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Showing 41 to 60 of 110 Records
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1974 (8) TMI 95 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ached certain properties belonging to the petitioner personally and put them up for sale. Aggrieved by the said recovery proceedings, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. There is no provision in the statute which authorises recovery of arrears due from a company by proceeding against its director. The proceedings are therefore without jurisdiction. They are accordingly quashed. Respondents 1 and 2 are directed to forbear from proceeding against the petitioner for recovering the arrears of sales tax payable by M/s. Hi-Precision Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. The petitioner is entitled to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1974 (8) TMI 94 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cular proceeding raises before it. Often enough, in dealing with the very narrow point raised by a writ petition wider arguments are urged before the court, but the court should always be careful not to cover ground which is strictly not relevant for the purpose of deciding the petition before it. Obiter observations and discussion of problems not directly involved in any proceeding should be avoided by courts in dealing with all matters brought before them but this requirement becomes almost compulsive when the court is dealing with constitutional matters... In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to enter into an examination of the vires of section 9-13(3) of the Act. We, therefore, decline to decide the second question canvassed before us. 7.. The net result, therefore, is that the writ application shall succeed a writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the imposition of penalty. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. PANDA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1974 (8) TMI 93 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t case was passed on 16th November, 1970, that is to say, after section 12-A had, in fact, come into operation. Section 12-A deals with a procedural matter, viz., the burden of proof for proving certain specified categories of facts. It is settled that such procedural amendments are retrospective in the sense that they apply to proceedings which are pending on the date when they come into force. So, even if this section had not been expressly made retrospective, it would have been applicable to the present cases because here the proceedings were pending before the Sales Tax Officer when the section came into force. In view of this legislative change, the decision in Gupta Homeo Medical Stores case 1969 24 S.T.C. 415. is not applicable to the present cases. In this view no useful purpose would be served by calling for a statement of the case. In the result, the applications under section 11(4) of the Act are dismissed, but we make no order as to costs. Applications dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 92 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ss it will be cattle feed within the meaning of the notification because the product was generally used as cattle feed. The fact that in special cases the user was different will not make any material difference. The article was held to be cattle feed and hence cattle fodder . The view taken in the case of Omrao Industrial Corporation(1) is applicable in the present case as well. The authorities below were not justified in bringing to tax the turnover of oil-cakes on the ground that it was sold by the petitioner to a firm, which did not use it as cattle fodder. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned assessment order under section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act for the assessment year 1968-69 is quashed. The assessment orders passed for the year 1969-70 under the Central Sales Tax Act as well as under the U.P. Sales Tax Act are quashed in so far as they impose tax on the turnover of oil-cake. The petitioner will be entitled to costs. Petition allowed.
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1974 (8) TMI 91 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rued as one issued under clause (1-A) of section 12-A of the Act. The proceedings are for the imposition of penalty. When penalty is sought to be imposed, the proceedings have to be strictly construed. When the notice issued purports to be under section 12(4) of the Act and the dealer has got a valid defence in it, no penalty could be imposed on him under section 12(4) after the original assessment order was made. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes also construed the notice issued under section 12(4) as not one under clause (1-A) of section 12-A of the Act. That benefit of doubt should go to the assessee and not to the State. It is not open to the State to contend that the notice should be construed as one issued under clause (1-A) of section 12-A of the Act. Therefore, we allow this revision petition and reverse the order of the Tribunal and restore the order made by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. It is ordered accordingly. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1974 (8) TMI 90 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pro tanto Hattrem v. Burdick, 138 Or. 660, 6 P. 2d. 18,19. These definitions show that if something is accepted as sufficient to discharge a liability, either in full or in part, that amounts to a payment. In case of a set-off which is found due to an assessee for the assessment period in question, it cannot be disputed that the said set-off would work as partially or totally extinguishing the tax liability. If that be so, such a setoff can legitimately be considered as the sum paid . Since this set-off is always with regard to the sum which is already paid prior to the assessment, we are of the opinion that all the requirements of the third category of cases contemplated by sub-section (3A) of section 36 are satisfied. In our opinion, therefore, the question which is reframed by us should be answered in the affirmative. This reference is accordingly disposed of. The State shall bear the costs of the opponent-assessee in this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (8) TMI 89 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conveniently absorbed in the cost of manufacture. Entry No. 4 of Schedule C prescribes a low rate of tax, namely, the rate of 3 per cent. This particular aspect of the matter gives support to our view that this low rate of taxation is prescribed with regard to the dyes and chemicals in entry No. 4 only because these dyes and chemicals were supposed to be used in the manufacture of finished articles. In other words, dyes and chemicals which are referred to in this entry are the intermediary products. 13.. Taking therefore all these facts and circumstances into consideration, we find that the Tribunal was right in taking a view that Aldrex, Dieldrex and Endrex are not the chemicals contemplated by entry No. 4 of Schedule C. Our answer to the question which is referred to us is, therefore, in the negative. This reference is accordingly disposed of and it is ordered that the applicant shall bear the costs of the opponentState in the reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1974 (8) TMI 88 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... prices charged for those sales with the prices charged for inter-State sales on the same dates or the correspondence between the dealer and the purchaser would be relevant material to arrive at a finding whether the price charged for inter-State sales did include any amount by way of sales tax or not. What has got to be ascertained is whether any amount by way of sales tax is intended to be passed on to the buyer as a bargain in the transaction. The process by which the matter could be determined has been explained by this court in Spencer and Co. Ltd. s case 1970 26 S.T.C. 283. It is therefore clear that the matter has to be investigated into and all relevant material gathered before arriving at a decision whether the assessee had not collected the sales tax. In this view, the order of the Tribunal and of the authorities below are set aside and the matter is remitted to the assessing authority to make a fresh order in the light of this order. No costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1974 (8) TMI 87 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... een made on the father of the petitioner when he was alive, before instituting the proceedings for recovery, it was the duty of the respondent to have ascertained as to who are the legal representatives of the deceased and whether they have come into possession of any of the assets of the deceased. It is only where the legal representatives have succeeded to the assets of the father to the extent of the assets of the deceased in their hands, they are liable. This court in Seshayya v. Assistant Commercial Tax Officer 1971 28 S.T.C. 306 1971 Kar. L.J. 6., has laid down the law as to what should be done when proceedings for recovery have to be instituted after the death of the assessee. In the above view, the order of the Magistrate cannot be sustained. We, accordingly, set aside the order of the Magistrate and direct him to consider the merits of both the contentions raised by the petitioner. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Ordered accordingly.
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1974 (8) TMI 86 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntitled to collect by way of tax any amount which a registered dealer effecting such sale would have been entitled to collect. In other words, when the State Government collects any amount by way of tax, it is not levying sales tax it is collecting, in addition to the sale price, ail amount which a registered dealer effecting such sale would have been entitled to collect. In view of section 19, there can be no doubt that the State Government is not a dealer under the Act. The distribution of foodgrains is also not done by any undertaking of the State Government. Therefore, when the State Government is not liable to tax under section 5(1), its agent cannot be made liable since the liability of the agent is coextensive with that of his principal. The view taken by the Tribunal that the respondent is not liable to pay tax for the relevant period is therefore right. Accordingly, this revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 85 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... preme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. H. Abdul Bakshi Bros. 1964 15 S.T.C. 644 (S.C.). has held that tanning bark purchased by the dealer and used in the process of tanning is liable to tax as tanning bark is brought for consumption in manufacturing an article for sale. In view of the said decision, it is clear that the view taken by the Tribunal in regard to the purchase of firewood cannot be sustained. As already stated, since neither the assessing authority nor the appellate authorities have given any finding as to whether the sellers are dealers as defined under section 2(1)(k) of the Act, we are of the opinion that the matter has to be remitted to the assessing authority for fresh investigation and assessment in the light of this order. Accordingly, these revision petitions are allowed and the matter is remitted to the assessing authority for a fresh assessment in accordance with law in the light of this order. Parties will bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1974 (8) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Officer, Winding up - Powers of liquidator, Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases
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1974 (8) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Memorandum of association - Act to override, Meetings and Proceedings - Extra Ordinary General Meeting, Disqualification of directors
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1974 (8) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court of Bombay was right in directing additional evidence to be led by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 under Order XLI, rule 27, of the Code of Civil Procedure?
Held that:- The application made by the official liquidator did not give sufficient particulars which, in our view, it should have. Once a show-cause notice was given to respondents Nos. 1 to 4 the official liquidator did not lead any evidence nor rely upon any other documents, nor did respondent No. 5, who was instrumental in initiating the misfeasance case against respondents Nos. 1 to 4, lead any evidence. In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the District Court to reject the evidence which the respondents had intended to lead or to disallow the production of documents other than those already produced, and for that reason the High Court rightly ordered that additional evidence be recorded in this case.
The official liquidator failed to establish that the Nagpur company was entitled to the whole or part of the infringement commission by reason of the fact that it was a sole selling agent of the General Motors parts in that particular area or it had an exclusive sub-agency from the Bombay company. The High Court considered that the evidence in the case was not sufficient to establish either of these claims. We have not been persuaded to hold otherwise.
It was agreed and accepted by all the associates that a commission of 2 per cent. on all such imports on the c.i.f. or f.o.b. invoice value, as the case may be, should be paid to the Bombay office. But, in so far as sub-item V of Item III was concerned, it was unanimously agreed that the associated offices should pay a commission of 5 per cent. on their imports covered by the licences owned by the Bombay offices.
It is not one's case that the commission according to this letter was not paid, and as the Nagpur company has received this commission it cannot claim any additional commission.
These two items, namely, ₹ 9,827 and ₹ 2,100, which are allowable to the liquidator come to ₹ 11,927. The other two items for ₹ 7,689-12-0 and ₹ 2,184 which relate to the purchases actually made by the Bombay company in pursuance of their offer and in pursuance of the majority resolution of April 25, 1953, and the difference between the book value and the purchase value of the car by the Bombay company were also allowed. Apart from this, item (5) for a sum of ₹ 2,686-3-0 in connection with the wrongful remission to the Hyderabad company was also allowed. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 72 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... the attempts to have the company wound-up underlines that it is an eminently fit case in which this court should not exercise its power in favour of the petitioner. I am satisfied that the petitioner, even if originally justified in bringing the petition, is persisting in its prosecution, with iniquitous motives and should be denied relief. It was, however, said that despite the company s offer to pay the petitioner, the debt in exhibit P-1 suit is outstanding and that would spell inability to pay its debts justifying a winding up. The bank which has filed that suit has not intervened to support the petition and it is not known what the company s defence to that suit is, or whether the company is unable to pay that debt, even if the debt is fully due, or whether the bank is willing to accommodate the company. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot claim a vicarious boost from that debt and it will be of no avail to sustain the petition. I dismiss the petition with costs.
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1974 (8) TMI 55 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Necessity Of Question Of Law, The High Court ... ... ... ... ..... . We may also refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Khodar Eswarsa and Sons, wherein on the basis of certain facts the Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessee did not make any deliberate attempt at concealment. The Supreme Court held that the conclusions drawn by the Appellate Tribunal with regard to concealment of income by the assessee were findings of fact and that no question of law arose for reference being made, to the High Court. The Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no fraud or gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee and on the basis of that finding the penalty was cancelled. In our view, it is purely a finding of fact and no question of law arises and as such we decline to direct the Tribunal to refer the aforesaid question to us. The application for making a reference has, therefore, no merit and is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1974 (8) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax, Natural Justice, Reason To Believe, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... ctive alternative remedy by way of appeal but interference at this stage may result in allowing a person to escape the provisions of law as the department might not be able to continue the enquiry from the stage where the principles of natural justice have been violated. It is also stated by the learned counsel for the revenue that there are no other known assets in the name of the second petitioner and, if the order has to be interfered with on any such technical ground, grave mischief would be done which could not be remedied at any later stage. These are certainly circumstances in our opinion, to be taken into account in imposing a self-restriction on ourselves from interfering with such orders under article 226 of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to interfere with the order of the Income-tax Officer on this ground of attack. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs of the 4th respondent. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... was made taxable in the hands of the shareholder. Thus unlike section 2(6A)(e) the section not only creates a fiction but goes further and says in whose total income such deemed distribution will have to be included for the purpose of the Act. Section 23A specifically directs such notional dividend to be included in the total income of the shareholders. If in such a case section 16(3) is to be invoked it would be totally inconsistent and contrary to the provisions of section 23A itself. It is for these reasons it was held in these cases that the fiction created in section 23A should not be projected into section 16(3). These decisions, therefore, do not help the assessee. The result is that the loans advanced to the wife and the other five minor children were includible under section 16(3) of the Act in the total income of the assessee. Accordingly, we answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (8) TMI 52 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Reason To Believe, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... rit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed with costs. As a result of the dismissal of this writ petition (and the connected petitions), the stay which was granted by Rajinder Sachar J., on November 23, 1971, and the further order of stay made by V. S. Deshpande J. on January 24, 1973, are vacated for action to be taken according to law by the department on the basis of the seizures which were impugned in this writ petition. Rajinder Sachar J., having restrained the passing of final order pending the writ petition, the revenue can proceed to pass final order in accordance with law. Shri M. K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner, states that some other clarifications, regarding which he says he is not aware, might have been passed in the writ petition during the pendency of the writ petition. He is only anxious that such clarification, if any, should not be nullified by any observation of mine made in this respect; it is not so intended. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Fair Market Value, Gift Tax, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... s on the facts of this case, but in the calculation of the real value of shares the Tribunal has not only overlooked the debt of Rs. 1,83,133 due by the company to the assessee as part of the consideration for the buses as also other liabilities and assets of the company. The real value of the shares has to be worked out, if need be, by applying the break-up method. As we are, however, holding that the transactions of transfer of buses and allotment of shares are two independent transactions, it is not necessary to go into the question as to what is the real value of the shares. That will be relevant only if the transaction is treated as one of exchange ignoring the form in which the transaction has been put through in the accounts of the company. We have to, therefore, answer the question in the negative and against the assessee, and we answer accordingly. The revenue will be entitled to its costs from the assessee. Counsel s fee, Rs. 250. Question answered in the negative.
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