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Case Laws
Showing 301 to 320 of 408 Records
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1996 (8) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the said oil had been imported in containers made of stainless steel, which was a banned item, but which had been painted over to give the impression that they were made of mild steel?
Held that:- The High Court noticed that the appellants' allegation was that the stainless steel containers were painted over to suppress their true nature, but it took the view that the respondents were not required to disclose the nature or price of containers. We do think that the High Court ought to have taken some note of the significance of painting of stainless steel. If the stainless steel containers were painted, and so painted as to resemble mild steel containers, there can be little doubt that the intention was to slip them through the Customs.
Certainly, the High Court ought not to have entered into the thicket of evidence. Evidence was something for the authorities hearing the parties under Sections 28 and 124 to accept and weigh. We do not approve of stultifying, in exercise of powers under Article 226, an investigation, still at the show-cause stage, by going into facts. Also the High Court in any event, ought not to have allowed the writ petition without reserving liberty to the appellants to proceed against the respondents under Section 130 which, as the High Court looked at it, was the appropriate course of action.The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court is set aside.
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1996 (8) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
Whetehr the process of separation of caprolactam from the waste is an independent manufacturing process and subjected to duty?
Held that:- The Tribunal in the two subsequent decisions in Jagatjit [1990 (5) TMI 148 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI] & L.M.L. [1991 (1) TMI 308 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI] found as a fact that the recovered caprolactam was not a saleable commodity upon the basis of the assessee's evidence and the failure of the Excise authorities to prove the contrary. The Excise authorities having made no attempt to disprove the evidence led by the assessees in those matters and this and establish by evidence of their own that the recovered caprolactam was marketable, there is no reason why they should now be given a second opportunity to do so by an order of remand.
Thus the appeals are allowed. The judgments and orders of the Tribunal under appeal are set aside and it is held that the recovered caprolactam is not excisable to excise duty.
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1996 (8) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
Benefit of the concessional rate of duty provided by an Exemption Notification (No. 70/89) denied
Held that:- The Tribunal mis-directed itself. There is no question of reading the word "and" disjunctively here. The Exemption Notification must be read plainly, as an ordinary man would read it, and, so read, Sl. No. 6(a) says that cups of roller bearings are liable to the duty applicable to the bearings of which they are part and cones of roller bearings are liable to the rate of duty applicable to the bearings of which they are part. There is no justification for reading the entry conjunctively in the sense that the rate of duty applicable to the bearings of which they are part will apply only when the cups and cones of roller bearings are imported together but not if they are imported separately.
Insofar as valuation is concerned, the Collector was right in rejecting the transaction value of the goods because, plainly, it was a totally unrealistic value. For the purpose of placing a value on the goods, however, the Collector resorted to very tenuous reasoning which we cannot uphold. At the same time, we must say that we do not approve of the findings of the Tribunal in this behalf, which we have referred to above. It may in a given case be necessary to value unbranded goods on the basis of the known price of branded goods and also the goods of one country of origin on the basis of the known price of the goods of another country of origin, but the linkage must be appreciable and proximate.
Thus the matter of valuation of the goods must go back to the Collector and the respondents and appellants should have the opportunity to place before him material as may enable him to arrive at their assessable value.The appeal is allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
Whether rotating hooks complete with bobbin case be treated as components for domestic sewing machines as prescribed under Clause (2) of Heading 84.2 (sic) of the Schedule?
Held that:- Government of India have wrongly exercised revisional powers by interfering with the decision of the Appellate Collector of Customs who allowed the appeal holding that the goods imported were not for domestic sewing machines and as such, they were classifiable under Item 84.41(1) of the Schedule. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.
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1996 (8) TMI 104 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Expenditure, Development Allowance, Entertainment Expenditure, Expenditure Incurred, Fines And Penalties, Sales Tax, Weighted Deduction
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1996 (8) TMI 103 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Garnishee Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... as it did not owe money to the assessee in default. The petitioner could be declared an assessee in default only if a notice had been issued under this sub-section. The petitioner has been condemned unheard and fastened with the liability to the tune of Rs. 5,53,920 without following the procedure laid down by law. The proceedings being without any jurisdiction have resulted in harassment to the petitioner as the recovery was sought to be made without issuing notice to the petitioner. It is elementary that issuance of notice under section 226(3) of the Act is a sine qua non for initiating the proceedings. The Assessing Officer should have known this elementary fact. The petitioner was deprived of the use of its money to the extent of Rs. 5,53,920 during all this period for no fault of its, for which we solely hold the Department to be responsible. This writ petition is accepted with costs. Notice, annexure P-1 , is quashed. Costs are quantified at Rs. 5,000 in each petition.
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1996 (8) TMI 102 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Levy of penalty u/s 271B - assessee did not maintain any books of account - HELD THAT:- Maintenance of accounts is envisaged under section 44AA and on failure to do so the assessee shall be guilty and liable to be penalised under section 271A. Even after maintenance of books of account the obligation of the assessee does not come to an end. He is required to do something more, i.e., by getting the books of account audited by an accountant. But when a person commits an offence by not maintaining the books of account as contemplated by section 44AA the offence is complete. After that there can be no possibility of any offence as contemplated by section 44AB and, therefore, in our opinion, the imposition of penalty under section 271B is erroneous.
Tribunal has overlooked this aspect of the matter. Of course, it is apparent from the records that the assessee failed to maintain the books of account as required under section 44AA and for that penalty is prescribed under section 271A. It is for the Tribunal to take action in accordance with law. Decided in favour of assessee.
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1996 (8) TMI 101 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... ndustries Pvt. Ltd. 1994 210 ITR 883. In the said decision, it was held that upon the conversion of the mineral into the form of rodi and powder, it does not retain the physical shape which the raw material has and is understood as a different commercial commodity by the business community. In these circumstances, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that conversion of limestone by crushing into rodi or lime dust is a process of manufacture and that the assessee was entitled to investment allowance. We are also in respectful agreement with the decision of the Madras High Court and the facts are more or less similar inasmuch as making chips out of big boulders will amount to a manufacturing process and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to the investment allowance as envisaged under section 32A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In view of the above, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1996 (8) TMI 100 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Tax At Source, Winnings From Lottery ... ... ... ... ..... o make payment of any tax to the extent to which the tax had been deducted at source by the person paying the prize money to the petitioner under section 194B of the Act. Admittedly, the certificate issued by Chandra Agencies to the petitioner shows that the tax liable to be deducted at source was in fact deducted by the said Chandra Agencies and thereafter it was no more the liability or responsibility of the petitioner to pay any tax amount mentioned therein. In the premises, I hold that the said order passed by the Income-tax Officer regarding the tax deducted at source is illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 205 of the Act and the same is quashed and/or set aside. This order would not, however, prevent the income-tax authorities to proceed against the said Chandra Agencies to realise the tax deducted at source. The income-tax authorities will take appropriate steps in the matter. In the result, the petition is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 99 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment Notice, Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Notice Of Reassessment, Reason To Believe
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1996 (8) TMI 98 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Industrial Undertaking, Manufacture Or Production, Special Deduction, Subject Matter, Wealth Tax Act
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1996 (8) TMI 97 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Cost Of Acquisition, Revenue Receipt, Winding Up ... ... ... ... ..... lakhs to the assessee in the instant case is not towards the loss of any earnings or business. It is quite clear that the payment was made in lieu of alternative premises to be provided to the assessee by the purchaser of the premises. It is not the case of the Revenue nor of the assessee that the assessee had suffered any loss in business by stoppage of the business due to the shifting to another premises by the assessee. Therefore, the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions reported in CIT v. Manna Ramji and Co. 1972 86 ITR 29 and CIT/CEPT v. Shamsher Printing Press 1960 39 ITR 90 is not attracted. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view taken in the Karnataka decision and following it we answer question No. 3 in the negative and question No. 4 in the affirmative in other words, both the questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Let a copy of this order be sent down to the Appellate Tribunal. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 96 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Public Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... public in regard thereto. The Tribunal (in paragraph 7 of its order), on the footing that it is an association of persons has considered the situation as to whether it could be individual in the context of the tax liability under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. We find that the authorities concentrated on this aspect from the point of view that the assessee is a trust which could be categorised as a public charitable trust. We find that there has been no enquiry with regard to the factual aspect of determination as to what the assessee could be with reference to the legal status. For the above reasons, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We decline to answer question No. 2 in the absence of necessary factual matrix and conclusion in regard thereto as discussed above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1996 (8) TMI 95 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Income From Undisclosed Sources, Partner In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... Punjab and Haryana High Court had the occasion to consider a similar point. While deciding the point the court observed that a perusal of section 68 of the Act shows that in relation to the expression books , the emphasis is on the word assessee meaning thereby that such books have to be the books of the assessee himself and not of any other assessee. A partnership firm is an assessable entity distinct from the individual partner. The books of account of a partnership cannot be treated as those of the individual partner. We are in respectful agreement with the decision and conclusion arrived at by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. In view of the above, we answer the question in negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no direction as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 94 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Quoted Equity Shares, Valuation Date ... ... ... ... ..... ses of this Act, means the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year. . . . From the above definitions, it is abundantly clear that the valuation date as per the Wealth-tax Act in relation to any year means the last day of the previous year as defined in section 3 of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, the year cannot be taken as completed on the valuation date and thus where a reference is made to any year immediately preceding the valuation date, it is to be taken as a completed year. Therefore, while interpreting paragraph 4(i) of the Central Board of Direct Taxes circular, the year pertaining to the valuation date necessarily has to be excluded while computing five years. In view of this, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Let our opinion along with the answer be transmitted to the Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. VINOD KUMAR GUPTA J. --- I agree.
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1996 (8) TMI 93 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Assessing Officer, Inaccurate Particulars, Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... view that the onus that has been shifted is rebuttable. It also does not mean that the Income-tax Officer or the Tribunal should not look into the fact as to whether the assessee-firm fraudulently concealed the income. We do not find any finding in that regard. We have gone through the order passed by the Assessing Officer who initiated the penalty proceedings. We do not find any material for initiation of the proceeding. Merely because the Assessing Officer disbelieves the return by itself would not be sufficient for initiation of a proceeding. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the initiation of penalty proceeding under section 271(1)(c) of the Act was not proper. Accordingly, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative, both in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
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1996 (8) TMI 92 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Additional Grounds, Power To Allow Additional Ground, Powers Of Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... peal the parties should not suffer. Denial to take up an additional ground, if it is necessary for proper adjudication of the matter, will amount to denial of justice. Besides, section 254 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to pass an order after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard as it thinks fit. In the instant case, the Tribunal thought it fit that the additional ground, which was raised before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal, has got some relevance in adjudicating the matter in dispute. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal passed the order in conformity with the provisions of law. Accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 91 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Tea Business ... ... ... ... ..... the Act must have some connection with the tea business. Any other income which has got no connection whatsoever cannot be taken as income from the tea business. Therefore, in our opinion, before taking into account the income derived from sale of scrap materials, it is necessary to determine whether the sale of such scrap materials is arising out of business of tea garden and/or tea plantation or manufacture of tea. Therefore, such finding has to be arrived at by the Assessing Officer only after a thorough scrutiny of the entire matter. In view of the above, in our opinion, the Tribunal was fully justified in giving the direction. Accord ingly, we answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no direction as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 90 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Appellate Authority, Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... he assessee. An order recorded on a review of only a part of the evidence and ignoring the remaining evidence cannot be regarded as conclusively determining the questions of fact raised before the Tribunal. In this case, the Tribunal did not discuss any evidence whatsoever and after quoting the submissions made by both sides the Tribunal disagreed with the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). In our opinion, this is not correct. The Tribunal failed to discharge its obligation as per the Act. In view of the above, we answer question No. 2 in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and question No. 3 in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. So far as question No. 4 is concerned in view of our answer to question No. 1 we need not answer the same. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
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1996 (8) TMI 89 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... r the provisions of section 37. Mr. Joshi, however, challenges this. According to him, motor vehicle tax is not paid on the basis of ownership, it is required to be paid only when the vehicle plies. We have gone through the provisions of the Assam Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1936. On reading of section 4 as well as section 8, it is abundantly clear that the tax is paid on the user of the vehicle in the State of Assam. Therefore, in our opinion, tax is required to be paid not merely because of owning of the vehicle, but because of its user. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction of Rs. 1,12,646 the amount paid towards motor vehicles tax, under section 37(3A). Therefore, we answer question No. 2 in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Guwahati.
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