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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 161 Records
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1976 (3) TMI 81 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
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... ... ..... equent results of assessee. Admittedly, in the past years and the subsequent years, the book results shown by the assessee were accepted by the Department without any demur. It has been pointed out on behalf of the assessee that the yield of dhall varied with reference to the quality of crop, rain-fall, soil conditions, etc. and as such the yield shown by the appellant ought to have been accepted. Alternative, it was claimed that the ITO should have at least given credit for the excess yield of husk accounted for as the appellant had shown as yield of 99.9 per cent and there could not be a total yield of more than 99 per cent. We feel that there is some force in these contentions. Taking a total view of the matter and having regard to the fact regard to the fact that the book results have been consistently accepted by the Department, we find no warrant for the sustenance of the addition of Rs. 7,575, We order deletion of this addition. 3. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 80 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
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... ... ..... ters etc. 2. The assessee rsquo s claim under s. 5(1)(iv) was rejected by the WTO on the ground that the house was not occupied. The AAC agreed with him. 3. For the purpose of s. 5(1)(iv) exemption it is not necessary that the house should be occupied. There is no dispute that the construction has been completed to the extent of making the ground floor ready for occupation. Even the first floor was also completed and only certain finishing touches had to be given. It is well known in these days of shortage of house that houses are occupied even before the finishing touches are given. We are satisfied that on the valuation date of the house was ready for occupation. If it was ready for occupation the exemption claim should be allowed. It is not material that the house was actually unoccupied. What has to be seen is whether it could be used as a house. We find from the facts that is could be used. The assessee will be given exemption under s. 5(1)(iv). 4. The appeal is allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 79 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
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... ... ..... property has been let out in different portions. It is impossible to let out properties without providing water facilities and where a building had been separately let out in portions such water facility has necessarily to be through overhead tanks and pipes. The expense on this is also on account of letting out the property only. 6. Thus, on an analysis we do not find any particular amenities which are provided by the assessee. As such even if the rent agreements treat them as separate, the ITO would be justified in treating the same as part of the figure for arriving at the annual letting value of the property. 7. We are fortified in this decision by this decision by the authority of the Kerala High Court in the case of P.A. Varghese vs. CIT 80 ITR 180 (Ker). The case relied on by the assessee in not applicable here because there the Tribunal found as a fact that there were separate services rendered. We are unable to give such a finding here. 8. The appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 78 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... conduct in this regard. The assessee rsquo s claim in the penalty proceedings was that there had been a sudden spurt in the value of the property in the financial year 1970-71 and, hence the assessee had not declared such a higher valuation in the assessment year upto 1970-71. There is nothing in the WTO rsquo s penalty orders to show that the assessee knew that the market value of the land was much higher than that disclosed in the original assessment proceedings for these years and yet understand the value in the original returns. We see no infirmity in the order of the AAC who has taken note of the principles laid down in Mansa Ram rsquo s case 1973 TAX 247 (All). and in Gumani Ram rsquo s case, 85 ITR 67. In short our conclusion is that the Department having failed to discharge that burden of showing conscious disregard of statutory obligation on the part of the assessee in this regard. The penalties levied were rightly cancelled by the AAC. 6. The appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 77 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... le of Rs. 825, it is a fact that the same was not returned by the assessee. According to him the assessee had not returned the said income due to over sight and I accept it. That may be tentamount a mistake but it cannot be said to be a failure to return the said income on account of any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect. I after hearing both the sides agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee. 7. Having come to the above conclusion I, on the facts and circumstances of the case, hold that the failure of the assessee to return the correct income for the year under consideration is not arisen on account of fraud or any gross or wilful neglect. The onus of the assessee in this behalf stands discharged. No case is made out against the assessee for levy of penalty under s.271(1)(c) of the Act read with the Explanation thereto. 8. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed. Penalty amount if already paid by the assessee shall be refunded to him.
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1976 (3) TMI 76 - ITAT DELHI-C
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... ... ..... the contention of the department that the omission to return income under the various heads was a deliberate Act on the part of the assessee. As we have already held these are not the basis on which the Income Tax Officer proceeded to hold the assessee in default for filing an estimate which he knew or had reason to believe to be not true. 15. We have seen that on merits no penalty is leviable upon the assessee under s.273(a). It has been held, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel of the assessee, that from a mere disparity between the estimate submitted by the assessee and the income he himself or the Income Tax Officer finally fixed in the assessment, no inference of dis-honesty could by drawn. We think that the ratio decided of the two cases cited by the learned counsel of the assessee directly applies to the facts of this case. The penalty is, therefore, also against the provisions of lrw. It is cancelled. 16. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 75 - ITAT DELHI-B
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... ... ..... ssee had invested in a house property during the accounting period relevant for the asst. yr. 1970-71 and that obviously she showed the interest on Bank deposit because she had to explain the investment in the house property this year. Even this fact is not against the assessee. It only shows that when she had offered to an explanation for the purchase of the house property she took note of her resources and coming to know that the interest was left out she again file the return for the asst. yr. 1970-71 which in turn led to the re-assessment proceedings for 1968-69. The onus in the present case was on the Department to show that whether it was concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. In my opinion on the facts and the circumstances of the present case the assessee rsquo s claim that the omission was due to over sight rather than due to any fraud or wilful neglect on her part is acceptable. 4. I, therefore, cancel the penalty and allow the appeal.
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1976 (3) TMI 74 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... nding does not call for any further interference. 71. About banquet sales it has already been held in Appeal No.158/STT that 15 per cent of the banquet sales would be exempt from payment of sales tax. I am of the view there was no necessity for the learned Addl. Commr. to remand the case to the assessing authority to examine the issue afresh when in an earlier case, it has already been decided at the level of the learned financial Commissioner that 15 per cent exemption should be allowed on such sales. The Order of remand on this point cannot, therefore, be upheld. 72. As a result of my findings given above, appeals No.158/STT and No.2165/STT are dismissed appeal No.22661/STT is partly allowed and the order of Addl. Commissioner, Sales Tax dt. 31st March, 76 is modified to this extent that order of remand in respect of banquet sales is set aside and it is held that 15 per cent of the banquet sales will be exempt from levy of sales tax, other respects that order is confirmed.
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1976 (3) TMI 73 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... ched. We find from the records that when assessee was informed that his share income had escaped assessment, he came out with the plea about disputes in the partnership. 11. The ITO who imposed the penalty and the AAC confirmed it, had not gone into this question of the possibility of bona fide belief. They only went by the existence of the firm and the liability of the assessee to be assessed to share income. That is how they imposed and sustained the penalty. They seem to have through that the proof of existence of the firm and the liability to be assessed to share income are conterminous with the absence of reasonable case. But the question is about the reasonable cause for failure in the cause. The existence of the firm and the liability to be assessed for share income are not conclusive materials about the absence of reasonable cause. 12. So we find that there was reasonable cause for the failure. For these reasons, we allow the appeal. The penalty imposed is cancelled.
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1976 (3) TMI 72 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... n that there was concealment of income in the revised return. It is not possible even to invoke the Explanation to s. 27(1)(c) because there is no factual or circumstantial material to show that there was any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee. We are not able to pin-point as to what exactly the fraud or gross or wilful neglect in this case particularly in a case where at the time of original assessment as well as at the time of assessment, the IT authorities had to make an estimate of the possible income that the assessee might have earned in a relevant accounting year. So on the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no material to think (at least sufficient material) that there is concealment of income on the part of the assessee. The Explanation is also of no assistance to the Department when the merits of the case is taken into consideration. so the appeal has to be allowed. 8. The appeal is allowed. The penalty imposed is cancelled.
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1976 (3) TMI 71 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... et out to the Civil Supplies Department of the State Government and that as such it had fetched a higher rent that usual. In the absence of material to show that for succeeding year atleast upto the date of completion of the assessment the said building fetched lower rent, the assessee s contention cannot be accepted. In the result, in view of our conclusion in part-14 above, we confine the enhancement of value to 1/3rd of the returned value in the case of each building. 18. At the hearing of the appeal, another ground was raised by the assessee with the permission of the Bench, namely, that the assessment in the instant case, having been completed on a dead person is a nullity. The name of the assessee in the tabular statement over the assessment order is Shri Nirbhai Singh, Sangrur . Shri Nirbhai Singh admittedly died on 19th March, 1971. The assessment in question, therefore, merits to be treated as a nullity. We hold accordingly. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 70 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... rmal legal document, which is the very basis of recovery of tax and the demand notice in this case was issued to a dead person, we are unable to see as to how the facts that the return was furnished by Shri Ujjal Singh, the legal heir, and that the notice and the questionnaire were issued to Shri Ujjal Singh and that it was Shri Ujjal Singh, who was heard during the assessment proceedings would make a difference and true a void assessment into a valid assessment. We hold accordingly. 9. We however, make it clear that the assessee was permitted to rise the additional ground in support of the relief prayed for in respect of the movable gifts. We are unable to accept the Department s argument that as the assessee had not disputed the taxation of the immovable gift, either before the Appellate CIT or before us, the scope of the order in the present appeal may be confined to the question of taxability of the movable gifts. We order accordingly. 10. The appeal is allowed pro tanto.
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1976 (3) TMI 69 - ITAT BOMBAY-C
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... ... ..... ssessee has no obligation to file its return under s. 139(1). No notice having been served on the assessee under s. 139(2) and the assessee having filed its return in response to notice under s. 148 within time, ordinarily no proceedings under s. 271(1)(a) would lie against the assessee. Since, however, disallowances made by the ITO have raised the assessee s total income to Rs. 27,594, it is to be seen whether the disallowances are of the nature that the knowledge that its income was taxable can be attributed to the assessee. In my opinion, having regard to the nature of disallowances made and the figure of total income assessed it may be reasonable to give the assessee a benefit of doubt. It therefore, hold that the assessee had no obligation to file the return and in any event, it was prevented by reasonable cause for doing to within time. In the circumstances I further hold that penalty imposed under s. 271(1)(a) is not justified. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 68 - ITAT BOMBAY-B
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... ... ..... d from property was filed voluntarily by her. The facts of the case as noted above go conclusively to show that the omission to disclose income from interest and from property was filed voluntarily by her. The facts of the case as noted above go conclusively to show that the omission to disclose interest income in the return filed at Rajkot was due to ignorance and inadvertant omission and that the assessee did not have any intention to conceal here income. As a matter of fact, she mentioned of the GIR Number of the Rajkot file on the return filed before the ITO at Bombay goes clearly to establish the assessee s bonafides. In these circumstances of the case, we agree with the finding of the AAC that there was no attempt on the part of the assessee to conceal income and the order of penalty was, therefore rightly cancelled. In view that we had taken it is not necessary to consider the legal contentions urged by the learned counsel for the assessee. 7. The appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the dry battery. The activity therefore does not result in a different commercial commodity coming into existence. Therefore, the activity done by the appellants does not constitute manufacture within the meaning of s. 2(17), Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. 32. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to the Special Bench in the affirmative. We hold that the activity of battery charging done by the appellants, namely, adding electrolyte and passing electric current through it in the battery supplied by the manufacturers was not a process of manufacturer within the meaning of s. 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The second appeals shall now be placed before the concerned Bench for disposal. 33. Before closing we would place on record our thanks to Shri Mahurkar, Sales tax Practitioner for the through, careful and logical exposition of the case on behalf of the appellants and to Shri Ghanekar, Assistant Commissioner (Legal) for his elaborate and strenuous arguments.
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1976 (3) TMI 66 - ITAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ned any stock account, cannot certainly by itself be a reason for the rejection of the book results. As rightly pointed out by the AAC, there is no case for the Department that there had been by the assessee any suppression of sales or inflation of expenses. These are only the third and fourth year of the assessee s business. The assessee has shown progressively better results from year to year at least in its manufacturing Department. In the circumstances, we do not think that the ITO was justified in making any additions to the trading results. Even in cases where the provision to s. 145(1) is to be considered as applicable, there must be the further consideration whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case any additions would be warranted. We do not find that there is justification in these cases for making any additions to the trading results disclosed by the assessee. We accordingly confirm the order of the AAC and dismiss these appeals as devoid of merit.
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1976 (3) TMI 65 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... iation carried forward from the past years would be available for set off against such income from other years. The High Court also further, alternatively, held that the s. 41(1) of the Act creates a legal fiction that the sum of Rs. 6,982 shall be deemed to be the business income of the assessee for the relevant previous year although, in fact, the business had ceased to exist and, therefore, the inevitable corollary of that fiction would be that the business would be deemed to have been carried on in that year, and unabsorbed depreciation would be available as the depreciation allowance for the relevant previous year could be set off against the sum of Rs. 6,982 deemed to be the business income of the assessee for the previous year. 8. In our opinion, the Allahabad High Court judgment squarely governs the facts of the present case. No contrary authority directly in point has been shown to us. In the circumstances, we uphold the order of the AAC. 9. The appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 64 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... profit. While, therefore, the learned Departmental Representative is right in saying that merely because in the sale deed a sum of Rs. 21,000 is shown as consideration for goodwill it need not be taken at its face value, still no material has been brought on record by the ITO to hold that it represents anything other than goodwill. There is, therefore, no justification to hold that the sum of Rs. 21,000 does not represent value of goodwill transferred to the Purchaser. Goodwill is a capital asset and even the Departmental Representative did not argue that goodwill is a revenue asset. At the most it could be held that there might be a surplus obtained on capital account in transferring the goodwill but it cannot at all be held that there is capital against assessable on transfer of goodwill by virtue of the judgment of the Mysore High Court in B.C.S. Setty s case on which the AAC rightly relied. We accordingly agree with the view taken by the AAC. 8. The appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 63 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... we cannot do in the face of the order of the AAC in the case of the vendee, which has become final. Therefore, to hold in this case that the consideration paid was more would be contrary to the findings in the order of the AAC in the case of the vendee that the consideration paid was Rs. 58,000 only. That would not be the correct thing to do because in the case of one transaction there can be no inconsistent findings-one in the case of the vendee that he paid only Rs. 58,00 and the order in the case of vendor that he received Rs. Rs. 1,00,000. Therefore, both on facts and for the reasons immediately stated and looking to the ruling of the Karantaka High Court above referred to, the orders of the authorities below cannot be sustained. We according allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the authorities below computing the capital against taking the sale consideration at Rs. 1,00,000 with direction to re-compute capital gains on the basis of actual sale price of Rs. 58,000.
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1976 (3) TMI 62 - ITAT ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... held that the firm s business had no goodwill. It had no premises of its own, since it was carrying business from the mill premises itself. It had no trade mark nor any permanency. It has no stock. It was merely supplying the cloth and yarn manufactured by Phagwara mills and lastly only a period of four months had left in the expiry of the agency agreement. Reference was made to a decision of the Madras High Court in G.V. Kasthuriswami Naidu vs. Controller of E.D., the facts of which were rather similar. Thus, considering the facts of the case it was held that the partnership firm had no goodwill and the addition was deleted. 10. It would appear that the Appellate Tribunal recorded its findings on an appreciation of the admitted facts. Question no. 3 has been suggested of this finding. In our opinion no question of law is involved as this finding is a pure finding of fact and hence, this question can also not be referred. 11. We, therefore, dismiss this reference application.
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