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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 49 Records
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1957 (4) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gust 15, 1947, so as to vest the power of control in the Joint Defence Council and thereby affect the purpose of the contract, assuming, though we do not so decide, that such power of control can affect the purpose of the contract. The original contract was not produced in this case, as it was not available in the appropriate office in India. The respondent did not even produce a copy thereof, but gave oral evidence as to the purpose of the contract. The Courts below proceeded on that oral evidence, and the appeal was argued before us on that footing. We have determined the purpose of the contract as on August 15, 1947, on the basis of that evidence, without deciding the further question if oral evidence was admissible in this case as to the purpose of the contract. For the reasons given above, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court, and restore those of the learned Subordinate Judge. The appellant will get costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (4) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trict procedure of law required for substitution of parties under Order XXII, Civil Procedure Code." In our opinion the assessment under section 34 for the assessment year 1944-45 was vitiated by the failure of the Income-tax Officer to issue notices to the other legal representatives of Ebenezer, whom the petitioner Alfred did not and could not represent. We, however, agree with the learned counsel for the Department, that no relief need be granted to the petitioner in these proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution, as he has availed himself of an alternative remedy; he has appealed against the assessment and that appeal has yet to be disposed of. If the assessment is set aside by the appellate authority, other proceedings may be open to the Department the scope of which we are not called upon to determine now. It is only on that basis that we direct that the rule be discharged and the petition be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged.
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1957 (4) TMI 64 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... espectful agreement. We hold that Income-tax Officer had power to initiate proceedings for re-assessment for the years in question, It has next been argued that the notices issued by the Income- tax Officer are invalid because they purport to be under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act which was not in force in the accounting periods stated. It appears that the Indian Income-tax Act was extended bodily to the Nandgaon State in 1942. The correct citation would, therefore, be “section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act as applied to Nandgaon State ". The omission of the words underlined is a slip and should not affect the merits of the case. When an authority has power to perform an act and the power under which the act is being performed has been wrongly stated, it is the duty of the court to refer to the appropriate power. We do not think there is any substance in this contention of the appellant. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 63 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... speak of there being no evidence to support a conclusion when in cases such as these many of the facts are likely to be neutral in themselves, and only to take their colour from the combination of circumstances in which they are found to occur.'" In the present case also the cumulative effect of all the facts should be taken in their proper setting. That is the only correct approach to the issue and I am, therefore, of opinion that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the memorandum of oral agreement dated the 1st March, 1947, is not a genuine document is a reasonable finding of fact and is supported by proper material. For the reasons expressed by me, I hold that both the questions of law referred by the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fees ₹ 250. RAJKISHORE PRASAD, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (4) TMI 62 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncome-tax Officer, therefore, to maintain the same percentage in respect of the year of assessment when the assessment at a flat rate of profit at a certain percentage in the preceding year or years has been adopted, and the objection of the assessee to such an assessment taken by him has been rejected in the preceding years. The Income-tax Officer, therefore, is well warranted in maintaining the same percentage in the year of assessment, and, in taking into consideration the past records of an assessee, provided there is some evidence or material before the Income-tax authorities for making the best judgment assessment, and it is not absolutely arbitrary, although in that sense too assessment must be to some extent arbitrary. For these reasons, I would reject the contention of Mr. Dutt and affirm the order of the Tribunal. I would, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Department. Ramaswami, C.J.-I agree.
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1957 (4) TMI 61 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e cancelled they were heard according to the provisions of Section 26 of the Act. Any hearing otherwise than in accordance with the statutory provisions is non-compliance with such provisions. So that in this case the appellants were not heard, as required by the statute, before their allotments were cancelled. This would also have required interference with the impugned order whether it be taken as the order of the Minister or that of the Additional Custodian. 27. This appeal is, therefore, for the reasons stated, accepted and the order cancelling allotments of the appellants whether considered that of the Minister as made on June 23. 1950, or of the Additional Custodian as Minister's order signed by him on June 28, 1950, is quashed. In the circumstances of this case there is no order as to costs in this appeal. Bhandari, C.J. 28. I find myself in complete agreement with what my learned brother has said and have nothing to add to the admirable judgment delivered by him.
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1957 (4) TMI 60 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the above statement of law enunciated by his Lordship. Here, it is not a case of no evidence or material, but here it is a case of one piece of admitted evidence, and suppression of evidence or material to the contrary by the assessee. In these circumstances, the only course left open in law to the Income-tax Officer was to make the best judgment assessment under section 23(4) of the Act on the basis of this one admitted isolated transaction. In my judgment, therefore, the assessment under section 34 of the Act made by the Income-tax Officer as subsequently modified and upheld by the Tribunal, cannot be assailed on any grounds urged on this reference. I would, accordingly, answer the question in each of the three references in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the Department. The assessee will pay a consolidated cost of ₹ 300 to the Income-tax Department for all the three references. RAMASWAMI, C.J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (4) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is no doubt a matter of regret that a foul cold-blooded and cruel murder like the present should go unpunished. It may be as Mr. Gopal Singh strenuously urged before us that there is an element of truth in the prosecution story against both the appellants. Mr. Gopal Singh contended that considered as a whole, the prosecution story may be true; but between 'may be true' and 'must be true' there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence. We have carefully considered all the arguments which Mr. Gopal Singh urged before us; but we do not think it would be possible to regard the approver as a reliable witness or to hold that the confession of Sarwan Singh is voluntary or true. In the result, the appeal preferred by Sarwan Singh must be allowed, the order of conviction and sentence passed against him must be set aside and he must be acquitted and discharged. Appeals allowed.
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1957 (4) TMI 58 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... act, namely, the trust deed, and that was the source of his rights and liabilities. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that because the source of the money was agricultural income, the remuneration paid out of the total estimated income available out of the trust properties should be considered to be "agricultural income". In my judgment, therefore, the remuneration of the assessee was not "agricultural income," and, therefore, it was not exempt from tax under section 4(3) (viii)of the Act. I would, therefore, answer the fifth question also in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Department. All the questions submitted by the Tribunal to this Court for determination under section 66(2) are accordingly answered in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Department. The Department is entitled to its cost from the assessee, which is assessed at ₹ 250. RAMASWAMI, C.J.--I agree. Questions answered in the negative.
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1957 (4) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... volving skill, there can be no doubt, having regard to the history of the legislation, as to what our answer would be. Nor does the restriction of the impugned provisions to competitions of a gambling character affect either the texture or the colour of the Act; nor do the provisions require to be touched and re-written before they could be applied to them. They will squarely apply to them on their own terms and in their true spirit, and form a code complete in themselves with reference to the subject. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the impugned provisions, assuming that they apply by virtue -of the definition in s. 2(d) to all kinds of competitions, are severable in their application to competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial extent on skill. In the result, both the contentions must be found against the petitioners, and these petitions must be dismissed with costs. There will be only one set of counsel’s fee. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an illegitimate competition can be regarded A a trade at all and in one view of the matter the tax may have to be justified as a tax on betting and gambling under Entry 62?
Whether our Constitution makers ever intended that gambling should be a fundamental right within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(g) or within the protected freedom declared by Art. 301?
Held that:- The competing words out of which one is to be selected are in some cases equally apt. We are not satisfied that the word selected by the Board is the more apt word in many cases. The reasons given by them appear to us to be laboured and artificial and even arbitrary in some cases. On the whole, we have come to the conclusion that the Court of Appeal was right in its conclusion that in point of fact the prize competitions run by the petitioners partake of a gambling nature and, therefore, fall within the definition and are to be governed by the regulatory and taxing provisions of the Act
The impugned law is a law with respect to betting and gambling under Entry 34 and the impugned taxing section is a law with respect to tax on betting and gambling under Entry 62 and that- it was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature to have enacted it. There is sufficient territorial nexus to entitle the State Legislature to collect the tax from the petitioners who carry on the prize competitions through the medium of a newspaper printed and published outside the State of Bombay. The prize competitions being of a gambling nature, they cannot be regarded as trade or commerce and as such the petitioners cannot claim any fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g) in respect of such competitions, nor are they entitled to the protection of Art. 301. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed and the order of the lower court set aside and the petition dismissed
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1957 (4) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
Whether 'Lyra' brand crayons should be assessed under item 45(a) as stationery not otherwise specified or item 45(4), as coloured pencils?
Held that:- With regard to the first two grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners it is abundantly clear that the petitioners have had a full hearing before two successive Collectors of Customs, Calcutta and their grievance as to the violation of the principles of natural justice is totally devoid of merit.
The contention that the impugned orders are manifestly erroneous, because 'crayons' have been treated as 'coloured pencils' is not a contention which can be gone into on an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It has no. bearing on the question of the enforcement of a fundamental right, nor can the question be decided without first determining what constitutes the distinction between a 'coloured pencil' and as 'crayon' a distinction which must require an investigation into disputed facts and materials.
This was a matter for the Constitution authorities to decide, and it is obvious that this Court cannot, on an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution, embark on such an investigation. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 53 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 3(6) could have been validly initiated against the assessee under the old law as it stood before the amendment. In other words, the right of the authorities to take proceedings for assessment under the old law had not become barred when Bihar Act VI of 1949 was passed and came into effect. In our opinion, therefore, the proceeding initiated against the assessee on the 29th June, 1950, in the present case was governed by the provisions of section 13(6) of Bihar Act XIX of 1947 as amended by Bihar Act VI of 1949. It follows that the proceeding initiated under section 13(5) on the 29th June, 1950, against the assessee is legally valid and is not barred by limitation. For these reasons we hold that the two questions of law upon which the Board of Revenue has stated a case must be answered in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. There will be a consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (4) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learned counsel then argued that the property was purchased in 1945 and there was no goods reason for holding that it was not her personal property and that she was a benamidar for her husband. The question whether the petitioner is the owner of the attached property or she is merely a benamidar for her husband and the property belongs to her husband, is a disputed questions of fact. The Additional Collector has held that she is merely a benamidar for her husband. A question like this can more satisfactorily be determined in appropriate proceedings in a regular civil suit. The petitioner has a right to file a suit for appropriate reliefs and that remedy is equally efficacious and more appropriate than the remedy that the petitioner has sought here. It is obvious that a question of title like this cannot be satisfactorily decided on the strength of affidavits filed by interested parties. This petition has no force and we accordingly dismiss it with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e been omitted from the regularly kept account. We are unable to see any basis to sustain such an argument. Section 6-A is quite clear that all sales with effect from the commencement of the year in which such contravention takes place will lose the benefit of the exemption under sections 5 and 6 of the Act and not merely sales in respect of which there has been a contravention of the rules or the conditions of the licence. With great respect we are in entire agreement with the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Madras v. Karuppan Chettiar 1957 8 S.T.C. 38 1956 2 M.L.J. 601. The revision is accepted and the order of the Appellate Tribunal in so far as it allowed the appeal of the assessee on the ground above-mentioned is set aside. The result would be that the appellant would not be entitled to exemption on Rs. 2,24,520-4-9. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer shall make a re-assessment in the light of our decision. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1957 (4) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... procedure either. There had certainly been a suppression by the assessees in the regular books maintained by them, of some of the transactions entered into, as would be clear from the entries in the seized books. The regular account books produced could not therefore be relied upon as representing all their turnover. There had to be an estimate of the suppressed dealings. We do not see any error in law or any failure of justice in the process adopted by the taxing authorities in treating the assessees to have pursued a uniform course of conduct of suppressing the same proportion of the turn- over. In any event the assessees cannot have any complaint because they had not produced to the tax authorities the books which would have contained the suppressed transactions. We see therefore no sub- stance in the last of the arguments urged and we reject it. The result is that these petitions also fail and are dismissed with costs in one. (Counsel s fee Rs. 100). Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 49 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... get certain notices, that cannot be the subject of a high prerogative writ. Mr. Majumdar has argued that the whole endeavour of the petitioner was to take the matter beyond the four years limitation and the petitioner nearly succeeded, since the matter would have been barred, sometime in early November, 1954. I do not think that this argument is entirely without any foundation. In any event, it is quite clear that even if there be any substance in the points put forward by the petitioner, he and/or his representatives have been far from being diligent and if there has been an ex parte order, it is entirely due to the fault of the petitioner and not the fault of the authorities, who have tried their best to hear the matter in the presence of the petitioner. These are the several points argued in this case which have all failed and the application must therefore be dismissed. The rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated. I make no order as to costs. Rule discharged.
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1957 (4) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was doing his business in rice, paddy and ground- nuts at Polur he was also carrying on business in another place, viz., at Kommandal, four miles away from Polur, by reason of his partnership in the Gajendra Rice Mills. In order that his account books etc. may not be suddenly seized and expose the double set of accounts which he was maintaining, this registered dealer has installed his own personal clerk to attend to this individual business in the Gajendra Rice Mills premises. The surprise visit of the officer exposed the secret place of business of this registered dealer. The language of section 14(3) is wide enough to take in both the real and the namke vasthe places in which the business is done. The Legislature has guardedly used the word any preceding office, shop etc., before the words any other place in which business is done. Point 5 fails. The convictions and sentences are irreproachable and they are confirmed and these revisions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 47 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... indicate only sales and supplies for price and in the course of business. The transactions between a non-proprietary club and its members stand outside the Act. 21.. As mentioned above, no sales tax has yet been levied on the petitioner club and so, in our opinion, no legal right of the petitioner has yet been infringed. It will be advisable for the club to produce its books of account before the Commissioner so that the authorities concerned may decide whether the petitioner should be registered as a dealer or not. The petition on this point is dismissed. Without inspecting the accounts and the account books, in our opinion, the authorities cannot determine the question whether the club should be registered as a dealer or not. The notice to the club asking it to get itself registered as a dealer within the meaning of the said Act cannot, therefore, be justified. We, therefore, quash it. In the circumstances of the case, we pass no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1957 (4) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the calculation of net turnover appellant is entitled to include the total value of the oil sold by him, viz., ₹ 6,76,719-0-11, irrespective of the fact whether these sales were effected inside the State or outside the State and deduct therefrom the total value of copra purchased by him from which the whole quantity of oil sold by him was manufactured, viz., ₹ 7,16,048-1-4?
Held that:- The non-obstante provision contained in section 26 of the Act has the effect of taking these transactions out of the purview of the Act with the result that the dealer is not required nor is he entitled to include them in the calculations of his turnover liable to tax thereunder.
Such inclusion, however, for the purposes aforesaid would not affect the non-liability of these transactions to levy or imposition of sales tax by virtue of the provisions of Article 286 of the Constitution and the corresponding provision enacted in the Act, as above.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the conclusion reached by the High Court was correct; the calculations of the net turnover made by the Sales Tax Authorities were also correct; and this appeal must stand dismissed
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