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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 42 Records
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1963 (5) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gh Court is right in holding that the Revenue Court alone has the jurisdiction over the suit and therefore in ordering the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper court. 18. The last point urged is that when the Civil Court had no jurisdiction over the suit, the High Court could not have dealt with the cross-objection filed by the appellant with respect to the adjustment of certain amount paid by the respondent. This contention is correct. When the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit it cannot decide any question on merits. It can simply decide on the question of jurisdiction and coming to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction over the matter had to return the plaint. 19. We therefore dismiss the appeal except in so far as it relates to the order of the High Court on the cross-objection filed by the appellant. We set aside the order dismissing the cross-objection. We order the appellants to pay the costs of the respondent throughout.
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1963 (5) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... greement between the parties as a result of the offer of the respondent accepted by the appellant and a similar note in the formal order dated February 16, 1948, had no reference to the actual order but could refer only to such contemplated supplies of goods for which no orders had been placed. 19. In view of the construction we have placed on the contract between the parties it is not necessary to decide the other contention urged for the appellant that the stipulation in the not amounted to a term in the contract itself for the discharge of the contract and therefore was valid, a contention to which the reply of the respondent is that any such term in a contract which destroys the contract itself according to the earlier terms is void as in that case there would be nothing in the alleged contract which would have been binding on the appellant. 20. We are of opinion that the order of the High Court is correct and therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. 21. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (5) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as required by sub-s. (3) of s. 81 were filed. The only grievance made is that the endorsement "two copies" was not repeated in the enclosure portion of the copy served on the appellant. We have already explained what is meant by the word "copy" in sub-s. (3) of s. 81 and we are of the view that the defects pointed out on behalf of the appellant are not of such a character as to invalidate the copy which was served on the appellant in the present case. 23. In conclusion we have to point out that we allowed one Dr. Z.A. Ahmed to intervene in these appeals on the grounds mentioned in his petition dated April 4, 1963. The intervener supported the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant. We have fully dealt with those arguments in this judgment and nothing further need be said about the intervener's petition. 24. For the reasons given above, we see to merit in these two appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs. 25. Appeals dismissed.
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1963 (5) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itled to succeed to the entire estate, a case which is covered by s. III of this Regulation. 53. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to decide the other contentions raised in this case. We, therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court below and dismiss the application of the respondents presented to the District Judge under s. IV of Regulation V of 1799. We order that the respondents will pay the costs of the appellant throughout. 54. Before parting with the case we would like to draw attention of Government to these provisions which appear to be somewhat out of date and which need to be repealed. Ample power is to be found in the Indian Succession Act and the Code of Civil Procedure to safeguard such rights and there is hardly any need for a provision which was passed to remove certain doubts created by the Regulation of 1793. ORDER OF COURT 55. In view of the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed with costa throughout. 56. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... varamba Bungalow in Katakampalli Pakuthi in Trivandrum Taluk, while Pinarummoottil tarwad was shown as at Pathirikari Muri in Vanchiyoor Pakuthi in Trivandrum. This again proves that the tarwad had two houses which were occupied by different branches. 22. We are satisfied that the exemption under the Act has been duly proved in this case. Since Bhagavathi Valli was not subject to part IV of the Ezhava Act, it is obvious that under the pure Marumakkathayam law, Meenakshi and Vesudevan were not her heirs, but Bhagavathi Narayani and her daughter Gouri. Of these Gouri Narayani joined in executing the document 'R' in favour of the answering respondent, which was executed by the legal representatives of the original mortgagee. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the present appellant was not entitled to redeem the otti, having never enjoyed the jenmom rights. The appeal, therefore, must fail and is dismissed with costs. 23. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (5) TMI 73 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... und is created by operation of the Insurance Act. But these facts cannot in our opinion justify the classification of the two kinds of businesses into two different businesses for the purposes of the Income-tax Act. We are, accordingly, of the view that the assessee having continued to carry on the same business in the succeeding years, the unabsorbed losses of the earlier years are available to be set off against the profits of the subsequent years. A further question was argued whether the amendment of the Act in 1953 was or was not retrospective in its scope. That question would arise only if we had held against the assessee on the first point. In that event, it would have been necessary to examine whether the amendment gave the right of adjustment only on and after the date thereof. In the view that we have taken, it is unnecessary to examine this question. The question referred to us is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee, which will be entitled to its costs.
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1963 (5) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to which reference was made, i.e.,Narsee Nagsee & Co. case (Supra) is the same case decided by this court, which was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, by its majority decision, affirmed the decision of this court but on a different line of reasoning. It was held that the notice under section 11(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act must be given within the financial year which commenced next after the expiry of the accounting period or the previous year which was by itself or included the chargeable accounting period in question. If notice was not so given, then the case fell under section 14 of the Act. In this view of the matter, it was held that the notice given in the case which purported to be one under section 11 was in fact a notice under section 14, and, therefore, governed by the period of limitation mentioned in section 14. For the reasons stated above, in our opinion, the petition should fail. The rule is, therefore, discharged with costs.
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1963 (5) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the losses prior to reconstruction do not come within the expression "losses incurred by the company in earlier years" for the purpose of the application of section 23A of the Act. They are relevant to be considered even though they may not be surviving in the books of the company as unadjusted or carried forward losses. It may be that even after taking such losses into consideration, it may be possible to come to a conclusion that the company was not justified in riot declaring a larger dividend but that is not the conclusion of the Tribunal in the present case. What the Tribunal has done is that it has refused to take them into consideration at all, because it has taken the view that after the adjustment against capital they do not survive for consideration for the purpose of the application of section 23A. That view, in our opinion, is wrong. Our answer, therefore, to the third question is in the affirmative. The assessee will get its costs from the department.
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1963 (5) TMI 70 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave declined to interfere in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred by article 226 of the Constitution, but the entire records have been placed before me as also the correspondence of which copies have been produced, apart from the material orders, and I am satisfied that no order was made whatsoever with regard to the return relating to the assessment year 1952-53, and that the return was simply ignored. In these circumstances, the notice in so far as it relates to and is maintained to relate to the year ending 31st March, 1952 (assessment year 1952-53), issued under section 34 by the respondents, must be quashed and is hereby quashed. It may be mentioned that the counsel for the petitioners also argued that since the partnership firm had been dissolved with effect from the 1st April, 1952, the notice was vitiated, but, in view of my decision on the first point, I have considered it wholly unnecessary to go into this matter. There will be no order as to costs.
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1963 (5) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lication. The contention that the Government could not get the benefit of this law in connection with its business activities was neither repelled nor considered. It was held to have no foundation as there was nothing on the record that the Food Department of the Government of West Bengal by undertaking rationing and distribution of food on a rational basis had embarked upon any trade or business and, in the absence of any such indication, it appeared that the department was discharging the elementary duty of a sovereign to ensure proper and equitable distribution of available foodstuffs with a view to maintaining peace and good government. 19. In view of what we have said above, we hold that the Union of India (UOI) carries on the business of running railways and can be sued in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati within whose territorial jurisdiction the headquarters of one of the railways run by the Union is situated. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1963 (5) TMI 68 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rial before us to come definitely to a conclusion in this respect. Even if we take notice of the subsequent legal proceeding and decision in this regard, as a Court of appeal can do, that will not be helpful to the plaintiffs until they amend their plaint suitably and change their averments in accordance with the changed position. Whether the suit on the plaint, as it stands, can be maintained against the defendant No. 1 or what amendment, if applied for by the plaintiffs, will be allowed to the plaint, are matters for the trial Court to decide. 19. The result is that the appeal is allowed in part and the judgment and decree of the trial Court are modified to the extent that the defendant No. 2 is expunged from the suit and the case against the defendant No. 1 is remanded for disposal according to law. The defendant No. 2 will be entitled to costs from the plaintiffs in this Court. The costs of other parties will abide the result of the suit. Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 20. I agree.
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1963 (5) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... making alterations in the registers of members cannot be held to be illegal or void and, in the circumstances, the burden lay upon the person making the application under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, to prove facts which would justify rectification of the registers of members. The Court can refuse to exercise summary jurisdiction under Section 155 in cases where complicated question of title is involved, leaving it open to the applicant to seek his remedy before the civil court. The present was a fit case in which this Court could refuse to exercise such jurisdiction, and as the burden of proof lay upon the applicants all the applications deserved dismissal though leaving it open to the applicants to seek such other remedy as they may be advised. 31. All the four Special Appeals are hereby allowed and the orders of the Company Judge are set aside. The application under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, shall stand dismissed. Costs throughout on the parties.
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1963 (5) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... required to pay fluty it will be illegal. For; the reasons stated by us earlier, we are of opinion that there having been an imposition of fine ins lieu of confiscation, there has been no actual confiscation of the goods so as to vest title in the government in respect thereof and the goods are' in the position of being liable to be redeemed by the importer on payment of fine. To such goods there will be a liability to pay customs duty, inasmuch as the goods had admittedly been imported into this country by sea. Secondly the imposition of fine only validates the import and it will have no further effect of absolving the importer from payment of customs duty. That liability is independent of the liability to pay fine in lieu of confiscation and will therefore subsist. The Collector of Customs in our opinion was justified in declining to deliver the goods unless the duty was paid. ( 21. ) The appeal is therefore allowed. The respondent will pay the costs of the appellant.
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1963 (5) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ionate value of the third mine and that leads us to the question as to the manner of determination of the proportionate value. We are of opinion that a reasonably accurate method of estimating the value of the third mine would be to compute it on the basis of the income yielded by each of the three mines during the period they worked. Admittedly such figures are available, as the assessee has returned the income from these mines during all of these years. The value of the third mine which ceased working in this year of account shall, therefore, be taken to be that proportion of the original outstanding of 23,000 and odd dollars as the total income yielded by this third mine bears to the total of the income of all the three mines. This question is accordingly answered in this manner, viz., that the assessee is entitled to write off such proportionate amount as indicated above. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Question answered accordingly.
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1963 (5) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... siderations. The goodwill of some businesses is derived almost entirely from the place where they are carried on. Some goodwills are purely personal, and some goodwills derive their value partly from the locality where business is carried on, partly from the reputation built up around the name of the individual or firm or company under which it was previously being carried on." It is manifest, therefore, that the term "goodwill" must be understood in a much broader sense than what was suggested by learned counsel for the assessee. On the materials available to the tax authorities, which I have indicated above, I am of opinion that they were justified in going behind the conveyance and fixing the valuation in the way they have done. The answer to the question referred to us shall, therefore, be in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this application. Certified for counsel. SEN J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (5) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... atutory provision. In such a case,, it would, no doubt, be open to industrial adjudication to have regard to all the relevant considerations before awarding the claim and in doing so, if it appears that a claim for bonus was made after long lapse of time, industrial adjudication may refuse to entertain the claim, or Government -nay refuse to make reference in that behalf. But these considerations would , be irrelevant when claims are made under s. 33C (2), where these claims are, as in the present case, based on an award and are intended 'merely to execute the award. In such a case, limitation cannot be introduced by industrial adjudication on academic ground of social justice. It can be introduced, if at all, by the legislature. Therefore, we think, that the Labour Court was right in rejecting the appellant's contention that since the present claim was belated, it should not be awarded. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1963 (5) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... trong parties are opposed to the petitioner in various ways. Whether they would exercise any influence upon the magistracy and whether magistracy would be able to withstand such a pressure, if made, is not germane to the present petition. We are of opinion that the petitioner has, by his affidavit, made out sufficient circumstances from which it can be inferred that he does entertain, and entertain reasonably, an apprehension that he would not get justice in these cases. In similar circumstances, this Court has not hesitated on an earlier occasion to transfer certain cases outside the State of Punjab. In our opinion, the present case is also one in which the interests of justice demand that the cases should be transferred outside the State of Punjab. We direct that the two cases shall be transferred to Sharanpur District and shall be tried there by a Magistrate who shall be chosen by the District Magistrate of Saharanpur for their disposal according to law. Petition allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on with the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act which applied to such applications but on the Court's deciding the question of limitation in connection with which sub-s. (2) of s. 10 followed practically the language of s. 3 of the Limitation Act as it said that no such application would be entertained unless it was made within a certain time. We arc therefore of opinion that the High Court fell in error in interfering with the finding of fact arrived at by the Subordinate judge with respect to the appellants having sufficient cause for not making an application for bringing the respondents on record within time and for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time. We allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the order of the Court below and restore that of the Trial Court. It will 'now proceed according to law with the further execution of the decree on the second application presented by the appellant for the purpose. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eposit lying in court but who cannot, on the record of the case, be shown to have withdrawn the amount. If the petition had mentioned that the decision of the appeal court had proceeded on the ground that' the amount was taken out, it is difficult to imagine that this Court would have given special leave to decide a question of discretion. I have considered the matter carefully. This is not a case of a mere error in the narration of facts or of a bona fide error of judgment which in certain circumstances may be considered to be venial faults. This is a case of being disingenuous with the Court by making out a point of law on a suppositions state of facts, which facts, if told candidly, leave no room for the discussion of law. The appellant has by dissembling in this Court induced it to grant special leave in a case which did not merit it. I agree, therefore, that this leave should be recalled and the appellant, made to pay the costs of this appeal. Special Leave revoked.
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1963 (5) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l of the respondents on the other charge;, viz , ss. 343, 348 and s. 201 read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Session judge awarded a sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment for the offence under s. 331 of the Indian Penal Code. Though we have altered the conviction to one under s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code, we do not think we shall be justified in reducing the sentence. A serious view cannot but be taken of such a barbarous method of dealing with persons suspected of a crime as was committed by these respondents in this case. It is necessary that deterrent sentences should be inflicted for such an offence when established. Accordingly, we convict the respondents under s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code and we sentence each of them to five years' rigorous imprisonment. The appeal is thus allowed in part and is dismissed as regards the acquittal of the respondents on other charges. The accused to surrender to their bail. Appeal allowed in part.
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