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Showing 21 to 40 of 87 Records
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1962 (3) TMI 112 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o consider the applicability of the proviso at all in case the assessee fails to bring itself within the scope of the main provision (section 4(3)(i)). As stated already, the trust, which has for one of its objects the carrying on of a pharmaceutical business, which can be properly and lawfully performed by devoting the entire income of the property to the carrying on of the said business, cannot be called a trust, in respect of which the property is held wholly or partly for religious and charitable purposes. With respect, we follow the decision of this court in T.C. No. 62 of 1958 (Commissioner of Income-tax v. East India Industries (Pte.) Ltd. 1962 46 I.T.R. 1086). In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to how far the assessee can successfully invoke proviso (b) to section 4(3)(i). The question is answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered accordingly.
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1962 (3) TMI 111 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... cative of the fact that the Government is not invested with any quasi judicial capacity in considering the objections and that the decision of the Government on the objections is an administrative decision. The present contention of Mr. I. M. Nanavati must therefore be rejected and for the reasons stated above we must hold that the inquiry under sec. 5A is an administrative inquiry and that the Government is invested with an administrative character in considering the objections and that the decision of the Government on the objections is an administrative act. (89.) The result therefore is that the petition fails and will be dismissed with costs. Costs will be fixed at ₹ 750/for each set. There will be separate sets of costs for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the one hand and the third respondent-Society on the other. We are glad to learn that the Government has cancelled the notification dated 14th September 1960 after the matter was argued in Court. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (3) TMI 110 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The same argument applies as in Motivala's case 1912 I.L.R. 36 Bom. 509, that the only thing which prevented the Income-tax Officer from giving effect to the terms of his assessment order without delay was the order for the obtaining of the prior approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, which is the main bone of contention in the petition and which I have already held to be illegal. I am, therefore, of the opinion that on the facts of this case the assessment order of the Income-tax Officer, called a draft assessment by the respondents, was in fact his assessment order and that therefore the issuing of fresh notice under section 22(4) of the Act to the petitioner was illegal and further proceedings on the basis of these notices must be quashed and I would accept the present petition to the extent of ordering accordingly. I would also allow the petitioner his costs from the respondents. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. HARBANS SINGH J.--I agree. Petition allowed.
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1962 (3) TMI 109 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anohar Lal Munshi Lal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1962 44 I.T.R. 618. This view was shred by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ramgopal Kaniyalal 1960 38 I.T.R. 193. Our attention was not drawn to any decision which has taken a contrary view. Apart from the authority cited above, the language of the proviso does not permit any other conclusion to be reached. In fine, our answer to the question raised in the reference is that it is not open to an assessee to adjust the loss sustained in speculative business against his income derived from other businesses which are not of a speculative character but he could lay claim to a set-off only against profits got from a business of a speculative nature. We accordingly answer the question referred to us against the assessee and in favour of the department. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Advocate's fee is fixed at ₹ 200 (rupees two hundred.) Questions answered accordingly.
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1962 (3) TMI 108 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efect in the deed of partnership dated July 25, 1951, as held by the High Court, there was a partnership constituted under the deed. The court treated the firm as having been in existence from the commencement of the year previous to the assessment year 1952-53. In the present case if it had been shown before the income-tax authorities including the Tribunal that the seven persons had entered into an agreement of partnership and carried on business together as a firm from January 1, 1953, to July 1, 1953, we would have answered the question in favour of the assessee. But unfortunately on the material before us we cannot possibly take that view. In the result the question framed "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee was entitled to registration for the period from January 1, 1953, to July 1, 1953?" must be answered in the negative. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. RAY J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (3) TMI 107 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... section 10(2) and the second proviso to it, it is impossible to hold that, in computing income, profits and gains of an assessee under section 12, the aforesaid proviso applies when allowances are granted in accordance with section 10(2)(vii). It is unnecessary to speculate on the reason for making the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) inapplicable in an assessment under section 12. It may well be for the fact that where an assessee lets on hire his machinery, plant, etc., and the letting amounts to a business, the case would fall under section 10; but where the letting does not amount to a business, the income is assessable under section 12. For all these reasons, our answer to the question stated by the Tribunal is that the second proviso to section 10(2) (vii) has no applicability in computing the income, profits and gains of an assessee under section 12. The assessee shall have the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 150. Order accordingly.
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1962 (3) TMI 106 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the litigation to be entitled to the fruits thereof. By clause (13) the settlor had only provided that by the advance of ₹ 5,000 the trust estate should not only benefit by the amount of that advance with interest but reap a substantial profit. If the result of the litigation was unfavourable to Rash Behari the trust estate would certainly lose ₹ 5,000 without any corresponding benefit. I cannot find in this clause any provision for retransfer of the income or assets of the subject-matter of the trust in favour of the settlor. In the result the question referred, namely, "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances and on a proper construction of the trust deed dated August 16, 1949, the whole income of the trust fell within the ambit of section 16(1)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act?", must be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. RAY J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (3) TMI 105 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n foreign exchange with the intention of making profit. The objects of the business of the company embrace such an activity. It is easier to hold that a single transaction entered into by an individual in the line of his own trade though not part and parcel of his ordinary business is an adventure in the nature of trade than to hold that a transaction entered into by an individual outside the line of his own occupation is an adventure in the nature of trade. The assessee in the present case has within its objects the business of dealing in personal chattels and merchandise. Dealing in foreign exchange is a form of business which is within the company's objects. In any event it is a business which the assessee professed to carry on. For all these reasons I am of opinion that the answer to the question is in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee is to pay the costs. Certificate for two counsel. G.K. MITTER J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (3) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rvision and control over all orders and proceedings of the Collector and it was urged that the failure on the part of the respondents to have availed themselves of this provision debarred them from moving the High Court. This would turn upon the question whether the relief by resort to proceedings under the Act would be sufficient and adequate which would render it unnecessary for the respondents to have moved the High Court. Though an objection of this sort appeared in some of the counter-affidavits filed before the High Court the matter does not appear to have been pressed before the High Court at the time of the arguments. As the High Court had certainly a discretion to grant relief under Art, 226 even if there were other alternative statutory remedies, we do not propose to entertain this objection at this stage. The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be only one hearing fee as all the appeals were heard together. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (3) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation subject to his paying all the costs incurred by the respondent upto date irrespective of the result of the suit. We therefore allow the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for considering only the question of limitation on the basis of the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, (No. XLVII of 1948) as amended by the Displaced Persons (Institution of suits and legal proceedings) Amendment Act ( No. LXVIII of 1950) after giving parties a chance to lead evidence in this connection, if necessary. If the court comes to the conclusion that the suit is within time on the basis, of these two Acts, a decree for the amount claimed minus the costs incurred upto this date by the respondent will be passed in favour of the appellant. If on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the suit is not within limitation ,p a under these two acts the suit will be finally, dismissed Costs incurred hereinafter will be in the discretion of the court Appeal allowed.
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1962 (3) TMI 102 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mainly for a purpose that falls within the categories in the Act as charitable and entitled to the exemption and (2) where the institution has for its purpose mainly the betterment of the private members, it is not entitled to exemption. In other words, if it is a vocational institution to promote the interests of the profession or vocation, it is not charitable." The Tribunal should have referred to the activities of the association in some detail. It is unfortunate that there is no reference to it. The Tribunal guided itself only by the consideration of the objects of the association. In the light of the authorities the question framed "Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the association can be held to be a public charitable institution and, as such, entitled to exemption under section 4(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act? "must be answered in favour of the assessee who will have the costs of this reference. RAY J.--I agree. Order accordingly.
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1962 (3) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on which duty is not paid. The onus is not on the prosecution to show that the goods are not, of Indian origin. That appears to be the view taken in the Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty 1962 3 S.C.R. 786 where at the learned Judges observed - "We are therefore of opinion (1) that section 178A was constitutionally valid, (2) that the rule as to the burden of proof enacted by that section applies to a contravention of a notification under section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchanges Regulation Act 1947 by virtue of its being deemed to be a contravention of a notification on under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, (3) that the preliminary requirement of section 178A that the officer seizing should entertain ,’a reasonable belief’ that the goods seized were smuggled" was satisfied in the present case." In our opinion there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. The appellant will surrender to his bail-bonds. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Act and not section 386 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and not section 386 of that as modified and applied to the Municipality of Howrah. It may look rather anomalous but that is what the effect of the modification of the language is. In our opinion therefore the contention of the appellant is well founded and section 38 of the West Bengal Fire Services Act does not repeal section 386 as modified and as applicable to the Municipality of Howrah. From the point of view of the respondent the result may be unfortunate but that is the interpretation of the language of the various section which are relevant in the present case. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and convict the respondent of the offences charged, but in view of the fact that the appellant succeeds on a question of interpretation we do not think it necessary to increase the sentence of fine imposed by the learned Sessions Judge. The appeal is allowed to that extent. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (3) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the claim for commission and interest thereon for supply of sugarcane, and the appellant alleges that it has a counterclaim of a lakh and fifty thousand rupees for short and irregular supply of sugarcane 'against that respondent. These are matters which, in our view, are wholly beyond the purview of s. 48 of the Act, when it is remembered that the second respondent is not a financing bank and that the appellant is not an agriculturist to whom any advances in cash or kind had been made or could have been made so as to bring the appellant within the purview of s.48 (1) e), and consequentially of Explanation 1. The decision of the Patna High Court to the contrary is, therefore, not correct. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs, and it is directed that the Registrar should not entertain the reference, and should not adjudicate upon the dispute, and not make an award. The main contesting parties must be left to their remedies in the ordinary courts. Appeal Allowed.
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1962 (3) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ax Laws Validation Act, 1956, was held constitutionally, valid. Fees ire also included within the taxing power of the legislature in the broadest, sense. Article (1) therefore has no application in the present case and we have to took to Art. 265 which says that "no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law". Sub-section (3) of s. 29-B is the law which retrospectively authorises the levy of licence-fees collected in this case. Retrospective power of the legislature to make a law being there even in the case of taxation, we fail to see how the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 29-B which validate the levy and collection of licence-fees can be hold to be invalid under Art. 31(1). We may add that the same will apply to fees collected under s. II and validated by sub-s. of s. 29-B. There is' therefore no force in this contention. It is hereby rejected. In the result, the petitions are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fee. Petitions dismissed,
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1962 (3) TMI 97 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that by such negligence a breach of contract has resulted. Considering the nature of the business carried on by the assessee, the risk of negligence such as the one attributed to the assessee's servant while acting in the course of their employment is clearly incidental to such business. It follows that the consequential liability to pay damages for such negligence is also incidental to the business. Following the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Badridas Daga v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1958 34 I.T.R. 10; 1959 S.C.R. 690 and Haji Aziz and Abdul Shakoor Bros. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1961 41 I.T.R. 350 and applying the rule in Imperial Oil Company Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue 1948 1 D.L.R. 305, we hold that the assessee is entitled to the deduction claimed and answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Being a case of first impression, we make no order as to costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (3) TMI 96 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gard the above statement in the Tribunal's order as incorporating am admission on behalf of the department that the assessee had a right to make out a new case before the Tribunal or that the new explanation given by him about the credit entry was satisfactory and should be accepted. If any such admission had been made the department would not have moved the tribunal under section 66 (I) and the Tribunal should have made some reference to this admission while rejecting the application under section 66(I). For all these reasons, our answers to the questions referred are that there is no evidence to support the finding of the Tribunal that the sum of ₹ 50,000 was not credited in cash by the assessee on 24th March, 1954, with Ramchandra and Sons, the bankers, and that the affidavit which the assessee filed before the Tribunal could not legally be taken into consideration. The department shall have the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 200.
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1962 (3) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hether under the English law or under the Indian’ statute will give way to the special agreement if any of the parties but it is unnecessary to go into these cases because the offer which was originally made by the appellant and accepted by in the respondent company has not been adhered to and the appellant is not proceeding on an entirely new basis. In our opinion the offer and the acceptance of the terms of the trust deed being wholly different from what has now been executed by the appellant and from the manner in which the new trust has been constituted into a lessee of the company without the company’s agreement it is not possible for a court in equity to accept the new trust as a bar to the respondent’s claim for possession. In this case the appellant has suffered no loss. The amount which he has expended has been returned to him. In our opinion the judgment of the High Court was right and we therefore dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (3) TMI 94 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... greement is not relief against double taxation but avoidance of double taxation. Taking into consideration these facts and circumstances I am of opinion that the records and materials in the present case establish, firstly, that the assessee was admittedly a resident in India during the accounting years, secondly, that it has not been established that the assessee was not a non-resident subsequent to the accounting periods, thirdly, that the income was derived from India as the expression meant at the relevant time of assessment and, finally, that the taxing authorities had jurisdiction to deal with the assessee because his liability to be taxed had accrued prior to August 15, 1947. The agreement between the two Dominions also preserves the jurisdiction of the respective Dominions to assess in accordance with the provisions thereof. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. The assessee is to pay the costs. Certificate for two counsel. G.K. Mitter J.- I agree.
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1962 (3) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e been intended to include wireless receiving sets used ordinarily to receive broadcast programmes." The learned Judge has not expressed a final opinion on the construction of the section. Presumably, he was of opinion that s. 4 applies only to a telephone established, maintained and worked by Government or with its permission. With great respect, the learned Judge has omitted to notice the first proviso to s. 4 of the Act which takes in a licence of a telegraph for one or other of the three purposes mentioned therein. In the result, we hold that as the respondent used the radio without a licence, he committed an offence under s. 20 of the Act. We, therefore, convict him under s. 20 of the Act also. But in the circumstances of this case, we think that no separate sentence is called for. The sentence already imposed under ss. 3 and 6 of the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, is sufficient. In the result, the order of the High Court is modified to the extent indicated.
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