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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 19 of 19 Records
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1952 (2) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to include the entire procedure prescribed by the Act for realising the amount. The fact that the Collector proceeds to recover the amount from the assessee is not inconsistent with the circumstance that the proceedings for recovery start earlier. I therefore hold that the issue by the Incometax Officer of a certificate is the first step of the proceedings for the recovery of the arrears. So construed, it follows that the proceedings were started within the time prescribed by Section 46 (7) of the Act. 6. There are no merits in the third point. The Collector is empowered to recover the arrears under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. It has not been established that he has contravened any provisions of the Act in bringing the property to s ale. If he is selling the property in inconvenient plots, it is for the petitioners to raise the necessary objections before him. 7. In the result the application fails and is dismissed 'with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.
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1952 (2) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nst the award can be filed there. In this application in which there is no prayer for setting aside the award, which exists, I do not think it proper to decide the question of the validity of the award." In our opinion, the Subordinate Judge correctly indicated the course which it was open to the appellant in law to adopt for the purpose of questioning the validity of the award, but not having taken that course and not having made any application in the courts below for amending the petition under section 33, the company cannot ask this court to go into the validity of the award by widening the scope of the original petition. This court is always in favour of shortening litigation, but it would be a very unusual step to allow the petition under section 33 to be amended now and to decide a question involving investigation of facts without having the benefit of the judgments of the courts below. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1952 (2) TMI 26 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e therefore desirable to extend their dictum too far. It was on similar lines that Kania, J., (as he then was) distinguished the above observations of the Judicial Committee in Chimanram Motilal v. Commissioner of Income- tax, Bombay(1). The matter appears to have been placed beyond any realm of doubt by various other Judicial pronouncements both before and after the said decision of the Judicial Committee. It is needlees for me to refer to all those cases most of which have been already cited in the judgment of my learned brother. I agree with him that the cursus-curiae of the various High Courts in India is in favour of the interpretation of Section 26 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act adopted by him, which section is substantially similar to Section 34 of the Income-tax Act considered in those cases. For the reasons aforesaid, I hare eventually agreed to the answers proposed as well as to the directions for coats allowed in this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (2) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... nation took place which also disclosed that the deceased was a "first class life" and it is most significant that it is only after this second examination that the appellants paid this cheque into their account. ( 27. ) From what occurred'the deceased indicated' I think quite clearly that if the appellants accepted his proposal the cheque should be appropriated towards the first premium and that such appropriation would conclude the bargain or contract. The cheque was received on that implied understanding and in my view the appellants accepted the offer in the manner indicated by the offerer, when they paid this cheque into their account. They must have accepted the proposal otherwise they could not have appropriated the cheque and having accepted it they signified their acceptance in the manner impliedly Indicated by the deceased. There was therefore a completed contract of insurance and the plaintiffs' claim was rightly decreed by S. R. Das Gupta, J.
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1952 (2) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e of Exhibit D, there is no abandonment in the sense that the tenant disappeared from the scene altogether saying nothing and making no arrangements about his interest and possession under the lease. As the statute creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. We are not concerned so much with what might possibly have been intended as with what has been actually said in and by the language employed. As in our view, there has been no "relinquishment" within the meaning of section 19, sub-clause (1), the conviction under sub-clause (2) cannot be sustained. It is set aside and the fine of ₹ 30,000 will be refunded if it has already been paid. The other parts of the order of the learned Presidency Magistrate, as regards the disposal of ₹ 1,000 paid by the complainant to the appellant and the sum of ₹ 29,500 brought in by the police, will, however, stand.
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1952 (2) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stantiate by evidence any of the allegations made therein. He admitted that the statement was based on hearsay. Ru- mours may have reached him from various sources, but before he published the article it was incumbent upon him as a reasonable man to attempt to verify the informations he received and ascertain, as far as he could. whether the facts were true or mere concocted lies. He does not appear to have made any endeavour in this direction. As the appel- lant did not act with reasonable care and caution, he cannot be said to have acted bona fide, even if good faith can be held to be a defence at all in a proceeding for contempt. What is more, he did not express any regret for what he had done either in the High Court or before us and his behaviour does not show the least trace of contrition. In these circumstances, we think that the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant S. Subrahmanyam. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehta.
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1952 (2) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion in King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma and Others((1945) 72 I.A. 57.). The convictions of the appellant and the sentences imposed on him are set aside, and there will be a retrial under the ordinary procedure. Boss J.--I agree with my brothers Mahajan and Chandrasekhara Aiyar that the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, offends article 14. As I explained in my judgment in The State of West Bengal v. Artwar Ali Sarkar( 1952 S.C.R. 284.), I prefer not to base my decision on the classification test. For the reasons given there I am of opinion that the differentiation here travels beyond. bounds which are legitimate. It is true the points of differentiation are not as numerous here as in the other case but the ones which remain are, in my judgment, of a substantial character and cut deep enough to attract the equality clauses in article 14. I would hold the Ordinance invalid. Preliminary objection overruled. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehta.
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1952 (2) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT
Application under article 32 of the Constitution made by Mohammad Yasin for the protection of his fundamental right of carrying on his business which, according to him, is being infringed by the respondent
Held that:- The bye-laws which impose a charge on the wholesale dealer in the shape of the prescribed fee, irrespective of any use or occupation by him of immoveable property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Area Committee including any public street, are obviously ultra vires the powers of the respondent Committee and, therefore, the bye laws cannot be said to constitute a valid law which alone may, under article 19(16) of the Constitution, of impose a restriction on the right conferred by article 19(1) (g). In the absence of any valid law authorising it, such illegal imposition must undoubtedly operate as an illegal restraint and must infringe the unfettered right of the wholesale dealer to carry on his occupation, trade or business which is guaranteed to him by article 19(1) (g) of our Constitution.
In this view of the matter the petitioner is entitled to a suitable order for protection of his fundamental right. The proper order would be to direct the respondent Committee not to prohibit the petitioner from carrying on the business of a wholesale dealer in vegetables and fruits within the limits of the Jalalabad Town Area Committee until proper and valid bye-laws are framed and thereafter except in accordance with a licence to be obtained by the petitioner under the bye-laws to be so framed. Appeal allowed.
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1952 (2) TMI 20 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tax Officer had no jurisdiction under Section 20(4) to cancel the registration certifi- cate in view of our answer to the first question. We therefore propose to answer the second question in modified form. Whether the Sales Tax Officer had any jurisdiction under Section 20(4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, to cancel the petitioner s registration certificate. In view of our answer furnished to the first question it is sufficient to say that the Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to cancel the peti- tioner s registration certificate and that the Sales Tax Officer assumed jurisdiction to do so upon a misconstruction of the material provisions of the Act for the reasons we have already indicated. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this reference and also to withdraw the amount of deposit he had made. There will be one consolidated hearing fee of 10 gold mohurs for this case and Miscellaneous Judicial Cases Nos. 148 and 150 of 1948. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (2) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on equitable consideration which apply as much to the period of limitation prescribed by the special Acts as to the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act itself. The learned Judges followed the Full Bench decision of our Court in the case of Dropadi v. Hira Lal(1). In view of what has gone before, it is in our view only just and equitable that the benefit of Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act should be available to an applicant of the present character. We are therefore clearly of opinion that by reason of the provisions of Sec- tion 29 of the Limitation Act an applicant under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act must have the benefit of the provisions contained in Section 12 of the Limitation Act, i.e., that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order which is necessary to be filed along with his applica- tion must be excluded in computing the period of limitation. We accordingly hold that this application is within time. (1) (1912) I.L.R. 34 All. 496.
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1952 (2) TMI 18 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... orward by the assessee on account of tax- free goods was admissible. In my opinion, this question, therefore, must be answered in favour of the assessee. I hold that, in the circum- stances of the case, the Sales Tax Officer was not justified in refusing the deduction claimed under Section 5(2)(a)(i) of the Act. The Com- missioner in allowing the claim to the extent of one-fourth has acted on an arbitrary assumption. In my opinion, the accounts and the relevant papers must, therefore, be re-examined for coming to a definite conclusion on the point and allowance should be made to the assessee accordingly. As the assessee has succeeded in respect of the answer on the last point, I consider that there should be no order for cost of these references, and the references are accordingly disposed of. The asses- see, however, will not be entitled to a refund of the amount already deposited by him in asking for these references. RAMASWAMI, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1952 (2) TMI 17 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the entry 48, List II, 7th Schedule, Government of India Act. The said entry 48 is identical with entry 54, List II, of the present Constitution. In the Central List I, item 90 authorises the Centre to tax futures markets . This would also indicate that the expression sale of goods in entry 54 does not include forward contracts. Explanation III to Section 2 (h), therefore, under which forward contracts are to be assessed, even though actual delivery has not taken place, cannot be held to be with- in the power of the U.P. Legislature. As in the present case no delivery has taken place, it is not necessary for me to express an opinion as to whether the entire provision relating to forward contracts, even in- cluding forward contracts in which delivery of goods does take place, is ultra vires or not. Explanation III to my mind is certainly ultra vires. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to determine the other two points raised by the applicant. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (2) TMI 16 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rd that the High Court will, in future cases, be well advised to require, before they seek to entertain any questions under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act that the preliminary requirements of the section are strictly complied with. The stringency of these requirements is clearly deliberate. It is the intention of the enactment that the High Court is not to be flooded with such applications. The object is salutary and in their Lordships judg- ment the High Court will be well advised, before they entertain any ques- tion under the section, always to see that the preliminary statutory conditions have been fully observed. For these reasons I hold that the reference made by the Board of Revenue in this case is not competent and the High Court has no jurisdiction to hear the reference or answer the questions raised therein. There will be no order as to costs, but the petitioner is not entitled to refund of the amount of deposit. SARJOO PRASAD, J.-I agree. Reference not answered.
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1952 (2) TMI 15 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 5,616 are carefully classified according to the principles and criteria laid down in paragraph 8 above. Pending this classification, the contention of the applicant in respect of the taxable quantum must be upheld. 12. The result is that the order of the Sales Tax Commissioner cannot be maintained. Though the applicant s concern is no doubt liable to pay sales tax on transactions, which are sales within the meaning of Section 2 (c) of the Sales Tax Act, according to the criteria laid down in paragraph 8 above, the actual liability to pay the tax cannot be said to have been established for want of definite date regard- ing the taxable quantum prescribed by Section 4(1) of the Act. The order of the Sales Tax Commissioner is, therefore, set aside and it is directed that a fresh order should be passed, after examining the accounts of the applicant s concern in the light of the principles and criteria laid down in paragraph 8. H.S. KAMATH, PRESIDENT.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (2) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... were torn off prior to the starting of the main show. In this view of the matter no contravention of Section 5, sub-section (3), of the Act is made out against the applicants. In view of the above finding it is not necessary to record any find- ing on the question whether the gate-keeper comes within the definition of the word proprietor in Section 2 of clause (7) of the Act which provides Proprietor in relation to any entertainment includes any person responsible for management thereof. We may, however, say that we are of opinion that a gate-keeper, whose sole function is to allow persons inside the hall and who has no control over the show, is not a person contemplated by the word pro- prietor in this Act as he cannot be said to be responsible for manage- ment of the entertainment. We, therefore, allow this application, set aside the conviction of the applicants under Section 5, sub-section (3), of the Act and order that the fine, if paid, be refunded. Application allowed.
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1952 (2) TMI 13 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Shares – Power, to issue of at discount, Shares warrants and entries in register of members, Directors - Power of and Winding up – Overriding preferential payments
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1952 (2) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meaning of unregistered company ... ... ... ... ..... on this point. If there were assets within the province which could be administered by this court, there would have been justification for making the winding up order, assuming this court has jurisdiction. But in this case there is no asset at all. If a liquidator is appointed, that liquidator will have to go to Orissa and administer the assets there. If, on the other hand, a local liquidator is appointed, he will have to come from time to time to this court for directions. Both these procedures involve unnecessary waste of time and money. On the other hand, the petitioner is not without his remedy. He can go to the High Court at Cuttack, and ask for the winding up of the company. It will be very convenient for that court to administer the assets through its own liquidator. Even assuming that this court has jurisdiction, I would not be disposed to make the winding up order on the grounds I have stated above. I dismiss this application, but I do not make any order as to costs.
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1952 (2) TMI 2 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Customs Inspector - Public Servant - Prosecution
... ... ... ... ..... ision of this court on this point Pichai Pillai v. Balasundara Mudaly. It was held there as follows The expression any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a Local Government or some higher authority, in S. 197 (1), Cr. P. C. will not include public servants whom some lower authority has by law or rule or order been empowered to remove. The section clearly intends to draw a line between public servants and to provide that only in the case of the higher ranks should the sanction of the Local Government to their prosecution be necessary. 8.In this decision Sheik Abdul Kadir Saheb v. Emperor and Narayana v. Emperor were dissented from - See also Ajzalur Rahman v. Emperor. The order of the lower court therefore cannot be supported and the dismissal and discharge are set aside and the present learned District Magistrate is directed to take the case on file and dispose of it according to law in the light of the observations made above.
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1952 (2) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Adjudication - Strictures - Expert opinion ... ... ... ... ..... other order as it thinks fit. Then again the authorities are permitted to levy fine according to their discretion. In these circumstances, it is impossible to think that the Customs officers are to adjudge matters without approaching them judicially. These considerations leave no doubt in my mind that though these officers may not be courts in the strict sense of the term, they are enjoined by the Act to act quasi-judicially, that is to say, they have got to approach matters which they have to decide in a judicial frame of mind. It is unnecessary to refer to other sections relied upon by the appellant s counsel to show that the order of the Customs authorities in this case was made in an administrative capacity. 110.As to the appellant s counsel s argument based on Section 198 of the Act, the matter has been exhaustively dealt with by my Lord. I have nothing to add. 111.In the result I entirely agree with what has fallen from my Lord. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.
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