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1987 (3) TMI 17 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Representative Assessee, Trustee ... ... ... ... ..... on the factual assumption that the dividend income received by the trustees is in respect of those very shares in respect of which tax has been deducted at source. In other words, the dividend income included in the assessee s income is the income of those very shares from out of which income-tax has been deducted at source by the company. The Tribunal shall, however, verify this factual aspect while passing orders under section 260 of the Act. We are only laying down the principle. The Tribunal shall pass appropriate orders keeping the said principle in mind. In view of the clarification we have made, we do not think that the direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to tax only the net dividend income is correct. The gross income from the dividends shall be treated as the income of the assessee and the tax deducted at source on those shares shall be given credit to, in accordance with law. The question referred to us is answered in the above terms. No costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... emselves. He did not press the contention before us because of the judgment of this court delivered at Nagpur on January 20, 1987, in Income-tax Reference No. 428 of 1975 (R. B. Shreeram Religious and Charitable Trust v. CIT - 198 172 ITR 373). The Bench (of which one of us was a member) found the submission that section 12(1) referred only to the income derived from voluntary contributions and not to the voluntary contributions themselves unacceptable. Mr. Dwarkadas submitted that the amendment effected in 1972 to section 12 and section 2(24) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, clarified the position in regard to which contributions constituted income. Having regard to our construction of the provisions of section 12, it is unnecessary to go into this submission, as also the submission that the said donations were casual and not of a recurring nature and, therefore, exempt. In the result, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... cision, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The learned advocate for the assessee orally prayed for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court from this judgment contending that such certificate has been issued by this court in the case of Molins of India Ltd. 1983 144 ITR 317 and in other cases where the decision in Molins of India Ltd. 1983 144 ITR 317 (Cal) was followed. Let a certificate under section 261 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, be issued on the following question of law Whether the surtax liability under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, can be allowed as a permissible deduction in computing the income of the assessee under the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? Let the order for issue of the certificate be drawn up separately. Leave is given to the advocate on record for the assessee to file vakalatnama within a fortnight from date. The reference is disposed of as above without any order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1987 (3) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Deemed Partition, Estate Duty, HUF, Legal Fiction ... ... ... ... ..... sed. It enables aggregation of the interest of the male lineal descendants for the purposes of determining the rate at which estate duty is leviable on the principal value of the interest of the deceased. No estate duty is leviable on the interest of the male lineal descendants. It only provides the machinery for determining the rate. To us it appears that the objects of section 34 would be achieved if the expression lineal descendants is understood in the sense which we have expressed above. Learned counsel for the Revenue rightly submitted that section 39(1) contemplates a deeming provision for partition in the joint family property immediately before the death of the deceased between the deceased and his lineal descendants which would include in the context of things only the sons and not grandsons. For what we have said above, we hold that 3/5ths was includible in the principal value of the estate left by the deceased for the purposes of section 34. No order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... r under section 132(3) is not dependent upon passing of an order under section 132(5). The jurisdiction to, pass an order under section 132(5) is dependent where any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles or things are seized under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) of section 132. The prohibitory order under section 132(3) is not within the sweep of section 132(5). Therefore, in our opinion, the validity of the orders under section 132(3) will not be affected merely because no order under section 132(5) has been passed. Moreover, the petitioner s grievance, as urged before us above, can appropriately be raised before the Commissioner or before the Assessing Officer and it would be within their jurisdiction to decide the objections of the petitioner in accordance with law. What we have said above will equally apply to the demand of the petitioner for the return of the key of the bank locker. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ petition is dismissed summarily.
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1987 (3) TMI 12 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Sales Tax, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... court without recourse to statutory remedies results in consumption of the time of this court in the filing of replies, rejoinders, amendment applications and several other applications, affidavits, counter-affidavits, additional affidavits and documents before matters become ripe for hearing. If the matter comes after exhaustion of all legal remedies, this court s precious time in the aforesaid proceedings can be saved and so, in our considered opinion, this growing tendency deserves to be curbed. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has got an alternative statutory remedy available to him. In case the petitioner files the appeal, we consider it proper to direct the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal within a period of one month and till then, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner for recovery of the tax assessed by the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Circle-III, Bhilwara, for non-payment of the same.
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1987 (3) TMI 11 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Sales Promotion Expenses ... ... ... ... ..... ery installed in the factory on estimated basis. So far as question No. 4 is concerned, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has given detailed and cogent reasons and pointed out that the term refractory is used in the Tax Export Credit Certificate Scheme as well as the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. He has followed those definitions and nothing to the contrary has been placed before us. In the above circumstances we reject the application in so far as questions Nos. 2 to 4 are concerned. But so far as question No. 1 is concerned, we direct the Tribunal to state a case and refer the following question of law for the decision of this court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in restricting the disallowance under the head Sales promotion expenses from Rs. 1,04,857 to 20,970 particularly in view of the Explanation introduced in section 37(2A) by the Finance Act, 1983 ? The application is disposed of. No costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 10 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Immovable Property, Appeal To Tribunal, Limitation, Practice And Procedure, Tribunal
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1987 (3) TMI 9 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... the partnership shall not be dissolved on such death and that the heirs of the deceased partner shall have no right whatsoever to claim any share in the goodwill of the firm. A contrary view was taken by the Madras High Court in CED v. Ibrahim Gulam Hussain Currimbhoy 1975 100 ITR 320. The Tribunal chose to follow the Gujarat view as against the view taken by the Madras High Court and accordingly held in favour of the accountable person. Thereupon, the Department applied for and obtained the present reference. Since the decision of the Tribunal, the Supreme Court has resolved the aforesaid conflict. The Supreme Court, in CED v. Mrudula Nareshchandra 1986 160 ITR 342, reversed the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and has expressly approved the decision and the reasoning of the Madras High Court. Following the said decision of the Supreme Court, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the accountable person. No costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 8 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemption To Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... ing to the third question, the contention of the assessee is liable to fail on the simple ground that these lands were not being used by the assessee, or a parent of his, for agricultural purposes in the two years immediately preceding the date on which the transfer took place, as required by the said section. Unless this requirement is satisfied, the assessee cannot claim the benefit provided by section 54B, even though he may have purchased another agricultural land within two years of the transfer. Now, admittedly, in all these cases, the land concerned was not used by the assessee or his parent, for agricultural purposes. It was under requisition by the defence department and in their possession. For this reason, question No. 3 is to be answered in the negative, i.e., against the assessees and in favour of the Revenue. For the above reasons, we answer all the three questions referred against the assessees and in favour of the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 7 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Delay In Filing Return, Entertainment Expenditure, Return ... ... ... ... ..... see in that case and, agreeing with the view taken by the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court held (p. 603) The assessee kept the key of the entrance which permitted access to the vaults in its own exclusive possession. The assessee was thus in occupation of all the premises for the purpose of its own concern, the concern being the hiring out of specially built vaults and providing special services to the licensees. As observed by Viscount Finlay in Governors of the Rotunda Hospital, Dublin v. Coman 1920 7 TC 517 1921 AC 1, the subject which is hired out is a complex one and the return received by the assessee is not the income derived from the exercise of property rights only but is derived from carrying on an adventure or concern in the nature of trade. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case fully applies to the facts of this case. We, therefore, answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 6 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Previous Year, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... learned counsel for the assessee that, since it has not entered the said amount in its books, the financial year must be treated as the previous year for this head of income cannot be accepted. The matter cannot be predicated upon entering or not entering the said amount in the books of account. Unless the assessee otherwise specifies, the previous year which it is already adopting shall be treated as previous year for other heads of income as well. In other words, the presumption is that the assessee has one previous year for all heads of income unless it says that it shall have different previous years for different heads of income (vide section 3(3) of the Act). In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the income must be treated as having been received in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1962-63. The questions referred are accordingly answered in favour of Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 5 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Previous Year, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... was said to be not a relevant or adequate ground for refusing registration under the Income-tax Act. Learned standing counsel for the Revenue sought to contend that the said Bench decision is not correct and requires reconsideration. We are, however, not inclined to go into the said question. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not say that there is no force in what learned standing counsel contends. What all we say is that there is a Bench decision which, in the normal course, is binding upon us and, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to go into the question of correctness or otherwise of the said Bench decision. Following the said Bench decision, we hold that the violation of rule 39 cannot furnish a valid or adequate ground for refusing grant or renewal of registration to the new firm. Accordingly, we answer the third question as well in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. References answered accordingly. No costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 4 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Legal Representative, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... sources. In view of the findings of the Tribunal which, in a sense, have now been confirmed by the High Court, since the High Court has declined to entertain an application for reference under section 256(2) of the Incometax Act, it is obvious that the petition challenging the orders of the incometax authorities and the Tribunal was wholly misconceived. As a matter of fact, we are surprised as to how such a petition at all was filed and entertained. Indirectly, the petitioners are asking a learned single judge of this court to sit in judgment over the order made by a Division Bench of this court while rejecting the application under section 256(2) of the Incometax Act, 1961. In our view, the writ petition is wholly misconceived and must be dismissed. Consequently, the writ appeal which is directed against the order vacating the interim order of stay must also be dismissed. Both the writ appeal and the writ petition thus stand dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 3 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... eighted deduction under section 35B(ii) or (iii) or both ? In the light of our decision in I. T. R. No. 100 of 1980 (CIT v. Orion Coir Mats and Matting Mfrs. P. Ltd. 1987 166 ITR 616), we answer question No. 1 in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the light of our decision in I. T. R. Nos. 7 and 8 of 1982 (CIT v. C. Tharian and Sons 1987 166 ITR 607), we answer question No. 2 in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these tax referred cases. A copy of the judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (3) TMI 2 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty, Penalty Provisions, Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... tances of the case, the Income tax Appellate Tribunal was not correct in law in cancelling the penalty levied under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In other words, the question referred to us in each of these two cases is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee. Before parting with the case, we may point out that the Tribunal, in its order in making the reference in M.C.C. No. 97 of 1983, has pointed out as under However, the case has not been decided by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on merits and if the reference application is decided against the assessee, an opportunity will have to be given to the assessee to argue on merits the issues raised before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The merits of the case shall, therefore, be decided in the instant case in the light of the observations already made by the Tribunal referred to above. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 1 - SC ORDER
Contention that it was obligatory for the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax to have given notice of hearing to the Wealth-tax Officer cannot prevail. The Wealth-tax Act, 1957, does not contain any provision like clause (c) of section 250(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
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