|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 57 Records
-
1964 (8) TMI 78 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... not know that there was any incorrect entry in the accounts and, therefore, could not be held to have concealed income from the return was accepted. Here the accounts were maintained by the assessee and it could not plead that it did not know the real nature of the entry of ₹ 76,000 standing to the credit of Haji Abdul Qayum. Sri S.D. Agarwal also relied upon a decision of this court in Lal Chand Gopal Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 48 ITR 324 but the observations made therein go against his contentions ; it does not at all support him. In the result our answer to question No. 2, if it must be answered, is in the affirmative. We direct that a copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. We further direct that the assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax his costs of this reference, which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200.
-
1964 (8) TMI 77 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s submitted that as the building was in one of the plots sold in March, 1960, there was no building on the portion that remained and that as a result the sales effected subsequent to March, 1960, should in any case be considered as sales of agricultural land. We do not agree. In our view, whether there was a building or not, the entire plot should be considered as non-agricultural land and the profits or gains derived by the petitioner from the sales he effected should be considered as assessable under section 12B of the Act. We must also add that there was nothing to prevent the petitioner from filing appeals under sections 30 and 33 of the Act and then agitating the controversy under section 66 of the Act. We think that this is the way in which he should have brought up the matter before this court, and not by a petition under article 226 of the Constitution. In the light of what is stated above, this petition has to be dismissed and we do so. No costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ot correct the witnesses would have stated that on the death of Rukhma Bai, Vitha Bai inherited the field set apart for Rukhma Bai herself. In the view of the Appellate Judge, therefore, the evidence of the plaintiffs' witnesses established that Vitha Bai had died after Rukhma Bai. We are unable to see how absence of any statement made by the plaintiffs' witnesses that Vitha Bai did not inherit the property was a circumstance from which an inference could be drawn in favour of the defendant. In any event the High Court has preferred the view taken by the Trial Court and has refused to accept the view taken by the First Appellate Court and in an appeal with special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court will not ordinarily discard the findings of the High Court on what is essentially a question of fact, and on which question the- Court was competent under the law governing the appeal before it to arrive. 7. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1964 (8) TMI 75 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... must be held to be no longer good law. The spindles in respect of which the aforesaid expenditure was incured and for which the development rebate was claimed by the assessee are clearly machinery and, when installed in the ring-frames, would constitute a self-contained unit for spinning. Though, therefore, they by themselves may not be said to be a self-contained unit, they must be held to be "machinery" and the spindles must also be held to have been installed for the purposes of the second paragraph of clause (vi) and clause (via) and, consequently, the expenditure incurred in their purchase and in substituting them for the old spindles would be entitled to development rebate. In the circumstances, therefore, the Tribunal was not correct in disallowing the development rebate. Our answer to the question referred to us must therefore be in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay to the applicant the costs of this reference. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1964 (8) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... igently pursued that remedy, it is not possible to hold him guilty of such laches as would prevent this court from giving him an opportunity of obtaining a decision of the Tribunal on the ground which was urged and pressed but not decided by it. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the department that the matter having been before the High Court under section 66(2) and section 66(4) and again under section 66A of the Act, it would not be proper for this court to grant the prayer of the petitioner. There is no force in this contention. At no stage did the High Court record any finding on the question as to whether the application filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal was one which could be said to be barred by time. For reasons given above, I would set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 9th June, 1956, and direct the Tribunal to dispose of that application afresh in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1964 (8) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... his prosecution was bad because it was not at the instance of the Government or an Electrical Inspector or a person aggrieved by the theft. It was clearly for the respondent if it was minded to go into that question, to establish that the prosecution had been instituted at the instance of a person aggrieved as it now seeks to do. It has never been disputed at any earlier stage that the prosecution had not been at the instance of one of the persons mentioned in s. 50. The onus of proving that fact was clearly on the respondent. It is a question of fact and we have no material on the record by which we can decide it. We, therefore, think that this case must be decided on the basis, as it was in the courts below, that the prosecution would be incompetent under s. 50 if it was in respect of an offence against the Act. We have found that it was in respect of such an offence. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the conviction of the appellant is set aside. Appeal allowed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... has been impounded under that sub-section can, within 7 days of seizure, get it released on fulfilling certain conditions. Such a claim could only be made by a person who is the owner of the animal impounded or who has at least the custody of the animal. We cannot, therefore, accept the first point raised by Mr. Kohli. Upon the finding that the raiding party was entitled in law to impound the cattle no question of private defence arises. For, S. 99 of the lndan Penal Code specifically says that there is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of previous hurt,, if done, or attempted to be done by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office. ’Me protection extends even to acts which will not be strictly justifiable by law. But here the act was fully justisiable by the law. There is thus no substance in the second point either. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd the centre of many controversies. The book is probably an unfolding of his philosophy of life and of the urges of the Unconscious but these are unfolded in his other books also and have been fully set out in his Psychoanalysis and the- Unconscious and finally in the Fantasia of the Unconscious. There is no loss to society if there was a message in the book. The divagations with sex are not a legitimate embroidery but they are the only attractions to the common man. When everything said in its favour we find that in treating with sex the impugned portions viewed separately and also in the setting of the whole book pass the permissible limits judged of from our community standards and as there is no social gain to us which can be said to preponderate, we must hold the book to satisfy the test we have indicated above. In the conclusion we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in dismissing the revision petition. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 70 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tion or for the purchase of the work seems to me to be the cost to him; and that whether someone has given him the money to construct or purchase for himself; or before the event has promised to give him the money after he has paid for the work; or after the event has promised or given the money which recoups him what he has spent." See also the decision of the Supreme Court in Hoshiarpur Electric Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1961 41 I.T.R. 608 (S.C.). We are in entire agreement with the decisions of the Bombay and Patna High Courts cited above, and must answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. We do so, but without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1964 (8) TMI 69 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f the produce concerned. In the light of what is stated above, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. We would like to add, however, that a fuller investigation is indicated in regard to sole crepe, and that the answer we have given should not form a precedent for the future. We say this particularly because we are not satisfied with the thoroughness of the investigation that has been made, and have answered the question in the way we have done only because questions of fact are not within our purview but within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The reference is answered as in the last preceding paragraph, but without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1964 (8) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the transfer of shamlat deh owned by the proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of management in the manner described above and the conferment of proprietary rights on non proprietors in respect of lands in abadi deh is illegal and the several provisions of law allowing this to be done are ultra vires Art. 31 inasmuch as no compensation is payable or whether the law and the action taken are protected by Art. 31-A?
Held that:- If agrarian reforms are to succeed, mere distribution of land to the landless is not enough. There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the village Panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than individual owners of small portions of lands Further, the village Panchayat is an authority for purposes of Part III as was conceded before us and it has the protection of Art 3 1 -A because of this character even if the taking over of sham lat deh amounts to acquisition. In our opinion, the High Court was right in deciding as it did on this part of the case.
With respect to abadi deh the same reasoning must apply 'The settling of a body of agricultural artisans (such as the village carpenter, the village blacksmith, the village tanner farrier, wheelwright, barber, washerman etc.) is a part of rural planning and can be comprehended in a scheme of agrarian reforms. It is a trite saying that India lives in villages and a scheme to make villages self-sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of the larger reforms which consolidation of holdings, fixing of ceilings on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate. The four Acts, namely, the Con- solidation Act, the Village Panchayat Act, the Common Lands Regulation Act and the Security of Tenure Act are a part of a general scheme of reforms and any modification of rights such as the present had the protection of Art. 31-A. The High Court was thus right in its conclusion on this part of the case also. Appeal dismissed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 67 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n the part of the department to communicate the same cannot be taken advantage of by the department. The obligation to communicate the order cannot be circumvented or evaded by the department and a power of revision exercised in contravention of section 32(2)(a). The assessee s right of appeal which would operate as a bar to the exercise of the powers of revision cannot be defeated by the negligence or the omission on the part of the department to communicate the order of assessment. The contention put forward by the learned Government Pleader would place the assessee completely at the mercy and caprice of the department. We have no hesitation in rejecting this argument as of no substance, and it is directly contrary to the scheme of section 32. The words proceeding recorded cannot possibly be equated to an order of assessment not communicated. For all these reasons we allow the revision petition, setting aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal. No costs. Petition allowed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er of the assessing authority fixing the turnover at Rs. 12,866.77 was based only upon the accounts of the assessee which had been checked and perused by the assessing authority. We do not think that this circumstance makes any difference as to rule out the applicability of section 32. Whether or not a return is submitted by the assessee, if the assessing authority applies his mind to the business dealings and transactions of an assessee and excludes certain items in the assessable turnover on an erroneous view of the law the revising authority will have undoubted jurisdiction to exercise its powers of revision. What is of importance is the fact, that the assessing authority had applied its mind to all the dealings and transactions of the assessee. We, therefore, hold that in the present case, the Deputy Commissioner had ample jurisdiction to exercise his powers of revision under section 32 of Act. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 65 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... only to construct a buildings and it could not be said that there was a sale of the materials used in the construction. This decision renders little assistance to Sri Ranganathachari. We are of the opinion that the correct position has been explained in the decisions cited by the learned Government Pleader, Gannon Dunkerly and Company (Madras) Private Limited v. Government of Madras 1964 15 S.T.C. 40. and A. Ebrahim and Company v. State of Bombay 1962 13 S.T.C. 877. The tests for inclusion in the taxable turnover are whether the sales effected were connected with the nature of the business carried on by the dealer and whether the entire course of business activity was not intended to be engaged in with the profit motive. It is abolutely clear to us that these tests are satisfied in this case. The sales will, therefore, be included in the taxable turnover and assessed. We, therefore, allow these revisions which costs. Advocate s consolidated fee of Rs. 150. Petitions allowed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 64 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of that firm were at Rewa (M.P.). The least that was expected of him was to have made at least one effort to comply with the provisions of rule 77 which in clear terms, inter alia, required him to serve a notice by registered post and only upon the failure of that mode of service he could have resorted to service by affixation. In the present case the report of the process-server shows that service by affixation was resorted to in the very first instance which was clearly in contravention of the provisions of rule 77. For the reasons given above, the assessment order and the notice of demand wherein the name of Messrs Panna Lal Umesh Kumar was subsequently added by the stroke of pen, are wholly without authority of law and require to be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The Sales Tax Officer is also restrained from taking any further proceedings in respect of that assessment order against the petitioner. The application is allowed with costs. Application allowed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... livery, debited by supply of brass sheets and discs of equal weight periodically at the time of supply of the sheets and discs an extra rebate in addition to the usual manufacturing charges was given based upon the additional requirement of zinc when copper scrap alone had to be melted. We are of the opinion that the fact that copper scrap was supplied instead of brass scrap, would not make any difference in the nature of this transaction. We hold, following the decision in Raju Chettiar s case 1955 6 S.T.C. 131., that there was no transfer of property in the scrap from the assessee to the rolling mills when it was delivered, that none of the elements of sale was present in the transaction and that the contract was only for manufacture and supply of brass discs and sheets out of scrap delivered. We allow the revision cases and set aside the assessments on the assessee on the disputed turnover before us in both the cases. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y the cloth alone. It is not in dispute that the cloth he stocks is sold by him only for such customers as are prepared to buy the cloth as well as entrust the stitching work to him. But, on that account, it cannot be held that two contracts, one for the sale of cloth and another for stitching the material, cannot be entered into. That will depend, as we have already mentioned, on the facts of each case. In the present case, the order book clearly support the inference of there having been two contracts entered into, one for the sale of cloth and the other for stitching it into a garment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the assessment of the assessee on the disputed turnover as representing the sale of finished garments is not supportable. It is also common ground that at that period the cloth as such was not assessable to sales tax. Therefore, we allow the revision petition and set aside the assessment on the disputed turnover. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 61 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in the present case there is no scope for assessing cotton waste once over again as cotton at the purchase point in the hands of the assessee, on the ground that after purchase he was proposing to export it outside the State. It has been also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that practically the entire turnover in cotton waste has been purchased by the assessee from spinning mills, and consequently the commodity has already suffered tax at single point. By viewing it as cotton and subjecting it to a fresh taxation, section 5(ii) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act which prescribes only a single point levy for cotton is also violated. We therefore allow the revision case and set aside the assessment order on the disputed turnover. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Since the assessee has got no turnover in cotton as such, the prayer for refund of licence fee has also to be allowed and it is also granted. Petition allowed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 60 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ale and the test of last stage for single point levy both occurring in one and the same year of assessment. The transactions where these two events fall in different years may turn out to be marginal cases, quite a few in number. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the assessment of the disputed turnover in the present case, solely on the ground that they remained as unsold stock at the end of the assessment year, and without considering whether the sales tax had become exigible with reference to the stage for single point levy mentioned in the Second Schedule, is improper. Therefore, we confirm the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and dismiss the revision. There will be no order as to costs. T.C. No. 125 of 1963. No one appeared for the respondent before us in this case. But the principle laid down above will apply to this revision case also. Therefore, this revision case is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1964 (8) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... eral of Supplies and Disposals for selling the vehicles at the most advantageous price in the market. But the Military Department, whose instrument or agent the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals is in making these sales, is not certainly engaged in a profit making activity. The Director-General of Supplies and Disposals after effecting sales of these vehicles, deducts the prescribed departmental charges and credits the balance to the Military Department. It is fairly obvious that in the matter of sales of certain unusable or condemned motor vehicles, no conception of any business activity either on the part of the Military Department, or of the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals, who was its instrument or agent for effecting the sales, can reasonably arise. We are therefore of the opinion that the assessees were rightly assessed to tax on this disputed turnover. The revision case is therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
|
