of the above proviso is mandatory, in the instant case it is all the more necessary in view of the admitted facts that the respondent has now taken possession of door No. 143, earlier occupied by Co-optex, and that she has also initiated execution proceeding for eviction of the tenant of door No. 147 A. As the mandatory requirement of the above quoted proviso has not at all been adverted to by the High Court in the light of the materials already on record and the above subsequent events we set aside the impugned judgment so far as it relates to the three appellants and remand the matter to it for fresh disposal of the three connected revision petitions in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. Since the matter is long pending the High Court is requested to dispose of the above petitions as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (9) TMI 676 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... s Ltd. 1998 (97) E.L.T. 193 (S.C.) 1998 (1) S.C.C. 665 . Learned Counsel are agreed that this is so. The appeals are allowed accordingly in terms of the aforesaid judgment. No order as to costs.
-
1998 (9) TMI 675 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of M/s. Kashi Papers v. Commissioner of Trade Tax and others, 1994(2) U.P.T.C. 977 in which a similar view was taken. In my view the Tribunal's order directing for release of the goods is justified and requires no interference. The Tribunal has however, held that the goods belonged to M/s. Mentha Trade Linkers and mere was therefore hardly any justification for opening for Indemnity bond and providing that it would stands discharged if the goods were delivered to the aforesaid party outside the State of U.P. at Raigarh. M/s. Mentha Trade Linkers had every right to stop transport of the goods and get them back to its premises and cannot be forced to export the goods outside the State of U.P. However, the learned Counsel for the respondents informs that indemnity bond has already been furnished. The authority should, therefore, release the goods forthwith. The revision petition is dismissed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 674 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... against the impugned order of the Tribunal and applies for withdrawal of this petition. The petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
-
1998 (9) TMI 673 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... der. 3. The undertaking on affidavit filed by the son and power of attorney holder of the petitioner is accepted as an undertaking by the petitioner. Indeed the learned counsel for the petitioner has also offered before the Court that the same may be so accepted. The property mentioned by the petitioner in the said affidavit/undertaking shall be available for recovery in the event of the demand against the petitioner being ultimately upheld and shall not be encumbered, charged or alienated in any manner whatsoever until the appeal is decided. 4.Orders under section 226(3) of Income-tax Act, shall be withdrawn forthwith by the respondents awaiting the orders of the Tribunal." 6. In view of the short controversy arising for decision in the appeal, the Tribunal is requested to accommodate the appeal filed by the petitioner for hearing out of turn and dispose of the same at the earliest preferably within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order.
-
1998 (9) TMI 672 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
... ...
... ... ..... not come under any of the adjustments prescribed in the Explanation to s. 115JA. For the reasons mentioned in paras 2.4 and 2.5, it is a debatable issue whether the amount of ₹ 33,06,05,633 could be excluded in arriving at the net profit as per the P&L a/c prepared for the purpose of s. 115JA in accordance with Parts II and III of Sch. VI to the Companies Act. Such a debatable issued cannot be a basis for prima facie adjustments under s. 143(1)(a) of the IT Act. In this view of the matter, we delete the addition made under s. 143(1)(a) of the Act. 2.8. Before parting with the case, we may add that we were informed in the Court that the Department had already issued notice under s. 143(2), thus setting in motion the regular assessment proceedings. The discussion as in our order will be without prejudice to any view that may be taken by the AO, in accordance with law in the regular assessment proceedings. 3. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 671 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dent, which fact has not been disputed before us, we consider that insisting upon the payment of the duty determined, cannot be upheld. Further, there is one other factor in this case and that is the appellant has since been declared as a sick industry by an order dated 23rd April, 1998 by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. 7. In these circumstances, we are of the view, that directing the appellant to pay the excise duty as determined as a condition for hearing the appeal, is not sustainable. Accordingly, on the facts of the case, the orders of the High Court and that of the Appellate Authority and the 3rd respondent are set aside. 8. Both the learned Counsel are agreed that the matter can go back to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad II Division for hearing the case on merits. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise Hyderabad II Division for hearing the matter on merits. The appeal is allowed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 670 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... no differences. Therefore, when the goods specifically fall within the statutory language and unliteral interpretation does not result in any absurdity or injustice, mere is no cause for applying the user text. But even otherwise by applying the user text also, the goods in question cannot be taken to Entry No. 16 because admittedly the varnish in question is used as a coating material and thinners are used as dilutents. The mere fact that they are so used in relation electrical goods, will not make them electrical goods. 13. For the above reasons, I am of the opinion that the view taken by the assessing officer was correct and the view taken by the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal is untenable. 14. These revision petitions are, therefore, allowed and setting aside the impugned order dated 31.3.1997. It is ordered that the said appeals would stand allowed and the dealer's First Appeal before the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) at this point, shall stand dismissed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 669 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the Consolidation Act, namely, the original appellate and the revisional authority duly considered the effect of the entries in the subsequent settlements and had recorded a finding that a fresh tenancy was given in favour of the appellants and not Beni Prasad, the respondent. These concluded findings of fact arrived at by the Consolidation Authorities could not have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and more so on a total misreading of the judgments of the authorities under the Consolidation Act. Having examined the impugned judgment of the High Court, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction in interfering with the findings arrived at by the authorities under the Consolidation Act. We accordingly set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and affirm the decision made by the authorities under the said Act. This appeal is accordingly allowed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 668 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that time, that did not mean that the dealer's appeal would have been dismissed. The validity of the order of remand depended on its own facts and validity cannot be lent to it by the subsequent order of assessment or the order on the dealer's second first appeal. 9. Learned standing counsel merely toed the repeated the view taken by the Trade Tax Tribunal, for which he could not site any authority in support of his contention. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal is not in accordance with law and deserved to be set aside. This revision petition is, therefore, allowed and setting aside the Tribunal's order dated 9.11.1989, it is ordered that the said appeal will stand allowed. The order dated 31.3.1986 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Trade Tax is also set aside and the assessment order dated 19.10.1985 is quashed. The dealer revisionist will get costs of this revision, which I assess at ₹ 1,500.
-
1998 (9) TMI 667 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... creening Committee are very reputed persons and hence their conclusion must be given full weight. It is not a question of doubting the calibre of the members of the Screening committee. While declining to agree with their conclusion no particle of mud is slung on any member of the Screening committee. Even if such a conclusion was made by a judicial personage the higher court which overrules it does not cast any stigma on the judicial officer concerned. o p /o p We have no doubt that there is utter dearth of evidence for the Screening committee to conclude that appellant had doubtful integrity. Such a conclusion does not stand judicial scrutiny even within the limited permissible scope. o p /o p We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order under attack including the order by which premature compulsory retirement was imposed on the appellant. The department concerned shall now work out the reliefs to be granted to the appellant as sequel to this judgment. o p /o p
-
1998 (9) TMI 666 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... -section (2) of the Partnership Act but was partly not barred and consequently the decree passed by the Trial Court as confirmed by the High Court is held to have remained well sustained and calls for no interference in the present appeal. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. At the request of learned counsel for the appellant, time to vacate the suit premises is granted till 30.6.1999 on the appellant's filing usual undertaking in the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today and also on further condition that from 1.10.1998 till the premises are vacated or till 30.6.1999, whichever is earlier, the appellant will pay by way of occupation charges ₹ 50,000 per month. If any of the conditions of the aforesaid undertaking or the present order is committed breach of, extension of time will stand recalled and the decree for possession will become executable forthwith. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (9) TMI 665 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... ne 8 correct “1994" as ”1991". Page 227 line 11 from bottom correct “length” as “printed price”. Page 241 line 2 from bottom correct “again by” as “against”. Page 243 line 2 correct “9" as ”39". Page 244 the figures in the last line namely “0.90",”1.50" and “2.40" will be corrected as ”1.15", “2.00" and ”3.15 “ respectively. Page 251 line 2 correct “ 57A” as “52A” Page 261 renumber item 22 as 23 and insert the following “22. Point (xxvi) page 232". 2. The above corrections will be carried out. We are grateful to the learned Counsel for either side who have taken the trouble of discovering these typographical and clerical errors bringing them to our notice so that necessary corrections may be carried out. Sd/- Sd/- (K. SANKARARAMAN) (JUSTICE U.L. BHAT) MEMBER (TECHNICAL) PRESIDENT
-
1998 (9) TMI 664 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e answer the question of law which had been formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal. There is no reference to the question of law in the impugned order and it appears that the High Court thought that it was dealing with a first appeal and not a second appeal under Section 100 CPC. The findings of fact recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on the record. There was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. None has been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the respondent either. The findings, therefore, did not require to be upset in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the learned Single Judge, under the circumstances, cannot be sustained. This appeal consequently succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 13th Sept. 1996 is set aside. As a result, the eviction suit filed by the landlord shall stand dismissed. No costs.
-
1998 (9) TMI 663 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t, on contest, no review petitions could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the case was an affront to the order of this Court, We express our strong disapproval and hope there would be no occasion in the future when we may have to say so. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably er-roneous The respondents who approached the High Court after the dismissal of their SLPs by the this court, abused the process of the court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly deprecate the manner in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court after the dismissal of the SLPs by this court. The appeals deserve to succeed on that short ground. The appeals are, consequently, allowed and the impugned order dated 7.4.1994 passed in the review petitions is hereby set aside. The respondents shall pay ₹ 10,000 as costs.
-
1998 (9) TMI 662 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ’ as separate items for the assessment period 1993-94. This court in M/s. Oil Seeds, Oil Trade and Industry’s Association Vs State of Karnataka In W.P. Nos. 1511 & 1512/98 by thus court dated 17.3.98 has held that “Rice Bran & De-Oiled rice bran are not different products. The assessing authority was not justified in assessing the same as two difference or separate items”. Hence this writ petition is allowed. The order impugned are quashel and the matter is remanded to the assessing authority to redo the assessment in the light of the decision of this Court in W.P. Nos. 1511 & 1512/98 dated 17.3.1998. It is now submitted by the learned Govt. Adv. That the order of the learned single judge has been challenged in W.A. No. 3069/98 & connected matter which is pending before the division bench of this court. It is obvious that the orders of assessing Authority is subject to the orders in the writ appeals referred to above. Petition Allowed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 661 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 6.1993 directing sugar industry to sell molasses at a specified controlled rate to different distilleries. The Controller of molasses in the State of Bihar also gave a further clarification that the central Government had not rescinded the Bihar Molases (Control) Act, 1947 and the State authorities were free to regulate and control molasses in exercise of power vested in the State under the State Act . In the State of Bihar also, in September 1993, a system of partial decontrol of molasses was introduced allowing sugar factories to sell the remaining molasses at free market prices after fixing a certain percentage for molasses to be supplied at fixed controlled rates to the distilleries. The challenge to these orders and the Bihar Molasses (Control) Act, 1947 are similar to the challenges in the appeals pertaining to the State of U.P. For reasons which we have set out in our judgment in the appeals pertaining to the State of U.P., these appeals are also dismissed with costs.
-
1998 (9) TMI 660 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... asure of business expediency. But detailed circumstances relating to claim of waiver are not before us. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned revenue authorities did not deal with all the relevant questions relating to the issue. For lack of material, we are unable to record a final finding whether the amount in question accrued to the assessee as its income. In respect of other issue, the learned CIT(A) recorded that the assessee followed mixed system of accounting. What is that mixed system? How interest accrued in the light of that mixed system ? In respect of above questions, we do not get any clear answer from record nor the learned representatives of parties provided any. In these circumstances, we set aside the impugned orders on this point and restore the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for recording a fresh finding in accordance with law. 9. In the result, the revenue’s appeal is dismissed and the assessee’s appeal is partly allowed.
-
1998 (9) TMI 659 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... operators in the scale of 1350-2200 (or 1400-2300 by concession of counsel) are arbitrary and illegal, ultra-vires and are declared violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The appellants are declared entitled to the designation of Data Processing Assistants grade III (also called earlier as gr B) in the scale of ₹ 1600-2660 with effect from 1.1.1986, the date when the IV Pay Commission scales came into force. The appellants are also entitled to the scale of ₹ 5000-8000 with effect from 1.1.96 in view of the government orders passed in connection with the Vth Pay Commission recommendations. 62. It is made clear that the judgment is applicable only to those 48 appellants who were directly recruited as Data Processing Assistants in the NSSO, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning. 63. The Appeal is allowed as stated above. There will be no order as to costs. 64. I.A.No. 1 in SLP (C) No. 19257/1995 may be listed before appropriate Bench.
-
1998 (9) TMI 658 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... accept the audit report before the completion of the assessment, the assessee could not claim it as a matter of right and that is why, in fact, in that case the Hon’ble Bombay High Court had answered the question against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. Thirdly, we cannot interpret that any word in section 11(4A) is redundant and would lead to absurdity if literally interpreted. In our view, the intention of the Legislature is very clear and it is to the effect that if a charitable society or institution wants to get the benefit of exemption of its income from business, the business should be firstly, incidental to the attainment of objectives of the trust or institution and, secondly, it must maintain separate books of account for such business. It cannot mean that if this interpretation is given, it would lead to any absurdity. 11. Taking all these factors into account, we uphold the order of the learned CIT(A) and dismiss the appeal filed by the assessee.
........
|
