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1995 (12) TMI 85 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
Late Filing, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... he first time under section 147, it cannot be levied under the shelter of section 215(3) or under section 139(8)(b) providing for increasing or reducing the interest depending on variation in the amount of demand as a result of an order under sections 147, 154, 155, 250, 254, 260, 263, etc. That is a provision which only enables the revenue authorities to appropriately reduce or increase the amount of interest in view of the variations in the amount of tax as a result of subsequent proceedings by way of appeals, revisions, rectifications, re-assessments, etc. However, these provisions do not authorise the levy of interest under section 139(8) or 217 for the first time where no such interest was charged in the original assessment made for that particular year. 7. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the learned CIT(A) has rightly deleted the interest levied under sections 139(8) and 217. 8. In the result, the revenue s appeal is dismissed
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1995 (12) TMI 84 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
Assessing Officer, Previous Year, Tax At Source, Tax Deducted At Source ... ... ... ... ..... t Officer to hold the assessee to ransom for all time to come but to ensure that all pre-assessment taxes are collected promptly and such proceedings are finalised much before taking up the regular assessment proceedings. 13. With regard to assessment year 1986-87, it is seen that the assessment order was passed on 22-9-1989. The appellate order was passed by the CIT(A) on 20-3-1991. In such a case, the order of the Assessing Officer levying interest under section 201(1A) for this assessment year can be said to be within reasonable time, as the Assessing Officer in this case handled the case of the assessee as late as on 20-3-1991. Therefore, the order passed by him for levy of interest under section 201(1A) of the Act on 25-1-1990 can be said to be within a reasonable time and no interference is called for in this regard. 14. In the result, the appeals for assessment years 1978-79 to 1985-86 are allowed, while the appeal for the assessment year 1986-87 fails and is dismissed
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1995 (12) TMI 83 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
Accounting Year, Assessing Officer, Assessment Year, Trading Liability ... ... ... ... ..... he year 1981, the amount if at all ought to have been assessed in the year 1982-83. We do not find any merit in this contention. Such a plea has obviously been raised because assessment for Assessment Year 1982-83 has become time barred in all fairness the assessee ought to have made the book entries soon after the receipt of the order of the Collector of Electricity Duty but it chose to postpone and made the book entries in the accounting year relevant to assessment year 1988-89. The book entries regarding the remission of liability having been made in the assessment year under appeal and the assessee admittedly having followed mercantile system of accounting we hold that the year of assessment of the remission of liability is the year under appeal. We accordingly reject the contention of the assessee s counsel. 10. In the light of the above discussion, we reverse the findings of the CIT(A) and restore those of the Assessing Officer. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1995 (12) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
Whether assessee liabl for notofication No. 161, dated 8-6-1983?
Whether printing and publishing of newspapers and news-magazines imported called "printing plates" fell under Chapter 37.01/08 of the Customs Tariff or under Chapter 84 - Chapter Heading 84.34?
Held that:- There is no material placed before us to show that the goods referred to in the Notification No. 161 are the same goods as are concerned herein. There is equally no material to show that the respondents-assessees have taken advantage of the said Notification.
Coming to the question of classification, Chapter Heading 37.01/08 speaks inter alia of photographic plates and film sensitised whether or not exposed or developed. As against this Chapter Heading 84.34 (which is relied upon by the respondents-assessees) speaks of "machinery apparatus and accessories for type founding or type-setting; machinery, other than the machine tools of Heading printing blocks, plates or cylinders; printing type, impressed flongs and matrices, printing blocks, plates and cylinders; blocks, plates cylinders and lithographic stones, prepared for printing purposes (for example planed, grained or polished)". Actually Chapter 84 deals with machinery, mechanical appliances etc. The agreed report of the Team appointed by the Tribunal indicates clearly that these plates are meant for and are used for printing purposes. Whether we look at the end use or to the character and nature of the goods, they are in the main plates employed in the printing of newspaper/magazines. The Tribunal has opined, on the basis of the above material that Toyobo photo-sensitive nylon printing plates are exclusively used in printing of newspaper and cannot be called photographic plates within the meaning of Chapter 37. They placed thereunder Chapter Heading 84.34. We are unable to say that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is not correct. It may not also be entirely correct to say that in no case can the end use or function of the goods is relevant on the question of classification. Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (12) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... ems which are sought to be charged with excise are not exigible to excise duty at all. Therefore, there is no question of throwing out the Petitioners at this stage, i.e. after admitting the Petition, on the ground of alternative remedy and to make them to undergo unnecessary litigation. In these circumstances, we cannot accede to Shri Dada s submission. 13.At the outset, on behalf of the Petitioners, it was submitted that the Petitioners were not pressing prayer (a) of the Petition which seeks declaration that the provisions of Heading No. 73.08 of the Schedule are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no question of considering or granting prayer (a). The Petition is made absolute in tersms of prayers (b), (c) and (d). However, we wish to make it clear that the Notice, dated 22nd March 1988 is held invalid and quashed as far as it relates to the said items viz. Columns, Girders, Trusses and Purlins. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Writ jurisdiction - Seizure - Reasonable belief ... ... ... ... ..... thereafter and the adjudication proceedings may be completed at an early date and preferably within a period of three weeks thereafter. The petitioners should not ask for any adjournment and would be entitled to produce all documents which according to them are required to be produced. The Union of India is also hereby directed, in the event the confiscation proceedings is decided in favour of the petitioner, to grant extension as regards the validity of the licence for the period the goods in question were under seizure. Such a direction is being made, in the interest of justice, so that the petitioner may not suffer any damage for acts of omissions and commissions, if any, on the part of the respondents. 70. This application is disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. 71. All parties are directed to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment.
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1995 (12) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Words and Phrases - `Natural cause' - Meaning and scope - Remission of duty - Writ jurisdiction - Appeal
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1995 (12) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Appellate Tribunal - Expeditious hearing ... ... ... ... ..... o. 40/94, the petitioners would be put to irreparable loss and hardship and also not able to utilise the goods for the purpose for which the goods were imported and that the petitioner will also incur heavy loss and also loss of reputation in the trade. He also represented that the petitioners are also suffering heavy demurrage charges and also to incur charges for the containers. Therefore, he requests that a direction may be issued to the CEGAT to dispose of the appeals as expeditiously as possible. The request now made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is just and reasonable. 5. Therefore, this Court direct the CEGAT to dispose of the appeals pending before it as expeditiously as possible within a maximum period of two months from today, in view of the urgency of the situation as explained in the above paragraphs. With this direction, these Writ Petitions are disposed of. No costs. Consequently, WMPs. 25382 and 25383/95 are dismissed Index Yes/No. as unnecessary.
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1995 (12) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Enquiry and Investigation ... ... ... ... ..... e Act. 9.The last part of the decision of the learned single Judge contains a direction to the Customs officials to issue fresh summons to the appellant. It cannot be construed as a premptory order that summons must, under any case, be issued to the appellant. We regard it as indicating that appellant need be present before any of the respondents only if a fresh summon is issued for his examination. It is not intended to be direction to the respondents that summons must necessarily be issued even if his examination is unnecessary. 10.All the same, we make it clear that every endeavour should be made to close the examination of the appellant before sunset and if for any reason it cannot be so closed, the same should be resumed only in the next day morning. This provision is enough to alleviate the apprehension of the appellant that he would be detained during night time also inside the office of respondents. 11.Subject to the above observations, we dispose of this writ appeal.
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1995 (12) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction during pendency of appeal before CEAGT - Refund - Validity of ... ... ... ... ..... order of the CEGAT, shall be considered. If the application submitted by the respondent/writ petitioner is not in the prescribed form, it is now open to it to make such an application and the application for refund shall be considered in terms of Section 11B(2) of the Act. If for any reason, neither the appeal nor the application(c) for refund is considered and disposed of, within 3 months as stated above, the respondent/writ petitioner shall be entitled to interest from today at 12 on the amount which will be found refundable. If on the contrary it is disposed of, there will be no liability to pay the interest. 6.For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The order dated 23-11-1995 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. 4289 of 1995 is set aside. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. However, the CEGAT is directed to decide the appeal, within a period of 2 months. The C.M.P. is also disposed of. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Writ Jurisdiction - Existence of efficacious alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... ideration and also in view of the totality of factors delineated above, it is not a fit case wherein the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can legitimately be invoked. This is so especially when a reference lies from the order of CEGAT. We are, therefore, inclined to reject this petition on the ground that the petitioner ought to have availed the remedy of preferring a reference application as provided for under sub-section (1) of Section 130 of the Act. 13.Before parting with the case, we, however, feel inclined to observe that in case the petitioner, choose to prefer a reference application under Section 130(1) of the Act, CEGAT will surely have regard to and consider the factum of pendency of the writ petition in this court and now being dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory remedy, for the purpose of construing sufficient cause. 14.In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... the CEGAT at the time of hearing of the stay application but the same was not considered by the CEGAT. No counter-affidavit has been filed by any of the respondents in the present writ petition inspite of several opportunities afforded. The aforesaid statement of the petitioner, therefore, remains unrebutted. We have, therefore, no material placed before us by the respondents in respect of the said issue even for considering the merit of the same. 5.Under the aforesaid circumstances, we have no other option left to us but to remand the case back to the Tribunal for considering and giving its decision on the said plea also in accordance with law after giving a hearing to the parties on the said plea. The parties shall, therefore, appear before the Tribunal on 10-1-1996 for necessary orders and the next date for further hearing of the matter. 6.With the aforesaid observations and directions, this writ petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above, but without any costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 73 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Writ Jurisdiction - Territorial jurisdiction of High Courts ... ... ... ... ..... y and based on equitable consideration. At this stage we may also refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd., reported in 1984 (18) E.L.T. 284 (SC) AIR 1984 SC 1264 stating thus Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. 5.Incidentally it may be mentioned that the office of the petitioner is located at Faridabad in the State of Haryana as it appears from page 68 of the writ petition. As the writ petition was dismissed on appreciation of the aforesaid principles and factors, in our opinion, no ground has been made out to interfere with our earlier order dated 10-7-1995 dismissing the writ petition. 6.In the result, this application has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.
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1995 (12) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Whether if a manufacturer clears various final products utilising duty paid inputs, according to Central Excise Rules, he was entitled to the benefit of MODVAT scheme and was entitled to get credit for the duty of excise paid on the inputs which were utilised for manufacture of final product?
Held that:- No reason why the assessee cannot make a debit entry in the credit account before removal of the exempted final product. If this debit entry is permissible to be made, credit entry for the duties paid on the inputs utilised in manufacture of the final exempted product will stand deleted in the accounts of the assessee. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the assessee has taken credit for the duty paid on the inputs utilised in the manufacture of the final exempted product under Rule 57A. In other words, the claim for exemption of duty on the disputed goods cannot be denied on the plea that the assessee has taken credit of the duty paid on the inputs used in manufacture of these goods. In favour of assessee.
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1995 (12) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Income, Excise Duty, High Court, Interest On Deposit ... ... ... ... ..... nce shall be deemed to be the income of the recipient and charged to tax accordingly in the year of receipt, if such sum would have been included in the total income of the person who carried on the business had such sum been received before such discontinuance. " This sub-section thus provides that any sum received after discontinuance of a business is to be treated as income of the recipient in the year of receipt, as if it would have been included in the total income of the person who carried on the business, had it been received before such discontinuance. In the premises, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was not right in holding that section 41(1) was not applicable to the amounts in question. Hence, the second question is also answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In the result, both the questions are answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 70 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reversionary Value ... ... ... ... ..... onary value of the land can again be added to the valuation of the property so arrived at. We have given our careful consideration to the above controversy. We are, however, of the clear opinion that by valuing the property on rental basis, the value of both the land and building is determined and, hence, the value of the land cannot again be added thereto by adding the reversionary value of the land on the ground that the building is very old. We are in agreement with the ratio of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in this regard in CIT v. Smt. Ashima Sinha 1979 116 ITR 26. We have also perused the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Smt. S. Neelaveni v, CWT 1980 125 ITR 665. The said decision, in our opinion, is not relevant for the determination of the point at issue in this case. In the premises, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 69 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ground for reopening of the assessment as there was nothing, but a change of opinion. Although the facts were before the Income-tax Officer and on that basis, he took the decision, but later on, he has sought permission from the Board for reopening of the assess ment. Therefore, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was nothing but a mere change of opinion by the Income-tax Officer and, subsequently, the Tribunal also found that the Income-tax Officer has not given the correct facts for obtaining the sanction and on that account, the Tribunal found that the opinion sought on the basis of the wrong facts also vitiates the permission. Hence, in these circumstances, the Tribunal has declined to make a reference and we are of the opinion that the whole case is dependent upon questions of fact and no substantial question of law is involved, therefore, we are not inclined to call for the reference under section 256(2) of the Act. Hence, the reference application is rejected.
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1995 (12) TMI 68 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Tax Deducted At Source, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... d. s case 1982 137 ITR 777 (Cal), at page 784, observed The Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Clive Insurance Co. 1978 113 ITR 636, proceeded on the basis of granting relief under section 49D of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, that the net amount received by the assessee was franked income and, therefore, could not be taxed again. The main ratio in our opinion, would be applicable even in the case of pre-1965 as well as post-1965 income in respect of the dividends declared by the company in the United Kingdom. Therefore, that decision receiving a due consideration by the Calcutta High Court and after distinguishing that case, their Lordships proceed in the matter with regard to the interpretation of section 5(1)(c) of the Act. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal is correct and the reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1995 (12) TMI 67 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Expenditure Incurred, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head Profits and gains of business or profession . We find that the amount expended was wholly and exclusively connectable with the purposes of the business and was not in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee. That being so, the Tribunal committed an error in not allowing the expenditure as deductible in terms of sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Tribunal under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar in terms of section 260(1) of the Act. Counsel fee for each side is, however, fixed at Rs. 750, if certified.
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1995 (12) TMI 66 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, HUF Property ... ... ... ... ..... rect path It is one of surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence .... to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Tribunal unnecessarily indulged in hair-splitting and erroneously declined the status as Hindu undivided family. In the result, we hold that the Tribunal was not justified in not accepting the status of the assessee as Hindu undivided family for the assessment years 1980-81 to 1983-84. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department. This reference application stands disposed of accordingly. A copy of this order shall be forwarded to the Tribunal under the seal and the signature of the Registrar of this court. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs as incurred. Counsel fee for each side shall be Rs. 750, if certified.
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