|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 201 to 220 of 265 Records
-
1994 (10) TMI 65 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Natural justice - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... ed 31-12-1992 of the Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Madurai I Division in its entirety and also the consequential order dated 6-1-1993 of the Superintendent, Central Excise, Thirumangalam Range by allowing W.P. Nos. 1785 and 1786 of 1993, I direct the 2nd Respondent/Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Madurai I Division, to restore the proceedings, which are the subject matter of the notices dated 13-8-1992 and 8-12-1992, and issue a fresh notice of hearing giving sufficient time also to the petitioner to submit their objections and thereafter give a hearing if so desired by the petitioner in accordance with law and decide the matter on merits objectively and in accordance with law uninfluenced by the earlier proceedings which have been hereby quashed. In the light of the above, W.P. Nos. 14509 of 1992 and 28 of 1993 are dismissed as calling for no separate orders in view of the orders passed in the other writ petitions and directions issued pertaining thereto. No costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
Action of the Union of India in withdrawing a time bound exemption Notification No. 66 dated 15-3-1979 for the import of PVC resins challenged
Held that:- Unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that Notification 66/79 could not be withdrawn before 31-3-1981. First, because the exemption Notification having been issued under Section 25(1) of the Act, it was implicit in it that it could be rescinded or modified at any time if the public interest so demands and secondly it is not permissible to postpone the compulsions of "public interest" till after 31st March 1981 if the Government is satisfied as to the change in the circumstances before that date. Since, the Government in the instant case was satisfied that the very public interest which had demanded a total exemption from payment of customs duty now demanded that the exemption should be withdrawn it was free to act in the manner it did. It would bear a notice that though Notification 66/79 was initially valid only upto 31-3-1979 but that date was extended in "public interest", we see no reason why it could not be curtailed in public interest. Individual interest must yield in favour of societal interest.
In our considered opinion therefore the High Court was perfectly right in holding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel had no application to the impugned notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 25(1) of the Act in view of the facts and circumstances, as established on the record. Appeals fail and are dismissed
-
1994 (10) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ jurisdiction - Warehousing ... ... ... ... ..... n to clear the goods and were waiting for some customer to come forward to clear the goods. Shri Mehta pointed out that the petitioners, on import, had probably no money to clear the goods and the goods were dumped in the warehouse and ultimately the respondents were required to charge dumping duty. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioners did not think it necessary to approach this Court for a period of four years from the date of import, that itself is sufficient to decline to grant any relief to the petitioners in respect of payment of interest in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In our judgment, it is not necessary to examine whether there is liability to pay interest in respect of goods warehoused prior to the date of amendment providing for payment of interest. We are not inclined to examine that aspect as in our judgment, the petitioners had deliberately delayed clearance for several years. 4. Accordingly, petition fails and rule is discharged with costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Detention certificate - Customs ... ... ... ... ..... the order passed by the appellate authority. In our judgment, the petitioners are entitled to the relief claimed. 3. Accordingly, rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). By interim order passed by this Court, the petitioners have deposited 40 of the demurrage charges with Port Trust and furnished Bank guarantee for the balance. The respondents are directed to issue detention certificate in accordance with the Rules within a period of six weeks from today. The Port Trust authorities are directed to determine the concession available to the petitioners in pursuance of the detention certificate within a period of four weeks from the date of submission of the certificate. The Bank guarantee furnished by the petitioners to stand discharged at the end of four weeks from the date of submission of the certificate. The Port Trust will obviously refund the amount deposited, in case such amount is not required to meet the charges. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall pay the costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
Whether appellants entitled for benefit under Notification No. 88 of 1977- C.E., dated 9-5-1977?
Held that:- The benefit of the Notification in view of proviso (i) can be extended only to such manufacturers in whose factory including the precincts thereof, not more than 49 workers are working on any day of the preceding 12 months. As within the precincts of the factory more than 49 workers were working including the workers of M/s. Stepwell Industries, the appellant shall not be entitled to the benefit of the Notification. Against assessee.
-
1994 (10) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the set of facts and circumstances of the instant case, the Collector and Tribunal were justified in concluding that the appellant was guilty of wilful mis-statement and suppression of facts?
Held that:- A reasonable conclusion can certainly and legitimately be drawn that the appellants wilfully and deliberately made mis-statements and suppressed material facts to avoid payment of excise duty. In other words it is not a case of simple inaction or failure on the part of the appellants to furnish material information.
As already found that the appellants have acted in conscious disregard of their statutory obligations and deliberately suppressed material facts the above contention can neither be accepted nor the above-quoted passage pressed into service. Appeal dismissed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
Demand - Limitation - Valuation - Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... by the Department was correct, the submission of the learned counsel on lack of jurisdiction to initiate proceedings is not necessary to be decided as the power to issue show-cause notice vests even if the duty was short-levied as a result of erroneous application of law. However, once the Department accepted the price list, acted upon it and the goods were cleared with the knowledge of the Department, then in absence of any amendment in law or judicial pronouncement, the reclassification should be effective from the date the Department issued the show-cause notice. The reason for it is clearance with the knowledge of the Department and no intention to evade payment of duty. 5.In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The appellant is held liable to pay duty on the dye-stuffs manufactured by it in the manner calculated by the Department from 16th October, 1976, the date the show cause notice was issued to the appellant. 6.Parties shall bear their own costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 58 - KERALA HIGH COURT
High Court, Income Tax Act, Question Of Law, Representative Assessee, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ons entail dismissal. Counsel for the Revenue had a further submission based on Explanation 1 to section 164(1). The contention was that the deed of trust in question did not expressly state the shares of the beneficiaries and, therefore, their shares should be deemed to be unknown. We dealt with a similar Explanation in section 21(4) of the Wealth-tax Act in our earlier judgment and came to the conclusion that the shares of the beneficiaries had been expressly stated, so that the similar Explanation to section 21(4) was not attracted to the facts of these cases. We do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of Sri N. R. K. Nair that the Explanation applies to these cases and that the shares of the beneficiaries have to be treated as indeterminate and unknown. Following our judgment in Income-tax (?) Reference No. 143 of 1985 and related matters we hold that there is no question of law liable to be referred in these cases. Accordingly we dismiss these petitions.
-
1994 (10) TMI 57 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Assessment Year, Reassessment Proceedings, Reference Application ... ... ... ... ..... nst the Revenue by the decisions of this court. We do not find that any purpose will be subserved by directing a reference of any of the questions of law. We have already noted that a reference application relating to another year relating to the status of the very same assessee was rejected. Therefore, the matter stands concluded against the Revenue by the decision of this court. Even if the reopening is held valid by this court differing from the view taken by the Tribunal, ultimately, the reopened assessment cannot be upheld in view of the prior decisions of this court and also the refusal by us to refer the very same question in Original Petition No. 16493 of 1992. We, therefore, feel that no purpose will be served by directing a reference of the questions of law. We do not therefore find that any purpose will be subserved by referring either of the questions to this court. We, therefore, decline to grant the prayer of the Revenue. The petitions are accordingly dismissed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 56 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... arious places to attract sufficient customers. The Tribunal took a different view on the facts and circumstances of the case and came to the conclusion that it will be reasonable to limit the receipt per day of the assessee during the year in question to Rs. 1,500. A perusal of the order of the Tribunal shows that adequate reasons have been stated therein as to why the reduction of the receipt per day to Rs. 1,500 was justified. It is not as if the Tribunal had acted on surmises. It has acted on cogent material available before it. The finding entered by the Tribunal is essentially a question of fact being an inference from the facts available on record. We do not find any merit in the contentions of the petitioner. The question is one of estimate of the assessee s income during the year. We find that a fair estimate of the same was made by the Tribunal. We do not find our way to accept the application for reference or to allow the same. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 55 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Finding Of Fact, Hybrid System, Income Tax Act, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... has, in its order dated February 2, 1993, considered at length the accounts of the assessee for the relevant assessment years 1985-86 to 1988-89. It has come to the conclusion that the assessee s business was transporting goods, and the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting as far as its business of transportation of goods was concerned, but in respect of the transaction for which the pronotes in question were issued, the transaction was of a special character distinct and different from other transactions of the assessee. The Tribunal has set out at length the reasons why this transaction has been considered by it as a separate and special type of transaction and has come to the conclusion that the assessee is entitled to employ a hybrid system of accounting in respect of this transaction. These are findings of fact and no question of law therefore arises, which requires to be referred to us for determination. Hence, the original petitions are dismissed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 54 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Compensation On Acquisition, Land Acquisition, Net Wealth, Question Of Law, Wealth Tax Act, Wealth Tax Reference
-
1994 (10) TMI 53 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Expenditure, Fines And Penalties, Income Tax Act, Interest Payable ... ... ... ... ..... lding that payment made under a statutory obligation because the assessee was in default could not constitute expenditure laid out for the purpose of the assessee s business, within the meaning of section 10(2)(xv). The facts stated above would clearly show that the nature of the liability of the assessee in the present case is entirely different from the statutory obligation of the assessee in the case decided by the Supreme Court. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal has correctly held that the interest liable to be paid by the assessee to the Kerala State Electricity Board for delayed payment of electricity charges is not penal in nature and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act. Thus, questions Nos. 1 to 3 in Incometax Reference No. 24 of 1985 and questions Nos. 1 and 2 in Income-tax References Nos. 492 and 493 of 1985 are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
-
1994 (10) TMI 52 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Power To Admit Additional Ground, Powers Of Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... s of the assessee so far as this case is concerned. The Tribunal has found that this is eminently a fit case where the assessee should be permitted to raise additional points in the appeal. Nothing has been made out before us to show that the assessee acted unreasonably or that he was in default. The Tribunal has, therefore, acted perfectly and legally in permitting the assessee to raise additional points about section 35B in the appeal and directing the Income tax Officer to deal with the matter on its merits. We do not, therefore, find any merit in the contentions raised by the Revenue, which according to us, stand concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court aforesaid. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, No costs. Communicate a copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,Cochin Bench, for information.
-
1994 (10) TMI 51 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Development Allowance, Income Tax Act, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... taken as a sort of deposit by the Coir Board to return it in a subsequent year. There is no expenditure having regard to the nature of the transactions and, therefore, no question of applying section 35B arises. Question No. 1 has to be answered in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue based on the aforesaid decision. We, therefore, dispose of the reference as follows We answer question No.1 against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We decline to answer questions Nos. 2 and 3 and direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to deal with the matter afresh in the light of the observations contained in the decision of this court in CIT v. Orion Coir Mats and Matting Manufacturers (P.) Ltd. 1987 166 ITR 616 and the decision in Income-tax Reference No. 317 of 1982. No costs. Communicate a copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for information.
-
1994 (10) TMI 50 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Concessional Rate, Industrial Company, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... do not find any reason to differ, it has to be held that the fact that a good portion of the processing of the cashew was done in outside factories with the processing charges being paid by the assessee will not take the assessee outside the ambit of the definition of industrial company in the Finance Act. We must also mention here that the matter, in the way in which it was put before us, does not appear to have been pressed either before the Commissioner (Appeals) or before the Tribunal. The Tribunal particularly chose to follow their earlier decision, which, as stated earlier, had been affirmed in reference by this court, since they have found no distinction in the facts relating to the earlier years and this case. Having regard to the circumstances and having regard to the decision in Income-tax Reference No. 375 of 1980--CIT v. Rajmohan Cashews (P.) Ltd. 1990 185 ITR 472, there is no question liable to be referred to this court. These petitions are, therefore, dismissed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 49 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Partnership Deed, Two Partners ... ... ... ... ..... it is evident that it has approved the approach of this court in Sant Lal Arvind Kumar s case 1982 136 ITR 379 (Delhi). Its ratio would apply. We, therefore, reject the contention that the law laid down in Sant Lal Arvind Kumar s case 1982 136 ITR 379 (Delhi) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In view of the foregoing discussion, we have no hesitation in endorsing the view taken by the Tribunal that the income derived by the old firm from January 1, 1969, to April 30, 1969, should be assessed in the hands of the newly constituted assessee-firm separately from the income derived by it for the period from May 1, 1969, to December 31, 1969, and income for both the periods should not be clubbed together for the purpose of assessment on the assessee-firm. We would, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Since the assessee is not represented, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1994 (10) TMI 48 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Question Of Law, Rate Of Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... ness of the assessee was running a private hospital, the assessee should not be allowed depreciation at the rate of 40 per cent. on the ambulance van which was given out on hire by the assessee. The Tribunal has rejected the contention. It has held that the ambulance van is kept by the assessee for the purpose of being used on hire and it is so plied. The plying of the ambulance van on hire itself constitutes the business of the assessee though it may be incidental to the running of the hospital. It has also observed that one business can be advantageously combined with another business. In the case of the assessee, the hire charges received by the assessee from the hire of the ambulance van are also assessed under the head Business . Hence, the assessee is entitled to depreciation at the rate of 40 per cent. We do not see any reason to take a different view as we agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Tribunal in this regard, Hence, the present petition is dismissed.
-
1994 (10) TMI 47 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Expenditure On Sales Promotion, Income Tax Act, Investment Allowance, Question Of Law
-
1994 (10) TMI 46 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Loss, Income Tax Act, Loss On Sale, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... id payment of tax. This was, however, reversed by the Tribunal, who considered the matter elaborately from various angles and came to the conclusion that far from being any scheme or ruse to avoid payment of tax falling within the principle of the decision in McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. CTO 1985 154 ITR 148 (SC), this was a case where the assessee genuinely attempted to salvage whatever they could get from the defaulter company, which was virtually insolvent. The Tribunal has approached the matter not merely from the angle of the conversion of the amount due into shares but also from another angle in which it has been pointed out that the amount due to the assessee could easily have been written off as bad debt and claimed as business loss. The order of the Tribunal is a well reasoned one based on the material. We do not find any infirmity or illegality in the said order justifying reference of any question for determination of this court. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.
....
|
