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Showing 21 to 40 of 63 Records
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1960 (2) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... nt, on the findings of the Tribunal, there seems to be no justification for any deduction from the claim made by the assessee. The Tribunal did not find, for instance, that the assessee had been paid in full by the military authorities. Nor did the Tribunal find that the assessee had not established the loss he claimed. It those two factors were beyond dispute, then the fact that in the case of others a claim had been allowed on the basis of a percentage of 1.75 was really irrelevant. On the material placed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal should have allowed the whole claim; that is, as we said, on the finding recorded by the Tribunal, there was no justification for reducing the claim made by the assessee. We answer each of the questions in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In our opinion, the entire claim ought to have been allowed in each of the years. The assessee will get the costs of the reference. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1960 (2) TMI 62 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to treat them as defaulters." In Vetcha Sreeramamurthy v. Income-tax Officer 1956 30 I.T.R. 252, decided by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Subba Rao, C.J., as he then was, has held that the discretionary power under section 45 of the Act is coupled with a duty to exercise it, and if he does not exercise it or exercise it in such a manner that it is no exercise of discretion at all, he can be compelled under article 226 to discharge his duty. Applying these principles to the present case, I am not satisfied, that the Income-tax Officer exercised any discretion whatever, in rejecting the application under section 45 of the Act. I, therefore, quash the order, exhibit P-2 and direct the Income-tax Officer to dispose of the application in accordance with law. It is seen from exhibit P-1, the application of the petitioner, that his appeal had been heard on February 20, 1959, but it still remains undisposed of. I make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 61 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sub-section (3) of section 34, on which reliance is being placed on behalf of the assessee, refers merely to the time during which the assessment or reassessment had to be made in pursuance of a notice under the section and has no relevancy to the point in question. In In re Lachhiram Basantlal 1931 I.L.R. 58 Cal. 909 the decision relied upon by the counsel, it was held that income could not be said to have escaped assessment if proceedings for the assessment of the assessee's income were still pending and had not terminated in a final assessment. This relates to the original assessment and has no bearing to the facts of this case. The assessee had presented an application under sub-section (2) of section 66 for certain other questions also to be referred. But the application is not being pressed and the same is accordingly dismissed. I would answer the question in the negative and dismiss the reference with costs. FALSHAW, J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1960 (2) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot be successfully challenged. 10. Once this conclusion is reached the question of what bonus is payable depends on a proper calculation of the available surplus of the Pratap Press itself without taking into consideration the loss incurred by the Vir Arjun. No objection has been taken before us to the calculation made by the Tribunal on that basis. As the only point raised in this appeal, viz., that the Vir Arjun and the Pratap Press form one industrial unit fails the appeal is dismissed with costs. 11. The position is the same in the other appeal i.e., Appeal No. 189 of 1959. There also the only question raised is that the Pratap Press and the Vir Arjun are two parts of one industrial unit. For the reasons already mentioned in the first appeal we must hold that these must be held to be distinct industrial units and that the workmen of the Press are entitled to such bonus as the working results of the Pratap Press justify. This appeal is also therefore dismissed with costs.
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1960 (2) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to pay rent in future for the land remaining with him, he does not pay any revenue which was payable by him so far with respect to such land. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that he has been deprived of the proprietary interest without any compensation, for he is relieved of the charge of paying land revenue which has also been taken into account in arriving at the net assets for that purpose, and that is all that he can expect considering that the land remains in his possession for all other purposes. We are therefore of opinion that there is nothing unconstitutional in el. (4) (e) of the Schedule. We therefore dismiss Appeal No. 110 but order parties to bear their own costs. We allow Appeals Nos. 40 to 109 and hold that s. 22 (1), s. 37 and cl. (4) (e) of the Schedule are valid and constitutional. As the respondents in these appeals have not seriously contested them we order parties to bear their own costs. Appeal No. 110 dissmissed. Appeals Nos. 40 to 109 allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 58 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sh agreement between the parties superseding the old contract. Under the fresh agreement, the assessee became entitled to receive ₹ 6,125 less, and it was this sum that was treated as irrecoverable. There can be no doubt that after the fresh contract was concluded, the old contract was not enforceable, and in that sense ₹ 6,125 was irrecoverable. The irrecoverability having been established independently of the solvency or otherwise of the debtor and the genuineness of the transaction not being in issue, we fail to see how the assessee's right based on section 10(2)(xi) of the Act could be denied. The requirements of the section the assessee satisfied in this case ; and it is apparently on a wrong view of the scope of section 9A of Act IV of 1938 that the claim appears to have been ultimately decided by the Tribunal. As we stated before, we answer the question in the affirmative, and in view of the assessee having succeeded, the assessee is entitled to costs.
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1960 (2) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 5-46, a deduction had been claimed under the head "bad debts" much earlier. The learned counsel for the Department therefore urged that the assessee could not be permitted to claim the same amount twice over as a deduction, as a bad debt and again as an item of expenditure. That contention, in our opinion, is well founded, and that was one of the grounds on which the Assistant Commissioner negatived the claim. With that finding also the Tribunal recorded its agreement, though it did not discuss the position in any detail. Though the two main grounds set out by the Tribunal for upholding the disallowance of the claim did not commend themselves to us, on the ground we have mentioned above the assessee's claim was bound to fail, and that should suffice to answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, he will pay the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1960 (2) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a notice issued in 1950. The contention of the learned counsel for the assessee, that, under these circumstances, the Income-tax Officer was not entitled to initiate proceedings under section 34 of the Act is well founded, and is supported by authority Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas 1959 36 ITR 569 , the relevant passage is at pages 575 and 576. Since the first question has to be answered against the Department and in favour of the assessee, that the initiation of proceedings under section 34 of the Act was not valid, the assessment itself, which was based on that invalid notice under section 34 of the Act, has to be set aside. We answer the first question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. As we have pointed out earlier, in view of the answer to the first question, on the basis of which the entire assessment goes, there is no need to answer the second question. As the assessee has succeeded in the reference, he will be entitled to the costs.
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1960 (2) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent with the conclusion reached by the majority of the judges in In re Lala Indra Sen 1940 8 I.T.R. 187, that such receipts are both casual and non-recurring. We also find ourselves in agreement with much of the reasoning of Braund, J., in that report on the several points which we have had to consider in this case. Our conclusion are The receipts of the assessee from his racing and betting activities in the two years in question constituted his income, but it was not income from any business, profession or vocation of his. It was income from other sources within the scope of section 6 of the Act. It was however not taxable income as it was income of a casual and non-recurring nature within the scope of the exemption granted by section 4(3)(vii) of the Act. We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee's legal representative will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (2) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the trading operation carried out in British India, but on what basis the Tribunal considered 50 per cent. was a fair share, the Tribunal did not explain either in the order of appeal or in the statement of the case. As we said, in the circumstances of this case, where the contract alone is to be taken as having been concluded in British India, a contract which no doubt had special features, we think that the shares to be attributed to that should not be in excess of ten per cent. Our answer to the question is that there was justification for apportionment under section 42(3) of the Act, but there was no justification for apportioning 50 per cent. to the operation carried out in British India; there was justification only for apportioning ten per cent. of the assessee's share of the profits to the trading operations he carried out in British India. As neither side has wholly succeeded there will be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (2) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ring of all the services would depend upon the proper working of this department, for, otherwise there would be confusion and chaos. The state Industrial, Court in this case has held that all except five of the departments of the Corporation come under the definition of "industry" and if so, it follows that this department, dealing predominantly with industrial departments, is also an industry. Hence the employees of this department, are also entitled to the benefits of this Act. The State Industrial Court held that five of the departments of the Corporation did not fall within the terms of the definition of "industry " in the Act. The employees of these -departments did not file any appeal against the finding of the State Industrial Court and we do not propose to express our final opinion on the correctness of the decision of the Industrial Court in regard to these activities. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reason of the mere fact that these things have been provided by the Railway Administration. The conclusion that necessarily follows therefrom is that the charges of ₹ 4-11 at either end sought to be levied by the Railway Administration in addition to the charges for carriage was " terminal charges " within the meaning of the Railways Act and the proposed levy being in accordance with Government Notification under s. 32 of the Act was nothing more than the application of standardized terminal charges.The Tribunal had therefore no jurisdiction to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise of the same and had no jurisdiction to reduce the same. The order made by the majority of the Tribunal cannot therefore be allowed to stand. The order made by the Tribunal is therefore set aside. The application made under s. 41 in respect of this levy of ₹ 9.6 per 4 wheeler truck in addition to the carriage is rejected. The appeal is allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Act should have run something on these lines "'Business' includes trade, commerce or manufacture, or any adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture or any profession or vocation." And section 2(16) of the Business Profits Tax Act should have run, "'Profits' means profits from a business", without any further reference to the mode of computation of those profits in Schedule I, that is read with section 10 of the Income-tax Act. As we have already pointed out, both the definition of profits in section 2(16) and the definition of business in section 2(3) and rule 1 of Schedule I require that before income is treated as income from a business within the scope of section 4 of the Business Profits Tax Act, it should be income which falls within the scope of section 10 of the Income-tax Act. Income, whatever be the source of that income, which does not fall within the purview of section 10 with which has to be read section 6(iv)
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1960 (2) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he provision in clause IV(6) of the lease which requires the lessee after the construction of the building to keep a suite of rooms for the use of the Raj officers free of rent and also to inscribe a model in the crest of the Burdwan Raj Coat of Arms, which, according to his argument, is not consistent with the lessee's right of ownership. This argument, in my opinion, is based on a misconception. Clause IV(6) clearly applies to a new construction after rebuilding which, according to the terms of the lease, will become the absolute property of the lessor. The lessor had, therefore, every right to impose any condition as to the user of the new building without in any way infringing the lessee's right as owner of the existing structures. For the reasons given above, I would answer the question as reframed by us in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel. G.K. MITTER J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (2) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ase dealt with a managing agency makes no real difference in the application of the principle, as in that case, it is against the congeries of rights that the assessee enjoyed under the deed of partnership that he was paid a compensation, and that was compensation for a capital asset. It cannot be said that the contract the assessee entered into with Abbas was in a line with the normal trading contracts the assessee entered into. His line of business was hardware. Once again, we have to point out that the partnership deed provided only for this one item of business, and that item of business the assessee had to give up, and for giving it up he was paid compensation. Therefore, it was not a trading receipt, and the compensation was really for loss of a capital asset. We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. As the assessee had succeeded he will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel 39 s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1960 (2) TMI 48 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er, as we have already stated in the present case, the facts are all available and it would be mere matter of elementary arithmetic to determine which part of the sum collected by the appellant could be attributed to illegal assessment. Even a most superficial examination of the relevant record would show what turnover of the plaintiff relates to the period before 26th January, 1950, and to the subsequent period. It would not be beyond the capacity of the court to determine that amount and we cannot see how it is beyond its jurisdiction. We would, therefore, hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim a refund of the amount of tax relating to transactions before 26th January, 1950. On this basis it is agreed that the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs. 2,079-14-0. This figure will be substituted in the trial court s decree for the figure of Rs. 13,948-6-9. The parties will bear their own costs both here and in the court below. Appeal partly allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 47 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Under the circumstances, the contention that the sanction is invalid must be accepted. 7.. Shri A.R. Choubey for the petitioner stated at the time of arguments that I should not decide the other points raised by him in this case, if I agreed that the sanction was invalid, as that might prejudice the petitioner, if he is tried for the offence in future after proper sanction. It is not, therefore, necessary for me to go into the other contentions raised before me. 8.. The jurisdiction of the criminal Court to try an offence under section 24 of the Act arises only after a proper sanction under subsection (2) of that section has been granted by the Commissioner. As in the present case, the sanction granted is invalid, the whole trial was without jurisdiction. 9.. Accordingly, I order that the conviction of the petitioner under section 24(1)(a) read with section 8(1) of the Act is quashed and the sentences passed are set aside. Fines, if paid, shall be refunded. Petition allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 46 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ontentions were rejected by the trial Court and, in appeal, the learned judges took the same view. Curgenven, J., observed thus It may be that collection and assessment of the duty was fixed upon a monthly basis in the interests of the assessee as well as of the revenue, but if the return which was to form the initial steps in such a procedure is withheld, it would be unreasonable to insist that it is still incumbent upon the revenue department either to assess the duty month by month or to forego their revenue altogether. Where there is a liability and no express provision limiting its realization, it is to be inferred that it may be realized at any time after it arises. There is, therefore, absolutely no merit in this petition. The petitioner has sought unavailingly to impeach the vires of Act V of 1958, and when he failed, he has filed this petition wholly on unsubstantial grounds. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 45 - BIHAR
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... ... ..... the movement of the goods. It may be that, before giving his despatch instructions, the original buyer enters into one or more transactions in order to fix the destination of the movement, but his is the controlling voice, and this he gets under the terms of the original contract with the petitioner-company. The movement of the goods and their actual delivery take place and are directly referable to the original contract. It seems, therefore, idle to argue that the actual delivery in Bihar is not as a direct result of the original transactions between the petitioner-company and their buyers . All these transactions listed in Annexures B, C and D of the petition stand on the same footing. 6.. The Board would, accordingly, hold that the petitioner has been correctly assessed on these transactions as they come within the scope of the explanation to clause (g) of section 2 of the Act. 7.. No other points have been urged. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of any such proceeding or notice is not liable to be called in question merely on the ground that such proceeding or notice was inconsistent with sub-section (1). It is again provided by clause (a)(ii) of sub-section (2) that notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a Court or Tribunal, nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed ever to have been applicable to such proceeding or notice. The widest retrospective operation is, therefore, given to clause (a)(i) of sub-section (2) of section 15. The retrospective operation is given to all proceedings and notices.........It is evident that the Legislature intended by the amendment that in construing the provisions of section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, the obligation to initiate proceedings within the period not longer than the period prescribed by section 15 will not be implied. The reply to the second question will, therefore, be in the affirmative. Costs costs in the petitions. Reference answered accordingly.
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