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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 44 Records
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1960 (10) TMI 108 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... first defendant, who was not entitled to it, under the mistaken impression that the money was due to her. There was, therefore, an obligation on her part to refund the money. Such liability must be deemed to have arisen on the date of the payment itself (Vide Baker v. Courage and Co., 1910 1 KB 50 . This obligation to refund was certainly incurred during the occupation period because the payment was between the two dates, 15-3-1942 and 5-9-1945. The term debt no doubt, is commonly used to, describe liabilities which have an origin in contract; but we see no reason why we should, restrict the connotation of that term to such liabilities only. Anything due and payable is a debt. On this point, therefore, we agree with the learned trial judge that no amount can be recovered by the plaintiff from the first defendant, even assuming that the first, defendant was liable to repay the amount paid to her agent. The appeal is therefore dismissed, but, in the circumstances without costs.
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1960 (10) TMI 107 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heir, is liable to pay out of the estate of the deceased the tax payable by the deceased. Under the will and codicil executed by the petitioners mother, the petitioner got nothing from the estate of the mother and the assessments in question related to the income of the mother during the three years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be regarded as the legal representative of his mother and the fact that he was one of the legatees under the will executed by his father does not make him the legal representative of his mother. 6. It follows that the petitioner is not liable to pay half the tax assessed as payable by the petitioners mother. The writ petition are, therefore, allowed and a writ of mandamus will issue in each case as prayed for. The petitioner will get his costs only in writ petition No. 460 of 1958 but not in the other two writ petitions. Advocates fee Rs. 100. Costs awarded shall be payable by the second respondent. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed if the contention urged on behalf of the appellants were accepted. The Legislature not having chosen to provide that the complaint of the Public Prosecutor shall also be signed by the person aggrieved, we will not be justified in the absence of compelling reasons to so hold. 11. The observation made by Mr. Justice Bavdekar in C.B.L. Bhatnagar v. The State AIR1958Bom196 What section 198B(13)......... means........ is that any complaint which may be made under section 198B must also satisfy the provisions of section 198, that is, the complaint will have to be made both by the person aggrieved, and by the Public Prosecutor , and by Mr. Justice Raman Nayar in R. Sankar v. The State I.L.R. (1959) Ker 195 that a complaint by a person aggrieved is not dispensed with even in regard to cases falling under section 198B, do not, in our judgment, correctly interpret sub-section (13) of section 198B. In the view taken by us, this appeal must fail and is dismissed. 12. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 105 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e pointed out above, is firmly established by the decisions of the various courts in this country and the courts in England. Consequently, we hold that the present suit for the balance of the unrecovered amount can certainly be maintained and we overrule the defendants' contention on this score also. 48. For the reasons mentioned above, we, therefore, partly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and decree the plaintiff's suit for Rs. 17480/-. We also allow interest on this amount from the date of the promissory note, that is the 24th February, 1943, up to the date of realisation at six per cent per annum simple. The rest of the plaintiffs claim will stand dismissed. As to costs, we think that the interests of justice would be fully satisfied it we allow the plaintiff three-fourths of the costs incurred by him in this Court as well as the court below and that the defendants should bear their own costs throughout. We order accordingly.
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1960 (10) TMI 104 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... merely because a few restrictive covenants are also imposed upon the assessee in order to safeguard the interests of the former employer by restraining the assessee from entering into a com- petitive business, or by requiring him to observe forbearance in advising others who are carrying on a rival business. In the present case, the assessee has received compensation for the loss of his employment. He had no doubt entered into restrictive covenants also but for observing these covenants, he was not required to render any kind of active service to his former employer. His relations with the employer as an employee were completely severed and the restrictive covenants only required him to forbear to do certain things for the unexpired period of the first agreement. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the present case, the payments received by him were not of a revenue nature in whole or in part. The reference is answered accordingly. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (10) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be assessed to tax each in his individual status. Section 41(1) in express terms directs that the tax shall be levied on the receivers "in the like manner and to the same amount as it would be livable upon and recoverable from the person on whose behalf such income, profits or gains are receivable." In this case the "person" to be assessed, the person whom the receivers represented, was the Hindu undivided family, and that was the only legal basis available in this case for the assessment levied on the receivers. 16. We answer the first question against the assessee. Section 41(1) is mandatory. Our answer to the second question also is against the assessee; despite the division in status the members continued under a liability to be assessed as a Hindu undivided family. We answer the third question in the affirmative and against the assessee. 17. The assessee will pay the cost of this reference. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (10) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hands; there must be many papers which a Chief Minister has to deal with in the day to day business of administration. If the Chief Minister did not remember the circumstances, it would have been easy for him to say so. If he remembered the circumstances, he could have refuted the allegations with equal ease. This is not a case where the refutation should have been left to Secretaries and other officers, who could only speak from the records and were not in a position to say why the Chief Minister passed certain orders. The petitioners are obviously suffering from a sense of grievance that they have not had a fair deal. We have held that there is not legal justification for that grievance; but in an executive as well as judicial administration justice must not only be done but it must appear that justice is being done. An affidavit from the Chief Minister would have cleared much of the doubt which in the absence of such an affidavit arose in this case. 22. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 101 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her the decision of the court below dismissing the suit is proper. The suit was dismissed while Act 5 of 1954 (Madras) was in force and that was the proper thing to do in the circumstances. 11. The last submission made on behalf of the appellant was that a fresh suit on the same cause of action was competent, that he had time till 7-2-1956 to institute such a suit and that if the period of pendency of this appeal which was filed on 2-3-1955 is excluded a fresh suit would still be in time. The question whether the period of pendency of this appeal can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not a matter which we arc called upon to decide in this appeal as the question wilt properly arise if and when the plaintiff institutes a fresh suit. 12. In the result, the decree of the court below is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed, aS the appeal fails on a question of law on which there was difference of opinion, we direct both sides to bear their costs in this court.
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1960 (10) TMI 100 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... st conscientiously reach a conclusion which it deems such evidence to justify. It follows that 'the appellant would only succeed should he establish that the order challenged was without any directing of the mind to the evidence by the deciding functionary, and that is not the ease. The argument, therefore, that every evidence must be collected by the dismissing authority, in our opinion, has no force. 4. The next argument of the appellant's learned Advocate is that retrospective dismissal and suspension cannot be ordered. We think the error is not such as cannot be obliterated by the appellate authority; and, in this case, the appellant has filed an appeal before the Government. We would not prejudice the fair hearing of that appeal by any observation in the writ petition, but it is clear that the error is not of jurisdiction, or of such far reaching effect, as to justify exercise of power under Article 226. In these circumstances, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (10) TMI 99 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business connection - profits or gains accrued or arose or could be deemed to have accrued or arisen to the non-resident on account of the business connection of the non-resident with the assessee - Relationship between the assessee and the non-resident fell within the meaning of the expression 'business connection' as used in section 42(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act - Held that:- These observations fully apply to the facts of the present cases, as I have already said. Here also the alleged agent is nothing more than a free-lance broker. He has not been appointed by the non-resident companies. He is not bound to canvass business for them. Whatever orders he canvasses are at his sweet will and if those orders are ultimately carried out, the non-resident companies give him a certain amount of commission, which varies from 1˝ per cent. to 2˝per cent. As a matter of fact, the entire sale transaction is completed outside the taxable territories. The only part of the transaction which takes place in the taxable territories is the canvassing by the alleged assessee agent for the goods of the non-resident companies. Such a connection, which is of a very loose nature and has no firm basis, cannot, in our opinion, be held to be “business connection” within the meaning of section 42(1) of the Act.
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1960 (10) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Rajagopalan, J.-In Ramaswami Aiyangar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1960 40 ITR 377 (Mad.) a Bench of this court held that in appropriate cases there can be a direction to refund to the successful assessee the initial deposit of ₹ 100 for each of the cases referred. The learned counsel for the department pointed out that the present case, where a similar request has been preferred, can be distinguished on facts from Ramaswami Aiyangar's case (supra). In the present case, the department went back upon their earlier decision in other assessment years not to treat the income as assessable income and assessed the assessee fund with reference to eight years to which the consolidated reference related. In view of the special circumstances of this case we think this is a fit case where the institution fee of ₹ 100 for each of the references should be ordered to be refunded to the assessee, as part of the costs to which as successful assessee, it will be entitled to.
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1960 (10) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the record we do not think it necessary to consider whether the additional evidence should be allowed to be adduced. It is not disputed that if the Kalambandis on which the appellant's right is based are rules or regulations having the force of law the impugned executive order issued by respondent 1 would be invalid. The right guaranteed to the appellant by an existing law cannot be extinguished by the issue of an executive order. In fact on this point there has never been a dispute between the parties in the present proceedings. That is why the only point Of controversy between the parties was whether the Kalambandis in question amount to an existing law or not. Since we have answered this question in favour of the appellant we must allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct that a proper writ or order should be issued in favour of the appellant as prayed for by him. The appellant would be entitled to his costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 96 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and did not apply to super-tax and that the assessee in that case (who was similarly placed as the assessee here in so far as the income from dividends was concerned) was liable to pay super-tax at the concessional rates mentioned in the Taxation Concessions Order, 1950. For these reasons, our answer to the first question is that the previous year in respect of the managing and selling agency source of income is the financial year ending on March 31, 1950, as chosen by the assessee. With regard to the third question, the answer is that the tax payable on the entire dividend income included in the total income after excluding the proportion of non-taxable dividend under paragraph 12 of the Taxation Concessions Order, 1950, would be at the concessional rates under the said Order and the assessee is liable to pay super-tax at the concessional rates mentioned in the Taxation Concessions Order, 1950, on the entire dividend income. The assessee shall have costs of this reference.
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1960 (10) TMI 95 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... action, though for the purpose of deciding whether a receipt is a capital receipt or a revenue income, one might consider the substance. In Bankey Lal Vaidya v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1965 55 ITR 400 , to which I was party, it was decided that when one partner on the dissolution of a partnership takes up the entire business and pays the retiring partner the price of his share, the price received by the latter is not a capital gain. My answer to question No. 3 is, therefore, in the negative and in the assessee's favour. Thus my answers to the three questions are (1)-Yes. (2)-Yes. (3)-N o. A copy of this judgment should be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as required by section 66(5) under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar. Since the ultimate result is in favour of the Commissioner, he should get his costs of the reference, which should be assessed at ₹ 1,000 from the assessee. Counsel's fee should be assessed at ₹ 1,000.
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1960 (10) TMI 94 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the word "individual" in a narrow sense to distinguish it from a Hindu undivided family. In considering this question, one has to remember that under the Act a Hindu undivided family as a unit and also an individual as a unit are liable to be taxed and the word "individual" is used in the section in its narrower connotation. Therefore, that does not furnish any index to the interpretation of item 86 in List I of the Seventh Schedule. For these reasons, we uphold the validity of section 3 of the Act in its relation to Hindu undivided families and the Wealth-tax Officers are authorised to initiate proceedings in assessing the capital assets of Hindu undivided families. No exception could, therefore, be taken to the action taken by the Wealth-tax Officer, Eluru, and the orders in question could not be successfully impeached. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed with costs in W.P. No. 20 of 1959. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Petitions dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 93 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which is deductible for income-tax purposes is one which is towards a liability actually existing at the time, but the putting aside of money which may become expenditure on the happening of an event is not expenditure." Adopting the argument with respect it may be said that the loss deductible for income-tax purposes in one actually existing at the time and debiting an amount which may in whole or in part be subsequently found to be due as a result of an arbitration agreed to between the parties is not a loss. BY THE COURT.--Our answer to the question referred is that the loss amounting to ₹ 14,994 was a loss pertaining to the assessment year 1946-47 and the relevant chargeable accounting period. The assessee will have his costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Fee of the learned counsel for the Department is fixed at the same amount. MOOTHAM, C.J.--Judgment pronounced by me today under Chapter VII, rule 1(2), of the rules of Court. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (10) TMI 92 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ular source. The determination of the tax payable is with regard to the tax payable on the total income and not on the income, profits and gains from any particular source. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the assessee family could not be said to have been assessed within the meaning of the proviso to clause (a) of section 2(11)(i) in respect of a source of income in non taxable territories which was included in the earlier Diwali account years for the purpose of determining the assessee's total world income and the average rate of tax applicable to its total world income. The answer to the question referred must, therefore, be that the assessee is entitled to take the year ending on March 31, 1950, as the Previous year for the purpose of the assessment year 1950-51 in respect of the source of income specified in the question. The assessee shall get the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (10) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re the Act was passed. The verb "has been" is in the present perfect tense, and may mean either " shall have been " or " shall be ". Looking, however, to the scheme of the enactment as a whole and particularly the other portions of it, it is manifest that the former meaning is intended. The verb " has been " describes past actions, and, to borrow the language of Fry, L.J., in Ex Parte Pratt 1884 12 Q.B- 334, " is used to express a hypothesis, without regard to time ". An externment order, however, to satisfy the requirements of s. 57 of the Bombay Police Act, must be made bona fide, taking into account a conviction which is sufficiently proximate in time. Since no absolute rule can be laid down, each case must depend on its own facts. In the result, we set aside the acquittal, and remit the case to the High Court for disposal on the other points urged before it and in the light of observations made here by us. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 90 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... once but in effect such deduction is effected only once in ascertaining the taxable profits of the composite business. Even once the principle is settled that only that portion of the profits and gains derived from the industrial undertaking is eligible for the exemption to the maximum limit provided in the section, the procedure adopted is in conformity with the section. What the assessee demanded of the Department was that the entire sum of ₹ 1,95,979 (that is the total profits of ₹ 4,44,462 minus the unabsorbed depreciation of ₹ 2,48,483), being less than six per cent. of the capital employed in the industrial undertaking should be exempted from tax. That point we have already decided against the assessee. It follows that the exemption granted to the limit of ₹ 4,715 alone is in order. Question (2) is also answered against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (10) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ces, it cannot be said that at the time the plaint was filed it was defective because the Power of Attorney in favour of Dunderdale was not a Power of Attorney on behalf of the firm and its partners. As the High Court has pointed out, there is on the record now Powers of Attorney on behalf of all the partners of the firm. It seems to us that the Division Bench of the High Court took a correct view in holding that the plaint was not a nullity. It was a case of a suit instituted by all the partners of a firm who were misdescribed as Manilal & Sons, a firm carrying on business at No. 11A Malacca Street, Singapore and., accordingly the learned Judges rightly allowed the plaint to be amended on terms and conditions stated in their order. It follows therefore that the High Court was also right in setting aside the decree of P. B. Mukherjea, J., dismissing the suit. These appeals accordingly fail and must be dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. Appeals dismissed.
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