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1953 (1) TMI 31
... ... ... ... ..... inst her, it would have been a different matter. But as her acquittal is so intimately related to the charge of the main offence, and as it took place only for the reason that she was held guilty of murder, there is no bar to the restoration of the conviction under section 201. 25. The result is that Ranjit Singh's Appeal No. 74 of 1952 is dismissed, but we substitute for the sentence of death the sentence of transportation for life, having regard to the time that has now elapsed since the occurrence and the probable motive of prevention of cruelty to a helpless woman. Kalawati's Appeal No. 73 of 1952 is allowed, and her conviction and sentence under section 302 discharged, but we convict her of an offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code, and sentence her to three year's rigorous imprisonment. 26. Appeal No. 73 allowed. Appeal No. 74 dismissed. Sentence reduced. Agent for the appellant in Appeal No. 73 B. R. Anand. Agent for the respondent G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
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1953 (1) TMI 30
... ... ... ... ..... he reversed decree. The sale being inevitable under the amended decree the judgment-debtor was clearly not entitled to restitution. It was held in Gansu Ram v. Parvati Kuer A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 130, that where a judgment-debtor could not have paid even the reduced decretal amount and the sum realized at the sale was less than the decretal amount the situation could not have been altered in any way had the decree been modified before, instead of after the sale, and the judgment-debtor could not invoke the provisions of section 144, except by showing that the sale was in substance and truth a consequence of the error in the original decree. The observations made in this case have apposite application to the facts and circumstances of this case. 15. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that there is no merit in either of these appeals and we dismiss both of them with costs. 16. Appeals dismissed. Agent for the appellant C.P. Lal Agent for the respondent Rajinder Narain.
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1953 (1) TMI 29
... ... ... ... ..... land in the possession of his mediate landlord, namely, the raiyat. Hence there is no discrimination between a raiyat and under-raiyat arising out of the extent of the land in their respective possession. The discrimination arises out of their respective status and rights as recognised in the Orissa Tenancy Act and the impugned Act has nothing to do with such discrimination. 28. I would therefore reject the petition with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs. B. Jagannadhadas, C.J. 29. I agree with the judgment of my learned brother. I would, however, reserve my opinion as regards Section 17, Orissa Tenants Protection. Act, for fuller consideration when any question relating to the actual application of that section, on the facts of a case, arises. For the purposes of the pre sent case, it is enough to say that the validity or invalidity of Section 17 of the Act (which is a separate and severable provision) in no way affects the validity of the rest of the Act.
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1953 (1) TMI 28
... ... ... ... ..... l against the order dealing with the quantum of the tax payable and it was, no doubt, entitled to "pass such orders thereon as it thought fit" (see Section 33 (4) of the Act). The words 'such orders thereon as it thought fit' are no doubt, very wide but they must relate to the matters that arise in the appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The appeal in this case, as we have already said, related to the quantum of the tax payable and in that appeal, the question whether there was sufficient cause for not complying with the previous notice did not arise, no appeal having been filed against the order under Section 27 though an appeal was provided for by the Income-tax Act. 9. In the circumstances of this case, the view taken by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal appears to us to be correct and the answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the negative. 10. The assessee must pay the costs to the Department which we assess at ₹ 300.
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1953 (1) TMI 27
... ... ... ... ..... for agricultural purposes in the accounting year. The purpose for which the lease was originally given or the purpose for which the land was being used at the inception of the tenancy before the year of assessment is immaterial. In the present case, as this point was not discussed at an earlier stage of this case the relevant enquiry was not made but it seems to me that there is much force in the contention that the land from which income was derived in the present case was not used for agricultural purposes and condition No. 3 was not fulfilled. In the result the assessee is not liable to be assessed to agricultural income-tax for the sum of ₹ 7,994 which was sought to be assessed in regard to the selami received by the assessee in the present case. As the assessee has succeeded the Board must pay the costs of this hearing as also of the hearing before the Federal Court. Certified for two Counsel as of a defended suit. SEN, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (1) TMI 26
... ... ... ... ..... estment in Government Promissory Notes of money lying idle in the Bank can be deemed to be one of the declared objects of the Bank. The petitioner having failed to show that the investment was made for carrying out some purpose for which the Bank has been founded, the only ground, as it seems to me, on which the interest from the investment might be held to be profits from the business disappears. Bardswell, J.-I agree that the interest derived by a Co-operative Bank from its investments in Government securities is not to be regarded as part of the profits of its business qua such Bank. I would take it that the exemption is meant as an encouragement to the employing of as much capital as possible for the financing of co-operative societies and so extending the scope of co-operation. The investing of money in Government securities does not further the cause of co-operation but is only a means of keeping from lying idle funds that cannot immediately be used for such a purpose.
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1953 (1) TMI 25
... ... ... ... ..... the provisions of Section 16(3)(a)( ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Learned counsel has urged that Srimati Chanda Devi's case (supra) was wrongly decided because an examination of the whole section indicates that the individual contemplated in that sub-section is one who is capable of having a wife and as a woman cannot have a wife, the sub-section cannot apply to her. This argument was considered in our previous decision and there is, therefore, no reason to say anything more. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.
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1953 (1) TMI 24
... ... ... ... ..... hether or not there is any evidence to support the Commissioners' finding, it is not for the court to consider how the court itself would have viewed the matter had it been res integra. If left free I might well have come to a different conclusion from that to which the Commissioners have come; but unless I can be satisfied that there was no evidence to support their finding, then I am bound to give effect to it." It cannot be said that in the case with which we are here concerned there was no material to support the finding of the Income-tax Tribunal. For the above reasons, I hold that the answer to the question submitted should be that the view taken by the Tribunal, that in the circumstances of the case the nature of the activities carried on by the assessee was not in the nature of business activities but in the nature of mere investments, is correct. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. RAMASWAMI, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (1) TMI 23
... ... ... ... ..... nt but the duty to pay interest is imposed by the statute. Apart from this I think (with great respect) that the Allahabad decision is of doubtful authority. The decision is not consistent with the principle laid down in Schulze v. Bensted 1915 7 Tax Cas. 30 and Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Barnato 1934-36 20 Tax Cas. 455. The Madras High Court expressly declined to follow the Allahabad case in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Narayanan Chettiar 1943 11 I.T.R. 470. For the reasons expressed I hold that in the circumstances of the case the amount of ₹ 10,497 which was realised by Gokulchand and the amount of ₹ 41,813-6-0 paid as interest under Section 18A have been rightly taxed as income in the hands of the Maharajah. The questions must accordingly be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. SARJOO PRASAD, J.―I agree and have nothing to add. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (1) TMI 22
... ... ... ... ..... mittee that the plaintiff's suit was barred and the reason given is that "the respondent Velu could only be entitled as heir to his father Nataraja, and from him and through him, and consequently his suit was barred by article 114," This portion of the judgment, it seems, was overlooked by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court and also by the Madras High Court in the case referred to above. The fact that under the ordinary law of inheritance the plaintiffs would come as the heirs of the husband of Rajlakshmi is immaterial. That would not be deriving their right to sue through and from the widow, and in this view of the case the plaintiffs' suit cannot be held to be barred. The result, therefore, is that we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore those of the trial judge with costs to the appellants in all courts. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellants Sukumar Ghose. Agent for respondent No. 1 R. R. Biswas.
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1953 (1) TMI 21
... ... ... ... ..... r profound respect for the opinions of the learned Judges who decided them, that the several cases relied on by the respondent were not correctly decided. Reference was made, in, course of argument, to section 6 of the West Bengal Act LXII of 1950. That section refers to orders or decrees made between the commencement of Act XVII of 1950 and Act LXII of 1950, i.e., between the 30th March, 1950, and the 30th November, 1950, and cannot have any application to the order for possession made in this case on the 27th February, 1950. For reasons stated above this appeal must be allowed and the order made by the High Court should be set aside and the respondents' application under section 18 (1) of Act XVII of 1950 should be dismissed and we order accordingly. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs except that the parties should bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant S. C. Bannerji. Agent for the respondent Sukumar Ghose.
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1953 (1) TMI 20
... ... ... ... ..... his individual capacity and the proceedings against him were hence without jurisdiction. The argument was rejected by Patanjali Sastri J. who said that even assuming that the notice did not; give the correct particulars as to the person or income which the authorities sought to assess the irregularity must, in the circumstances of the case, be deemed to have been waived by the assessee. 6. In our opinion the present case falls within the ambit of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in -- AIR 1953 SC 429 (A)' and it must be held that the proceedings before the taxing authorities purporting to tax the Hindu undivided family of Gulabrai Manoharlal and demanding the tax assessed from the six divided constituent members under Section 29, Income-tax Act are legally valid and that the question framed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal must be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250/-
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1953 (1) TMI 19
... ... ... ... ..... hich also dismissed the appeal on the merits. Learned counsel has pointed out that the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal being completely without jurisdiction, the order of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be deemed to be an order under Section 33. In case the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal, in the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction, had varied that order to the disadvantage of the assessee, it may have been possible to ask for a reference for the decision of the question whether they had any jurisdiction to do so; but, they having merely dismissed the appeals, the effect of the order of the Income-tax Officer remained and, as there was no appeal provided for against that order, the order of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be treated as an order under Section 33 against which a reference is provided for under Section 66. This reference cannot be entertained and is rejected. We make no order as to costs. Reference rejected.
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1953 (1) TMI 18
... ... ... ... ..... n the Zamindar's Sherista. Although in the rent receipts Dobson continued to be shown as the recorded tenant, eventually Jones's name appears on the rent receipts as tenant. In spite of the increase in land value and the letting value the landlords through whom the plaintiff derives his title did not at any time make may attempt to eject the tenant or to get any further enhancement of rent since 1860. All these circumstances put together are explicable only on the hypothesis of permanency of the tenure and they irresistibly lead to the conclusion, as held by the lower Courts, that the tenancy in question was heritable and a permanent one. The decision of Mukherjea, J., in the case of Probhas Chandra Mallick v. Debendra Nath Das (supra) is definitely in point. In this view of the matter we hold that the Courts below were right in dismissing the plaintiff's claim for ejectment.' In the result this appeal must fail and we dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (1) TMI 17
... ... ... ... ..... to enact; that Part I of the Act was not severable, that the whole Act hung together and therefore the whole was invalid. I hold that the trial held under the Regulation is void under article 13, read with articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner should be set aside. Following the view taken in Lachmandas’s case(1) I direct that the petitioner shall be tried according to law. This order will govern petition No. 368 relating to the other petitioners. (1) 1947 A.C. 503. (2) 1952 S.C.R 710. ORDER. BY THE COURT -As the Constitutional issues. raised in the petitions have also been raised in the appeals preferred by the petitioners they have been dealt with in the appeals by consent of parties, and the petitions are dismissed. The constitutional points in the appeals having been decided against the appellant,; by the majority the appeals will be heard on other points when the appeals are ready for hearing. Petitions dismissed.
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1953 (1) TMI 16
... ... ... ... ..... right. I, therefore, agree that the sale of loom hours does not come within the definition as given in the Sale of Goods Act and the Sales Tax Act and is exempt from payment of tax. The second question formulated by the Board is as follows Are sales to registered dealers, through commission agents, whose offices are situated outside Bihar, sales of the class mentioned in Section 5(2)(a)(ii)? In view of the findings in the statement of the case submitted by the Board it is quite obvious that the question does not arise and need not be answered. The Board rejected the contention of the assessee that it was a sale to the Tatas and held, on the contrary, that it was sale to Shaw Wallace and Co., who are admittedly not registered dealers in Bihar, and, therefore, the exemption under Section 5(2)(a)(ii) is not available to the assessee. In my opinion, therefore, that question has rightly not been answered and did not arise for consideration at all. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (1) TMI 15
... ... ... ... ..... ibed is fatal to the validity of the reference. We further held in the circumstances of that case that the Board of Revenue improperly made the reference in violation of the provision of the statute and the High Court was capable of entertaining objection to the statement of the case, and if it came to the conclusion that the case should never have been stated, the High Court was not compelled to express its opinion upon the questions of law referred. For the reasons stated, we think that the first question of law raised in the statement of the case should be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Sales Tax Department. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the other three questions of law referred to in the statement of the case. The assessee must pay the costs of hearing. We fix the hearing fee at ten gold mohurs. Reference answered accordingly. (1) (1930) I.L.R. 9 Pat. 472. (2) (1952) A.I.R. 1952 Pat. 357 3 S.T.C. 167.
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1953 (1) TMI 14
... ... ... ... ..... over Section 16-A the accused alleged that he was not a dealer but a commission agent and the Sub- Divisional Magistrate came to the conclusion that the accused is not therefore a dealer and that he is not liable to pay the tax and so he cannot be prosecuted. In coming to this conclusion he committed an error be- cause it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Radhakrishna Rao v. Province of Madras , that the term dealer will take in a com- mission agent also as in the instant case. Therefore, the Court below ought to have found that the accused is an assessee falling within the scope of the Act and that he is liable to pay the tax. In the result, the order of acquittal of the lower Court is set aside and the accused is convicted as charged and he is fined in a sum of Rs. 50. The tax is also made recoverable from him as if it were a fine. Time to pay the fine and the tax amount three weeks from the date of the receipt of this order in the lower Court. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (1) TMI 13
... ... ... ... ..... Court will require the Board of Revenue to state a case only where the High Court was not satisfied that such refusal was justified. The refusal evidently would be justified if the application to the Board for reference was made beyond time, and in those circumstances it would not be open to the High Court to call for a statement of case, because whatever the other reasons may be on merits, the order of the Board refusing to make a reference would be on the face of it legal and valid. If it were otherwise, then an assessee could at any time without regard to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 21 make an application to the Board for making a reference, and on such refusal apply to the High Court within the time provided under sub-section (2) to call for a statement of case and have the matter decided on merits. This could not be the intention of the law. The application of the assessee must, therefore, fail and has to be dismissed with costs. Reference not answered.
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1953 (1) TMI 12
Section 457 of the Companies Act, 1956 – Winding up – Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... tinguished from the interests of some of the directors or the managing directors or the managing agents, whose interests may not be entirely identical with the interests of the general body of shareholders. It, therefore, appears to us that the court below while passing the order under appeal removing the official liquidator lost sight of this aspect of the case. In our opinion considering the interests of the general body of shareholders it is necessary that the official liquidator should continue to be in charge of the liquidation proceedings. It is also necessary that the liquidation proceedings should be brought to a speedy conclusion. We would therefore set aside the order passed by the court below removing the appellant from the office of the official liquidator and appointing the first respondent as such. The appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal including hearing fee of Rs. 100 to be paid by the first respondent. The cross-objection is dismissed. No costs.
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