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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 51 Records
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1955 (9) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... tarwad properties. Whether the junior member did or did not claim a right during his lifetime to partition, when his proprietary interest becomes inheritable under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, then, on his demise, his heirs would become automatically entitled to claim the right which has been left by him in so far as it has not been disposed of by any testamentary disposition. He would be deemed therefore to have died intestate in respect of his proprietary right or interest in the tarwad property and the surviving heirs of the deceased junior member would be entitled to claim partition of the property and have their share or shares separated from the property. With respect, we cannot agree to this statement of the Law for reasons already given. 16. In the above view, no question of the constitutional validity of Madras Act XVIII of 1949 can arise. Our answer to the reference is that the said Act is not repugnant to Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
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1955 (9) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e into operation provided the valuation discloses a surplus and not a deficit. There is no warrant for that contention in the language of rule 3(a). When rule 3(a) refers to "computing the surplus for the purpose of rule 2" it only refers to the mode of computation laid down in rule 2(b). It does not postulate that the result of the computation must be a surplus before rule 3(a) can come into play. If there is a surplus, then the surplus would be reduced by the permissible deduction under rule 3(a). If there is a deficit, the deficit will be increased by the permissible deduction under rule 3(a). But if the deduction is one which falls within the ambit of rule 3(a) it must be allowed as a deduction in computing the surplus or the deficit for the purpose of rule 2(b). The answers to the questions therefore will be (1) in the negative, (2) does not arise, (3) in the negative, and (4) in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the cost. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (9) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er were to be accepted, then the assessee would be in the happy position of not having to pay the penalty at all because there is no provision in law of recovering the penalty. The reason why Section 18A (9) is not mentioned in Section 47 is because, again, the Legislature has looked upon the imposing of penalty on the grounds mentioned in Section 18A(9) as the exercise of power under S. 28 and not under Section 28(1)(c), and as Section 47 provides for recovery of penalties imposed under Section 28 it was unnecessary to refer to Section 18A(9). 3. In our opinion, the Tribunal was in error in holding that the appeal was not competent. Therefore, we must answer the Question as follows "The order of the Income Tax Officer imposing the penalty was passed under Section 28(l)(c) read with Section 18A(9) and an appeal against that order lay, to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and thereafter to the Tribunal". 4. The Commissioner to pay the costs. 5. Reference answered.
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1955 (9) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o express decision of the statutory authorities have been placed before me. I have referred to the averments in the counter-affidavit of the respondent, that the petitioner has taken out licence, under the Factories Act for the remaining seven establishments also. That, however, should not in the circumstances of this case; preclude the determination afresh of the question, whether each or any of these seven establishments of the petitioner is a "factory" within the meaning of the Factories Act of 1948. It is open to the petitioner to apply to the statutory authority, the Inspector of Factories, for the determination of that question with reference to each of the restaurants. The primary duty to decide whether any given establishment, a restaurant, is a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act of 1948 is that of the statutory authorities. 23. This petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will however be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.
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1955 (9) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ignatures or the handwriting of Deshpande Paranjape or Jamnadas would have been enough What was in issue, however, before me was apart from Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas having signed or written those documents, whether the contents of those various documents were correct This certainly could not be proved by Balkrishna Bhagwan Deshmukh who had no personal knowledge whatever about the contents of those various documents. It would have served no purpose whatever to admit those documents in evidence with the reservation as suggested by Mr. Taraporewalla. I was supported in this conclusion of mine by the remarks of the appeal Court in --'11 Bom H C R 242 at p. 246 (A)', and I accordingly declined to admit in evidence the said various documents in spite of Balkrishna Bhagwan Deshmukh deposing before me that the said, various documents were signed by or were in the handwriting of Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas. (The rest of the judgment is hot material to the report.)
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1955 (9) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ery nature of the thing requires that a large discretion should be left to the authority. Discretion which is wide is not necessarily arbitrary. It was said that under section 233 of the Act the civil courts are debarred from enquiring into the reasonableness of the order; but that is because matters concerning revenue and settlement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts, and under section 62 of the Act, the Board of Revenue has revisional jurisdiction over all orders passed in connection with settlement. We think that the power conferred on the Settlement Officer to fix an earlier date for giving operation to the rent rate is reasonable and valid, and that it invades no fundamental rights of the landlord. For the reasons given above, we must hold that the scheme embodied in sections 81 to 86 of the Act does not transgress any of the Constitutional limitations, and is valid. In the result, the petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1955 (9) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s and we cannot predicate that the 300 shares which were sold were shares other than the bonus shares, and you have to determine what the cost to the assessee was with regard to these 350 shares, and that cost can only be arrived at by averaging the cost by taking into consideration the fact that the 50 bonus shares were received free of cost. It is only by that method that the proper profit or loss can be arrived at. In is only by that therefore, by reason of the decision that we gave in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Messrs. Manecklal Chunilal & Sons Ltd. (Income Tax Reference No. 16 of 1948) the method of valuation adopted by the Income-tax Department was right and the loss should be assessed according to the method of the Department and not according to the assessee company or to the Tribunal. The answer therefore must be that the loss by the assessee company computed by the Department is according to law. The assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (9) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ral Court in Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces and Berar( 1944 F.C.R. 284) and in other cases referred to in Rajah of Bobbili v. The State of Madras( 1952 1 M.L.J 174, 193-194) and it was held by the Federal Court that the word "acquisition" occurring in section 299 had the limited meaning of actual transference of ownership and not the wide meaning of deprivation of any kind that has been given by this Court in Subodh Gopal Bose's case( 1954 B.C.R. 587) to that word acquisition appearing in article 31(2) in the light of the other provisions of the Constitution.' It is, therefore, not clear at all that the impugned Act was in conflict With section 299 of the Government of India Act,1935. Besides, this objection was not taken or even hinted at in the petitions and cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. The result, therefore, is that these petitions must be dismissed. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs.
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1955 (9) TMI 76 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alled for. In my opinion, the correct view to be taken in such cases was taken in the case of 1950 18ITR194(Mad) and I would refer, in particular, to the judgment of Viswanatha Sastri J. 18. For the reasons given above, it appears to me that there were no materials in this case on which the Tribunal could properly hold that any part of the remuneration paid to Mr. Rohatgi as Managing Director was the income of the assessee family for taxing purposes. The Tribunal, it would be remembered, did not hold the whole of the remuneration to be the family's income but only a part. In my view, there are no facts in the present case, from which it could be held that the amount in question was assessable in the hands of the assessee family as a part of its income. 19. The answer to the questions referred must, therefore, be Question (1) "No." Question (2) "On Mr. Rohatgi personally." The assessee will have the costs of this Reference. S.C. Lahiri, J. 20. I agree.
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1955 (9) TMI 75 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e years immediately preceding the previous year. The reasons for introducing this fiction was that certain profits in the past years bore less tax because the company did not pay any excess dividend and it conformed to the ceiling laid down by the Legislature, but when in subsequent years the company departed from the ceiling the Legislature asked the taxing authorities to assume that what was being paid as dividend was out of those profits which had been kept back or kept in reserve. But, as we have just pointed out, this fiction has no scope. It cannot have any play in a case where there are no past profits which were kept back or kept in reserve. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right when it came to the conclusion that the assessee company was not liable to pay any additional tax in the circumstances of this case. The answer to question No. 1 will be in the affirmative and the answer to question No. 2 will be in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs.
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1955 (9) TMI 74 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . In our opinion the two cases are not in pari materia. In the case of a Court sale the sale is effected by the Court and the Court issues a sale certificate when the sale becomes complete and the title vests in the auction purchaser. In the case of a sale by a receiver, although it may be a result of an order of the Court, it is not the order of the Court that vests the title in the purchaser. In order to vest the title in the purchaser the receiver has to execute a conveyance in favour of the purchaser and it would be that conveyance which would ultimately vest the title in the purchaser. Therefore the sale effected by the receivers was a sale as contemplated by the Transfer of Property Act. It was not a compulsory transfer of title as a result of any provision of the law. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was in error when it took the view that this case fell within the third proviso to section 12B. We, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the negative.
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1955 (9) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in circumstances gets exemption from payment of tax which has been assessed and which has been charged. The only ground that the Tribunal has in its judgment given for accepting the contention of the department is that the assessee was not assessable to tax by reason of section 25 (4). That, with respect, is a clearly erroneous view of the matter. The assessee was not bound to make an application under section 25 (4). He might not have made an application in which case the position would have remained the same except that the department would have proceeded to the next stage, that of levying the tax, but because he did apply under section 25 (4) and the application was granted the department stopped at the second stage of charging and did not proceed to levy the tax or compel the assessee to pay the tax. In our opinion the case of the assessee falls within the ambit of the notification. The result is that the answer to the question submitted to us must be in the affirmative.
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1955 (9) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it as his dividend income. Whether rights the assessee may be entitled to by reason of the fact that subsequently he became liable to refund the dividend, those rights are outside the ambit of the particular assessment with which we are concerned. He may have relief under the Income-tax Act or he may not, but we are not concerned with the position that arose on the 4th December, 1947, which would correspond with the assessment year 1948-49. We are only concerned with the assessment year 1946-46, and as far as that assessment is concerned the assessee had no answer to the contention of the Department that the sum of ₹ 30,000 represented his dividend income. Our answers to the questions submitted to us will therefore be Question (1) is unnecessary. Question (2) in the affirmative as to the first part. The latter part of question (2) does not arise. The assessee to pay the costs. Notice of motion dismissed. No orders as to costs of the notice of motion. Appeal dismissed.
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1955 (9) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s brought about by the political change. In our opinion, therefore, the services of the plaintiff came to an automatic termi- nation on the emergence of Indian Dominion. The special order and arrangement affecting his case that ,%,as made in pursuance of the Viceroy's announcement resulted in his service not being continued from and after the 15th August, 1947, and the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration prayed for. The learned Judges of the High Court in coming to the conclusion they did, have, with respect, missed the significance of the phrase "special orders or arrangements affecting his case" used in article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, and failed to appreciate that this was to be construed in the light of all the relevant events that proceeded, commencing from and following upon the announcement of the Viceroy dated the 30th April, 1947. The result is that the appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances without costs.
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1955 (9) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is that this must have proceeded from the joint family funds, and that this is implicit in the finding of the Tribunal. It is also mentioned in the judgment of the Tribunal that Krishnaswami was anxious to support his son, the present appellant, and that many of the witnesses whom the respondent was obliged to examine, were really anxious to help the appellant. (Vide para 12). We do not, however, desire to express any opinion on these contentions, as we propose to leave them to the decision of the Tribunal. 11. We accordingly set aside the order of the Tribunal, and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of the joint family or for his own personal benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record. It is made clear that no further evidence will be allowed. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
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1955 (9) TMI 69 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the benefit of the permit granted to him by R.T.A. for over four years and that he should not now be deprived of that benefit. The benefit accrued to Kesavarao by reason of successive orders obtained by him for stay of the operation of the order of the C.R.T.B. If we were quashing the order of the Government we would hold that the benefit obtained by Kesavarao as a result of the orders staying the operation of the order of the C.R.T.B., was not a benefit justly or properly obtained by him, and that that circumstance would be no reason for confirming him in the enjoyment of that benefit. 8. It follows that the appeal should be allowed, the order of Balakrishna Ayyar J. should be set aside, and the Writ Petition No. 273 of 52 dismissed. In view of the doubts honestly entertained by the parties with reference to the policy of the Government in granting stage carriage permits, we direct that their should be no orders as to costs either before Balakrishna Ayyar J., or before us.
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1955 (9) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... closed on the face of the judgment; see for example the observations in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab( 1954 S.C.R. 145, 156) and Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( 1955 1 S.C.R. 238, 241). In a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is only called for when it is manifestly inadequate. In our opinion, these principles have not been observed. It is impossible to hold in’the circumstances described that the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial, sentence, and no adequate reason has been assigned by the learned High Court Judges for considering the sentence, manifestly inadequate. In the circumstances, bearing all the considerations of this case in mind, we are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the question of sentence) should be allowed and that the sentence imposed by the High Court should be set aside and that of the Sessions Court restored. Ordered accordingly.
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1955 (9) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessment year 1944-45 and the assessment year 1945-46, and the petition, as we have already pointed out in our judgment, with regard to the assessment year 1945-46 is the same as the year 1944-45. Therefore, we amend the question No. (1) by adding "Whether the Tribunal erred in law regarding the sums of ₹ 2,18,669 paid to C.H. Ghanekar and ₹ 1,09,375 paid to Keshardeo Hanumanbux." We will answer the question that the Tribunal erred in law regarding the sum of ₹ 6,77,875 paid to C.H. Ghanekar, and the sum of ₹ 34,875 paid to L.V. Iyer, as also the sum of ₹ 2,18,669 paid to C.H. Ghanekar and the sum of ₹ 1,09,375 paid to Keshardeo Hanumanbux; and the answer to question No. (2) will be that there was evidence before the Tribunal with regard to the sums of ₹ 54,100 paid to Narayandas Joharmal, ₹ 4,600 paid to Miss Grant and ₹ 4,707 paid to Dharsey Chapsey. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (9) TMI 66 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was understood then, he was resident of an Indian State, the provision with regard to section 22 has no application to a non-resident. The contention is obviously untenable. It is now well settled law that the Indian Legislature has the competence to tax nonresidents and the legislation cannot be challenged on the ground of extraterritoriality. If the Legislature has the power to tax a non-resident, surely it has the power which is not of such a wide nature of making a provision for the issue of a notice which would bind a non-resident. In our opinion, therefore, the case falls under section 34(1)(a), the period of limitation is eight years, and if this is the period of limitation there is no dispute that the notices were issued in time and the assessments were completed in time and the assessments were valid and binding. Our answer to the questions submitted to us will be (1) In the negative. (2) Does not arise. The assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (9) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 00. This is nothing more than a mere book entry, to use the language of the Privy Council. The value put upon the shares of the new company in no way increases or decreases the real value of what Sir Homi Mehta got, and what he got was the very shares which he purported to transfer to the limited company but held through a limited company and not through himself as an individual. Ultimately the result must depend upon the view that we take as to whether Sir Homi Mehta made any profit or gain in a commercial sense by transferring these shares to the newly formed limited company. In our opinion he did not make any profit or gain and therefore the mere fact that the shares which he transferred had a market value at the date of the transfer higher than the cost price of the shares did not make Sir Homi Mehta liable to pay tax on the difference. We therefore answer the question submitted to us in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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