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1975 (7) TMI 73 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Exemption notification - Effect of withdrawal - Change in rate of duty - Taxing statute - Canons of interpretation
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1975 (7) TMI 72 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH (INDORE)
Rasching rings ... ... ... ... ..... Item (4)....... There is no doubt that the petitioner manufactures porcelainware, although those rasching rings may be unglazed. It does not matter whether the procelainware is glazed or unglazed. The test of glaze applies only to tiles and to chinawares. Thus, the taxing authorities were right in imposing excise duty of the rasching rings manufactured by the petitioner under Sub-item (4) of Item 23B of Schedule I to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 The said decision of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Indore and that of the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi, cannot be said to be erroneous and it was warranted by the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and there would be no occasion to interfere with those decisions. 6. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this petition fails and accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee shall be Rs. 100/- outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1975 (7) TMI 71 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : JABALPUR BENCH, IND
Taxable event - Rate of duty - Determination of ... ... ... ... ..... with reference to Section 4 of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, where exemption has for the first time been revoked and an article is subject to excise duty with effect from a particular date. Excise duty being a tax on production or manufacture, the liability for tax will arise at the time the production or manufacture is completed and not at the time the goods are removed from the godowns by the producer or the manufacturer, of course, if that liability under Section 3 be established, then the matter relating to rate will be governed by the provisions of Section 4 of the Act and the relevant rules pertaining thereto. In view of this position, we do not think that the present case is a fit one for a certificate of fitness for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, as, in our opinion, no substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this case. 6. This petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed summarily without notice to the other side.
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1975 (7) TMI 70 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Export Business, Export Profits Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... , we are of the opinion that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had rightly held that the donations by the assessee to the Chief Minister s Drought Relief Fund could not be allowed as business expenses under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but that they could properly be allowed as voluntary donations under section 80G(2)(a)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In our opinion, the learned Members of the Appellate Tribunal were in error in allowing the sum as business expenses under section 37(1) of the Act. As a result, we would answer the question referred to us as follows That, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not in law justified in allowing deduction of the amount paid by the assessee as contribution to the Chief Minister s Drought Relief Fund by holding it as an admissible deduction under section 37(1) of the Income tax Act, 1961. However, under the circumstances, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs of these references.
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1975 (7) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Income Tax Authorities, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... and seizure conducted in the premises of the petitioner s brother ended in an order under section 132(5) of the Act similarly passed. The Central Board of Direct Taxes has cancelled that order on the ground that the Income-tax Officer had not acted properly in ignoring the objections filed by the petitioner s brother. That is only by the way. As the goods were seized on the 6th June, 1972, the order of the 19th December, 1972, would be wholly without jurisdiction, as it was passed beyond the period of 90 days provided in the statute. In our opinion, the petitioner is entitled to the writ of certiorari. The order of 19th December, 1972, is accordingly quashed and the petitioner is entitled to the return of the articles of jewellery and the silverware in the possession of the department. We direct the return of those items within four weeks from this date. The rule nisi is made absolute. The writ petition is allowed. The petitioner will have his costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 250.
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1975 (7) TMI 68 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Bona Fide, High Court, Income Tax Authorities, Search And Seizure Under Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... civil prison for a period of two weeks and is also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200. In default of payment of fine, he shall be further detained in the civil prison for a period of one week. The case of respondent No. 3 stands on a different footing. She has rightly stated on oath that she was faced with a difficult situation. On the one hand she was confronted with a stay order issued by the Motion Bench and on the other she had to comply with the directions of her superior officer, respondent No. 1. We have no doubt in our mind that left to herself, she would have obeyed the injunction issued by this court. The omission on her part to offer an apology at the earliest stage is also explainable because she had to fall in line with her superior officer. We feel that the interests of justice would be met if she is administered a stern warning that any lapse of the like nature on her part shall be severely dealt with in future. We order accordingly. R. S. NARULA C.J.--I agree.
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1975 (7) TMI 67 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Fresh Information, Income Tax Act, Reason To Believe, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... ising action under section 132 of the Act against the petitioner. An offence under section 193, Indian Penal Code, was prima facie proved against them. (2) Respondent No. 3 by changing the order sheet of the file in proceedings under section 132(5) of the Act had also committed the same offence. (3) The Assistant Director of Intelligence attached to the office of respondent No. 1 by recording a note that the proposal of respondent No. 2 mentioned at (1) above had been received on October 7, 1974, had also fabricated false evidence. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Awasthy, we are tentatively of the view that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry be held into this matter. Let notices be issued to respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the Assistant Director of Intelligence working in the office of respondent No. 1 to show cause why a complaint under section 193, Indian Penal Code, be not filed against them. R. S. NARULA C.J.--I agree.
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1975 (7) TMI 66 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Gratuity Fund, Gratuity To Employees ... ... ... ... ..... t is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. We, however, hasten to add that this does not mean that the Tribunal has allowed the sum of Rs. 3,48,671 and Rs. 6,42,917 mentioned in the two questions as liabilities that had accrued in the years of account for the relevant assessment years in those two cases. What the Tribunal has stated, we have extracted in our judgment and it is for the Income-tax Officer to determine the exact quantum of liability in the light of the principles stated in this judgment and in accordance with the directions in the orders of the Tribunal. We answer the question referred to us in I.T.R.C. No. 59 of 1974 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. We, direct the parties to bear their respective costs in all these tax referred cases. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1975 (7) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Agreement To Sell Property, House Property, Transfer Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... the property was worth more than Rs. 100 and without a registered sale deed it was not possible for the title to pass. It may be that, if A tried to get back the property, section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act would come to the aid of the appellant in defence. But the suit in that case had been filed to establish the right of the appellant as owner of the property and in such a suit the appellant could not take the benefit of section 53A. Thus, it is quite evident from the facts of this case that even though the purchaser was put into possession with all the other rights incidental thereto, in the absence of a registered sale deed, as the value of the property exceeded Rs. 100, the transferee cannot be regarded as owner and, for asserting such a right, section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was not available. Thus, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the revenue. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (7) TMI 64 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Revised Returns ... ... ... ... ..... oncealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished. The offence of concealing the particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income in the instant case has to be considered in relation to the original returns which were submitted by the assessee and wherein this concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income has occurred. So in determining the quantum of penalty the amount of income, the particulars of which were concealed or inaccurate particulars of which were furnished, has to be taken into consideration. It is, therefore, found that the Tribunal was justified in holding that for the purpose of calculation of penalty the difference between the tax on the incomes shown in the first returns and the tax on the incomes assessed shall be taken as the amounts of tax that would have been avoided. In the result both the questions of law are answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. D. M. SEN J.--I agree.
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1975 (7) TMI 63 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... these facts which have been found by the Tribunal, it will be difficult to resist the claim of the assessee that the fencing surrounding the refinery processing units should be regarded as part of the plant. If the fencing were to be regarded as a separate item and not as a part of the processing unit, still in view of the Petroleum Rules, 1937, it is quite clear that without the fencing put up around the processing units, the processing units could not be at all put to use and as such the fencing would fall within the meaning of the expression plant as given by Lindley L. J. in the case of Yarmouth v. France. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the fencing constructed around the refinery processing units constituted plant for the purpose of granting depreciation allowance as well as development rebate. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1975 (7) TMI 62 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Income Tax Authorities, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... registered thereafter. The key provision of the Act in this respect is the definition of the instrument of transfer in section 269A(f) meaning the instrument of transfer registered under the Registration Act, 1908. It would follow that an instrument of transfer not so registered would not be covered by the definition. Then follows the definition of transfer in section 269A(h) which simply means that the transfer of any immovable property by sale or exchange, namely, under the Transfer of Property Act. Under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a transfer of immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 and above can be made only by a registered instrument. It would follow, therefore, that any transfer, to attract the provisions of the impugned Act, would have to be registered under the Registration Act. Till then, the provisions of the impuged Act would not apply to it. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (7) TMI 61 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ion on this point. The argument raised by Mr. Awasthy on the basis of section 138 of the Income-tax Act is also not acceptable to us. Though this section invests the Income-tax Officer with a discretion to allow or disallow a stranger to get information relating to any assessee in respect of any assessment made under the Income-tax Act and in that sense if the cases of more than one assessee have been processed at the same time the result of negativing the claim for privilege would be that the petitioner-assessee would indirectly get information regarding other assessees also, yet we feel that the authorities by clubbing the cases of more than one assessee should not be allowed to withhold information from an assessee to which he is otherwise entitled. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the view that the claim for privilege put forth on behalf of the respondents is not made out from any point of view whatsoever, which is hereby disallowed. R. S. NARULA C.J.--I agree.
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1975 (7) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... d out in this judgment. The very use of the word development shows that the intention and the object of providing this allowance is to provide a fund for development of industry. Development rebate is for expansion of the industry by adding something to its existing machinery or other asset or of a totally different kind. The intention behind the provision of development rebate is, therefore, obviously to encourage capital formation through the medium of savings out of current profits. Clause (3) of paragraph VA makes it amply clear that the amount standing to the credit of development reserve can only be used in the development of the business of the company. Thus, it is clearly an asset belonging to the assessee-company and is includible in the net wealth of the assessee-company. Thus, the sum of Rs. 7,22,477 standing to the credit of development reserve is liable to be included in determining the net wealth of the assessee. The assessee shall pay the costs of the revenue.
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1975 (7) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... act that decision itself is against the case of the appellant. On the basis of these features, it must be held that the property, namely, No. 39, Vepery High Road, Madras, being the joint family property of Tej Singh and his sons was liable for the discharge of the income-tax liability of the same joint family and that the appellant is not entitled to an injunction preventing the second respondent from proceeding against the said property for recovery of the said tax arrears. In view of this conclusion of mine, it is unnecessary to consider the other technical points, such as the suit being barred by limitation, the notice issued under section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, not being in confirmity with the requirements of that section and the suit itself being barred under section 67 of the Income-tax Act. Under these circumstances, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Having regard to the special circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (7) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... , if such expenditure is in the nature of entertainment expenditure the same is not to be allowed beyond the specified limit. On the face of it the two items of Rs. 9,128 and Rs. 27,318 were incurred by way of meeting hotel bills for lodging and boarding of guests in hotels and by way of meeting catering charges of guests which are clearly in the nature of entertainment expenditure and obviously under sub-section (2) of section 37 beyond the specified limit of Rs. 5,000 no further deduction can be allowed to the assessee. In our view, therefore, the Tribunal was right in taking the view that the expenses of Rs. 36,446 were not allowable as a deduction in computing the profits of the business of the assessee-company. The second question is, therefore, answered in the negative and against the assessee. In view of the fact that on one question the assessee has succeeded and on the other question the department has succeeded, there will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1975 (7) TMI 57 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Finding Of Fact, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... in question was a revenue receipt and that there was conscious concealment of the particulars of the income or deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars in respect of the sum of Rs. 25,000. It is correct, as observed by the Supreme Court, that this may be a good item of evidence in the penalty proceedings but the penalty cannot be levied solely, on the basis of the reason that the assessee failed to explain the entry in question. In the instant case, the Tribunal has observed that there was no further evidence to sustain the penalty except the rejection of the explanation given by the assessee. That being so, and in view of the clear observations of the Supreme Court, as quoted hereinabove, the proposed question of law is concluded by finding of facts. We, therefore, find that no question of law as proposed arises out of the order of the Tribunal. In the result, the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. B. N. SARMA J.--I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (7) TMI 56 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Confidential Nature, Income Tax Authorities, Income Tax Records ... ... ... ... ..... idence Act as they come within the scope of sub-section (1), clause (iii), of that section. These income-tax records, originals of which have been produced by the income-tax department, are certainly public documents within the meaning of section 74 since they are documents forming the acts of public officers who discharge executive functions by imposing and collecting tax. One of us (Sambasiva Rao, Actg. C.J.) held in Vijaya Kumar, Machinery and Electrical Stores v. Alaparthi Lakshmikanthamma that the income-tax returns are public documents. Since they are originals themselves of public documents, they require no further proof. For this reason, we uphold the decision of the trial court to the extent stated above, i.e., for the period after April 1, 1964, and dismiss the civil revision petition to that extent alone. In view of the fact that the law had been in an uncertain condition in this State so far, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of the revision petition.
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1975 (7) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Textile Mill, Written Down Value ... ... ... ... ..... cted from the world income and thereafter a proportion was struck did not amount to an actual allowance of the entire depreciation in ascertaining the taxable income that accrued in British India. Therefore, the depreciation deducted in arriving at the taxable income alone could be taken into account and not the depreciation taken into account for arriving at the world income. This ratio fully governs the facts of the present case and the question referred to us in view of this decision shall have to be answered in favour of the assessee as under On a proper interpretation of section 10(5)(b) the written down value for calculating depreciation should be calculated by taking the original cost less depreciation referable to the proportionate profits taxed in the taxable territories for the assessment years 1939-40 to 1942-43. As both the assessee and the revenue have partly succeeded in this reference, the fair order as to costs will be that each party will bear its own costs.
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1975 (7) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assets To Minor Child, Market Value, Net Wealth, Valuation Date, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... l assets that has to be taken into account and not the value of the assets into which it is converted. If the legislature intended the value of the converted assets which came into existence after the original transfer, the appropriate language would have been used by the legislature especially when under this section the property is deemed to be included in the net wealth of the assessee. In the absence of clear and explicit provisions it is not possible for us to accept the contention of Mr. Joshi merely by reason of the fact that he emphasises the expression the value of assets which on the valuation date are held . The value on the valuation date is to be determined of the original assets which are transferred, and, in our opinion, the provisions of section 4(1)(a)(iii) have been correctly construed by the Tribunal. Thus, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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