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Showing 21 to 40 of 51 Records
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1963 (8) TMI 55 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sposed of. On the other hand proceedings have been started under section 34(1)(a). These proceedings have been held to be without jurisdiction and, therefore, assessment under section 34(3) could only be made in the proceedings taken or to be taken on the basis of the return filed by the assessee under section 23. It may still be open to the department to take such proceedings and on that matter we do not pronounce any opinion as we are not called upon to do so. But no proceedings under section 34(3) can be taken when the only proceedings on the basis of which action had been taken were under section 34(1)(a). If those proceedings are of no consequence, on their basis no action under section 34(3) can be taken. In this view of the matter the second question must also be decided against the department. For the reasons given above, both the questions are answered in the negative. The assessee will have her costs, which are assessed at ₹ 200. SHAMSHER BAHADUR J.--I agree.
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1963 (8) TMI 54 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g particular benefits", that is conferring on the members some tangible benefit which would not be available to them unless they paid the specific fees charged for such special benefits. 19. The conclusion reached by me hereinbefore also receives support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Commission of Income-tax v. Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. 20. On behalf of the assessee, strong reliance was placed on certain observations found in Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, I have not thought it necessary to consider that decision. That apart, we were informed that the decision is under appeal to the Supreme Court. 21. For the reasons mentioned above, my answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and in favour of the department. 22. Assessee shall pay the costs of this reference. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. 23. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (8) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... resumption under s. 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the appellant's conviction of the offence with which he was charged must be maintained on the basis of that presumption. In this view of the matter we do not propose to consider whether the High Court was right in basing its conclusion also on the other evidence adduced in the case to prove the actual payment of illegal gratification by the partners of the firm M/s. Ramdas Chhankanda Ram. Lastly, Mr. Lall prayed that the sentence be reduced. The sentence imposed on the appellant is one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹ 5,000/-. Under s. 5(2) the minimum sentence has to be one year's imprisonment, subject to the proviso that the Court may for special reasons to be recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. We are unable to see anything that would justify us in taking action under the proviso. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... specified to be produced were in fact made available by the assessees and it would be a mere guess unsupported by any evidence to say that there must have been other books which the assessees deliberately refrained from producing In our opinion, the Tribunal was not right in holding that there must has been a suppression of accounts on the part of the assessees so as to justify the penalty of non-registration as contemplated u/s 23(4) We have already pointed out that even if the assessees were to be treated as defaulters so as to attract assessment on the best judgment basis, it would yet be a matter of discretion for the officer either to grant or refuse registration This aspect of the matter was not considered at all either by the officer or by the Tribunal o p /o p For the reasons stated above we are of opinion that the question must be answered in favour of the assessees We, however, make no order as to costs o p /o p Question answered in favour of the assessee o p /o p
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1963 (8) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion in which no appeal lies to the High Court. The present cases answer the description as the Orders of the Subordinate Judge were erroneous in denying a Jurisdiction and no appeal lay to the High Court against them. Even otherwise, the trial judge was in error in not dismissing the suits. His decision that the suits were not maintainable and yet keeping them pending was itself an exercise of jurisdiction with a material irregularity. If the trial judge had dismissed the suits and passed decrees there would undoubtedly have been appeals and no revision would have lain. But the order actually passed by him was not a decree nor even an order made appealable by s. 104 of the Code. Involving as it did a clear question of jurisdiction it was revisable and the High Court was within its rights in correcting it by the exercise of its powers under s. 115 of the Code. The appeals must therefore fail and I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother Shah, J. Appeals dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 50 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... likely to come up for decision; ordinarily if there is any "material", that is to say, good ground for such action, the application of the proviso cannot be questioned; further, the superior officers and the Appellate Tribunal at the end would be the venue for the correction of any capricious action. The existence or the sufficiency of the material on which an Income- tax Officer has come to the conclusion that the method of accounting employed is not such as to disclose the true income, profits and gains is undoubtedly open to review by the appellate authorities. The opinion of the Income-tax Officer on that question should be based on good grounds. His conclusion in that regard can be challenged before the appellate authorities. For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The department shall pay the costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1963 (8) TMI 49 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be invalid, then the validity of the proceedings taken by the Income-tax Officer without a notice or in pursuance of an invalid notice would be illegal and void." In view of these clear observations by the Supreme Court, I do not think there is any scope for any further argument in this matter. The notice which was issued and served in the instant case was obviously invalid and the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer were, consequently, illegal and void. The service of notice on the assessee was a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Income-tax Officer under section 34. No consent can confer jurisdiction upon a court if the court has no jurisdiction. The failure to give the requisite notice deprives the Income-tax Officer of his jurisdiction to assess under section 34. The answer to the question framed is, therefore, in the negative. The respondent will pay to the applicant the costs of this reference. Certified for counsel. Sen J.-I agree.
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1963 (8) TMI 48 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
UNCLAIMED WAGES - EXPENSES FOR REPLACING OLD MACHINERY BY NEW, NATURE OF ... ... ... ... ..... enditures, particularly where it happens to be an expenditure of a preliminary type, is this one, but none the less, it is a perceptible one. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for universal applications and each case must depend upon its own facts and circumstances. It would therefore be the duty of the court to find out from a scrutiny of facts and circumstances the true and proper nature of such expenditure. In our view, the Tribunal was right in the conclusion that it arrived at, namely, that the expenditure incurred by the assessee-company in respect of these two tours undertaken in the years 1955 and 1956 was not revenue expenditure but was capital expenditure. In t?e result, our answer to the question referred to us on this aspect of the case by the Tribunal is in the negative. In view of the fact that both the parties have partially succeeded, it is agreed by them that the proper order of costs would be that each party should bear his own costs of this reference.
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1963 (8) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ve been so severe on appellant No. 1 when it observed that the material produced by appellant No. 1 had a tendency to mislead the Court, if not an actual attempt to do so. It is undoubtedly true that Thimmaraju should have looked into the record more carefully and should have stated clearly that the facts stated in the statement filed by him were taken partly from the individual service register of appellant No. 2 and partly from the Register, which is kept as a general Register for gazetted servants in the State. Therefore, we think there is some substance in the contention made by the learned Attorney-General that the harsh criticism made by the High Court against appellant No. 1 is not fully justified. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the. order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed with costs throughout, There will be one set of hearing fees in both the appeals filed by the two appellants. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (8) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case." These general observations made in the context of admissions to college cannot, in my view, be applied in the case of a reservation of appointments in the matter of recruitment to a cadre of particular service. The doctrine of "destruction" of the fundamental right depends upon the entire cadre strength and the percentage reserved out of that strength. Further, the expression used in the observa- tions, Viz. "generally" and "broadly", show that the ob- servations were intended only to be a workable guide but not an inflexible rule of law even in the case of admissions to colleges. I cannot, therefore, hold that in the present case the provision made by the State was not for reservation but for a purpose not sanctioned by the Constitution. In the re- sult, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with majority opinion the Writ Petition is allowed with costs.
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1963 (8) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the grounds mentioned in section 34(1)(b), it should be open to him to call in aid other grounds available to him and which actually emerge at the time of the proceedings themselves, is not now properly before us. That question does not arise from the order of the Tribunal. Whether it would be open to the assessee to raise the point before the Tribunal when the matter is again taken up for consideration by it for disposal of the case on the merits is a question upon which we do not express any opinion. The Tribunal has disposed of the appeal merely on the ground that section 34(1)(b) was not applicable. We have now held that that view is not correct. It will be open to the Tribunal to take back the appeal on its file after receipt of this reference and dispose it of in accordance with law. Questions Nos. 1 and 2 are answered against the department and question No. 3 is answered in favour of the department. There will be no order as to costs. Questions answered accordingly.
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1963 (8) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fore, manifest that in Bombay Presidency the rule accepted in Dattaka Chandrika has never been followed and the share of an adopted son in-competition with a natural born son among Sudras has always been 1/5th in the family property, i.e., 1/4th of the natural born son’s share. Nothing has been placed before us to compel us to depart from the long established rule prevalent in the Bombay State. We, therefore, cannot accept the argument of Mr. Chatterjee in this regard. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1960 filed by the plaintiff and defendant 3 is dismissed with costs, and Civil Appeal No. 334 of 1960 filed by defendants 1, 2, 4, (1892) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 100. 5, the legal representatives of defendant 7 and def. 8, except to the extent of the 8th defendant’s right to maintenance under Ex. 371, is dismissed with costs. So far as the 8th defendant is concerned, the appeal filed by her is allowed with costs proportionate to her interest in the property throughout.
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1963 (8) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a confession which is relevant can be proved by oral evidence in view of the provision of s. 164 of the Code?
Held that:- The High Court in the present case rightly rejected the oral evidence of Mr. Dixit. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
Whether "the extent of control and regulation" provided by the Central Act takes within its fold the area or the subject covered by the Orissa Act?
Held that:- Where an intention to effect a repeal is attributed to a legislature then the same would in our opinion, attract the incident of the saving found in s. 6 for the rules of construction embodied in the General Clauses Act are, so to speak, the basic assumptions on which statutes are drafted. If this were the true position about the effect of the Central Act 67 of 1957 as the liability to pay the fee which was the subject of the notices of the demand had accrued prior to June 1, 1958 it would follow that these notices were valid and the amounts due thereunder could be recovered notwithstanding the disappearance of the Orissa Act by virtue of the superior legislation by the Union Parliament. The appeals would, therefore, be allowed and the Writ Petitions would stand dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is that there is no valid circumstances whatsoever which will indicate that the intention was to purchase and re-sell for gain and not to make a prudent investment in land in an important portion of an important town when the same was available at a price that was attractive. Part of the consideration was no doubt found by selling a part of the property and another part by means of an overdraft. But that is the way in which many investments are made and we see no reason to hold that that fact will sustain the conclusion that the transaction was an adventure in the nature of trade. It follows that the question referred has to be answered in the negative and against the department. We do so. The department will pay the costs of the assessee. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1963 (8) TMI 40 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mpugned Act cannot be regarded as a colourable piece of legislation. It was directly within the competence of the State Legislature and it is too much to contend that the Legislature had resorted to the device of clothing the legislation in a form which would make it appear that it was within its legislative power. If really it was beyond its competence, the form in which it was clothed will not save the Act from condemnation because a Legislature cannot violate the constitutional prohibitions. As already mentioned, it was within the power of the State Legislature to make sales tax laws. For these reasons, the third contention is also rejected. It follows that the impugned legislation is quite valid and its constitutionality cannot be questioned. In the result, W.P. Nos. 820 to 824 of 1959 and W.P. No. 1006 of 1959 are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee in each Rs. 50 (Fifty). W.P. No. 929 of 1959 is dismissed without costs as it has not been admitted. Petitions dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bility incurred are very general and comprehensive and ordinarily take in both civil and criminal liability. There was no reason why the all comprehensive word should not carry its full import but be restricted to civil liability alone? The learned Judge further observed that the context does not compel any such limitation. Under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, section 61 provides that the repeal of the Sales Tax Act, 1939, shall not affect the previous operation of the said Act or any right, title or obligation or liability already acquired, accrued, or incurred. The wording of the saving section, section 61 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, is the same as found in section 48(2) of the Bombay General Sales Tax Act, 1953, and therefore the decision of the Supreme Court holds goods in this case also. The order of acquittal, therefore, is erroneous and is hereby set aside. The case will be re-tried by the District Magistrate of Ramanathapuram. Order set aside.
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1963 (8) TMI 38 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... de hosiery or knitted garments from readymade garments cannot in any way affect or widen the plain and natural meaning of the term ready-made garment so as to include hosiery goods. The amendment is only by way of abundant caution so as to place beyond doubt or controversy that ready-made garments do not include hosiery goods. 8.. Learned counsel for the assessee stated before us that the assessee was in fact dealers in ready-made garments and not in hosiery goods. This contention cannot be entertained in this reference which has been made on the finding that the assessee is a dealer in hosiery goods. 9.. For all these reasons, our answer to the question propounded is that hosiery goods are not ready-made garments falling under entry No. 2 of Part IV of Schedule II to the Act, and that they are liable to sales tax at the rate of four per cent., according to entry No. 1 of Part VI of the Schedule. We make no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (8) TMI 37 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ject of course to the other provisions of the Constitution, such as Article 286(2). The significant words are subject of course to the other provisions the Constitution, such as Article 286(2). 9.. Article 286(2) of the Constitution (omitting the proviso thereto) provided Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The State loses these cases not for any lack of a parliamentary provision authorising the imposition of the tax but for the reason that out of quiescence or carelessness it has not chosen to alter the date specified in section 26 of the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, from 31st March, 1951, to 6th September, 1955. 10.. In the light of what is stated above these petitions have to be allowed and we do so, Advocate s fee Rs. 300 for all the three cases together.
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1963 (8) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Lakshmi Mills Company Limited, Coimbatore, who were the petitioners in T.C. No. 288 of 1962. This petition arises out of the assessment in the year 1956-57. The dispute is whether the purchase turnover of cotton amounting to Rs. 2,27,205-2-0 at the Koilpatti branch relates to inter-State purchases. In this case also the sellers agents took delivery of the cotton at Tuticorin Port and delivered the goods at the Koilpatti branch by lorry. The Tribunal has taken the view that the transaction cannot be viewed as inter-State in character because there was break of journey at the Tuticorin Port in the course of movement of the goods from Bombay to Koilpatti. We have held in T.C. No. 288 of 1962 that this view is untenable. For the reasons stated in that decision we are of opinion that the petitioners must succeed in this case. In the result, the order of the Tribunal relating to the turnover of Rs. 2,27,205-2-0 is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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