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Showing 241 to 260 of 288 Records
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1990 (10) TMI 48 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... contrary decision, either of the Supreme Court or of this court, is brought to our notice. We may also notice that the first question referred by the Tribunal itself says that the salary was paid to the karta for the personal services rendered by him. The judgment of the Tribunal also shows that this salary paid to him was earned by the karta not on account of any detriment to the family assets but in consideration of his personal services. If so, the first question must be answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We hold that the salary income of the kartas of these Hindu undivided family assessees cannot be included in the share income of the respective Hindu undivided families. Once question No. 1 is answered in the negative, question No. 2 does not arise for consideration. It need not be answered. The income-tax references are answered accordingly and the writ petitions are allowed with the above directions. No order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Domicile, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... ble person relied upon circumstances referred to in the order of the Tribunal to contend that an intention to abandon the domicile of origin and acquire a domicil of choice had been made out. But we are unable to accept this for the reasons set out earlier. Likewise, the reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdus Samad v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 505 by counsel for the accountable person does not in any manner support the case of the accountable person that there was an abandonment of the domicile of origin and the acquisition of a domicile of choice by the deceased or even the conclusions arrived at in that regard by the Tribunal. We, therefore, answer the question referred in T. C. No. 114 of 1980 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Likewise, the questions referred in T. C. No. 462 of 1986 are answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The Revenue will be entitled to its costs in these references. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1990 (10) TMI 46 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... come-tax Appellate Tribunal. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal is not satisfactory. Therefore, in the light of the earlier Bench decisions of this court, we decline to answer the question referred to this court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, but, at the same time, we direct the Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeal to file and re-evaluate the entire matter in the light of the Bench decisions referred to hereinabove. It is for the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to consider the matter in the light of the above Bench decisions and if it considers that it will be just and proper, in the circumstances of the case, that the matter is re-evaluated by the assessing authority, the Tribunal will be free to make a remit of the matter to the assessing authority for that purpose. The reference is disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (10) TMI 45 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Benami Transactions - Civil Procedure
... ... ... ... ..... ht for is necessary for determining the real point in controversy between the parties, and the defendants can be compensated with costs, there cannot be any objection to allowing the amendment. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the defendants fails. In the light of the above discussions, I allow the amendment subject to payment of Rs. 2,000 as costs to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants within two weeks. The payment of costs shall be a condition precedent for allowing the amendment. The amended plaint which has already been filed by the plaintiffs be taken on record after the costs are paid as directed. The defendants shall file a written statement to the amended plaint within four weeks from today. Replication, if any, be filed within three weeks thereafter. I. A. No. 6517 of 1990 stands disposed of list the matter before the joint Registrar on December 13, 1990. All other pending applications be listed before court for arguments on January 11, 1991.
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1990 (10) TMI 44 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assessment U/S 144B, Draft Assessment Order U/S 144B, Objections By Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... of assessment together with the objections received from the assessee to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and then complete the assessment again. We answer question No. 2, as recast by us, in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Since the result of our answer to question No. 2 in Income-tax Reference No. 83 of 1987 is to result in a remit of the matter to the Income-tax Officer for redoing the assessment after complying with the formalities enjoined by section 144B(4) of the Act, it is unnecessary and improper to pronounce on the merits, on the other questions. So, we decline to answer question No. 1 in Income-tax Reference No. 83 of 1987 and also both the questions, referred at the instance of the Revenue, in Income-tax Reference No. 84 of 1987. The references are disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (10) TMI 43 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Representative Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... iciaries may vary in the future either by reason of some beneficiaries ceasing to exist or some new beneficiaries coming into being. Thus, the third question stands fully answered by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court which is binding on us and it becomes totally unnecessary to call for a reference to answer the third question. In the view we have expressed, if the assessing authority has correctly assessed in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 161 of the Act, as it was prior to the amendment, then, it cannot be said that the Commissioner could assume jurisdiction on the ground that it was prejudicial to the Revenue and, therefore, he certainly would not get jurisdiction to revise. . Thus, even the other questions raised would be inconsequential in the light of the answer already given by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in regard to question No. 3. In the result, we dismiss these petitions, but there will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rit petition is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs. It is made clear that this order does not preclude the appropriate authority from taking proceedings for cancellation of the certificate in accordance with law. It is made clear that before effecting any cancellation, an opportunity of hearing shall be given to the petitioner. If a show-cause notice is issued within ten days of producing certified copy of this order before the first respondent, the petitioner shall be allowed to purchase the tendu leaves from the Department on depositing half the tax due in accordance with section 206C and furnish a bank guarantee for the balance half. If, however, the show-cause notice is not issued within the said period, this direction shall not operate. The petitioner shall produce a copy of this order before the first respondent within a week from today. Certified copy of this order may be given to learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges by tomorrow.
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1990 (10) TMI 41 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al and without jurisdiction. The lower appellate court has failed to appreciate that the effect of such an order is to set aside the well-considered judgment of the trial court without going into any of the findings recorded therein. My attention has been drawn to Guru Maharaj Anandpur Ashram Trust v. Chander Parkash, AIR 1986 P and H 399. The said judgment follows two earlier decisions of the same learned judge reported in Gurnek Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1986 P and H 228 and Jubedan Begum v. Sekhawat Ali Khan, AIR 1984 P and H 221. These judgments are in consonance with the view taken by me. The revision petition is, accordingly, accepted and the judgment dated February 6, 1980 of Sh. S. P. Singh Chaudhary, Additional District Judge, Delhi in R. C. A. No. 144 of 1979 is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the court below for decision of the appeal in accordance with law. Since the respondents are not represented before me today, there will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 40 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Account Books ... ... ... ... ..... t be said that the professions which we have mentioned such as street hawkers, ordinary pan sellers, etc., belong to the same category or class of persons as advocates, doctors and engineers. Therefore, there is no vice of discrimination if they are treated separately and distinctly. Within that profession, a further classification is made, viz., those who earn more than Rs. 25,000 and those who earn less than Rs. 25,000. Those who earn more than Rs. 25,000 are required to maintain books of account. Therefore, we do not see any unreasonableness in such classification. However, it is rightly pointed out by Mr. S. P. Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the vice of discrimination, if at all it was there, has been eliminated since by inserting rule 6F in the Income-tax Rules by which such a financial limit has been imposed on the professions enumerated in sub-section (1) of section 44AA of the Act as well. Therefore, there is no merit in this petition. It is rejected.
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1990 (10) TMI 39 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment, Representative Assessee, Trustee ... ... ... ... ..... unable to accept the contentions canvassed on behalf of the assessee and we find ourselves in disagreement with the view taken by the Tribunal and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us in the negative and hold that the assessee is not entitled to the concessional rate of tax and should be subjected to the maximum marginal rate of tax under section 164(1) of the said Act for the relevant assessment year. Reference answered accordingly with no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment should be sent under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench, Ahmedabad. At this stage, learned counsel for the assessee prays for a certificate of fitness under section 261 of the said Act. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, this case is not a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the prayer of learned counsel.
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1990 (10) TMI 38 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... n it also appears that this fact was communicated by the Estate Duty Department to the Collector, Kanpur, through letter dated February 7, 1980. If so, we fail to understand how the recovery proceedings can still be continued against the petitioner. Learned standing counsel for the Government says that the petitioner has also got to pay the recovery charges. In this case, it would be seen that the tax recovery certificate itself is dated January 22, 1980, and the petitioner paid the entire duty on February 2, 1980. Whether, in such circumstances, any recovery charges are leviable is doubtful, particularly when the notice of demand in pursuance of the recovery certificate itself appears to have been issued on March 10, 1980. Be that as it may, that is not in issue before us. If any separate notice for collection charges is issued, it shall be open to the petitioner to dispute the same or question the same according to law. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. No costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Plant ... ... ... ... ..... cluded in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by the decision of this court in Income-tax Reference No. 74 of 1978 disposed of on September 12, 1990 (S. K. Tulsi and Sons v. CIT 1991 187 ITR 685 1990 UPTC 1105. It may be mentioned that, in this case too, the cinema is located in a well-constructed building fitted with all the necessary fittings and furniture, etc. Accordingly, the question referred is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Chemical Works, Depreciation, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... removal of tannin is described as a chemical, catechu is not described as a chemical. No authority is also cited for holding that catechu is a chemical. We make it clear that we should not be understood as expressing any opinion on the question whether catechu is a chemical or not. We are merely pointing the defect in the approach or the reasoning of the Tribunal. Since the very approach adopted by the Tribunal is wrong, we are inclined to remit question No. 2 back to the Tribunal for fresh determination in the light of the principles indicated hereinabove. Since we have dealt with questions Nos. 1 and 2 on merits, it is unnecessary to go into question No. 3.-Question No. 3 merely pertains to the merits of the decision of the Tribunal. For the above reasons, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 2 is remitted for reconsideration. We decline to answer question No. 3 as it is unnecessary. No costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... perty Act, 1937. The Supreme Court explained that, by virtue of the provisions of the said Act, widow steps into the shoes of her husband though having a limited estate and, therefore, when she dies, her interest passed to her heirs. The said decision, in our opinion, has no relevance whatsoever to the facts of the present case. This is not a case where the death of Dr. Bhargava took place at a time when the 1937 Act was in force. The simple question in this case is whether, on the date of death of Dr. Bhargava, his wife had Any share in the Hindu undivided family property. The answer can only be in the negative. The wife had no share nor could she sue for any such share. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that, on the death of Dr. Bhargava, the entire interest in the Hindu undivided family property passed to his heirs in full. The question is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the accountable person. No costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 34 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... in the earlier part of our judgment, we propose to agree with the law laid down in the later decision of this court in the case of ITO v. Vinod Krishna Som Prakash 1979 117 ITR 594. Lastly, it may be pointed out that, for taking the view that an appeal lies to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against an order passed by the Income-tax Officer, we also derive support from the book The Law and Practice of Income-tax by N. A. Palkhivala and S. A. Palkhivala, Volume 1, Eighth Edition 1990, where, at page 1499, the learned author has also opined that an appeal under clause (g) (which was formerly clause j) and now amended) lies from an order of the assessing authority rejecting an application for registration on the ground that the said application was barred by time. In view of the above discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department with costs of Rs. 250 (rupees two hundred fifty only) payable to the assessee by the Department.
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1990 (10) TMI 33 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Record, Revision By Commissioner, Valuation Report ... ... ... ... ..... record of any proceeding and such record is not confined only to the assessment order. Where any proceeding is initiated in the course of the assessment proceeding having a relevant and material bearing on the assessment to be made and the result of such proceeding was not available with the Incometax Officer before the completion of the assessment, but the result came subsequently, the revising authority is entitled to look into such material as it forms part of the assessment records of the particular assessment year. An assessment made without considering the valuation report for which proceeding had already been initiated in the course of an assessment proceeding is not a proper assessment and such assessment is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. For the reasons aforesaid, the question in this reference is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1990 (10) TMI 32 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... in this view, we hold that the second proviso to section 54E(1) of the Income-tax Act, inserted with effect from April 1, 1984, is only clarificatory in nature, that, in the case of compulsory acquisition of property under the statute, for the purpose of section 54E(1) of the Act, it is sufficient if the investment in specified assets is made within six months from the date of receipt of the compensation amount. We further hold that the second proviso to subsection (1) of section 54E should take effect from the date of enforcement of section 54E of the Act and it is applicable to the original compensation as also to the enhanced compensation received for the acquisition. In the light of the above, we hold that the learned single judge was justified in quashing exhibit P-1 and directing the Income-tax Officer to rework the benefit available to the assessee in the light of the observations contained in his judgment. This writ appeal is without merit. It is dismissed in limine.
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1990 (10) TMI 31 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ssee was under no obligation under the lease agreement dated April 23, 1940, and under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act to restore the land leased to it to its original condition and that, therefore, the question of any liability for restoration charges on estimate being allowed as revenue expenditure under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would not arise. Accordingly, the first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to answer question No. 2. Needless to mention, while giving effect to our judgment under section 260(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Tribunal will consider whether and to what extent the assessee is under an obligation to restore the land leased to it to its original condition in terms of the new lease agreement dated May 7, 1971, and if so, whether and to what extent the restoration charges on estimate can be allowed as revenue expenditure. No order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 30 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Income, Special Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... allowance granted to the assessee either to meet his personal expenses at the place where the duties of his office or employment of profit are ordinarily performed by him or at a place where he ordinarily resides or to compensate him for the increased cost of living. The above sub-sections extend the scope of the term income so as to include the special allowances and benefits mentioned in these special clauses. Considered in the light of the above new provisions, we have to hold that the allowance given to the assessee for meeting the refreshment expenses during office hours is taxable as income. We answer the question referred to this court in the negative and hold that the allowance towards expenditure on refreshments is income and is taxable. The question is decided in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (10) TMI 29 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Appeal To Tribunal, Firm, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... tinuation of registration under section 184(7) of the Act before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and, as such, the second appeal before the Tribunal is obviously competent. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, whether there was sufficient cause justifying the delay in filing the declaration in Form No. 12, it is essentially a question of fact unless any perversity in a legal sense is shown. In the present case, the Department has nowhere asserted that the Tribunal, while accepting the plea of reasonable cause of the assessee, has based its findings on any irrelevant or extraneous considerations. Under the circumstances, I answer both the questions in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department. Since none has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal B Bench, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act.
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