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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 41 Records
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1952 (3) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t there is no provision in the rules, as they now stand, for setting aside of an order of dismissal for default even in a case where the Tribunal might be later satisfied on unimpeachable evidence that notice was not in fact effected or that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance. It is true that there is no such rule but it must be held that there is inherent jurisdiction in the Tribunal to set aside an order of dismissal for default or an order passed on an appeal heard ex parte when it is satisfied that there was in fact no service of notice or that there was sufficient cause which prevented the appellant or the respondent from appearing on the date fixed. As a matter of fact Mr. Das on behalf of the Department has not challenged this inherent power of the Tribunal. We see no force in this contention and in our view Rule 24 of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules 1946, is not ultra vires. 5. The Department is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 300.
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1952 (3) TMI 39 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is adopted which is known as the mercantile method, then his income would be assessed on that basis. In other words, a merchant may employ the mercantile method and compute his income on the basis of debts due and liable to be paid rather than the cash method by which he would show his income in accordance with moneys actually received by him. When the first method is adopted the liability to pay tax would be on the accrual basis and not on the receipt basis. But it must not be forgotten that Section 13 only applies to Sections 10 and 12. There can be no mercantile method basis as far as Section 8 is concerned. As far as Section 8 is concerned, interest on securities only becomes "income" when it is actually received and not when it is due or capable of being received by the assessee. The result therefore is that we must answer the question submitted to us as follows "Assessment year 1946-47". Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (3) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e proper question is. In our opinion that was not the proper attitude for the Tribunal to take. The law and procedure are perfectly clear. It is open to the assessee to apply to the Tribunal to refer the questions of law to us. If the Tribunal refuses, then the assessee comes before us and we, if we think it a fit case, frame the questions, as we are entitled to and ask the Tribunal to submit a statement of the case with regard to the questions which we have framed; and it is for us to answer those questions after perusing the statement of the case. It is not for the Tribunal to consider whether the questions framed by us are proper questions or not. 3 Our answer to the questions referred to us are With regard to the assessment year 1940-41 (a) in the negative, (b) In the negative, (c) In the negative. With regard to the assessment year 1941-42 (a) in the negative, (b) In the negative. (c) In the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. 4 Answer accordingly.
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1952 (3) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... wn in favour of the appellant in this case were not present there. We allow the appeal on the charges of murder, conspiracy and kidnapping and reverse the findings and sentences on those charges and acquit the appellant of them. We however convict the appellant of an offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code, and sentence him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The learned Sessions Judge omitted to record a conviction under section 201 because he was convicting the appellant of murder. He followed a Nagpur decision which holds that in such a case it would be improper to convict in the alternative. We express no opinion about that; the question does not arise as we have acquitted the appellant of the murder and the cognate charges. The case now falls in line with that of the Privy Council in Begu v. The KingEmperor((1925) 52 I.A. 191.) and the conviction and sentence are confined to section 201. Agent for the appellant Ganpat Rai. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehta
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1952 (3) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mission on the goods sold by him. The question as to the capacity in which, in any particular case, the sole agent happens to be working, will depend on the facts of that case. In the case before us, there is nothing at all to indicate that the assessee-firm, in taking over the sole agency of Messrs. Shankar Sugar Mills, Limited, entered into any contract which created the relationship of master and servant. On the other hand, the considerations which have weighed with us in holding that the work of managing agency of Messrs. Shankar Sugar Mills, Limited, was being carried on by the assessee firm as their own business equally apply to their sole agency business also and it must be held that the income gained by the assessee-firm as sole agents was income or profit from their business. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The Department is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 300 in each case. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1952 (3) TMI 35 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot be set off against the capital gains for that year?" The answer to this question will be in the affirmative; it could be set off against ₹ 90,400. "2. Whether when the total income in any year of a company consists entirely of a residue of capital gains remaining after set-off against the total capital gains of that year of loss from business the amount by which the super-tax payable by them should be reduced should be computed on the total amount of the capital gains or only on the residue mentioned above?" The answer to this question will be, "on the total amount of the capital gains." The assessee has raised a question, "whether the provisions of Section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act are ultra vires the Indian Legislature". We have already decided this question on earlier references and, therefore, we answer that question in the negative. There will be no order as to the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (3) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s we have observed earlier, a decision dealing with the validity of restrictions imposed on one of the rights conferred by article 19 (1) cannot have much value as a precedent for adjudging the validity of the restrictions imposed on another right, even when the constitutional criterion is the same, namely, reasonableness, as the conclusion must depend on the cumulative effect of the varying facts and circumstances of each case. Having given the case our best and most anxious consideration, we have arrived at the conclusion, in agreement with the learned Judges of the High Court, that, having regard to the peculiar features to which reference has been made, section 15 (2)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause (4) of article 19 and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1952 (3) TMI 33 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion for this loss ; but at best this is one circumstance which might weigh in favour of the assessee as against which there are other circumstances to which our attention has been drawn. If the Tribunal after weighing these circumstances has chosen to come to the conclusion that on the probabilities of the case the statement of the assessee that he did not know of the loss of S. S. Rehmani till December, 1947, is false it is not a finding which can be said to be not justified by any materials on the record. The result, therefore, is that we answer the questions submitted to us as follows No. 1 -In the affirmative. No. 2 -In the affirmative. No. 3 -In the negative. No. 4 - This question has been withdrawn by the Solicitor General and we therefore do not answer this question. The additional question raised on the supplementary statement of the case will be answered in the affirmative. Assessee to pay three-fourths of the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (3) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Whether petitioner has been deprived of his personal liberty in accordance with procedure established by law?
Held that:- Article 166 directs all executive action to be expressed and authenticated in the manner therein laid down but an omission to comply with those provisions does not render the executive action a nullity. Therefore, all that the procedure established by law requires is that the appropriate Government must take a decision as to whether the detention order should be confirmed or not under section 11 (1). That such a decision has been in fact taken by the appropriate Government is amply proved on the record. Therefore, there has been, in the circumstances of this case, no breach of the procedure established by law and the present detention of the petitioner cannot be called in question.
For the reasons stated above, in my opinion, this application must fail.
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1952 (3) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
The Motor Vehicles Act contains a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities, and the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities; it is not a matter of right.
Held, that under the Motor Vehicles Act, the issue of a permit for a bus was not dependent on the ownership of the bus but on other considerations also, and as the Central Traffic Board had issued an order granting permits to one of the claimants after considering all circumstances the High Court acted erroneously in interfering with the Order of Traffic Board on an application under Art. 226 and in any event the order of the High Court issuing a direction to the Regional Transport Authority to grant permits to the other party was clearly in excess of its powers and jurisdiction.
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1952 (3) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent tax. He has also pointed out that there may be yet another case of engaging board-boys without payment of any wages but on the agreement of giving them free shows in lieu of their services. I have not come across any provision in the Act which exempts proprietors of an entertainment other than those who have some duty to perform in connection with the entertainment from payment of entertainment tax and if the board-boys, who are engaged on the condition that in lieu of their services they would be allowed to see the entertainment free of charge, are admitted to the place of entertainment they would be liable to pay entertainment tax under Section 3(2) of the Act. I, therefore, find myself unable to accept the interpretation placed by the learned Sessions judge on the expression some duty to perform in connection with the entertainment or to accept this reference. The accused persons have been rightly convicted and sentenced. The reference is rejected. Reference rejected.
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1952 (3) TMI 29 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... carrying on of which a dealer has to be registered under our Sales Tax Act, considering that Section 2(c) of the Act restricts the definition of dealer to persons carrying on the business of selling or supplying goods. The trucks sold in this case, therefore, had no connection with any business for the carrying on of which the applicant was liable to be registered as a dealer under the Act, apart from the fact that trucks or other motor vehicles have not been mentioned in his registration certificate, and that, during the period to which the assessment relates, he sold no motor vehicles other than the two trucks in question. For the reasons given above, the contention that the case is covered by the Board s ruling, notwithstanding the one distinguishing feature I have referred to, is correct and, as my learned colleague agrees with this view, the application is allowed and the learned Com- missioner s order is set aside. N.P. SHRIVASTAV, MEMBER.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1952 (3) TMI 28 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ht or liability. In the present case, the order of this Court is not an order on merits, that is, with regard to the applicant s liability to pay the tax, and does not determine any right except the one to prosecute the appeal before the Commissioner of Sales Tax without paying the tax assessed on it. The right to continue the appeal without paying the tax has nothing to do with the merits of the appeal and therefore the decision of this Court negativing the applicant s contention cannot be regarded as a judg- ment or a final order . This Court has done no more than to point out to the applicant that the Act must be complied with. The view which we take finds support from a decision of the Bombay High Court in P.V. Rao v. Ahmed Haji(1). In this view, we cannot grant a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution and dismiss the application. We, however, make no order as to costs. Application dismissed. (1) A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 125.
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1952 (3) TMI 27 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... int of law. If the Revising Authority refuses to refer the question of law to this Court, it is open to this Court to direct that authority to refer that question to it. It will be seen that the Sales Tax Act provides what may be called a complete machinery for appeal, revision and reference. In the ulti- mate analysis, if there is any real question of law in any particular case, it is the view of this Court that will prevail and the applicant has not been denied a right by the Sales Tax Act to move this Court at a proper time and in the proper manner. We think, having regard to the facts of this case, that the applicant has a suitable remedy. This application cannot and should not be entertained. Interlocutory or interim orders of judicial tribunals or quasi-judicial tribunals can- not be the subject of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. We think that no case has been made out for interference by this Court. The application is, therefore, dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1952 (3) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has not preferred any revision. Under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure I take notice of the case of 2nd accused also. To make the judgment consistent, I must set aside the conviction and sentence of the second accused also in this case though he has not preferred any revision. Both the accused are acquitted. The fine if paid will be refunded. Since in the case the firm has not been prosecuted and the con- viction is being set aside because the two accused are prosecuted individually, this acquittal will not stand in the way of a fresh com- plaint being laid against the firm B.L. Patnaick and Sons and K. Chiranjeevi and against all the three partners of the firm as such and they being prosecuted for the non-payment of the tax. It will not be open to either of these accused or even to the other partner who is not joined as an accused to raise any plea under Section 403, Criminal Procedure Code. Accused acquitted. (1) 1951 2 S.T.C. 53 (1951) 1 M.L.J. 511.
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1952 (3) TMI 25 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... State has asked what the position would be in regard to the bound volumes sold by the applicant-concern, such as A.I.R. 1950 Nagpur, which is a volume containing the decisions of the Nagpur High Court published by the concern during the year 1950. Here too, I will be guided by the plain meaning of words. Such a volume, taken as a whole, cannot be considered as having been issued periodically. Its sale is a single transaction even where payment is made in more than one instalment. The position then, in brief, is that subscriptions received for the regular supply of the All India Reporter in monthly parts should be excluded from the turnover, as relating to the supply of tax-free goods, while the sale prices of the separate yearly volumes made out of the monthly parts cannot be excluded from the turnover. In the light of the legal position explained above, I set aside the learned Commissioner s order and direct him to reassess the appli- cant accordingly. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (3) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts of sale were made in Fort Cochin. The plaintiff or his son was present in Fort Cochin and executed the contracts. The delivery of the goods was undertaken to be given in the yards of the respective buyers who are all carrying on business in Fort Cochin. On these facts we have no hesitation in holding, agreeing with the learned trial Judge, that the plaintiff must be held to be a person who carries on the business of buying or selling goods in the State of Madras and therefore a dealer within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act. The sales tax, as observed in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(4), is a tax levied on the occasion of the sale of goods. The sale must be deemed to have taken place in Fort Cochin which is part of the State of Madras. The appellant was therefore rightly assessed under the Act. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. (1) 1908 A.C. 46 P.C. (3) (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 753. (2) (1921) 44 Mad. 773. (4) 1942 F.C.R. 90 1 S.T.C. 104.
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1952 (3) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN
Custody of company’s property ... ... ... ... ..... the assets available in Travancore. No such question arises in this case. So long as the assets in Travancore belonged to the company and the liquidator, who represented the company after the winding up order could deal with the property and so long as he satisfied the requirements of the lex situs relating to the transfer of immovable properties, we find no reason why the sale deed should not be upheld. In this view of the case it is clear that the attachment cannot take effect as against the sale deed executed by the liquidator before the date of attachment. The objection of the vendee was, therefore, rightly allowed by the learned Judge. We confirm the order of the court below and dismiss this revision petition with costs. Subbamania Iyee J. mdash I concur. Mr. Kurup prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133, clauses (b) and ( c) of the Constitution of India. We are not satisfied that this is a fit case for granting leave. Leave is therefore refused.
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1952 (3) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Compensation for loss of office ... ... ... ... ..... uld obviously apply to any claim which may be put forward by the appellant for an estimated amount of profits which might have been earned by the company if it had continued. We think that the same consideration must also apply to the claim for office allowance. The appellant cannot compel the company to continue to carry on business for 20 years or pay him office allowonce for the full period of 20 years though the company itself may cease to carry on business long before the expiry of the period. We further think that the position of a managing agent materially differs from that of an ordinary employee of the company, employed at a fixed salary. In this view the third item of claim must be entirely disallowed. O.S.A. No. 32 of 1951 is allowed in part. The appellant will get proportionate costs but the respondents 1 and 2 will bear their own costs. Respondent 3, the Official Liquidator, will take the costs from the company s funds. O.S.A. No 20 of 1922 is allowed with costs.
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1952 (3) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company – Service of documents on members by, Meetings and proceedings – Contents and manner of service of notice and persons on whom it is to be served and Explanatory statement to be annexed to notice
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