|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 61 Records
-
1961 (10) TMI 113 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he Division Bench which decided Criminal Appeal No. 645 of 1960 and what were its decisions. The Sessions Judge convicted the accused under section 304 Indian Penal Code and this finding was confirmed by the High Court in appeal. This finding is, therefore, that the accused was guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. That finding is final under Section 430 Criminal Procedure Code and in this view of the matter, we cannot hold that the accused was guilty of the offence of culpable homicide which amounts to murder. Although two views are possible, technically and strictly speaking the two findings would be contradictory. We cannot therefore allow the appeal against acquittal under Section 302 I. P. C. because the accused were convicted under Section 304 I. P. C. and the conviction is confirmed. The appeal against the acquittal under Section 302 Indian Penal Code of accused No, 2 who was convicted under Section 304 Indian Penal Code must be dismissed.
-
1961 (10) TMI 112 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ns before a Magistrate for any offence. Offence has been defined to mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force . If, therefore, under S. 145 of the Bombay Police Act, the conduct of petitioner No. 3 is punishable then clearly it is an offence, and if it is an offence, Section 197 must apply. It is, however, argued that Section 159 of the Police Act clearly negatives the application of S.197. It is merely a protection afforded to a police officer or a Revenue Commissioner or Magistrate who discharges some functions under the Police Act, against their being penalised or required to pay damages if they can justify whatever they have done as being done bona fide and legally. This does not in any manner control the application of S. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This argument must therefore be repelled. (13) In the result, we make the rule absolute and dismiss the complaint filed by the respondent. (14) DF/D.H.Z. (15) Petition allowed.
-
1961 (10) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... inted out the High Court is wrong in thinking that the evidence shows that Major Singh gave any of the fatal blows. Hazura Singh in his first dying declaration mentioned Major Singh as having given a below of him on his left wrist. Apart from Bhag Singh only Hira Singh has ascribed any specific part to Major Singh in addition to saying generally that he took part in the attack. The evidence therefore leaves scope for thinking that Hazura Singh has made a mistake about Major Singh or has wrongly implicated him. We are not therefore prepared to say that the view taken by the Trial Judge as regards Major Singh is clearly unreasonable. 30. We therefore allow the appeal of Major Singh set aside the order of conviction and sentence made against him by the High Court and restore the order of acquittal made by the Trial Court. The appeal of Harbans Singh is dismissed. Major Singh should be set at liberty at once. 31. Appeal of appellant 2 allowed. 32. Appeal of appellant 1 dismissed.
-
1961 (10) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dge of the High Court considered the declaration by Pappala Chinna Ramadasu, which continued unchanged, as sufficient to prove an offence of theft. In our opinion, in the circumstances and in the light of the finding given by the District and Sessions Judge with regard to Ex. D-2, it was necessary to go further to see what right Pappala Chinna Ramadasu had to the Press at all. If this had been considered, the learned Judge would have seen that there was some doubt the right of Pappala Chinna Ramadasu to transfer the Press in 1955 to Boddepalli Lakshminarayana, and further that the defence that the appellants took possession of the Press under a bona fide claim of right was a good defence entitling them to an acquittal. 12. In the result, this appeal must succeed. The convictions of the appellants and the sentences passed on them are set aside, they are acquitted and their bail bonds shall stand discharged. The fines, if realised are ordered to be remitted. 13. Appeal allowed.
-
1961 (10) TMI 109 - THE HOUSE OF LORDS
... ...
... ... ..... 9;s death the ships in question had a value on the open market considerably in excess of that written down value. The liability for such a balancing charge was, in my view, a "contingent liability" within the meaning of section 50(1) of the Act of 1940, the liability being contingent upon the ships being sold at a price in excess of their written down value. The courts below have, in my opinion, put too narrow a construction on the words "contingent liabilities." The commissioners will, under section 50(1), require to make an estimation of the contingent liabilities as appears to them to be reasonable. The allowances to be made will not be the full extent of the balancing charges. I therefore agree that the appeal should be allowed and the case dealt with in the way in which my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack proposes. Appeal allowed. Solicitors Hyde, Mahon & Pascall for Keenlyside & Forster, Newcastleupon-Tyne Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
-
1961 (10) TMI 108 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed in effect and substance as a continuation of the predecessor Court when the entire jurisdiction, power and authority possessed by the successor Court can be traced to the predecessor Court and the decisions of the predecessor Court must, therefore, tie accorded the same binding character and effect as if they were decisions of the successor Court. This, in my opinion, is the true ground on which must rest the binding authority of decisions of the High Court of Bombay given prior to the appointed day qua this High Court. 146. I, therefore, agree with the answer given by My Lord the Chief Justice in the majority judgment to the question referred to the Special Bench and hold that the decisions of the High Court of Bombay given prior to the appointed day i.e., 1st May 1960, do not constitute "law in force" within the meaning of Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, but have the same, binding force and effect as if they were decisions of this High Court.
-
1961 (10) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
... ...
... ... ..... e annexure "B" to the statement of the case and summary of these agreements in so far as payment of bonus goes is annexure "A" to the case. We fail to see how from these agreements it can be inferred that the bonus paid to the employees was not out of profits. On the other hand, these documents would show that the agreement relating to payment of bonus was reached between the employer and the employees after the completion of the year, when the position as regards the available profits must have been ascertained. 8. In our opinion, therefore, the first question will have to be answered in the negative. We answer the question accordingly. In view of our answer to the first question, the remaining questions do not survive and need not be answered. In the circumstances of the case, especially in view of the fact that care was not taken in getting framed the real question that arose in this case, we make no order as to costs. 9. Questions answered accordingly.
-
1961 (10) TMI 106 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . But that is a different matter. In the absence of any express provision in the Income Tax law and on general principles we do not see why a partner in an unregistered firm should not be permitted to claim a set-off in respect of his share of loss in an unregistered firm against the profits of his other business simply because the department does not choose to determine the losses of the unregistered firm." 8. With these observations we respectfully agree. In our view, the Income Tax Officer cannot, by his own act or omission, put the assessee at a disadvantage, unless a discretion is given to his under the law to do so, with a view to depriving the assessee of any advantage which he may derive in claiming the set- off. No such discretion has been provided under the Act. 9. In this view, our answer to the question in both the references is in the affirmative. These references are accordingly ordered with costs in R.C. No. 1 of 1960. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1961 (10) TMI 105 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e accounting year or not provided the Income-tax Officer was satisfied about the genuineness of the firm. We have, however, to decide the question, which has been referred to us according to the position in law and, as we have already stated, we must answer it by saying that the assessee firm was not entitled to obtain registration for the assessment year 1953-54. That the assessee firm was not entitled as of right to obtain registration under section 26A would, however, not disentitle the income-tax authorities to permit registration following the instructions, which have been issued by the Board of Revenue as we find from the observations of Hidayatullah J. referred to above. In view of the finding of the Tribunal that there is no material on the basis of which the genuineness of the firm can be questioned or suspected, the assessee, we hope, may not find it difficult to obtain registration for the assessment year 1953-54. The assessee will pay. the costs of the department.
-
1961 (10) TMI 104 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... would be urged against him that he did not write off the debt in that year. Therefore, the assessee always finds himself on the horns of a dilemma and it is the duty of the department to take a sympathetic view of the matter if in fact that debt was never recovered. Therefore, if the debt was not allowed to the assessee in the year of account, there is not reason why the department should not consider allowing him this debt in the next year." 9. The material on the record shows that out of the sum of ₹ 2,23,162 the assessee had been able to recover only two sums, namely, ₹ 8,322 and ₹ 42,000. The assessee had not been able to recover anything beyond that up to now. There cannot be any doubt that the balance of the amount that had remained to be recovered had subsequently become a bad in some year or other. 10. Our answer to the second question is in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department. 11. Questions answered in the negative.
-
1961 (10) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d have as against their new sovereign, were those, and only those, which that new sovereign by agreement express or implied, or by legislation, chose to confer upon them." Thus, before the respondents could claim the 'benefit of s. 299(1) of the Constitution Act, 1935 they had to establish that on November 9, 1947, or thereafter they possessed legally enforceable rights with respect to the properties in question as against the Dominion of India. They could establish this only by showing that their pre-existing rights, such .as they were, were recognized by the Dominion of India. If they could not establish this fact, then it must be held that they did not possess any legally enforceable rights against the Dominion of India and, therefore, s. 299(1) of the Constitution Act, 1935 avails them nothing. As already stated a. 299(1) did not enlarge anyone's right to property but only protected the one which a person already had. Any right to property which in its very.
-
1961 (10) TMI 102 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... led to exemption from payment of tax on the said amount of ₹ 2,45,557. We do not consider it necessary to deal with the other decisions referred to by counsel for the parties inasmuch as in our view the decision in each case turned on the facts of that case and none of them is a direct authority on the question which falls for our consideration in this case. Before parting with the case, it has to be said that a notice of motion was taken out by the counsel for the Commissioner for correction of the statement of the case. It was not opposed on behalf of the assessee. The notice of motion is allowed and the statement of the case would stand so corrected. In the print supplied to us, a copy of the appellate order of the Tribunal was not included. But the copies were filed before us during the course of the hearing. They be taken on record. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.
-
1961 (10) TMI 101 - MAHARASHTRA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ive or were not in existence at the time the Act came into operation. For reasons stated above, in our opinion, the action of the first Expenditure-tax Officer, first respondent hereto, in issuing a notice under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act was without jurisdiction and, therefore, void in law. The notice issued by hint is, therefore, liable to be quashed. In the. result we set aside the said notice and further direct the first respondent not to take any steps or proceedings under the Act against the petitioners in respect of the expenditure incurred by the late Maharaja of Morvi during the period 1st April, 1957, to 17th August, 1957. The rule is accordingly made absolute against the first respondent to the extent as stated above. The first respondent shall pay the costs of the petitioners. The rule against the second respondent is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, we do not consider it necessary to make any order as to costs of the second respondent.
-
1961 (10) TMI 100 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ur of the trustees and not in favour of the minors. The argument is that tinder section 16(3)(a)( iv) the transferees of the assets have to be the minor children themselves and, therefore, when cine transfer is not to the minor child, but to the trustee, though for the benefit of the minor child, it is not a transfer to which the provisions of section 16(3)(a)( iv) of the Act applies. We do not think it necessary to answer this question in view of our answer to the second question. Even on the footing that the settlement by a trust deed would amount to an indirect transfer in favour of the beneficiaries under the settlement, we have held in dealing with the second question that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there were no direct or indirect transfers by Keshavji and his son in favour of their own minor children. That being so, we do not answer the first question as being unnecessary to be answered. The assessees will get their costs from the Commissioner.
-
1961 (10) TMI 99 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s", in the other clauses, as already stated, we have no doubt that the entire amount had not become due to the assessee on the date of the agreement. It is difficult to assume that option was given to the debtor not to pay his debt. 9. It is true that the assessee has, in its books of account, treated that the entire amount of ₹ 48,000 had accrued due to it on the date of the agreement, but to that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, hardly any importance could be attached. 10. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible to hold that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the two amounts of ₹ 12,000 and ₹ 6,000 received by the assessee from the two respective principals are taxable under section 10(5A) of the Act. The answer to the question referred to us, therefore, will have to be returned in the affirmative. We answer it accordingly. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner. 11. Questions answered in the affirmative.
-
1961 (10) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d its sale, it would have been possible to hold that any profit arising from such an adventure was in the line of the business of the assessee by reason of his association with the firm of managing agents. This is not the case here. This was an independent transaction of the assessee, which, in our opinion, displays all indications of its being an acquisition of a capital asset, and its subsequent sale after a fairly lengthy interval of enjoyment of that property did not result in any revenue profit. In the light of the argument addressed to us and in the light of the real point at issue, we modify the second question to read "Whether the sum of ₹ 1,75,000 is assessable as profit from an adventure in the nature of a trade?" and answer that question in favour of the assessee and against the department. In this view, it is unnecessary to deal with the other question that has been stated. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
-
1961 (10) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e payment of wages during the leave period, for under that section the management would have to pay at a rate equal to the daily average of their total full time earnings for the days they worked. The factory registers would show the total full time earnings of each worker for the days during the month immediately preceding his leave. The average shall be taken of the earnings of those days and the daily average of those earnings would be the criterion for fixing the wages during the leave period. I cannot, therefore, say that s. 79 of the Act by its impact on s. 80 thereof makes it inapplicable to a worker of the category with which we are now concerned. This argument, therefore, is rejected. No other question was raised before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. By Court. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed, the order of the Court below set aside and the appellant acquitted. Fine, if paid, will be refunded. Appeal allowed.
-
1961 (10) TMI 96 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he court of King's bench; commanding, upon good cause shown to the Court, the party complaining to be admitted or restored to his office." 11. For these reasons, I consider that in the present case a writ of mandamus should go principally to respondents Nos. 2 and 3, commanding them not to give effect to the order, and to withdraw their recognition of the existing Managing Committee constituted of respondents Nos. 4 to 13. But in order to make that Writ effective and as consequential to that writ I would issue a direction under Article 226 of the Constitution to respondents Nos. 4 to 13 to make over charge of the school to the Managing Committee appointed by the Samaj, by its resolution dated the 27th March, I960, and to its Secretary, Sri J. Kundu, and to desist from interfering with the management of the school by the Samaj. 12. I would accordingly allow this application, but I propose to make no Order as to costs. Choudhary, J. 13. I agree. Sahai, J. 14. I agree.
-
1961 (10) TMI 95 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... wspaper (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 578, in support of the contention that it is only legislation directly dealing with the right mentioned in Article 19(1) that was protected by it and, if the legislation was not a direct legislation on the subject the said Article would have no application, the test being not the effect or result of the legislation but its subject matter. A similar argument advanced in the Supreme Court by the learned Attorney General is dealt with at pages 618 and 619 of the Report and has been accepted. Finding myself alone under the necessity of deciding this point and, as at present advised, I accept the argument of the learned Government Advocate and hold that in the present case at the instance of the decree-holder it cannot be held that Section 49M is unconstitutional and violates any fundamental right of the decree-holder. 88. In the result, I would dismiss both the appeal and the Civil Revision but would make no order as to costs.
-
1961 (10) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e government exercises his powers of eminent domain and acquires property, public funds have to be utilised for the payment of compensation to the true owner and not merely to any claimant who cares to appears on the screen. The Government have a special responsibility in this regard. and cannot later take refuge behind the pretext that the compensation was pain to the claimant who actually appeared while others did not appear. So long as that is the situation the acquiring officer has aright to make such a reference, even if a dispute or controversy as to title arises on the documents before him. He cannot be made liable for costs, and it is the party who has to bear the costs incurred in establishing the title of the party to receive the compensation amount. 5. According, I allow the second the appeal and direct that award of costs against the Government by the learned Additional District Judge be set aside. The parties will bear their costs here. No leave. Appeal allowed.
|
