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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 126 Records
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1975 (11) TMI 139 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cer and the kachchi rojmel was seized. Without stating so in express terms, the judgment and order of the Tribunal makes it quite clear that the Tribunal has proceeded on the footing that, in view of this seizure, after 20th February, 1958, the assessees would probably have maintained regular and proper books of account and there was nothing on the record of the case to show to the contrary. We fail to see how it could be said that the Tribunal has committed any error in coming to this common-sense conclusion. If there had been any material which indicated that even after 20th February, 1958, the assessees had continued to suppress sales, the Tribunal might have as well come to a contrary conclusion. In our view, the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is correct. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative. In view of the fact that the assessees are not appearing, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (11) TMI 138 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ime when the purchases were made, the normal use of butter paper was for packing goods. There is no finding of the Tribunal that such is the normal use of butter paper. All that the Tribunal has stated is that butter paper could be used for packing soft and delicate things. It is common knowledge that butter paper can be used for purposes other than packing of goods, viz., in electrical laminations, in photograph albums, in making stickers and so on. In view of the absence of a finding that the normal use of butter paper is for packing of goods and there being no common knowledge that such is the normal use of butter paper, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the butter paper purchased by the assessees was covered by entry No. 24. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondents the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (11) TMI 137 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l did not consider this aspect of the question and went astray in making a sweeping remark that even though there are sufficient reasons or not, justice had to be done. The Tribunal misguided itself on this question of law when it held that non-production in time is not a relevant consideration in granting relief to the assessee regarding the turnover covered by the C forms. This extreme generosity displayed by the Tribunal in doing justice cannot be upheld in law. We set aside the order of the Tribunal and remand the case back to the assessing authority to apply its mind and to consider whether there were sufficient reasons for the nonproduction of the C forms before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner earlier and revise the assessment accordingly regarding the turnover covered by the C forms produced if he is satisfied about the sufficiency of reasons. The tax revision case is disposed of as above. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Petition allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 136 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Commissioner of the application for grant of certificate and the actual issue of the certificate, what the Sales Tax Officer has done is to make the certificate operate retrospectively from the date of the receipt of the application for the grant of the certificate in the office of the Commissioner of Sales Tax. This is something done for the benefit of the purchasing dealer and his vendor inasmuch as it enables the respondents to make purchases without being under the liability to have collected from him by his vendor the tax which his vendor would otherwise be liable to pay to the Government. We do not find in the said entry any bar against the Commissioner of Sales Tax or any officer acting under the authority delegated by him so acting beneficially to the dealers. For the reasons set out above, we accordingly answer the question as reframed by us in the negative. The respondents will pay to the applicant the costs of the reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1975 (11) TMI 135 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lance. No evidence was recorded because both the Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Tribunal proceeded on an entirely erroneous basis. Even though the Commissioner of Sales Tax did not record any evidence, the Tribunal at least ought to have either recorded such evidence itself or remanded the matter to the Commissioner of Sales Tax to record the necessary evidence, as it did in the second Voltas appeal. In view of this state of affairs, it is not possible for us to give any answer to the question submitted to us, except that the Tribunal erred in deciding the appeal before it in the absence of evidence, and should have before deciding the appeal either recorded the necessary evidence itself or remanded the appeal to the Commissioner of Sales Tax to record such evidence, and we answer the question submitted to us accordingly. There will be no order as to costs of the reference. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicants will be refunded to them. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (11) TMI 134 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which he deals, that is, in which he buys or sells in the course of his business. The form of the certificate of registration, namely, form 2 to the said Rules, sets out the type of business or businesses which the dealer is carrying on. The scheme of the Act and the Rules and the forms appended thereto leave no doubt that unless the goods which have been resold were purchased from a registered dealer who was dealing in that very class of goods, there could be no claim for deduction under clause (ii) of section 8 of the said Act. Where a registered dealer who has made the first sale was not dealing in this class of goods, the goods sold could not be said to be sold by a registered dealer, and such a sale must stand on the same footing as a sale by an unregistered dealer. For the above reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The applicants will pay to the respondents the costs of the reference fixed at Rs. 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (11) TMI 133 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... It is a misnomer to call rice as paddy. They are two different things in ordinary parlance ........ This would give a guideline as to the proper approach to be made in determining whether the particular commodity is or is not cotton yarn . Since the commodity is not before us, we do not wish to express any final opinion in this matter. With great respect we disagree with the view of the Madras High Court in the decision in Madura Mills Company Limited v. Government of Madras 1970 25 S.T.C. 407., relied on by the Tribunal for reaching the conclusion it did. We therefore set aside the order of the Tribunal in Tribunal Appeals Nos. 222 to 224 of 1973 and remit the cases back to the Tribunal to deal with the appeals afresh in the light of what we have stated in this judgment and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions which we have referred to. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in the tax revision cases before this court. Cases remitted.
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1975 (11) TMI 132 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ras v. Cement Allocation and Co-ordinating Organisation 1972 29 S.T.C. 114 (S.C.). We shall extract the observations in paragraph 1 of the judgment The High Court entertatined that writ petition. It would have been proper if the High Court had directed the assessee to put forward its case before the authorities under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Now that the High Court had entertained the writ petition and gone into the merits of the case, it serves no useful purpose to refuse to go into the merits of the case. 8.. We are therefore unable to accept the contention of counsel on behalf of the revenue that we must at this stage decline jurisdiction. 9.. In the light of what we have stated above, we set aside the judgment under appeal and allow the original petition holding that caristrap rayon cord strapping is rayon fabric exempted from tax under item 7 of the Third Schedule to the Act. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 131 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on parlance meaning should be accepted. In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Raju and Mannar 1966 60 I.T.R. 246 (S.C.)., the Supreme Court held that a diesel engine was machinery . A tractor would certainly be a machinery in view of what has been stated above and tractor parts would be spare parts of machinery and, therefore, would come within the purview of entry 60. 4.. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Additional Sales Tax Tribunal was not right in holding that tractor parts and electric motors were exigible to tax at 5 per cent. Our answer to the second question is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessing officer was justified in assessing the turnover of sale of tractor parts and electric motors at 7 per cent. The assessee went unrepresented. We would accordingly direct parties to bear their own costs of the references. PANDA, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1975 (11) TMI 130 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... led that for the purpose of determining the total turnover under section 7, the turnover relating to inter-State sales is not to be included. Editorial note In pursuance of the abovesaid order the following corrections should be made in the Reports at page 300 supra In the headnote at page 300, in line 10 from the bottom, omit the words inter-State sales as well as and in line 9 from the bottom, omit the words which are . In the judgment at page 302, in line 23 from the bottom, insert the word not between the words inter-State sales is and to be included .
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1975 (11) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
permit holder is the owner within the definition of the "owner" in the Bihar Act and other Acts and is also the "operator" within the meaning of the word "operator" in other Acts to which reference has been made. The liability to pay tax is of the permit holder in all cases
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1975 (11) TMI 128 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
In respect of export of cotton yarn and cotton textiles under the Cotton Textiles Export Promotion Incentive Scheme, the assessees were granted import licence for importation of textile chemicals, dyes and gums. One R agreed to purchase from the assessees the imported dyes and chemicals. But as the licence was not transferable, it was agreed that the assessees would sell to R on monopoly basis the imported goods on forward, afloat or c.i.f. basis at a certain price. On receipt of a part of the sale price, which was the premium, the assessees agreed to hand over the licence to enable the purchaser to take steps for importing the goods in the name of the assessees.
Held, that as the licensed importer was the assessees and the purchaser could not have placed on order with the foreign seller, there was no privity of contract between the foreign seller and the purchaser and that, therefore, there was a sale by the assessees to the purchaser which was liable to be taxed under the Tamil Nadu Act.
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1975 (11) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant-company is a dealer within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956-hereinafter referred to as the Central Act, liable to pay sales tax thereunder?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As it was the appellant-company which carried on the business of selling cement although it was acting as selling agents of the Corporation. The Corporation was not the dealer which effected the sales but it was the company which did so.
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1975 (11) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the price of cotton seeds was deductible from the purchase turnover of unginned cotton?
Held that:- All the present appeals have also got to be disposed of in identical terms. The directions given by the learned single Judge are to be modified only to this extent that in all these cases fresh assessments will have to be made under section 11AA as introduced in the Act by the Amendment Act in the light of the judgment of this court in the case of Shakti Cotton Company [1971 (11) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]. The appeals are accordingly disposed of in the manner stated above.
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1975 (11) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sales of manganese ore made by the petitioner-company to M.M.T.C. in execution of agreements, annexures N, O and P, occasioned the export of the goods sold out of the territory of India?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is quite clear in this case that the movement of the goods took place in pursuance of the contracts of sale which ultimately merged into actual sales and it was only thereafter that the tax was sought to be levied by the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was also not disputed that the tax has been levied only on such sales of the manganese ore despatched from the State of Madhya Pradesh which came from the mines situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Thus all the incidents of an inter-State sale are present in the instant case and the view taken by the High Court that the sales were covered by section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act is absolutely correct and we fully endorse the same.
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1975 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Notification No. SRO-3908 dated December 7, 1957, issued by the Central Government in purported exercise of its powers under section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950, is ultra vires?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Set aside the judgment of the Appellate Bench of the High Court and declare the notification dated December 7, 1957, and the subsequent notifications in so far as they withdrew the exemptions from tax mentioned above, to be unconstitutional.
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1975 (11) TMI 92 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... n hence these liabilities are not confirmed by your directors. As we have said, the report for the balance-sheet as at 31st December, 1968, was signed on the 26th July, 1970. The application for winding up was presented on the 9th March, 1972. The position, therefore, is that unless the statements made in the balance-sheet as at 31st December, 1968, and the directors rsquo report referred to above are treated as admission of liability, on the date of presentation of the winding-up petition, the appellant rsquo s claim may have been barred by limitation. The learned trial judge has taken the view that there is a bona fide dispute as to the question of limitation. As we share this view for the reasons given in the judgment of the trial court, this appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. We make it clear, however, that this judgment would not prevent the appellant from pursuing other remedies in an appropriate forum, if so advised. S.K. Datta, J. mdash I, agree.
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1975 (11) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... pellant at the material time was in a position to pay off or compound its debts. Further, it appears that the Darjeeling suit was dismissed for default on July 21, 1973. It was said that the suit has been restored but no paper in support was produced. For all these reasons we are unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. The last point urged on behalf of the appellant is that in view of the secured debt as alleged by the respondent, the petition for winding up was not maintainable unless the security was given up. This contention is untenable by the express provisions of section 439(1)(b) which states that a petition for winding up of a company can be made by any creditor. Under sub-section (2) a secured creditor is to be deemed to be a creditor within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1). For all these reasons and as all the contentions raised by the appellant fail, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Sankar Prasad Mitra, C.J. mdash I agree.
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1975 (11) TMI 74 - ITAT ORISSA
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... ... ..... ase figures and by adding 15 per cent profit over the same. The GTO be rateably determined and tax be recomputed by the AO. After recomputation, if it is found that the appellant has paid any excess tax, the same be refunded by him. 8. Lastly, it is to be seen whether the appellant has preferred the second appeals in time. It is an admitted fact that there has been 18 days delay and the matter could have been decided by the Tribunal. But unfortunately it has not been said that it be decided by the time of hearing. The appellant has filed a petition that on account of the father rsquo s illness who is also a share-holder of the business, he has moved from place to place for which he could not file the appeals in time. As sufficient cause has been shown, the delay need be condoned and at this length of time on useful purpose will be served by sending it to the Tribunal for orders. In the peculiar circumstances, the limitation is condoned and the appeals are accepted as in time.
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1975 (11) TMI 71 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... ility that in future the shares themselves may be liable to alteration or fluctuation was immaterial. This dictum was approved by the Supreme Court in CWT vs. Kripashankar Dayashankar Worah 81 ITR 763. So, the contention of the Revenue that at a future date when the money set apart for the marriage expenses of the daughters is expended, there is scope for an unequal spending and in this view the shares of the beneficiaries are indeterminate, lacks substance since the shares of the beneficiaries are known and specific during the relevant accounting period. Moreover, the proper way of interpreting the declaration deed is that the marriage expenses of the daughters have to be met with from out of a specific sum set apart, the shares of the daughters are definite and known. So interpreted, there is no scope for application of s. 21(4) of the WT Act. The point is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 8. In the result, all the appeals fail and stand dismissed.
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