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Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 283 Records
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1989 (2) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ing any distinguishing features. We are not aware of the circumstances in which the reference for the assessment year 1978-79 was refused by the Tribunal. We cannot say whether the facts and circumstances for the year 1978-79 were similar to the year in dispute or for that matter to the year 1977-78. The decision of the Tribunal will stand or fall according to the result in the reference for the assessment year 1977-78 which is already pending for disposal before this court. Accordingly, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, B Bench, New Delhi, to draw up a statement of the case and to refer the following common question of law for the years in question for the opinion of this court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally correct in holding that the Income-tax Officer was not justified in initiating proceedings under section 147 (b) of the Act ? As the assessee has not put in appearance, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1989 (2) TMI 42 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Co-operative Society, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... the co-operative bank by allowing deduction of interest from the total income both by the Tribunal and the High Court on reference. It is true that a finding was recorded in that case that Government securities and municipal debentures amounted to stock-in-trade and not in the nature of investments. This finding was recorded in view of the circular and the peculiar facts of the case, and the matter was not under consideration under section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. In any event, that decision does not go against the assessee because the relief was granted to the assessee in that case also. For the reasons recorded above, we answer both the questions in favour of the assessee, in the affirmative and hold that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that short-term call deposits were investments within the meaning of section 80P(2)(d) of the Act and qualified for deduction under that provision for both the years in question. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1989 (2) TMI 41 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... xplanation was inserted keeping in view the pronouncements of different High Courts of the country relating to the interpretation of section 40(b) of the Act. It also seems quite logical and reasonable that it should be only the net interest which has been paid by the firm to the specified partner that should be disallowed under section 40(b) of the Act. It does not stand to reason that while the interest paid by the partners and received by the firm would be added as the income of the firm, at the same time, the interest paid by the firm to the same partner who had paid interest to the firm would be disallowed. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We, however, make it clear that the interest paid by the firm shall be deducted after taking into account the interest paid by the partners individually. To make it clear, we state that each partner s account shall be examined separately and deduction shall be confined accordingly.
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1989 (2) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... en a contrary view. The judgment of this court in the case of Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. 1979 119 ITR 431 and also similar other judgments of the other High Courts were considered in that case. Since there is a judgment of this court which has been followed by the other Benches of this court in a number of cases, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, the same is not pressed and, therefore, we decline to answer question No.2. So far as question No. 3 is concerned, since the case has gone back on remand, the assessee does not want to press this question also at this stage. So, we decline to answer question No. 3. Since there are conflicting judgments of the two High Courts on question No. 1, this case is certified as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court under section 261 of the Act. Let a-certificate be issued separately. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (2) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... r which the accounting period was August 10, 1964, to April 30, 1965. The findings of the Tribunal are that the sum of Rs. 1,50,000 credited in the books of the company on the first day of its incorporation represented the assessee s income from other sources and not from business. That this sum of Rs. 1,50,000 was includible as income was not disputed. The Tribunal has stated that it would be not unreasonable to infer from the facts of the case that the amount credited on the first day of the accounting year of the assessee-company was a credit item. If it was an income from business source even on the first day of the incorporation it was for the assessee to explain how he earned that income. In the absence of such evidence or explanation, the Tribunal was right in treating the income as income from other sources. Accordingly, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (2) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Business, Business Expenditure, Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... d to the ex-employee should be allowed as deduction in the computation of the assessee s income. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in his order, directed the income-tax Officer to re-examine the claim of Rs. 15,000 and if the date on which the liability was ascertained fell within the accounting year ended on April 14, 1963, the Income-tax Officer was directed to allow the expenses in the assessment for the assessment year under consideration. Since the income is to be assessed under section 28 of the Act, this expense has to be allowed. The Tribunal has rightly pointed out that if the relevant date on which the liability was ascertained fell within the accounting period ended on April 14, 1963, this would have to be allowed. In the circumstances, question No. 2 is also to be answered in the affirmative. Accordingly, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (2) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ideration to mean market value of the shares ? 2. Whether, on the facts and according to the provisions of law, the imposition of penalty is not erroneous, illegal and excessive ? The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench B , New Delhi, is directed to draw up a statement of the case and refer the aforesaid questions of law for the opinion of this court. The assessee will be entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 125.
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1989 (2) TMI 36 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fact was not specifically challenged before the Tribunal and the Tribunal was not called upon set aside the said finding. The Tribunal has come to its finding after taking into consideration the relevant facts that were before it. In particular, the Tribunal has considered the shortness of time during which the shares were held. The finding is not based on any irrelevant materials. The Tribunal has considered all the facts brought before it. The finding on the profit-making motive made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not under challenge before it. There might be other facts which might have induced the Tribunal to come to different conclusion but those facts were not placed before the Tribunal. On the facts of the case, no question of perversity about the finding of the Tribunal has been raised. In the circumstances, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (2) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court, Property ... ... ... ... ..... efore, the assessee would be entitled to the benefit of the saving provision under section 22 of the Act. We are of the view that the principle of this decision would be squarely applicable on the facts giving rise to this reference. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was right in the view it took that for the purpose of section 22 of the Act, the business carried on by the firm should be regarded as being carried on by all the partners and, therefore, no income from the property should be computed in respect of the portion of the property occupied by the firm of which the assessee is a partner and in excluding the annual letting value of the property in respect of the portion under the occupation of the firm in the computation of the income from the property in the hands of the assessee partner. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The assessee will be entitled to his costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1989 (2) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Priority Industry, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... basis for the rectification order is the decision in CIT v. L. M. Van Moppes Diamond Tools (I) Ltd. 1977 107 ITR 386 (Mad) which, as noticed earlier, has not been approved by the Supreme Court in the decision in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1978 113 ITR 84 and when the basis upon which the rectification was done is no longer available, it follows that the rectified order cannot also be sustained. We, therefore, answer the second question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. It, therefore, becomes unnecessary to render any answer with reference to the first question, as that question does not really survive for consideration in the light of the answer given to the second question referred to us. We, therefore, do not consider it necessary to answer the first question and return the reference unanswered in so far as it relates to the first question. The Revenue will be entitled to its costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1989 (2) TMI 33 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution, Prima Facie Case, Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ceived by a wife in her capacity as a partner of a firm (in which her husband also happened to be a partner) could not be taxed over again in her hands, when such share of income from the firm had been already added on to the income of her husband. That being so, the assessing authorities did not have jurisdiction to have a repeat performance of assessment when the income of the wife had already been treated as part of the income of the husband and taxed as such. In that view of the matter, the petitioners are entitled to relief from this court. Exhibit P-3 in Original Petition No. 1487 of 1987 and exhibit P-5 in Original Petition No. 1450 of 1987 are quashed. It is declared that the petitioners are not liable to be assessed on their share income from the firm, when such share income has already been taxed in the hands of their husbands by assessments made on the husbands under the very same enactment The writ petitions are allowed as above, but without any order as to costs.
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1989 (2) TMI 32 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the former case was confined to the facts of the case in the latter case. In L. H. Sugar Factory and Oil Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1980 125 ITR 293 (SC), the latter case was held to be a case on facts and the former decision in 82 ITR 376 was resurrected. In this state of wobbling of authorities, true it is, that no test of universal application can be laid down by the courts. In the instant case, the assessee was generating energy earlier at a cost of 0.95 per unit for the use of the factory unit. Now, electricity lines are laid down to run the factory efficiently. The fixed capital of the business is not touched. The question required to be answered is whether expenditure of Rs. 45,149 in such circumstances is capital expenditure. We see that the investment was made to run the factory efficiently. We hold in the facts of the case that the expenditure is of revenue nature and answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1989 (2) TMI 31 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... overned by the decision of this court in CIT v. Vithal Textiles 1989 175 ITR 629, where a Division Bench of this court has held that the Commissioner has jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act to revise the order of assessment passed by the Income-tax Officer in accordance with the directions given by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 144B of the Act. We see no reason to take view different from that taken in 1989 175 ITR 629. Following that decision, therefore, it must be held that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the order of assessment in the instant case could not be said to be an order passed by the Income-tax Officer and that the said order could not be revised by the Commissioner under section 263 of the Act. For all these reasons, our answers to the two questions referred to this court by the Tribunal are in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1989 (2) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Loss, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... . In our view, the Tribunal has not properly appreciated the facts as also the legal issues involved in the case. In our view, the case must be sent back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal. We remand the case to the Tribunal and the Tribunal will go into the facts that have been brought on record and consider the facts brought out before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and give its decision after taking into consideration all the facts. Therefore, the case is remanded to the Tribunal without answering the second question that has been raised. Question No. (1) is answered in the negative. So far, as question No (ii) is concerned, the Tribunal will consider whether the loss is a trading loss or not. This question will have to be decided by the Tribunal after considering the facts as directed above and also after hearing the submissions of the learned advocate of the assessee and also the facts mentioned by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. BABOO LALL JAIN J. -I agree.
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1989 (2) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Merger Of Order Of ITO In That Of The AAC, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... ssed by the Income-tax Officer shall include (c) Where any order referred to in this sub-section and passed by the Assessing Officer had been the subject-matter of any appeal, the powers of the Commissioner under this sub-section shall extend to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal. This amendment, though not applicable to the assessment order concerned herein, manifests the legislative intent. It is really clarificatory in nature. We have, of course, held that even without such an explanatory clause, the position is the same. For the above reasons, question No. 1 is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs. Referred Case No. 177 of 1985 In this case, the question referred to has to be answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee following the decision in Torson Products Ltd. v. CIT 1988 173 ITR 611 (AP). The reference is answered accordingly. No costs.
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1989 (2) TMI 28 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Benami Transaction
... ... ... ... ..... that the present transaction is exempted from the provisions of the Act, 1988 , in view of the provisions of section 4(3)(b) of the Act as the transaction was entered into on account of a fiduciary relationship. M. D. Jain, as already stated above, is related to Surinder Kumar as his brother-in-law. There is no merit in this contention. There is no evidence on the record produced on behalf of Narinder Kumar and others that M. D. Jain was in such a position to dominate them. On the other hand, their case is that they had paid all the instalments though in the name of M. D. Jain, whereas the stand of M. D. Jain is that he had sent the amount which was paid in his name under the agreement. R. F. A. No. 74 of 1986 is allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial court are set aside and the suit of M. D. Jain and others for possession of the property in dispute is decreed. R.F.A. Nos. 72 and 73 of 1986 are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs in these appeals.
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1989 (2) TMI 27 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... return, the assessee had filed copies of accounts showing distribution of profits and losses between the members. May be so. But the Income-tax Officer, evidently with a view to verify the correctness of the said figures, called upon the assessee to produce the account books. The assessee pleaded loss of books which was not accepted by the Income-tax Officer as a fact which means that he was entitled to draw an adverse inference against the assessee. Refusing the registration of the firm is necessary consequence of the said finding. We do not see any error in the order of the Tribunal. It is not disputed before us that the registration could be refused if the firm failed to satisfy the Income-tax Officer that the profits and losses of the firm were apportioned between the partners in the manner specified in the partnership deed. For the above reasons, the question referred to is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1989 (2) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, House Property, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... longing to an assessee have to be included in his net wealth. Strictly speaking, the house property assets did not belong to him. By the extended definition of section 4, these assets have to be included in the net wealth of the assessee. Now, having included the assets in the net wealth of the assessee, the exemptions in respect of these assets which were provided under section 5 cannot be denied. Our view on the question is in consonance with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of CWT v. B. T. Agrawal 1987 163 ITR 72, the Bombay High Court in the case of CWT v. Rai (C.) 1979 119 ITR 553 and also the Karnataka High Court in the case of CWT v. Eapen (K. M.) 1978 114 ITR 415. The Madras High Court has also taken the same view in the case of S. Naganathan 1975 101 ITR 287. In view of the aforesaid, the question referred to this court is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BABOO LALL JAIN J. -I agree.
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1989 (2) TMI 25 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Municipal Tax On Building ... ... ... ... ..... by voluntary contributions. The learned Deputy Assessor and Collector has given weighty reasons to come to the conclusion that there were no voluntary contributions to the petitioner-society and also to show that the case of the petitioner-society was not covered by section 115(4) of the Act. As has been noted above, in the present case, it is the school which is generating income for the petitioner-society and no amount whatsoever is being spent by the petitioner-society on the school. The learned Deputy Assessor and Collector has further observed that the petitioner-society is being run purely on commercial lines for the purpose of profits and it is in receipt of income generated from this activity in the form of building fund and donations, etc., which are forced on the Students and their guardians. Thus, there is no voluntary contribution. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the impugned order for us to interfere. This petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine.
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1989 (2) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... distribution agreement in the context of the accrual of distribution commission to the assessee as per the system of accounting followed by the assessee. Instead, the Tribunal had proceeded to decide the question on the basis of conjectures and surmises relating to loss of potentialities, which, even if acceptable, would not in any manner render the distribution commission earned by the assessee unaccrued. We may also point out that the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal on conjectures and surmises cannot be sustained, more so in this case, as the Tribunal has omitted to consider the terms of the agreement dated April 22, 1966, and the letter dated January 10, 1968, and its effect upon the accrual of distribution commission income to the assessee as a distributor during the relevant accounting year. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The Revenue is entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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