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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 57 of 57 Records
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1964 (8) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here was material or evidence before the Tribunal from which a finding could be arrived at by those authorities as to the sense in which this entry glass-ware may be understood in the trade parlance or by the people who are called upon to deal with these articles. If there is no such evidence, it is difficult to hold as a matter of construction of the entry and the provision in the Schedule that the term glass-ware excludes either sheet glass or plate glass. Thus, on a consideration of all the objections raised by the assessee we have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the Tribunal that entry No. 15 regarding glass-ware does include sheet glass and plate glass is correct and is justified in law. We therefore answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. As the reference is decided against the assessee, the costs of this reference shall be borne by the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (8) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 3rd edition, page 544, para. 1055, the law is stated in these terms As a writ of execution cannot issue against any partnership property except on a judgment against the firm, partnership property cannot be taken in execution for a separate judgment against one partner. I am therefore of the clear opinion that the State had no right to seize the movable properties of the petitioner-firm. It is needless to observe that the State may pursue any other right, it may be legally entitled to, in appropriate proceedings for the purpose of working out the rights of the assessee in the petitioner-firm. In the present writ petition the Court is only concerned with the limited question of the right of the State to seize the movable properties of the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus will issue as prayed for. No costs. The bank guarantee furnished shall be cancelled by the departmental authorities concerned and returned to the petitioners. Petition allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er of assessment was not communicated to the assessee in any of the modes which the law has prescribed for the purpose. The learned Government Pleader argues that the normal presumption of due performance in regard to official acts should be applied to this case. But, in the present case as mentioned above, the word despatched is by itself not sufficient to show which one of the methods of service prescribed by the rules was adopted. Since one cannot conclude from the mere use of the word despatched , that service by registered post was the method of service resorted to, one cannot apply any such presumption, about the due performance of official acts. Therefore, our decision in A.M. Safrilla and Co. v. State of Madras T.C. No. 26 of 1963. will apply to this case, and we hold that the order of the Deputy Commissioner is without jurisdiction. The petition is allowed and the assessment on the disputed turnover is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the bargain between the members of the Society on the one hand and the Society on the other in regard to the disputed turnover. The relevant by-laws of the Society also may have to be looked into for a correct appreciation of the position. Therefore, while maintaining the order of remand by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for a more detailed examination of the case and fresh disposal, we set aside the observations of the Tribunal in regard to the scope of the proviso to section 2(r) and the manner in which the benefit of the exemption under that proviso can be availed of by a dealer including an agent, who is a dealer as provided in the definition in section 2(g)(iii) of the General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner will dispose of the case in the light of the remarks we have set down above. The appeal is ordered in the above terms but, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Case remanded.
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1964 (8) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reement to get the block itself made by the assessee on behalf of the customer to save further trouble to the customer to select a block-maker himself. That the assessee was prepared to do this extra service for the customer, instead of leaving it to him to get the block prepared on the basis of the design should, in our opinion, not make any difference. It would also not justify the integration of the two contracts into a single contract for the value of goods supplied. It is also not proper to deal with the advertisement and translation charges as pre-sale charges, which was the view which the department chose to accept. In our opinion, the circumstances clearly make out a contract for art and translation charges distinct from the contract for the sale of the block, and therefore the Tribunal s order was correct in excluding the charges made for the former service from the assessable turnover. The petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (8) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 9, which excludes from its scope pure silk cloth. Learned counsel for the petitioner as a final argument referred to item 19 of the First Schedule to the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, which provides zari, as an item of goods assessable at the point of first sale in the State. According to the learned counsel, the sales in this case are subsequent sales and therefore they would be exempt, but the fallacy in this argument lies in the fact that what was sold is not zari. It is zari thread embroidered into attractive designs or patterns on silk cloth. The customer has paid in these cases not for zari material as such, but for the design worked out with zari material on silk cloth which can be used for being stitched to other garments. The argument would have been perfectly valid if what was sold was zari, plain and simple. But that is not so in this case. We therefore confirm the decision of the Tribunal and dismiss the revision case, but without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (8) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e decisions, can be exercised in its discretion by the assessing authority. In the present case, the facts are that the return in the proper form was before the assessing authority who refused to treat it as a valid return, but the appellate authority in its discretion, treated it as a valid one. We have already given reasons which distinguish the present case from that in Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons 1962 13 S.T.C. 680. because here we have not so much of a case for condonation of delay, as a case where a subsequent return was treated as one validly submitted in compliance with a notice calling for rectification of defects in the first return. We are of the opinion that the decision of the Board of Revenue, in the above circumstances, cannot be upheld. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Board of Revenue and restore the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... But, in view of the general way in which the description was given, namely, dyeing and tanning materials , in item 59 before its amendment, we cannot read into it the meaning that only commodities used exclusively for dyeing and tanning were included in that description. The Legislature, after the amendment on 1st October, 1960, has restricted the term to certain specified commodities used exclusively for dyeing and tanning. But it cannot be held by retrospective operation of the amendment that such an intention was implicit in the earlier enactment, especially when the terms of earlier enactment can be interpreted without any ambiguity, in the light of the principles stated above. We are therefore of the opinion that this is a case where the sales of myrobalam bark to tanners should be assessed at single point as tanning material. We therefore allow the revision case and set aside the assessment on the disputed turnover. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 50 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner, the sole proprietor of his business, was in fact working somewhere else and the business premises had been lying locked for a long time and it was known that he was working for someone else the process-server s attempt to serve the notice at the petitioner s defunct business premises can be nothing but a farce and a traversty of justice. For the assessment year 1959-60, there was, therefore, even less justification for accepting the processserver s report and treating the service which was made by affixation at the last known place of business, as sufficient and valid. For the reasons given above the assessment orders under the U.P. Sales Tax and Central Sales Tax Acts dated 23rd of March, 1963, and the 28th of November, 1963, for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 respectively and the recovery proceedings taken pursuant to such invalid assessment orders are hereby directed to be quashed. Accordingly, the petitions are allowed with costs. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the registered dealers in Punjab who gave C Forms to the assessee had complied with the rule in force in Punjab framed by the Punjab State Government?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The Punjab purchasing dealers need only comply with the Punjab rules in the matter of supply of C Forms to the selling dealer, in Madras State, and rule 10(1) framed by the Madras State will not apply to them.
The order of the Tribunal is not right and that the assessee is entitled to the lower rate of assessment, because he has furnished declaration in C Form as required under the Act and the rules. The revision is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1964 (8) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
Whether High Court of Bombay was correct in setting aside the conviction of the respondent under section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, hereinafter called the "Act", read with a notification of the Reserve Bank of India dated November 8, 1962, and directing his acquittal
Held that:- In our opinion, the very object and purpose of the Act and its effectiveness as an instrument for the prevention of smuggling would be entirely frustrated if a condition were to be read into section 8(1) or section 23(1-A) of the Act qualifying the plain words of the enactment, that the accused should be proved to have knowledge that he was contravening the law before he could be held to have contravened the provision.
If a person chooses to carry on his person what is not personal baggage or luggage understood in the legal sense but what should properly be declared and entered in the manifest of the aircraft there can be no complaint of the unreasonableness of the Indian law on the topic. The result, therefore, is that we consider that the learned judges of the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent. The appeal has, therefore, to be allowed and the conviction of the respondent restored.
The respondent was accordingly arrested and though the Magistrate directed his release on bail pending the disposal of the appeal in this court, the respondent was unable to furnish the bail required and hence suffered imprisonment, though it would be noticed that such imprisonment was not in pursuance of the conviction and sentence passed on him by the Magistrate. Such imprisonment continued till May 8, 1964, when the decision of this court was pronounced, so that virtually the respondent had suffered the imprisonment that had been inflicted on him by the order of the Presidency Magistrate. In these circumstances, we directed that though the appeal was allowed, the sentence would be reduced to the period already undergone which was only a technical interference with the sentence passed by the Presidency Magistrate, though in substance it was not.
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1964 (8) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order for public examination was void as offending article 20(3) of the Constitution which says that "No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."?
Held that:- Section 45G of the Banking Companies Act did not offend clause (3) of article 20 of the Constitution and no order 4ot public examination under it could violate that clause as there could be no accusation in a proceeding under the section resulting in an order for public examination.
For the purpose of action under section 545 ot the Companies Act and section 45J of the Banking Companies Act it is not essential that a public examination should first be held either under section 478 of the Companies Act or section 45G ofthe Banking Companies Act. Therefore, public examination under section 478 of the Companies Act and section 45G of the Banking Companies Act have no concern with proceedings under section 545 of the Companies Act and section 45J of the Banking Companies Act. A prayer for action under section 545 of the Companies Act and section 45 J of the Banking Companies Act cannot hence amount to accusation under article 20(3) for the purposes of orders for public examination under section 478 of the Companies Act or section-45G of the Banking Companies Act. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Power to apply to court to have questions determined or powers exercised, Winding up - Preferential payments and Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc.
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1964 (8) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Managing director - Approval of Government for appointment ... ... ... ... ..... s of appointment of a person after the commencement of the Act. But this intention has not been made clear in section 269, before the amendment of 1960. In the absence of such clear intention, it cannot be held that section 269 is applicable to persons appointed as managing directors after the commencement of the Act as distinguished from the appointment of managing directors after the commencement of the Act I therefore agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and hold that the petitioner was not bound to apply to the Central Government under section 269 for approval If the appointment of the petitioner was not subject to approval by the Central Government, the information furnished by him in exhibits P-32 to P-34 cannot be said to be false. There can therefore be no contravention of section 628 of the Companies Act. The petition is allowed and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside. Fine, if recovered, will be refunded to him.
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1964 (8) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... uld not be justified in treating them as belonging to him instead of to the ostensible owner. My conclusion is that the company, by setting up counter claims which are prima facie valid, has raised bona fide disputes regarding its liability to pay the debts claimed by all three of the petitioners. It has reasonable excuses for non-payment and cannot be deemed unable to pay its debts on account of any legal presumption arising under section 434(1). As for the other allegations put forward by the petitioners to justify winding up, I am satisfied that they make out no case. If the petitioners have any grievance against Mittar Sain Jain (who, it may be noted, happens to be the father of petitioner No. 2) on account of the way he is managing the affairs of the company, there are other remedies that they can pursue as shareholders. Winding-up would not be an appropriate remedy, when the company is perfectly solvent and flourishing. This petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1964 (8) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is no substance in this appeal and it must be dismissed with costs?
Held that:- All that the appellant's writ petition says is that he is given to understand that the amounts sought to be included in the assessments of the appellant have already been found by the income-tax department, Bombay, to be the income of the said Mulji Manilal Kamdar and that he has been assessed on the same amounts by the 6th Income-tax Officer, C-I Ward, Bombay, and recovery proceedings have already been started against him. It is plain that an allegation that the appellant is given to understand does not amount to an allegation on oath about the fact which the appellant knows to be true. It is thus clear that the main object which the appellant had in mind in moving this court under article 136 was to gain time. That is why at the final hearing, not even an attempt was made to raise any question about the jurisdiction of respondent No. 1 or the validity of the law under which he is proceeding against the appellant. Appeal dismissed with cost.
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1964 (8) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Smuggling - Proof - Burden of proof - Evidence ... ... ... ... ..... is conclusive on the fact of smuggling, it cannot be taken to be proof of the fact. Supposing for instance in this case the ingots were stolen (not that I hold so) and the petitioner, in order to hide it, gave a false explanation, can it be said that because of that, the gold ingots should necessarily have been smuggled? Clearly the answer should be in the negative. Similarly, there may be other possibilities which may really explain the petitioner s possession of the gold ingots. The circumstantial evidence, even if it can be so described, which the respondent relied on had no more effect than that the explanation offered by the petitioner was false. The circumstantial evidence did not prove that the ingots were smuggled. In my view, therefore, the finding of the respondent that the ingots had been smuggled was not based on any legal evidence. It follows that his order is illegal and invalid. 8.This petition is allowed and the order of the respondent is set aside. No costs.
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