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Showing 1 to 20 of 44 Records
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1960 (1) TMI 56 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r was capable of earning taxable profits and that it was in the course of this money-lending business that he had made certain advances to the two unregistered firm. This was not the way in which the claim for deduction was sought to be put forward and proved before the Income- tax Officer. In this case it is obvious that for claiming deduction on account of the interest amount paid by him, the assessee should have got the firms themselves to pay the interest amount directly and claimed deduction in respect of that amount at the time of the assessment of the firms themselves. For these reasons our answer to the question stated by the Tribunal for decision is that the assessee in the present case is not entitled to any deduction for interest paid by him on money borrowed from outsiders for making advances to the two unregistered firms. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income- tax. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (1) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed in holding that the whole of the income was to go to deity, thus varying the judgment of the trial court that only a portion of it was to be so employed. The High Court applied Cy-pres doctrine relying on N. Sankaranarayana Pillayan & Ors. v. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras It was there held that where the grant is to the deity and the income is ear-marked for the services for which the specific endowment is created, if there is a surplus which cannot be spent on these services, it would be a case for the application of the Cy-pres doctrine. Taking into consideration that originally the inam income was only ₹ 11 the whole of which was to be and was expended on the service of deity i.e. Kalyanotsavam and considering the nature of the grant the High Court has rightly applied Cy-pres doctrine. 9. We are therefore of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court was right and we dismiss this appeal with costs. 10. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he conciliation proceedings held on that date on the ground that there was no dispute which required settlement. On the said facts it was contended before the Appellate Tribunal that at any rate the workmen were not entitled to any compensation for the period of lock-out after September 17, 1952. The Appellate Tribunal rejected the contention on the ground that the argument was based upon an assumption that in case the workmen's representative had taken part in the conciliation proceedings, the matter would have been settled and the lock-out would have been lifted, and that the said assumption was only a surmise. The same argument has been repeated before us by the learned Attorney-General. This point was not pressed before the Tribunal. That apart, we agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal. Further, the question raised is not such as can be permitted to be raised under Article 136 of the Constitution. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (1) TMI 53 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er section 43 and an enquiry should have been held into the status of the mills as agents of the non-resident corporation; and that it was only if after such enquiry it had been found that the mills were the agents of the non-resident corporation that any liability for deduction could be imposed on them under sub- section (3B). This contention cannot be acceded to having regard to the purpose of section 43 and the plain meaning of the expression "unless he is himself liable to pay any income-tax and super-tax thereon as an agent". As it has not been contended before us that the liability of the mills for deduction under the substantive part of sub-section (3B) is dis- placed by reason of the applicability of the second proviso to that sub- section, our answer to the question referred to by the Tribunal for decision must be in the affirmative. The mills shall pay the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 200. Reference answered affirmatively.
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1960 (1) TMI 52 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... m the respective entries." If the explanation offered by the assessee in the assessment proceeding was deliberately false it is possible to argue that there was some material before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal which justified the imposition of penalty upon the assessee under Section 28 (1) (c) of the Act. In the present case, in our opinion there was no material before the Income Tax authorities for holding that the assessee has been guilty of suppression of particulars of his' income within the meaning of Section 28 (1) (c) of the Income Tax Act. It follows, therefore, that in the facts and circumstances of the case the penalty has not been validly imposed upon the assessee under Section 28 (1) (c) of the Income Tax Act and the question referred to the High Court by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Income Tax Department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of the reference. Hearing fee, ₹ 250.
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1960 (1) TMI 51 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncome, for it is nobody's case that they were capital gains, nor other persons' cash. The Tribunal's conclusions, therefore, cannot be treated as perverse nor can the finding be treated as one whereof there is no evidence in support. The result is that the answers to the first question in I.T.R. No. 18 of 1957 and to the three questions in I.T.R. No. 19 of 1959 are in favour of the Department. There remains the second question in I.T.R. No. 18 of 1957. Having given our best attention to the arguments of the counsel for the assessee, we feel that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to correct the error, which view is conceded to be supported by the decision of the Bombay High Court as well. Therefore the second question in I.T.R. No. 18 of 1957 is also answered against the assessee. Having regard to the circumstances that the assessee has been prejudiced by the error of the Tribunal, we make no order as to costs in these references. Accordingly the reference is answered.
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1960 (1) TMI 50 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rt of the accused to use the possession of the property when taken for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction of a debt due to him, and only for that purpose, has no bearing on the question of dishonest intention under the Penal Code. To hold that such a purpose could render innocent what would be otherwise a wrongful gain within the meaning of Section 23 would amount to the recognition of a right on the part of every individual to recover an alleged debt by the seizure of property of his alleged debtor, and would tend to a state of things in which every man might, if strong enough, take the law into his own hands." I entirely agree with this observation. I find that there are numerous other decisions on the point which support the opinion which I have already expressed; but I consider it unnecessary to refer to them. 10. I am satisfied that there is no substance in the points urged by Mr. Ugra Singh, and this application, therefore, fails. It is, accordingly, dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aces, nature of activities and the assistance given by him other than those which had already been mentioned in the grounds of detention. Under Art. 22(6) of the Constitution it is clearly stated that nothing in cl. (5) of that Article shall require the authority making an order of detention to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against public interest to be disclosed. In the present case the authority concerned had declined to disclose in the public interest any facts or particulars as to dates, persons, places, nature of activities and the assistance given by the petitioner other than those which had already been mentioned in the grounds of detention. In such circumstances, it would have been entirely inappropriate for the respondent to supply copies of the further materials placed before the Advisory Board although the Advisory Board may have required further information in order to satisfy itself The petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion 5(e) of the Act, not because it was his personal liability that was diminished by that payment, but because after such a sale there will be no gross income from the land from which the allowance could be deducted. So long as the source of income to acquire which the loan had been expended stood, such an expenditure would be wholly and exclusively for purposes of that source of income, and the payment of interest thereafter would also be an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for that purpose, that is, the purposes of the land, within the scope of section 5(e) of the Act. 13. We are clearly of opinion that the deduction claimed by the assessee fell within the scope of section 5(e) of the Act and that the whole of ₹ 22,628-9-8 and not merely ₹ 1,570-10-7 should have been deducted from his assessable income. The order of assessment will be revised accordingly. 14. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsels fee ₹ 100. Order accordingly.
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1960 (1) TMI 47 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le, the sale is not liable to income-tax. Now coming to the two questions sent to this court, it is obvious that the sale of the raw materials is linked with that of the machinery, plant and premises, the two are indivisible, and therefore no amount can be allotted to the sale of raw materials and so charged to pay the income-tax. Therefore the sum of ₹ 1,13,529 has been wrongly charged to pay income-tax. So far as the answer to the second question is concerned, it must be given in view of the terms of the agreement. We have already shown that consideration is indivisible, and failure to pay any part may result in resale of entire properties. Accordingly the sale of machinery is not distinct from the sale of chemicals and any decision so separating the two is legally not warranted. Thus what has been allotted as the price of chemicals is not legally correct and the transaction is inclusive of raw materials and is a single one. That is our answer to the second question.
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1960 (1) TMI 46 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... icer under section 23(4) on September 30, 1953, is bad in law, (a)absolutely, because he made the assessment of the association and not of those who were members of the association at the time of the dissolution jointly and severally; and (b)particularly as against any member on whom notices under sections 34 and 22(4) were not served because of such failure to serve notices on him. The assessment is not binding on the petitioner, as no notice under section 22 was issued to him and as he was not assessed severally or jointly with others referred to above. (ii)The applicant is not liable for the amount of tax payable as determined in the order of assessment dated September 20, 1953, as that assessment was not made in conformity with section 44 of the Income-tax Act. In the result, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and find that question No. 2 does not arise in view of our finding on question No. 1. We award costs to Raja Reddy Mallaram to be paid by the other party.
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1960 (1) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oses that the said witness has not deposed that the Company used the reserves as working capital; nor does the said witness seek to prove either the balancesheet or any extract taken therefrom. In the circumstances, the respondent had no opportunity to cross-examine him in respect of the alleged user of the reserves. For the aforesaid reasons, we have no option but to hold that ₹ 51 lakhs representing the reserves were not used as working capital and, therefore, the said amount was rightly deducted by the Industrial Court from ₹ 60 lakhs fixed by it towards rehabilitation. As the balance of ₹ 9 lakhs spread over 15 years came to only ₹ 60,000 during the bonus year and as the statutory depreciation was ₹ 83,639, the Industrial Court rightly excluded the entire rehabilitation amount from its calculations in arriving at the surplus. No other points were raised before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or expedient it may be to dismiss a writ petition before issuing rule nisi oh the ground of a subsisting alternative remedy, it may not always be just to do so at the final stage, when the parties have incurred all the expenses and the Court has gone into the matter fully. In Official Receiver, Guntur v. Seshqyyai, dealing with the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, this' Court observed as follows The principle that revision should not be allowed when another remedy is available is a principle which may very conveniently be applied at the stage of admission. This revision petition wt.s admitted by Mr. Justice Varadachariar nearly two years ago and since it has been admitted we think that it would be wrong at this stage to say that it must be dismissed merely because the Official Receiver might have proceeded by way of suit. In the result, I confirm the rule nisi and make it absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1960 (1) TMI 43 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of List 1 to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is comprehensive enough to justify the imposition of the wealth-tax on the Hindu undivided family. Mr. Kondaiah, type learned counsel for the respondent, has sought to place reliance upon entry 97 in List 1. He contended that the Constitution in enumerating the various heads of legislative power in the Union List has sought to exhaust the entire field of legislation of the Union Parliament and if by any inadvertence any power is not specifically conferred and could not be reasonably implied, the residuary entry in 97 should be resorted to. In the view I have taken that the expression "individuals" in entry 86 is comprehensive enough to include a Hindu undivided family, there is no need to further pursue the contention of the learned counsel as to the scope and applicability of entry 97. For the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ove is in general terms, and puts a time limit on the delegation made by that order. It says nothing about delegations of a special kind already in existence, or that the general order was to be in suppression of all special orders. It does not, in terms, seek to affect them either expressly or even by implication. In my opinion, the special delegation made by the Order of December 20, 1949 (No. II), remained unaffected, and thus enables the Health Officer to file the complaint. 50. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to decide whether s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is merely enabling or mandatory, and whether in the absence of a proper delegation, the Health Officer or other officers of the Municipality or any private person could have initiated the prosecution in such a case. 51. I would, therefore, hold that the appeal has no force, and that it should be dismissed. ORDER 52. In view of the judgment of the majority the appeal is allowed. 53. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (1) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... D, were not outside the competence of the arbitrators. The High Court in appeal under the Letters Patent, did confirm the order, setting aside the award; but there was no binding decision between the parties that the claim described in Sch. B, that is, the claim for establishment and contingency charges, was within the competence of the arbitrators in reference under clause 20. It may be observed that according to the High Court of East Punjab in the Appeal No. 31 of 1953, under the Letters Patent, it was not necessary to express any opinion whether the claim in Sch. C was within the competence of the arbitrators, and the claims described in Sch. D does not appear to have been agitated in the second arbitration proceeding. 26. We, accordingly, agree with the view of the High Court that the Award of the arbitrators was liable to be set aside because of an error apparent on the face of the award. In this view, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 27. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 40 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no doubt true that section 24(1) is for the benefit of the assessee and that the assessee has unqualified right under sub-section (2) to carry forward the loss of the previous years for being set off against the profits of a subsequent year. But at the same time sub-section (3) of section 24 casts a duty on the Income-tax Officer to crystallize and compute the balance of loss which the assessee is entitled to have set off under section 24 against the profits of a subsequent year. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that in the present case the Department could not minimize the business loss of the assessee by setting it off against the dividend income. The result, therefore, is that we answer the question submitted to us by the Tribunal by saying that the business loss of the assessee could be set off against the dividend income of ₹ 64,926, from companies registered in Part B States. In view of the circumstances leading to this reference, we make no order as to costs.
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1960 (1) TMI 39 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ate Tribunal in declining to entertain a similar question of law as an additional ground of appeal. Our answer to the questions referred to us are these. The original assessment dated March 12, 1953, was barred by time. That being so, the fresh assessment dated November 17, 1954, is bad in law. In the circumstances of this case, it was open to the petitioner to raise the plea of limitation even though that plea had not been raised before the Income-tax Officer in proceedings relating to the original assessment or the fresh assessment under section 27 of the Act. Before we part with this case, we must observe that when the limitation was running out, the Department could and should have brought that fact to the notice of the High Court and obtained a suitable modification of the writ of prohibition to enable it to carry on and complete the assessment within the prescribed time. In the circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this reference.
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1960 (1) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ional validity of the section cannot be sustained. We, therefore, hold that s. 3 of the Act is void as infringing Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The, entire section therefore must be struck down as invalid. If so, the prosecution of the respondent under that section is void. The learned Advocate General made an impassioned appeal to persuade us to express our view that though the present section is void on the ground that it is an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right, in the interests of public order the State could legitimately re-draft it in a way that it would conform to the provisions of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. It is not this Court's province to express or give advice or make general observations on situations that are not presented to it in a particular case. It is always open to the State to make such reasonable restrictions which are permissible under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 37 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... tative capacity. Secondly, whether when a return is made under such sections as 23, 27 or 29, which are not concerned with returns of income but with lists of names of persons who may be changeable to tax in respect, inter alia, of payments made by the person responsible for the return, there is any basis for a penalty under section 25 other than that of the fixed penalty of ? 20. In other words, whether there is any income covered by the subject-matter of the return in respect of which it can be said that the person making the return "ought to be charged to tax under this Act." These are incidental matters which cropped up in the course of the argument before this House and which, on the view taken by the Court of Appeal of resulting personal chargeability, seem to have weighed heavily with the court. I say no more about these two questions which on any view can, in my opinion, have no effect on this case. I agree that the appeal should be allowed. Appeal allowed.
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