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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 41 Records
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1956 (9) TMI 77 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t authorities to reject the claim of the respondent, viz., that he had no direct interest in the concerned route. Even assuming that this charge is justified, we fail to see how it can advance the appellant's case. If the Government's order is right, that the application of the appellant should be rejected, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the respondent should have been granted the permit or some other applicant should have been. It was also said by appellant's learned counsel that there was interference by the Government with the findings of fact arrived at by the subordinate tribunals. The only material fact was the fact of transfer of permits by the appellant and that was not a fact in dispute. On that fact it was open to the Government to hold that the claim of the appellant should be rejected. 20. Rajagopala Aiyangar J., was right in dismissing the appellant's petition. This appeal fails and is dismissed but we make no order as to costs.
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1956 (9) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ise in favour of the Department. But if we accept the principle of Jankidas's case, fortified as it is in this case by the fact that the assessee was remitting this amount in the course of a banking business, then no questions of examining those items arises. But, if we want to go into the merits of these four items, then the matter would have to be remanded, so that a supplementary statements of the case arise because of what we have just stated. 5. We will re-formulate the question submitted to us in paragraph 12 "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, all or any one or more of the four items of ₹ 10,000, ₹ 50,000, ₹ 50,000 and ₹ 75,000 constituted remittances of profits to British India for the purpose of section 4 (1) (iii) of the Act ?", and nswer that in the negative. The other question raised by the assessee do not survive. 6. The commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. 7. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (9) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cial Government C. P. & Berar v. R. Robinson (1953)IILLJ29Mad . 7. I am unable however to agree that Alagirisami, the boy found holding a tin containing paint would come within the definition of a "worker" and make up the requisite number 20. This boy was found holding a tin of paint does not mean that he was there for the purpose of ornamentation of the packing for transport which would come within the definition of "manufacturing process" because he was found standing outside apparently to paint the sign-board which would certainly not be a case of doing a kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process. 8. In the result, the Sangu Soap Works will not fall within the definition of a "factory" and the convictions rested on that foot cannot be sustained. The convictions and sentences are set aside and the revisions are allowed. The fine amounts, if collected, will be refunded.
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1956 (9) TMI 74 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er did not hear the petitioners, no prejudice was caused to them. Assuming we took the view that the Income-tax Officer was in error in not hearing the petitioners, the most that we can do on this petition is to direct the Income-tax Officer to hear the petitioners and all that the petitioners could urge before him would be the question of law as to whether their objection was barred by limitation or not. Now, that very question has been urged and urged at some length by Mr. Palkhivala before us. So that we have had an opportunity of hearing the petitioners and being satisfied that the Income-tax Officer was right in coming to the conclusion that the objection raised by then was barred by limitation. As no useful purpose would be served even if we were to take the view for which Mr. Palkhivala contends, in our opinion, it is unnecessary to decide this question on this petition. 12. The result is that the petition fails and must be dismissed with costs. 13. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (9) TMI 73 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... even if the period to be excluded under section 67A of the Act was only that between 3rd January, 1951, and 6th February, 1951, the appeal presented to the Tribunal on 23rd February, 1951, would be within the period of limitation allowed by law. What we have recorded above is sufficient to answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. Even were it only a case of examining the correctness or propriety of the order of the Appellate Tribunal refusing to exercise its discretion in favour of the assessee, we would have been inclined to hold that the circumstances of the case called for the exercise of the discretion to condone the delay, assuming there was delay-in fact there was no delay-in favour of the assessee. But we are not resting our answer to the question on this feature of the case. As we have recorded above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of the reference.
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1956 (9) TMI 72 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with which the transaction was effected. (3) The relationship between the parties to the transaction is not by itself conclusive to prove that the motive of the actors in that transaction was the avoidance of liability. (4) It is not sufficient if this was an incidental advantage which might have accrued to an assessee ; it must be the main motive to compass which the transaction was brought about. None of those principles was violated by the conclusion reached by the Tribunal on the material before it, that the main purpose of the assessee in forming the partnership in the year of account 1943-44 was the avoidance or reduction of the liability to excess profits tax even with reference to that very year. There was, of course, also the future years to be taken into account in gathering what was the motive, the main purpose, of the assessee in bringing about the transactions in question, the two partnerships. We answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1956 (9) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the computation of the capital used and the abatement to which the assessee is entitled. As we started by saying, we must frankly confess that whichever view we take of the third proviso leads to difficulties and the construction is not free from doubt. But taking everything into consideration (1) the scheme of taxing the profits of a business in an Indian State under the Income-tax Act, (2) the change of the language effected by the Legislature in enacting the Business Profits Tax Act, and (3) the canon of construction we have always followed that in case of an ambiguity, we must give the benefit of the doubt to the assessee, we have come to the conclusion that the assessee is entitled under the third proviso to section 5 to deduct the losses incurred by him in the Indian State and set them off against the profits made in the taxable territories. We must, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference.
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1956 (9) TMI 70 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the Taxing Department taxing the gains of a speculative business and not giving any reduction for speculative losses. Apart from the fact that the taxing statute is full of anomalies, we do not think that in this particular case the anomaly is very serious. If, as we have already pointed out, the object of the Legislature was to prevent this buying of speculative losses in order artificially to reduce profits, then whatever anomaly it might have created, the only way the mischief could have been defeated was by enacting the proviso in the manner in which the Legislature has done. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was right when it held that the assessee was not entitled to deduct the sum of ₹ 19,723 being the losses from speculation, from its business profits. The answers therefore to the questions submitted to us will be Question (1) was not pressed for the purpose of this reference. Question (2) in the negative. The assessee to pay the costs of the reference.
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1956 (9) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... own value. If the expression "made" is understood as "factually made" it would mean that in such a case the amount would not be brought to charge as a capital gain unless the assessee had the benefit of the diminution in the written down value by the same being allowed as a revenue expenditure in the computation of his income under section 10(2). In our opinion this consideration is almost decisive in favour of the construction urged by learned counsel for the Department. As admittedly no adjustment has been made under section 10(2)(vii) in the assessee's assessment to income-tax, the assessee is not entitled to have this adjustment made in the computation of his capital gain under section 12B. The decision of the Tribunal was therefore correct and the second question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed he must pay the costs of the reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (9) TMI 68 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... im (case) for damages, so far as it is founded on the unlawful attachment and receipt of the money thereunder, must also fail. 25. Before the learned Subordinate Judge the appellants' claim was also sought to be supported by invoking equity in their favour. No such ground, however, has been pressed before us presumably for the obvious reason that the appellants' conduct throughout would militate against such a plea. No plea of equity is, therefore, open to the appellants. 26. Before concluding we would also like to add that this plea of tort should not have been allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge to be raised in support of the appellants' claim as, in the pleadings before the Court, there was hardly anything to indicate it in any sufficient manner and as this plea obviously required consideration of matters which could not strictly be said to be all matters of law. 27. In the above view, we dismiss this appeal with costs. Renupada Mukherjee, J. 28. I agree.
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1956 (9) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
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... ... ..... ncerned, we are of opinion that the plaintiff is certainly entitled to an order from us that the defendants be prohibited from interfering in his possession over the property in dispute till they can establish their right in law to do so. (14.) We , therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below, and decree the plaintiff's suit to this extent that it will be declared that the plaintiff is at least a Shikmi of the land in dispute, and owner of the house and well standing on it, and the defendants are prohibited from interfering in His possession of the property in dispute unless they can establish their right to do so by some thing which hikes place after the date of our decree. AS the plaintiff has been dispossessed during the pendency of this litigation, he will be put back in pos session so that the status quo before the suit be restored. The plaintiff will get his costs from Mehta Jagannath Singh. The State will bear its own costs.
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1956 (9) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d on the 28th August 1948, an ad-interim stay order was made by that Court. On the 4th April 1949, the High Court passed the final order that the application cannot be granted unless the U. P. Government agreed to pay the claimant interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum up to the date of payment; on this the learned Government Advocate undertook to obtain instructions and inform the Court within a week what attitude the Government took. On the 12th May 1949, the application for stay was dismissed as not pressed. The result of these proceedings amounted to the deprivation to the claimant of the additional sum awarded to him by the District Judge and which we have restored to him now. In these circumstances, the appellant is entitled to interest on the additional amount awarded to him at the rate of 6 per cent., as provided in the Land Acquisition Act. from the 8th July 1948, till the 12th May 1949. 10. To the extent mentioned above, Appeal No. 187 is allowed with costs.
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1956 (9) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... spondent suggested that the requirements of natural justice could not be waived by any of the parties and that it was incumbent upon the Appellate Authority to observe the so-called rules of natural justice. o p /o p In our opinion, there is no warrant for such a proposition. Even in a court of law a party is not entitled to raise the question at the appellate stage that he should have been granted an adjournment which he did not pray for in the court of first instance. Far less, such a claim can be entertained in an appeal from a tribunal which is not a court of justice, but a statutory body functioning in a quasi judicial way. o p /o p For the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, the judgment under appeal is erroneous and must be set aside and we are further of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge of that Court had taken the more correct view of the legal position. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout. o p /o p Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1956 (9) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to make the order. These grounds therefore must be in existence when the order is made". But the grounds referred to in the above passages are the reasons for making the order, not the formal expressions in which they are. embodied, and that will be clear from the following observation further on "By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of all the facts". Our conclusion is that the failure on the part of the District Magistrate of Thana to send along with his report under section 3(3), the very grounds which he subsequently communicated to the detenu under section 7 is not a breach of the requirements of that sub-section, and that it was sufficiently complied with when he reported the materials on which he made the order. The second contention of the petitioners also fails, and these applications must therefore be dismissed.
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1956 (9) TMI 63 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erested persons. It is merely a direction for the orderly administration of public affairs and compliance or non-compliance with it does hot affect the rights of tax-payers. This objection too must, in my opinion, be decided against the petitioner. 27. In view of the decision of this Court in Bhagwan Dass Sud & Sons v. Commissioner of income-tax, Civil Writ No. 6 of 1955. D/- 24-1-1856 (Am 1956 Punj 148) (M), Mr. Pathak abandoned the objection taken in para 10 of the petition, namely that the constitution of the Special Circle at Ambala was discriminatory in character and was repugnant to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 28. For1 these reasons I am of the opinion that although the learned counsel for the parties argued this case with conspicuous ability the petitioner was unable to substantiate any of the pleas put forward by him. The petition must, in my opinion, be dismissed with costs. I would order accordingly. Bishan Narain, J. 29. I agree.
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1956 (9) TMI 62 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... books to a stranger, the burden is on the Department to show that it does not belong to him Radhakrishna Behari Lal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa 1954 26 I.T.R. 344 at 350. This burden is not discharged by mere proof of the circumstance that it was paid to the stranger late. 21. We are of opinion that with regard to both the transactions the Tribunal has based itself on conjectures. Conjectures are not inferences and cannot take the place of evidence. In this connection we may refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mehta Parikh & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1956 30 I.T.R. 181. 22. We are therefore of opinion that the first question referred to us must be answered in the negative. In view of the negative answer given to the first question, the answer to the second question must also be in the negative. 23. Costs of the application shall be borne by the non-applicant. Counsel's fees ₹ 150. Questions answered in the negative.
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1956 (9) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aken into consideration. Now, the assessee is protected there by the proviso to section 12B(2) and that proviso gives him the option, that where the capital asset became the property of the assessee before the 1st day of January, 1939, he may substitute for the actual cost such fair market value which shall be deemed to be the actual cost to him of the asset on that date. Here, the assessee has exercised the option and he wants the purchase price to be taken as the fair market value prevailing on the 1st January, 1938. In doing so, the assessee is within his rights and the Department cannot insist that the assessee should be compelled to treat as the purchase price the actual cost of the shares in January, 1938. Therefore, the answer to the question submitted to us will be that the sale price per each share should be taken at ₹ 46. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. No order on the notice of motion. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (9) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he year of account. The result, therefore, is that the question submitted to us must be answered in the negative. Before we part with this reference, we must draw the attention of the Taxing Authorities to the obvious injustice which the assessee company has suffered by reason of what we must consider to be a lacuna in the law. If the intention of the Legislature was to give an impetus to an assessee who sets up new buildings and instals new machinery, then there is no reason why this particular assessee should not get the benefit of initial depreciation. There is no reason on principle why this assessee should have got the benefit of initial depreciation if it had completed its building a few months before the year of account and had commenced production. We, therefore, request the Authorities to sympathetically consider the case of the assessee and to give such relief as they think proper. The assessee to pay the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1956 (9) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... en found guilty of the offence of conspiracy under charge No. 1 by the Sessions Judge and the High Court. There was ample evidence on the record to justify this conviction and we have been unable to find any reasonable ground for suspecting that the conviction was unjustified. So far as the charge for the specific offence of cheating under charge No. 11 is concerned, although he was acquitted by the Sessions Judge, we think, that the High Court was justified in setting aside the acquittal and convicting him of the offence under this charge. It is unnecessary to consider in detail the material upon which the High Court found this appellant guilty of the offence under this charge, as it will make no difference in the ultimate result so far as the case of the appellant is concerned, if he was rightly convicted by both the Courts below for the offence of conspiracy under charge No. 1. 9. It appears to us that there is no merit in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed.
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1956 (9) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s merits he indulged in speculation and drew unjustified distinctions in order to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. In our opinion, in reviewing the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded, the learned Judges of the High Court did not disregard the principles which should guide a Court of appeal in dealing with an appeal under the provisions of Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code. 22. The appellant is a young student. We greatly deplore the fact that a person like the appellant should have thought fit to commit such a heinous and brutal crime. He is lucky to have escaped the extreme penalty, and it is to be hoped that by his future conduct the appellant will prove that he deserves the good fortune of having escaped the extreme penalty of the law. 23. For the reasons given above, we hold that no grounds have been made out for interference with the judgment and order of the Punjab High Court dated the 27th of April 1955. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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