|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 354 Records
-
1990 (8) TMI 359 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 0 per square metre, the total consideration for doing rubber lining for delivery casting with plug C.I., only Rs. 65 in value represents the rubber component and adhesive, and the entire remaining consideration represents work to be done. From the abovesaid affidavit on behalf of the assessee it is further seen that the rubber, rubber chemicals, solvent adhesives, etc., are used only incidental to the work and the final rubber lining of the equipment is a permanent improvement to the equipment of the customer. The Tribunal also has found that the entire lining of customers equipment represents job work, that the purchase order is for a consolidated sum for work as well as materials incidentally used therein and that the basic nature of the contract is for executing a work and not specifically for transfer of property in goods. 19.. In the result, these tax revision cases are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1990 (8) TMI 358 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ehalf of the applicant on the case of Rambagh Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer 1990 78 STC 35 (Raj) relating to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, which also did not have any provision for levy of sales tax on food-stuff served in restaurants and hotels before February 2, 1983. For the reasons already indicated, the ratio of that decision will have no application to a case under the Act where such levy and recovery was permissible even before February 2, 1983. 11.. We may mention that our attention was invited by the learned counsel for the applicant to various amendments made from time to time in the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act and the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, but detailed reference to all amendments is not necessary. We have already noticed the material difference between these State Acts. 12.. To conclude, we answer the question in the affirmative. No order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1990 (8) TMI 357 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion. Merely because it is report of an Inspector, the same cannot be rejected only on the ground that it was detected after expiry of the year. 5.. In the result, the question is to be answered in the negative in favour of the Revenue by stating that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was not justified to hold that because the inspection was made on May 29, 1976 even though the materials detected disclosed suppression of transaction during the assessment year 1975-76 the said report cannot be utilised for the year 1975-76. 6.. Tribunal is competent to examine correctness of the estimate. On the finding that material is not acceptable it has allowed the appeal. Now after receipt of the answer Tribunal is to pass an order under section 24(5) of the Act to rehear the appeal on the question of correctness of estimate. 7.. There shall be no order as to costs. J.M. MAHAPATRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1990 (8) TMI 356 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
... ...
... ... ..... competence. The contention of the learned State Representative that there was already a provision in the Act that a club or association selling goods to its members is a dealer and that the said provision stood resuscitated after the constitutional amendment came into force does not appear to be tenable. Unless the transaction itself is deemed to be sale such an effect could not take place. It is for the Legislature to create a fiction of sale so that the transaction could be made taxable. This does not appear to have been done by the Legislature in its own wisdom. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that an unincorporated club is not a dealer as its transaction in question with its members does not constitute sale. 13.. In the premises, the application succeeds and is allowed. The impugned notices of assessment under form VI are hereby quashed. There will be no order for costs. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
-
1990 (8) TMI 355 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he orders in the second appeals in their entirety ought to be held not to be in accordance with law, so that all the three Members can consider the second appeals both on merits as well as on the question of estimate afresh. 9.. In view of our aforesaid discussion on the facts and in the circumstances of these cases, answering the questions would not be justified and we decline to answer the same keeping it open to the Tribunal to hear the second appeals on merit afresh. 10.. Statements of case in S.J.C. Nos. 85-90 of 1981 have not been received though called for. Statements in other cases clearly make out the facts. In such circumstances, we did not wait for the statements and disposed of all the cases without waiting for the formalities to be observed which would only satisfy the provisions of law without any benefit to parties since on receiving the statements our answer would be the same. 11.. Parties shall bear their own costs of these cases. J.M. MAHAPATRA, J.-I agree.
-
1990 (8) TMI 354 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ference to clauses (iv) and (v). We have declined to grant that permission having regard to the enormous lapse of time. The period of benefit has expired long ago, which is nearly 8 years. It was however contended that the passage extracted from the order of the learned single Judge in Dharmendra s case ILR (1979) 2 Kar 1909 clearly held that the 1977 notification had not in any way abrogated the notification issued earlier as at annexure A in 1969. But then a careful reading of the passage which we have extracted earlier in the course of this order clearly goes to show that observation was made with reference to the petitioners before the court in that batch of writ petitions and it was not a general observation in regard to the other contents of the order made in 1977 as at exhibit G. 11.. In the result, we have no choice but to sustain the demand made for the reasons we have given and dismiss this writ petition. There will be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.
-
1990 (8) TMI 353 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e imposed and hearing may be given later, that also should satisfy the requirement of rules of natural justice. It is not incumbent that every penalty must be imposed only after hearing the party though that may not be the case on the facts of this case. We are therefore satisfied that the appellant-dealer had adequate opportunity to urge all the grounds available to him before the first appellate authority as well as the second appellate authority and even before us. We did ask Mr. Katageri to produce the evidence of goods having suffered tax when they were purchased at Bangalore. No document was forthcoming. In that circumstance we are in full agreement with the order of the appellate authorities and find that there is no merit in this revision and accordingly dismiss this revision petition. We would have awarded costs but Government Advocate who was representing respondent was not present in the court and therefore we do not propose to award any costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1990 (8) TMI 352 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ely mentioned on or after 11th May, 1973, it cannot be held that the earlier two entries treated it as an independent item. It is true that in the bracket, foreign liquor is described as including spirits, wines and fermented liquor and the word mild liquor is not specifically mentioned. But, in our view, that is not decisive of the matter. Spirits, wines and fermented liquors will have to be read only as illustrative items in view of the use of the word including . Unless otherwise specified, the words foreign liquor would include all liquors mentioned in the definition including mild liquor . Thus, until mild liquor was specially carved out of foreign liquor , it fell within the term foreign liquor before 18th December, 1972 and in the term any other liquors for the period 19th December, 1972 to 10th May, 1973. Thus, the assessment made by the Tribunal was correct. 6.. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. No costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1990 (8) TMI 351 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in law. 3.. The last surviving point is whether the sale was casual in nature and not in the course of business. The term business is defined under section 2(5A) of the Act and the amended definition as it stood during the relevant period (January 1, 1983 to September 1, 1983) read thus business includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern and any transaction in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern, and any transaction in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, the commencement or closure of such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern Under the circumstances, this transaction amounted to sale in the course of the business as rightly held by the Tribunal in its detailed order passed in the second appeal as well as the order rejecting the application for reference. 4.. No case for interference, therefore, exists. Order accordingly. No costs. Application dismissed.
-
1990 (8) TMI 350 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ollected tax of Rs. 2,600.50 on sale of machinery though the sales tax was not payable, those being casual sales. The said amount was forfeited by the Sales Tax Officer under section 46(2) of the Act as amended by Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1962 with retrospective effect from January 1, 1960. Against that order of forfeiture, an appeal was preferred by the assessee, but without any success. Second appeal filed by the assessee was also dismissed by the Tribunal. 2.. The only question involved was and is whether Maharashtra Act No. 21 of 1962 could have retrospective effect in view of article 20(1) of the Constitution. The point stands concluded in view of our decision in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Khimji Velji and Co. 1985 58 STC 95, wherein it is held that such retrospective effect does not violate article 20(1). No other aspect arises for consideration. Hence we answer the question in the affirmative. No order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1990 (8) TMI 349 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e dates of payment till the date of refund or realisation. The respondents shall also refund to the petitioners such amounts as have been recovered from them under the provisions of the new section 13AA. Such amounts as have been recovered on and after December 6, 1989, shall be refunded with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from that date. The learned Government Pleader applies for four months time to make the aforesaid refunds. Counsel for the petitioners oppose the application and state that, the figures were available with the respondents all along so that verification would have been carried out. Nonetheless, having regard to the amounts involved, we direct that all the aforesaid refunds shall be made within four months from today. The respondents shall pay to each of the petitioners the costs of the writ petitions quantified at Rs. 1,000. Oral application by the learned Government Pleader for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused. Petitions allowed.
-
1990 (8) TMI 348 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... The definition of the term manufacture was amended by Act No. 9 of 1989 with retrospective effect from the date of bringing into force the Act, i.e., 1st January, 1960. The process of refining oil is thus included in the definition of manufacture even for the relevant period by a deeming fiction. Under the circumstances, there is no scope for debate on the question that conversion of crude oil into refined oil involved manufacturing process. It is contended by Shri V.C. Daga, the learned counsel for the assessee, that retrospective definition is bound to cause prejudice to the assessee and under the circumstances, he is entitled to exemption on the basis of trade circular issued by the Commissioner. We are not in this reference concerned with that aspect of the matter. The assessee is free to move the appropriate authority for that relief, if available. 4.. To conclude, the question is answered in the affirmative. No order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1990 (8) TMI 347 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... thus, the first purchaser whose purchase price was the royalty. On this finding, relying on the principle decided in 1971 27 STC 176 (Orissa) (P.R. Tata and Co. v. Sales Tax Officer), where harida was collected from forest on payment of royalty, the Tribunal held that royalty is the purchase price on which purchase tax is leviable. 3.. We have our own doubts if collection of mahua flower on payment of royalty would amount to purchase of such goods. In this case, however, the dealer has not questioned whether the transaction amounts to purchase. Once it is accepted as purchase, royalty paid becomes the purchase price since there is no dispute that mahua flower belongs to the State and on payment of consideration which is called royalty, the dealer purchased the same. 4.. In view of our discussion, on the facts and in the circumstances, the question is answered in the affirmative against the Revenue. No costs. J.M. MAHAPATRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1990 (8) TMI 346 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 966. On the basis of the material so obtained as per direction of the first appellate authority, show cause notice was issued and fresh assessment order passed vide order dated September 27, 1967. The said order was confirmed in the first appeal by the Assistant Commissioner and in the second appeal by the Tribunal. The assessee applied for reference under section 61(1) of the Sales Tax Act. The said application for reference was dismissed and aggrieved thereby, application under the proviso to section 61(1) of the Act has been made to this Court. 3.. Basic issue in the case is whether there could be a fresh order of assessment on the basis of the remand order which was later on set aside. Having regard to the whole background, it cannot be said that the question is inarguable. Hence we set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and direct the Tribunal to refer to this Court appropriate question along with statement of facts. Order accordingly. No costs. Application allowed.
-
1990 (8) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT
The Appellant was officiating as a Major though he held a substantive rank of Captain as a permanent Commissioned Officer of the army when on December 27, 1974 he took over as the Officer Commanding 38 Coy. A.S.C. (Sup) Type 'A' attached to the Military Hospital, Jhansi. In August, 1975 the Appellant went to attend a training course and returned in the first week of November. 1975. In his absence Captain G.C. Chhabra was commanding the unit of the appellant and he submitted a Contingent Bill dated September 25, 1975 for Rs.16,280 for winter liveries of the depot civilian chowkidars and sweepers. The said Bill was returned by the Controller of Defence Accounts (CDA) with certain objections. Thereupon the appellant submitted a fresh contingent Bill dated December 25, 1975 for a sum of Rs.7,029.57. In view of the wide difference in the two Contingent Bills, the CDA reported the matter to the Headquarters for investigation and a Court Enquiry blamed the appellant for certain lapses. After considering the said report of the Court of Enquiry the General Officer Commanding, M.P., Bihar and Orissa recommended that 'severe displeasure' (to be recorded) of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Central Command be awarded to the appellant.
-
1990 (8) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
Exigibility of sales tax in respect of sale of jeera, menthi, ajwain, saunf and cardamom, sale of wet dates, sale of old newspaper and transaction of mustard oil - whether they are first purchases or not?
Held that:- Appeals allowed in part and dismissed in part.
-
1990 (8) TMI 337 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioner is a 'dealer' within the meaning of section 2(d) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, and is liable to pay sales tax on its sales turnover?
Whether, in the circumstances and on the facts of the case, no sales tax can be levied in view of the provisions of article 285 of the Constitution?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no dispute that the Union of India is the owner of the Northern Railway Departmental Catering, Railway Station, Pathankot. The goods were purchased by the railways and were sold by the railways. The tax was imposed on the sale of goods. At the time of the sale, the goods belonged to the Railways. In view of the provisions of article 285(1) of the Constitution, such sales were immune from taxation under the State law. That was also the view of the High Court. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed, but no order as to costs.
-
1990 (8) TMI 331 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification - Appeal - Valuation ... ... ... ... ..... Order Nos. 238 to 321/90-A, dt. 28-3-90 1990 (49) E.L.T. 387 (T) . 4. emsp Following the ratio of the said judgment which squarely applies to these matters, we reject the appeals except Appeal No. 2123/88-A. We reject this appeal insofar as it relates to landing charges. 5. emsp With regard to the other question involved in appeal No. 2123/88-A, Shri Ram, the ld. Advocate brought to our notice that the Tribunal in an earlier judgment, in respect of the same appellants, held that insoluble sulphur is classifiable under Heading 35.01/32-(10) of CTA. Smt. Baliga, the ld. SDR, after verifying the judgment, accepts the position following the earlier order, we allow the Appeal No. 2123/88-A insofar as it relates to the question of classification of insoluble sulphur. 6. emsp The 14 appeals are disposed of accordingly. (Appeal No. 2774/89-A was also listed for today. However, Shri Ram brought to our notice that by its order dt. 28-3-90, the Tribunal already disposed of this appeal).
-
1990 (8) TMI 324 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Enforcement of orders of one court by other courts ... ... ... ... ..... n to entertain the order as if it were a decree for the purpose of execution of that decree and to realise the amount involved in that decree. This point having not been considered by the Small Causes Judge, the orders under revision are liable to be set aside. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The order made in Execution No. 1146 of 1984 dated April 12, 1985, holding the petition as not maintainable is set aside. The matter stands remitted to the Small Causes Court, Bangalore City, with a direction to take appropriate action to execute the decree in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Since the parties to the execution petitions have been duly served, there is no need to issue a fresh notice. The court below is directed to rehear and dispose of the matter by September 30, 1990. The parties are directed to appear before the court below on September 3, 1990. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the court below immediately.
-
1990 (8) TMI 323 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Winding up – Circumstances in which a company may be would up ... ... ... ... ..... e wound up by the court. So, none of the disputes referred to in the above-noted clause 15 of the partnership agreement can be co-related to the relief in Company Petition No. 39 of 1990. For this conclusion of mine, I seek support from the following earlier pronouncements of this court as well as the other High Courts (i) Salaq Ram v. New Suraj Finance and Chit Fund Co. Pvt. Ltd. (Company Application No. 8 of 1979 in Company Petition No. 147 of 1978 mdash decided on July 12, 1979), (ii) Maruti Ltd. v. B. G. Shirke and Co P. Ltd. 1981 51 Comp. Cas. 11 1981 PLR 732, ( iii) Thakur Paper Mills Ltd., In re, AIR 1968 Patna 289 1969 39 Comp. Cas. 47 (Patna) and (iv) Hind Mercantile Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. J H. Rayner and Co. Ltd. 1971 41 Comp. Cas. 548 (Mad). No judgment taking a contrary view has been brought to my notice by learned counsel for the applicants. In the light of the above discussion, this Company Application No. 88 of 1990 is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
........
|
