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Showing 1 to 20 of 59 Records
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1954 (3) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e confession was not true or voluntary and that there was no sufficient corroboration by other evidence in the case. This contention involves an investigation into pure questions of fact which we decline to entertain, as we do not think that a finding of fact depending upon the merits or appreciation of the evidence is open to reconsideration in an appeal brought by special leave. Learned counsel has referred to certain passages in the judgments of the courts below and has attempted to argue that the confession is not corroborated by other evidence in the case. We see no reason to differ from the view taken by the Sessions Judge and the High Court on this point. No flagrant error of law or procedure has been pointed out to us in the findings of the courts below, nor are we satisfied that in arriving at findings of fact any miscarriage of justice has resulted to the appellant. 13. We accordingly hold that the conviction and sentence are fully justified and dismiss this appeal.
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1954 (3) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... firmed. 32. It was finally contended that the defendants had blended C Schedule properties along with the admitted ancestral properties so as to impress them with the character of joint family properties. The burden of proving blending is heavily on the plaintiff. He has to establish that the defendants had so dealt with the properties as to show an intention to abandon their separate claim over it. This is a question of fact on which the Courts below have concurrently found against the appellant, and there are no grounds for differing from them. 33. In the result, the decree of the lower Court will be modified by granting the plaintiff a decree for half the value of the plots, S. Nos. 634 and 635, S. Nos. 639, 640 and 641 and S. Nos. 642, 644 and 645 as on the date of the suit. Subject to this modification, the decree of the lower Court is confirmed, and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs in this appeal. 34. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 90 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this Court in the case of -- 'Bhikhan Gir Gossain v. Jalpadat Jha' AIR 1921 Pat 293 (2) (B) in support of this view. Although it is a decision of a single Judge, in my opinion, Jwala Prasad, J. set forth the correct view, supported as he was by two decisions of the Calcutta High Court, -- 'Sudevi Devi v. Sovaram Agarwallah' 10 CWN 306 (C) and -- 'Bharat Chandra v. Yasin Sarkar' AIR 1917 Cal 31 (D). In my opinion, the mere fact that the petitioners before the Munsif could have filed an appeal with a prayer for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal did not deprive them of the right to move the Court in the exercise of its inherent power to set aside an order passed by it obtained through fraud. I see no reason to think that the order passed by the Munsif was one without jurisdiction or was passed with jurisdiction but with material irregularity. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 32/-. Ranjan Das, J. 3. I agree.
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1954 (3) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ould, in any case, be sufficient. There is no substance in this contention and it must be overruled. 22. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. As for costs, it must be mentioned that the defendant died while the appeals were pending, and that it is his legal representatives who are prosecuting them. The property mortgaged is an estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act II of 1904. The plaintiffs alleged in their plaint that the mortgage was binding on the estate under section 4 of the Act. Issue 6 was framed with reference to this allegation, and the finding of the trial court was that it was not binding on the state. But on appeal, the High Court held that the question could not be gone into in a suit laid against the mortgagor. It accordingly discharged the finding, and left the question open to be determined in other and appropriate proceedings. In view of this, we direct that the parties do bear their own costs in this court. 23. Appeals dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 87 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om dividends, and if he is to be given exemption only in the sum of ₹ 13,865 whereas his dividend income in the Indian State had been ₹ 66,045 he would get exemption at a lower rate than he would be entitled to. Now, the answer to this difficulty is clearly to be found in Section 17(2) of the Act and Section 17(2) lays down the mode of computation where there is a total income and a part of that income falls within the category of exempted income. That is exactly the position here. The total income is ₹ 1,32,592 and the exempted income is ₹ 13,865 and the mode of computing tax on the exempted income of ₹ 13,865 is the mode laid down in Section 17(2). 11. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was right in the view that it took and we will answer the question submitted to us by the Tribunal that the assessee is required to pay the tax on ₹ 1,18,727 and not on ₹ 66,295. The assessee to pay the costs. 12. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (3) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... profit of ₹ 4-5-4 per maund on the stock requisitioned. We hold, therefore, that the last portion of clause 25 places an unreasonable restriction upon the carrying on of trade or business and is thus an infringement of the respondent's right under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and is, therefore, to that extent void. The same result follows if the impugned clause is examined in the light of article 31(2). The clause by vesting the power in the authority to acquire the stocks at any price fails to fix the amount of the compensation or specify the principles on which the compensation is to be determined. The clause leaves it entirely to the discretion of the executive authority to fix any compensation it likes. The High Court rightly held that the clause offended against article 31(2). 7. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the last portion of clause 25 is void and dismiss the appeal with costs. 9. Agent for the appellant and for the intervener R. H. Dhebar.
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1954 (3) TMI 85 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Now, we do not read the resolution as in any way altering the provision in the trust deed. The trust deed gives the discretion to the trustees to utilise the income in the manner they think proper. A resolution by the trustees themselves to limit their discretion or to regulate their discretion cannot possibly take the case out of the proviso, Mr, Palkhivala also wanted to rely on an order passed by Mr. Justice Coyajee oh the 18th April, 1952, by which he ordered the trustees to pay the beneficiaries, viz., Minocher and Mehra, equally the full income from the trust. Now, this order was passed after the relevant assessment years and we will express no opinion on the effect that this order might have upon the question as to whether the case has been taken out of the proviso, In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was right in the view that it took as to the liability of the trustees to pay tax at the maximum rate. The answer we must give to the question is in the affirmative.
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1954 (3) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... remedy was available could not apply where a party came to the court with an allegation that his fundamental right had been infringed and sought relief under article 226. Moreover, the remedy provided by the Act is of an onerous and burdensome character. Before the appellant can avail of it he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax. Such a provision can hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy. For the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that the High Court, having held that the Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Act was ultra vires, was in error in dismissing the application on the ground that it was not entitled to relief under the provisions of article 226 of the Constitution. In the result therefore we &How this appeal with costs and direct an appropriate writ to issue restraining the first respondent from imposing or authorising imposition of a tax on the appellant in exercise of its authority under Explanation 11 held void. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (3) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat it was not shown that there were no similar tenancy and Land Revenue laws in other parts of Rajasthan and the impugned Acts being ameliorative legislation designed to raise the economic status of the agriculturists in Mewar could not be said to constitute any discrimination merely because no such legislation existed in the other parts of Rajasthan . This difference between the two parts did not justify that such progressive and ameliorative measures for the welfare of the people existing in a particular area should be done, away with and the State be brought down to the level of the unprogressive States. The judgment shows that the Bench far from going back on its previous view adhered to it and expressly distinguished the case under appeal before us on its special facts. . As a result of the foregoing discussion we hold that the view taken by the High Court is correct. We accordingly dismiss the, appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant R. H. Dhebar.
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1954 (3) TMI 82 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ings, and they did participate, though they failed to avail themselves of the opportunity given by the Income Tax Officer to produce the account books. 13. 'Point No. 3 ' What we have said above is enough to dispose of this point also. Under Section. 34 of the Act, the Income Tax Officer could deal only with the escaped income of a firm and, in doing so, he cannot go back upon the assessment already made under Section 23; but in making assessment under Section 34 all the powers conferred upon the Income Tax officer under Section 23 can and should be exercised; and with reference to the given assessment year it was perfectly open to the Income Tax Officer to deal with the assessment on the basis that it was an unregistered firm, after cancelling the registration that had already been granted. 14. The petitions fail and are dismissed with costs of ₹ 250, each in W. P. Nos. 613 and 629 of 1950. There will be no order as to costs in W. Ps. Nos. 201 and 202 of 1953.
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1954 (3) TMI 81 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stered firm. It cannot be said of the present assessment order that it was made on any particular basis which basis subsequently disappeared. The present assessment order was made on the basis of the law as it then stood and it was only because the law was subsequently altered that the liability of the petitioner might be considered to have arisen under the amended law. But the liability of the petitioner to be assessed in a particular amount was finally determined on 9th October, 1952, and that liability was determined according to law. That liability cannot be altered because the law has been subsequently altered or amended. 5. In our opinion, therefore, the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer calling upon the petitioner to pay the sum of ₹ 29,446-9-0 is not warranted by law. The result is that we must issue a writ against respondent No. 1 in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. 6. The respondents to pay the costs of the petitioner. 7. Order accordingly.
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1954 (3) TMI 80 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee was rightly rejected by the Income-tax authorities. A similar view as to the construction of Section 26A has been taken by the learned Judges of the East Punjab High Court in Kalsi Mechanical Works, Nandpur v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1953 24 ITR 353 . In that case a firm was alleged to have come into existence by a verbal agreement in June, 1944, but the instrument of partnership was drawn up only in May, 1949, after the expiry of the relevant accounting year. It was held by the learned Judges that the firm was not entitled to be registered under Section 26A for the purpose of assessment for the year 1949-50. For the reasons expressed I hold that the firm constituted under the partnership deed dated the 1st May, 1931, was not entitled to be registered under Section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act for the years 1945-46, 1946-47 and 1947-48, and that the question referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department. Ahmed, J.-I agree.
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1954 (3) TMI 79 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the assessment and also for payment under Section 29 only upon Gannu Rao. The same procedure was followed for the chargeable accounting period preceding the year now under dispute by Gannu Rao, submitting a return to the excess profits tax authorities, and it was not disputed. We therefore; think that the notices served in such circumstances on Gannu Rao both under Section 13 of the Act and also under Section 29 of the Income-tax Act were valid, and, therefore, the proceedings cannot be said to be without jurisdiction, so as to empower this Court to interfere by quashing the proceedings by issuing a writ, as for. The requirements, in our opinion of Section 63 of the Income-tax Act were amply satisfied in the present case by the notice of demand served upon Gannu Rao. Since the liability of the several partners is joint and several under Section 44 of the Act, and since admittedly the tax demanded under Section 29 was not paid, each of them became a "defaulter".
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1954 (3) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ppellate Assistant Commissioner read along with the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner regarding the assessment the year 1948-1949, which was confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal, leaves no room, in our opinion, to doubt that the disallowance of the claim made on behalf of the company to deduct the commission paid to Ramaswami was only on the ground that it was a division of the profits. We therefore, think that the assessee undoubtedly within the purview of the Notification granting exemption, and the Commissioner of Income-tax had misdirected himself and failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law. Further, there is an error apparent on the face of the record, as, on the facts found, the rejection by the Commissioner of the petition by Ramaswami was not justified in law. For these reasons we think that the application must be allowed and the Commissioner of Income-tax directed to restore the petition to his file and dispose of it according to law.
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1954 (3) TMI 77 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h it consisted in part in handling, the handling was such that it involved use. In my view, therefore, the Commissioner wss not right in holding that the appellant had failed to bring himself within Section 3(2), read with Schedule III of the Act. 19. It has been stated by the Commissioner that the wages of the appellant were admitted to have been ₹ 60/- to ₹ 70/- per month. We are informed that on the basis of that rate of wages, the proper amount of compensation would be ₹ 2,940/-. 20. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The judgment and order of the Commissioner are set aside and the appellant's application for compensation is allowed. There will be an order for payment to him by the respondent as compensation of a sum of ₹ 2,940/- with the costs of this appeal, the hearing-fee of which we assess at three gold mohurs. 21. In view of the difficulty of the point, we would not make any order for costs of the trial Court. Das Gupta, J. 22. I agree.
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1954 (3) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reason is that it is undesirable to let things glide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This,however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so hear its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution order of under section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed but with no order about costs. Civil Suits Nos. 311 of 1951 to 314 of 1951, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, will be stayed till the conclusion of the prosecution under section 193, Indian Penal Code. As the plaintiffs there are parties here, there is no difficulty about making such an order. The petition for special leave is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat the Legislature seeks to control and the object, as enunciated in the Act, is to ensure that the endowments attached to the religious institutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for purposes for which they were founded or exist. As there is no question of favouring any particular religion or religious denomination, article 27 could not possibly apply. The result is that, in our opinion, the only sections of the Act, which are invalid, are sections 38, 39 and the proviso to section 46. The application under article 32 is, therefore, allowed to this extent that a writ in the nature of mandamus would issue restraining the Commissioner and the State Government enforcing against the petitioners the provisions of -the sections mentioned above. The other prayers of the petitioners are disallowed. No separate order is necessary in Case No. I of 1950, which will stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs either in the petition or in the appeal.
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1954 (3) TMI 74 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... come. 7. In the instant case the source of the credits was not alleged to be of an independent character. In this respect the case is analogous to G.M. Madappa v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras 1948 16 I.T.R. 385, but there is also an additional factor. In Bachhraj Amolakchand v. Commissioner of Income-tax Misc. Civil Case No. 174 of 1949 the assessee's explanation that ₹ 54,532 in the assessment year 1944-45 were drawn from the sale proceeds of family ornaments was rejected and the amount was held to be an income from undisclosed sources. This decision is a circumstance indicating the possibility of the assessee possessing an undisclosed source of income. In this context, the Income-tax Authorities were entitled to drawn an inference that the amounts which had admittedly no specific independent source represented revenue receipt from undisclosed sources. 8. The application fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. Application dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n made is not a return under Section 22(3) merely because the return is of an income which is not assessable is, in our opinion, with great respect, unacceptable and contrary to the scheme of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, in our opinion, the notice issued under Section 34 was not a valid notice. With regard to the assessment order made on the 26th of February, 1951, apart from the fact that the order is made as a result of proceedings under Section 34(1), it is also bad on the ground that it is made after the period of limitation. The period of limitation under Section 34(3) is four years from the last date of the year in which the income became first assessable and as that year ended on the 31st of March, 1946, the assessment order was made four years beyond the period of limitation. The result, therefore, is that we must answer the questions submitted to us (1) in the negative and (2) also in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (3) TMI 72 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a, C.J., proceeded upon the view that a mere remission leading to discharge of the liability of the debtor could not become income and could not fall within the ambit of Section 2(6C) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The question in the present case is wholly different. The question to be determined in this case is whether upon a proper construction of Section 10(2)(xi) the amount remitted by the assessee should be deducted as a bad or doubtful debt. In my opinion the principle laid down in the Bombay case has no application to the present case. For the reasons I have attempted to state I am of opinion that the sum of ₹ 33,343 should be treated as a bad and doubtful debt within the meaning of Section 10(2)(xi) of the Indian Income-tax Act and the question referred by the Appellate Tribunal should be answered in favour of the assessee. The Income-tax Department must pay the costs of this reference hearing fee ₹ 250. AHMAD, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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