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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 516 Records
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2000 (3) TMI 1086 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... be in harmony with the object. It cannot be disputed that insurance claim received in respect of goods destroyed by fire has no close nexus with the export activity; the connection is too remote, in the sense that the goods might have been meant for export. But we have to only arrive at "total turnover" and not the "total receipts" of the business. Not all items appearing in the profit & loss account can be properly described as "total turnover" of the business. 7. Section 41(2) as it existed prior to 1-4-1993 gives a clue. Any insurance monies received in respect of goods, the cost of which has been earlier allowed as deduction "shall be deemed to be profits and gains of business" under the provision. The fiction was unnecessary if such receipts were to be considered as "turnover" as normally understood. 8. We are therefore of the view that the decision of the CIT(A) is correct. We uphold the same and dismiss the appeal.
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2000 (3) TMI 1085 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... e present case. Though the assessee has not brought on record any material to establish that the interest was earned out of the surplus funds available with her, still we are of the opinion that even assuming that the surplus funds were temporarily invested for earning interest, the same cannot be said to be out of the business activity of the assessee and will thus be taxable under the head ‘Income from other sources’ and not as income from business. 7. The learned counsel for the assessee wanted a set off for the interest paid out of the interest received but since we have held that interest received has to be taxed under the head ‘Income from other sources’ and interest paid (SC) of packing credit advances, as stated by the learned counsel for the assessee, the said set off cannot be allowed. 8. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order of the learned CIT(A) and restore that of the Assessing Officer. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1084 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s reverted back to his original business during the pendency of the eviction petition before the Rent Controller and for many years now has been carrying on the original business. In these circumstances, where the change of business was only for a very short period and the appellant, during the pendency of the eviction proceedings reverted to the original business which he is carrying on since then, and more particularly because all other grounds, namely, arrears of rent, structural alterations made in the premises in question and bona fide requirement of the landlord, on which the eviction of the appellant was sought, have been negatived, we feel that the ends of justice would be better served if the appellant is allowed to stay in the premises in question as tenant, subject, however, to his paying rent at the rate of ₹ 1,500/- p.m. than the original rent of ₹ 600/- p.m. The appeal is disposed of in the manner indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1083 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... FAO No. 449 of 1978 and FAO No. 2 of 1980 was filed. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings which we have recorded, we hold that High Court committed a serious mistake of law in holding that the Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic person and in allowing the claim over this property in favour of respondents. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the High Court dated 19-4-1985 and in FAO No. 449 of 1978 and FAO No. 2 of 1980 are hereby set aside. We uphold the orders passed by the Tribunal both under Section 10 of the said Act in Suit No. 449 of 1978. Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. Costs on the parties. S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 2735-36 of 1989 The main question raised in these special leave petitions is the same as has been raised in Civil Appeal No.3968 of 1987, which we have disposed of today. In view of this, the point raised by the petitioners in this petition is unsustainable for the same reasons and is therefore dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1082 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . The applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey & Ors.vs. Tarapada Dey & Ors. 1987 (4) SCC 398 and Gursharan Singh & Ors vs. NDMC & Ors. 1996 (2) SCC 459 . Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in directing the deduction of the sum of ₹ 30,000/- from the security amount deposited by the appellant. We find that the learned Single Judge had assigned cogent reasons for return of the earnest money to the appellant and those findings could not be disturbed by the Division Bench allegedly on the ground of equities. The appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 1.12.1998 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of M.P. in LPA No.270/98. The order of the learned Single Judge is restored and the appellant held entitled to refund of the whole amount of the earnest money deposited by him. No costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1081 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... itution of India but in its wisdom have excluded the foreign companies from the additional levy. Since the surcharge has been treated to be different than the rate of tax by the two countries in the agreement, we hold that the restriction placed on the rate of tax under article 14(2) of the convention between the Government of Republic of India and the Government of United States of America is in regard to the rate of tax excluding surcharge. In this view of the matter the Assessing Officer was justified in restricting the rate of tax in the case of the appellant company to 60 per cent and therefore CIT was wrong in holding that the orders passed by the Assessing Officer for the respective assessment years in regard to rate of tax were erroneous insofar as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. We, accordingly, set aside the orders of the CIT under section 263 for assessment years 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95. 14. In the result, the appeals of the assessee are allowed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1080 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... action. After withdrawal, an application under Section 43(2)(rr) was filed for the eviction of the tenant which, as pointed out earlier, was rejected by the Prescribed Authority and also by the District Judge but was allowed by the High Court. In view of the above discussion, such an application could not have been entertained under Section 43(2)(rr) as the landlord wanted to occupy the residential portion of the building for non-residential purposes. It was, therefore, not a ground within the meaning of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) and, therefore, the application under Section 43(2)(rr) was not maintainable and should have been rejected by the High Court as well on that ground. The appeal is consequently allowed. The impugned judgment dated 27.5.1999 passed by the High Court is set aside and those of the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge are maintained and the application of the respondents under Section 43(2)(rr) is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1079 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fied it is necessary to detain you under COFEPOSA Act, 1974 with a view to preventing you from concealing, transporting smuggled goods as well as dealing in smuggled goods." Since the above satisfaction did not speak of smuggling of goods or abetting smuggling of goods, which was in Gururnukhi version of the detention order, the Supreme Court took the view that the detenu could have been confused whether he should represent against the grounds in the detention order or the satisfaction recorded in the grounds of detention. Hence, it held that he was precluded from exercising his right of making an effective representation under Article 22(5) of The Constitution of India and quashed the detention order. 10. For the said reasons, we allow this writ petition quash and set aside the impugned detention order; direct that the detenu Iqbal alias Balu Rafiuddin Shaikh, be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case; and make the rule absolute. 11. Writ petition allowed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1078 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... J. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1077 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Claimants then confined their resistance to the plea that the application for recall is not legally maintainable. Therefore, we strongly feel that the claim must be allowed to be resisted, on the ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If we fail to afford to the Insurance Company an opportunity to substantiate their contentions it might certainly lead to serious miscarriage of justice. In the result, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned orders and quash the awards passed by the Tribunal in favour of the claimants. We direct the Tribunal to consider the claims put forth by the claimants afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity to the appellant Insurance Company to substantiate their allegations. Opportunity must be afforded to the claimants also to rebut the allegations. We make it clear that while disposing of the claims afresh the Tribunal shall not be trammeled by any of the observations, if any, made by us on the merits of the allegations.
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2000 (3) TMI 1076 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Delay condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1075 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... odge it by proving that it is a sham and fictitious transaction. When circumstances of the case and the intrinsic evidence on record clearly point out that the transaction is not bona fide and genuine, it is unnecessary for the court to find out whether the respondent has led any evidence to show that the transaction is sham, bogus or fictitious. For the afore-mentioned reasons, we are unable to say that the High Court erred in taking the view that the sale, in favour of the appellants, is neither bona fide nor genuine and confers no right on them. In view of the finding on point No.1, the suit property remained the property of the Company and, therefore, it vested in the Central Government under Section 3(1) of the Act of 1973. This is what the High Court held on point No.2. which is supported by the judgment of this Court in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Madanlal Agrawal 1997 (1) SCC 177 . In the result, we find no merit in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1073 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the way of respondent satisfying the trial Court or the High Court, on any fresh application, of any other valid ground by which he would fall within the parameters contemplated in Section 37 of the Act. 9. As we are not able to concur with the rationale adopted by the learned single Judge we have to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order. We are told that respondent has already been put back in jail and therefore no other con sequential direction need be passed by us. 10. Shri U.R. Lalit, learned senior counsel made a last plea that as respondent and his wife both are now interned in jail there is nobody to look after the children and that there is no possibility of effectively conducting defence in the trial. We make it clear that this order will not in any manner affect the right of the wife of the respondent for seeking any remedy which is available to her under law. 11. The Appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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2000 (3) TMI 1072 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om exports. However, the said allowance is to be adjusted in working out the gross total income computed without deductions under Chapter VI-A and that the deduction under section 80HHC shall however not exceed the gross total income. 12. In this case the gross total income of the assessee after adjustment of carried forward unabsorbed investment allowance is ₹ 15,31,608. The profits derived from exports for the purposes of section 80HHC have been worked out at ₹ 14,26,306. Since the gross total income worked after adjustment of investment allowance is more than the deduction under section 80HHC, the assessee is entitled to the deduction of the entire profits derived from exports without adjustment of unabsorbed investment allowance against that income. We therefore uphold the claim of the assessee and direct the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction to the assessee in accordance with this order. 13. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1071 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Delay condoned The appeal is dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1070 - SUPREME COURT
Detenu challenging the order of detention passed against him on 2.8.99 under the COFEPOSA
Held that:- The detention order in respect of the present petitioner should be based principally on the facts centerd on what he had done in collaboration with his co-traveler. The detaining authority cannot be said to be totally ignorant of the fact that Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran was also detained under a separate order, for, the aforesaid detention order against Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran was passed by the same detaining authority just six days prior to the impugned detention order.
the grievance regarding delay in disposing of the representation made by the detenu to the Central Government is not valid in the circumstances of this case. Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. It is needless to say that the parole benefit which petitioner is enjoying by virtue of the order passed by this Court will stand terminated forthwith.
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2000 (3) TMI 1069 - SUPREME COURT
What of the petitioner has in the SDF when it was not even born and fund was created and how the petitioner, a competitor, would have any right to claim the fund?
Held that:- While the collection and remittance to SDF has been discontinued w.e.f. April 1994, the petitioner made its claim for the first time in 1999 which would appear to be rather incongruous. It is submitted that the claim made by the petitioner is not bona fide and writ petition has been filed with ulterior motives, which are not difficult to fathom. SAIL had stressed immediate need for restructing and modernising all the main steel plants. Due to recession, SAIL has been passing through severe financial position and has to suffer a loss of Rs.1574 crores in 1998-99. It has further to suffer burden of interest to the tune of Rs.2017 crores per annum for modernisation. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner does not have any right to claim any relief in the writ petition pertaining to utilisation of SDF. It is quite apparent that from the very nature of the creation of SDF, manner of remittance to SDF and purpose of its utilisation, it is a fund created ultimately for the utilisation by the member steel producers only. We do not think it is a fit case where this Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India should grant leave to appeal from the impugned judgment of the High Court. Leave to appeal is refused.
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2000 (3) TMI 1068 - SUPREME COURT
Whether this Court in appeal can refer the parties to arbitration under the new Act?
Held that:- The language of Section 8 is peremptory. It is, therefore, obligatory for the Court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement. Nothing remains to be decided in the original action or the appeal arising therefrom. There is no question of stay of the proceedings till the arbitration proceedings conclude and the Award becomes final in terms of the provisions of the new Act. All the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties would now be governed by the new Act including the right to challenge the Award. The Court to which the party shall have recourse to challenge the Award would be the Court as defined in clause (e) of Section 2 of the new Act and not the Court to which an application under Section 8 of the new Act is made. An application before a Court under Section 8 merely brings to the Courts notice that the subject matter of the action before it is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement. This would not be such an application as contemplated under Section 42 of the Act as the Court trying the action may or may not have had jurisdiction to try the suit to start with or be the competent Court within the meaning of Section 2 (e) of the new Act. We, therefore, allow the application and would refer the parties to arbitration. No further orders are required in this appeal and it stands disposed of accordingly.
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2000 (3) TMI 1067 - TAMIL NADU TAXATION SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... . Nos. 1347 and 1348 dated November 5, 1999 (Madras Cements Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu ) should have precedence. Further, we have to point out that an agreement between the parties cannot be overlooked unless either of the parties take legal steps to modify or alter the agreement in a manner known to law. It is an essential principle of law that the contract between the parties should be taken as it is, unless legally modified. In this view of the See page 208 supra. matter we do not accept any of the arguments advanced on the side of the petitioner and we accept the stand of the Government that the impugned notice dated September 9, 1999 is valid and is in accordance with law. Consequently, the original petition fails and is dismissed. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 24th day of March, 2000. Petition dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1066 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e products). The subject-matter of the sale is REP licences/exim scrips. The sale or transfer of REP licences/exim scrips took place in pursuance of the agreement between the appellant and the export house. As the goods (REP licences/exim Scrips) were not in existence at the time of the agreements, the transfer is completed only on delivery of the goods. In this case therefore, the taxable event is the issue of the REP licences/exim scrips in favour of the export house by the licensing authority in pursuance of the agreement and the disclaimer by the appellant. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale/transfer took place outside the territory of India. 28.. We do not find any error in the impugned revisional order dated January 22, 2000 passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Karnataka). As all the points raised by appellant are answered against the appellant, it follows that there is no merit in these appeals. Accordingly, these appeals are rejected. Appeals dismissed.
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