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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 63 Records
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1960 (2) TMI 43 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ax. 2.. The Board is requested to issue necessary instructions in the matter to the Commercial Tax Officers. The Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, expressed the view that the appellant would earn the exemption as falling within category (ii) set out supra. For the application of the said G.O. the person claiming exemption should be a medical practitioner owning a dispensary and dispensing medicines only to his patients. From the facts we have discussed in the foregoing part of our judgment relating to the contention whether the appellant is a dealer within the meaning of the Act, it is apparent to us that the appellant would not fit in with this description. So, the question of earning any exemption does not arise. In the result, we confirm the assessments to the extent indicated in this judgment and we remand the matter for an enquiry with regard to cash sales and for the issue of revised orders of assessment accordingly. We propose no order as to costs. Case remanded.
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1960 (2) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efrained from collecting the tax from its customers, was put forward for the first time only before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. As we have already pointed out, before the Sales Tax Officer this point was not raised. Before the Deputy Commissioner, it was merely urged that (sic) relief mentioned above. It was not even alleged before the Deputy Commissioner that it was because of this opinion the petitioner did not collect sales tax on the oil sold by him. It was only before the Tribunal that this plea was put forward for the first time. It was not shown that the assessee had in fact acted to his detriment on the basis of this letter. The decision of a Bench of this Court in China Sambamurty v. Additional Income-tax Officer, Vizag(1958) 2 An. W.R. 515., called in aid by Sri Ranganathachari, counsel for the petitioner, is irrelevant and does not throw light on the question before us. In the result, the tax revision case is dismissed, but without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 41 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urse of the same piece of legislation. Such an Act is not meant to give a hide-bound meaning to terms and phrases generally occurring in legislation. That is the reason why the definition section contains words like unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. We do not think that there is any warrant for incorporating the definition of person given in the Madras General Clauses Act (1 of 1891) into the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. It looks to us that having regard to the considerations pointed out above, there is certainly repugnancy between the word person as defined in the Madras General Clauses Act and the context of the concerned G.O. It is apparent from a reading of the different G.Os. that the word person has been employed in its popular sense and not as a legal or juristic entity. For these reasons, we hold that the view of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is unsustainable and allow the revision. We make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 40 - BIHAR
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... ... ..... tender are also for finished items as are to be fitted in the completed building and not for supply independently thereof. Therefore, in regard to payments made under this agreement, the petitioner would not be liable to sales tax. This would exclude, therefore, the sum of Rs. 1,47,690 in 1950-51 and the smaller sum of Rs. 57,307 in the year 1951-52. 6.. The Board would, accordingly, modify the remand order passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner to this extent, namely, that the petitioner is not liable to sales tax for the sums received by him under the agreement relating to the construction of 40 Junior Officers residences on Baylay Road during the two years 1950-51 and 1951-52. The petitioner would, however, be liable to sales tax for materials supplied by him under the other agreement relating to the construction of the Langat Singh College hostel and ancillary buildings in the year 1951-52. The petition is allowed in part on the above terms. Petition allowed in part.
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1960 (2) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s thus no machinery provided either in the Act or rules to enable to Govern- ment to collect under rule 12 the amount paid by way of refund. While Act XVII of 1954 validates all assessments to tax on the amounts of sales tax collected by a dealer and nullifies any order having contrary effect, it has failed to provide for a machinery to give effect to its provisions, to enable the authorities to recover any amount paid by way of refund by reason of any judgment or order which the statute has declared as void. It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion in this case whether the Government might have other methods of recover- ing that tax from the petitioners. The demand notices in Form B served on the petitioners under rule 12 of the Turnover and Assess- ment Rules are invalid, and the amount of tax refunded could not be collected by them in pursuance of such notices. An appropriate writ will be issued to that effect. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to do, and if the Assistant Collector considered that the applicants were not taking advantage of the opportunities given to them to prove their contentions, it would be wrong to suggest that he was not right in doing so. Under these circumstances we see no reason to interfere with the order made by the appellate authority or by the Additional Collector in revision. 4.. It may be pointed out that it is necessary for the parties to show utmost diligence in the prosecution of their remedy, and asking for adjournments should not be encouraged as a matter of course. Except for good grounds adjournments should not be granted. Only for a sufficient reason should an adjournment be given, and the fact that the consultant was not available at the adjourned date of hearing would not be a sufficient reason for granting an adjournment. On this ground we think that the view taken by the Additional Collector is correct. The application fails and will be dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... prescribed form and before the prescribed date. As we take the view that, in fact, no application was made by the applicants the fact that in returns the collection of sales tax by the applicants have been shown does not assist Mr. Patel in his contention. But even assuming that the circumstance has a bearing upon the question at issue, it is clear that the statement made by the applicants in the returns is a statement made by the applicants in their own favour. It has, therefore, no evidentiary value. The applicants collected the sales tax and showed the collection in the returns submitted by them. This is about all, but it does not go to prove the applicants case. 5.. In our opinion, therefore, the authorities below were right in coming to the conclusion that the applicants were liable to pay the purchase tax under section 10(a) of the Act of 1953. No other point has been urged on this revision application. It, therefore, fails and will be dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 36 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Constitution does not carry the petitioners far even if it is well-founded. Assuming it to be well-founded, the sale of such things will not fall within entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule or entry 92-A of List I. It would therefore fall within entry 97 of List I and to provide for the levy of a tax on such sales would be within the competence of Parliament. I dismiss the petitions. Petitions dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ission of returns. The Notification G.O. No. 1323, Revenue, dated 6th May, 1953, states In exercise of the powers conferred by section 6 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, (Madras Act IX of 1939), the Governor of Madras hereby exempts permanently with effect from the 1st April, 1953, every person owning or having an interest in country oil chekkus, single or multiple, and dealing exclusively in the produce of such chekkus from payment of any tax under section 3(1) of the said Act in respect of such dealings. But the facts here clearly show that the accused was not dealing exclusively in the oils expelled by the chekku run by him. On the other hand, he has been purchasing from others and trading on that oil. His turnover also clearly shows that he could not have been dealing in the very small quantities which alone his country oil press would expel. The convictions are, therefore, correct, and the sentences are proper. The revisions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 34 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es ordinarily employed by cultivators, human labour in the present case, only to make the husks a really marketable commodity, fibre, and to make it fit to be taken to the market, it cannot be said that the husks have ceased to be horticultural produce. We are also of the view that the husks in being converted into fibre have not really changed their nature so much as to make them any the less horticultural produce. According to us the process that has been applied in this case is only the minimum that is required to make the husks really marketable or more marketable and also the minimum that is required to preserve the husks from deterioration and loss of value. It is also the minimum that is required to make it fit to be taken to the market. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the fibre is not an horticultural produce. In the above view we hold that the decision of the Tribunal is correct and hence we dismiss the revision petition with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF ASSAM
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... that the payment of a cheque, or a bill payable on demand, on account of a debt to a banker, a payment by which it was intended to be handed to them as property, and not merely handed to them as a servant or agent, but handed to them as cash with the object of reducing a balance, was a payment for perfectly good and valuable consideration but I do not know that it is necessary to decide that point here, because it is not raised. In the result, therefore, I am of opinion that this appeal should be allowed and the defendant can claim a set-off in respect of the amounts of the fixed deposit receipt and the cheques mentioned above. It is not disputed that if the defendant can claim a set-off in respect of these amounts, the plaintiff is not entitled to any decree. The result will be that the suit of the plaintiff-respondent will stand dismissed, but, in the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. Sinha, CJ. mdash I entirely agree and have nothing to add.
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1960 (2) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Act of 1956 indicates that it was intended thereby to destroy the rights created by section 153-C of the Act of 1913?
Held that:- Section 10 of the Act of 1956 deals only with the jurisdiction of courts. It shows that the District Courts can no longer be empowered to deal with applications under the Act of 1956 in respect of matters contemplated by section 153-C of the Act of 1913. This does not indicate that the rights created by section 153-C of the Act of 1913 were intended to be destroyed.
section 24 of the General Clauses Act puts an end to the notification giving power to the District Judge, Poona, to hear the application under section 153-C of the Act of 1913 as that notification is inconsistent with section 10 of the Act of 1956 and the District Judge cannot, therefore, continue to deal with the application.Section 24, therefore, does not cancel the notification empowering the District Judge of Poona to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of 1913. It seems to us that since under section 6 of the General Clauses Act the proceeding in respect of the application under section 153-C of the Act of 1913 may be continued after the repeal of that Act, it follows that the District Judge of Poona continues to have jurisdiction to entertain it. If it were not so, then section 6 would become infructuous. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Annual return - General, Meetings and proceedings – Company Law Board’s power to call annual general meeting, Accounts – Annual accounts and balance sheet, Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases
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1960 (2) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Appointment of directors and proportion of those who are to retire by rotation
... ... ... ... ..... compensation to the outgoing London directors was a payment made for commercial expediency and that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal to the contrary is inconsistent with the evidence and contradictory to the evidence and so it must be held that the Appellate Tribunal has misdirected itself in law in reaching that conclusion. In my opinion the present case is governed by the principle laid down by the House of Lords in Bairstow case (supra), to which I have already referred. For the reasons I have expressed I hold that the payment of pound 20,000, equivalent to Rs. 2,66,677, paid as compensation for loss of office to the London directors is an admissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. I would, therefore, answer the question of law referred by the Appellate Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Kanhaiya Singh, J. mdash I agree.
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1960 (2) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proviso to section 13 of the Income-tax Act is applicable to the facts and circumstances of these cases?
Held that:- When the Tribunal applied the proviso to section 13 because of the various blemishes which were pointed out by the Income-tax Officer and accepted by the Appellate Tribunal, it cannot be said that there was any error in the order of the Appellate Tribunal justifying the interference of this court under article 136. Appeals dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the investment by a co-operative bank of its assets in fixed deposits in the manner that the appellant bank had deposited its moneys falls within the term " business " and is therefore assessable under section 10 of the Income-tax Act, or it is an investment the interest from which would fall under the term " other sources " and therefore within section 12 of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- High Court was in error in treating interest derived from deposits as not arising from the business of the bank and therefore not falling within the income exempted under the Notification. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court set aside. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was a voluntary relinquishment on the part of the managing agents of a part of the income, i.e., ₹ 1,00,000 which was the difference in both cases between the commission payable under the original agreements and the commission calculated on the modified agreements?
Held that:- In both these appeals the amount liable to income-tax would be the amount which the respective managing agents were entitled to receive as commission ; for, that would be the amount which would accrue or arise in each case and the amounts they were entitled to were ₹ 1,00,000 less than what they would have received had the terms of the managing agency agreements not been varied. Appeals dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the commission accrued on the proceeds of every single sale or it accrued only when the assessee firm exercised its option to charge its commission on the total sale proceeds or on the weight of the yarn sold?
Whether the managing agents were to get the amount of commission after the whole profit was determined at the end of the year?
Held that:- On a proper construction of the contract, it is obvious that the managing agents were to be paid at the end of the year. They had the option of receiving a percentage on total sales or three pies per pound and this was exercisable at the end of the year. There was also a liability to pay back a portion of the commission in certain contingencies which also could be determined only when the accounts were made up for the year. It is thus clear that there was no accrual of any commission till the end of the year. On this construction of the contract it cannot be held that the commission had accrued as and when the sales took place and that as a result of their agreeing to the modification of the agreement the managing agents had voluntarily relinquished a portion of their commission. On the other hand under the original agreement the managing agents were entitled to receive commission only at the end of the year and before then the agreement was varied modifying its terms as from the beginning of the accounting year. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 5 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ Jurisdiction - Seizure - Burden of proof - Smuggling ... ... ... ... ..... ld to be smuggled gold, the second petitioner cannot be said to have been concerned in the smuggling thereof. 23.In my opinion, therefore, there was no evidence to support the 1st respondent s conclusion that the gold was smuggled gold or that the second petitioner was concerned in the smuggling thereof. It, therefore, follows that the order for confiscation of the said gold and the order for personal penalty imposed upon the second petitioner cannot be sustained and must be quashed. 24.I, therefore, direct that a writ of Certiorari be issued quashing the said order. I also direct that a writ of Mandamus be issued against the 1st respondent directing him to return the seized gold to the petitioners. The 1st respondent is given one month s time to return the said gold. There can be no order in this matter against the second respondent. The 1st respondent to pay the petitioners costs of this petition which, in view of the duration of the hearing of this case, I fix at Rs. 700.
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1960 (2) TMI 4 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Custom House Broker Licence ... ... ... ... ..... refused a licence. There being no provision now, under which the respondents can be compelled to issue a licence, the relief has to be denied to the petitioner. He is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus, compelling respondents 1 and 2 to return the licence to him. But as the petitioner has a fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) to carry on his business as Custom-House Broker, the direction in Ext. P-10 circular that the clearing Agents and Brokers of this Custom-House are accordingly hereby informed, that if they wish to continue to act as clearing Agents from that date, they should submit their application therefor in the prescribed form................................................ is lacking in validity. A direction will issue to respondents 1 and 2 to allow the petitioner to carry on his business as Custom-House Broker, until the requisite notification is made, if at all, under section 202(1) of the Act. This petition is disposed of as above, but without costs.
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