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Showing 41 to 60 of 74 Records
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1964 (9) TMI 55 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ious benefits to the Acharya. The case, therefore, in our opinion stands on the same footing as the case of the priest-in-charge in Daly v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue. The benefits received by the Acharya by reason of the institution providing residence, food, clothing, servants, horses, carriages, elephant, etc., for the Acharya and the members of his household and incurring expenditure for the same cannot be said to represent money's worth, i.e., something which can be turned to pecuniary account. The question whether the benefits are capable of being turned to pecuniary account is a question which must be judged as a whole and so judged, it is to our minds clear that they are incapable of being converted in terms of money and cannot, therefore, be regarded as income assessable to tax in the hands of the assessee. We, therefore, answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative. Each party will bear and pay his own costs of the reference.
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1964 (9) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ures have shown an admirable spirit of restraint and have not even once in all these years discussed the conduct of Judges. We must not lose faith in our people, we must not think that the Legislatures would misuse the powers given to them by the Constitution or that safety lay only in judicial correction. Such correction may produce friction and cause more harm than good. In a modern State it is often necessary for the good of the country that parallel powers should exist in different authorities. It is not inevitable that such powers will clash. It would be defeatism to take the view that in our country men would not be available to work these powers smoothly and in the best interests of the people and without producing friction. I sincerely hope that what has happened will never happen again and our Constitution will be worked by the different organs of the State amicably, wisely, courageously and in the spirit in which the makers of the Constitution expected them to act.
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1964 (9) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petition. Indeed, the petitioner s learned counsel has not asked me to go into the merits of this claim. What he wants is that the proportionate duty payable on this sum of money should not be collected from him pending the appeal. I do not think that I should exercise the discretion of granting a stay of collection of a portion of the estate duty. This discretion legitimately belongs to the Assistant Controller under section 73(4) of the Act. It is open to the petitioner to approach the Assistant Controller and get appropriate relief. Though the petitioner claimed in the petition a stay of collection of the estate duty payable on another sum of Rs. 72,206, his learned counsel does not press it, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to consider it. This writ petition is allowed in part as indicated above. As the petitioner has succeeded substantially in this writ petition, I direct the respondent to pay the costs of the petitioner. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed in part.
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1964 (9) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng to the Appellate Director has long expired. The statement of the learned counsel for the department that the Appellate Director might condone the delay in preferring the appeal is but poor consolation to the petitioner. I am not satisfied that, in a case like the present, where an order has been based on a finding unsupported by any evidence or where there has been a clear violation of the principles of natural justice in passing the order, I should dismiss the writ petition on the rather technical and narrow ground that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of preferring an appeal to the Appellate Director. For the reasons stated above, I allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order. It will be open to the Assistant Controller to go into the entire matter afresh and fix the estate duty payable in respect of the estate of the deceased, Swamy, according to law. I make no order as to costs in the circumstances of this case. Counsel s fee Rs.250. Petition allowed.
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1964 (9) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mischief done during the pendency of the writ proceedings, and restore the parties to the position that they occupied prior to the writ petition. Therefore, they directed, while issuing a writ of certiorari, the authorities to refund the money they had collected illegally during the pendency of the writ proceedings. But in the present case, the writ petition itself for quashing the assessment for 1957-58 has failed. No question arises of restoring to a party any benefit which he has lost by an illegal action taken by the authorities during the pendency of the writ proceedings. The principles laid down by the TravancoreCochin High Court, in the decision above cited, will not apply. In our view, as long as there has been no stay of further proceedings for the assessment of the petitioners to tax for 1957-58, there is no need to the assessment. In view of the foregoing discussion, we dismiss all the three writ petitions. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to be iron scrap, as was done by the Tribunal in this case, there is no scope at all for contending that it will be machinery or a part of it, or hardware or iron and steel falling within item 23. The assessee has been found to be a dealer in old scrap iron materials, and this is not susceptible of any doubt. The learned Government Pleader wants us to admit the revision case for deciding that iron scrap, as found by the Tribunal, is an item of machinery. We are unable to see any reason for drawing such an inference. The revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Schedule less one per cent Provided that no prosecution for an offence under section 45 shall be instituted in respect of the same facts on which a penalty has been imposed under this section. It is, therefore, clear that the analogous provisions to section 10(d) and section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act in the Madras General Sales Tax Act are section 23 and section 45(2)(e). In this view of the matter the levy of penalty in this case, for the purpose of appeal, should be viewed as one under section 23 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Section 31 of that Act gives a right of appeal to a person aggrieved by an order under section 23. Therefore, in our opinion, the levy of penalty in this case is an appealable order. We, therefore, overrule the objection of the learned Government Pleader, as to the maintainability of the appeal. The revision cases are, therefore, allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (9) TMI 48 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, giving exemption from taxation to milk and curd and specifying curd as meaning dahi and khowa . It was suggested that in the background of the Act of 1947 the word curd as used in entry No. 21 of the Act of 1958 should also be understood as including khowa . We are unable to accept this contention. The assessment here is under the Act of 1958 and not under the Act of 1947. That being so, the meaning given to the word curd in the Hindi version of the Act of 1947 can be of no assistance in the construction of the word curd as used in entry No. 21 of Schedule I to the Act of 1958. 6.. For these reasons, our answer to the question stated for our opinion is that khowa does not fall within the meaning of the word curd as used in item No. 21 of Schedule I to the Act of 1958, and is, therefore, not exempt from tax under the entry. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (9) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ), 3(2) or 3(3), is a matter which is essentially a part of the assessment proceeding, and cannot be exercised at any earlier stage, unless the rules specially require that to be done. It seems to us accordingly that the departmental officials were in error in pronouncing upon the validity of possible future claim which might be made by the assessee at the stage when he was merely asking for a form of declaration and nothing more. While we agree with the conclusion reached by Veeraswami, J., that writs of mandamus should issue in these cases, we reach that conclusion on a different line of reasoning. In our opinion, it was not necessary for the learned Judge to have determined in the course of these writ proceedings whether the sale of vegetable oil, which went into the manufacture of vanaspati or soap, would be eligible for the concessional rate of tax. Subject to these observations, we dismiss the writ appeals with costs. Counsel s fee (one set) Rs. 100. Appeals dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 46 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... terial printed and supplying it to the producers with a profit-motive and that being so he falls within the definition of a dealer under section 2(e) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. Sri Ranganathachari tried to explain away several of the factors indicated above by suggesting that it might have been a mistake committed by his client in making the entries in the accounts. This is not an explanation that was offered by anyone on behalf of the petitioner at any time before and it is also difficult to believe that these entries are the result of a mistake. In these circumstances, we find it difficult to accede to this suggestion. We are not able to find any ground or justification to differ from the conclusion of the department and the Tribunal that the transactions in question constituted sales which would be subject to tax under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. In the result, the petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ader urged another argument that in the C declaration forms, the assessees have stated that they have purchased the goods for sale and they have not mentioned specifically that they have purchased goods on behalf of the principals. We do not agree with this contention. If the correspondence, which we have already adverted to, showed that the assessees acted as buying agents, the fact that the assessees had given incorrect or wrong particulars in the C forms will not convert the buying agency transactions into transactions of purchase by the assessees for their own benefit. They might have done this to enable their sellers to obtain a lower rate of tax. We therefore reverse the order of the Board of Revenue so far as the purchasing agency transactions are concerned and hold that the assessees are entitled to exemption in respect of those transactions as they have satisfactorily proved them to be buying agency transactions. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (9) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... omer a large number of copies prepared out of that negative. In v. K. Baraskar v. State of Madras 1963 14 S.T.C. 615., Jagadisan, J., delivering the opinion of the Bench, had to deal with a case where an assessee was engaged in drawing pictures for remuneration and handing them over to business firms of printers, who thereafter printed them in hundreds and thousands of copies for sale or presentation. Adopting the principle laid down in the English decisions and following the decision of Veeraswami, J., in D. P. Roy Chowdhury v. State of Madras(4), the learned Judge held that the artist in that case did not effect sales of the pictures he painted or drew. That case again is distinguishable from the one we have to deal, where the assessee is a photographer doing on a commercial scale the business of studio photography. We, therefore, confirm the order of the Tribunal in regard to the disputed turnovers. The revision case is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 43 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al Sales Tax Act. In such cases Article 286(1) of the Constitution takes the sale automatically out of the taxing power of all the States in India, as well as of the Central Sales Tax Act. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in a recent decision in Guduthur Thimmappa and Son v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1964 15 S.T.C. 299. at page 307 observed The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that section 4 is not subservient to section 5 as in the case of section 3, but that section 4 has an independent operation and that if the situs of the sale is within the State of Andhra Pradesh there is no scope for invoking section 5. We must demur to this proposition. It appears that section 4 has to be treated as subject to section 5 and where section 5 applies, there is no more need to decide whether section 4 will apply. For the reasons given in the foregoing paragraphs, I allow the revision case and set aside the assessment on the disputed turnover. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (9) TMI 42 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... generis will apply and the residential building cannot be said to be ejusdem generis with the things already enumerated. 4.. It is clear enough that aerated waters, charged with carbonic acid gas, coloured or plain and with a dash of some essence, cannot in any sense be regarded as ejusdem generis with syrups, or distilled juices, or jams, or fruit juices, or essences and gulkand. What is inter alia taxable under entry No. 49 is drinks of the kind specified in that entry and not aerated waters. If aerated waters do not fall under item No. 49 of Part II, Schedule II, then clearly the tax payable on the sale of aerated waters would be according to item No. 1 of Part VI, Schedule II. 5.. For these reasons, our answer to the question posed for our decision is that the word drinks in item No. 49 of Part II, Schedule II, does not include aerated waters. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (9) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o quarrying work, the contract itself did not specify quarrying as part of the work to be done by the contractor. In order to secure the proper quality of the materials, certain quarries were indicated as the source from which the materials should be produced. It was open to the contractor to acquire the material from the quarry owners or to engage in quarrying operations himself. But in so far as his own contract was concerned, it was not a quarrying contract, and in that view, it was decided that the exemption did not apply in that case. In the light of the facts we have set out, we are satisfied that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel fail. On facts, it was not a case of a sub-lease of a right acquired by the petitioner it was really a sale of sand. Secondly, the exemption in terms will not apply, for no quarrying contract of any description was involved. Both the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee (one set) Rs. 100. Petitions dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 40 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ccrued or the liability for the payment of the sum arose. (3) In the suit the plaintiff may, notwithstanding anything in the last foregoing section, but subject to the law in force at the place aforesaid, give evidence with respect to any matter stated in the certificate. (4) This section shall apply if under this Act as in force as part of the law of Pakistan or Burma, or under any other similar Act forming part of the law of Pakistan or Burma, proceedings are taken against a person in Pakistan or Burma, as the case may be, for the recovery of an amount stated in a certificate made by a Collector in any State to which this Act extends. The remedy by way of a suit was, therefore, available to the petitioners, which, admittedly, they did not make use of. Therefore, the objection raised by the learned counsel is pointless. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, I will make no order as to costs. Petitioner dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (a) and section 34(1A), it is essentially a case of assessment under section 23 of the Income-tax Act. It must be noticed that section 30 of the Income-tax Act which provides for the right of appeal does not in express terms refer to an order under section 34 assessing income which had escaped assessment. But there can be no doubt about it that a right of appeal under section 30 would be available to an assessee on the footing that it is an assessment under section 23 of the Act. The argument before the Supreme Court was that orders under section 34(1)(a) could be appealed against under section 30 read with section 23, while in the case of assessment under section 34(1A), such a right of appeal was not available, which argument, as mentioned above, was rejected. It is unnecessary to refer to the other decisions rendered under the Income-tax Act referred to by the learned counsel. For all the reasons mentioned above, we dismiss the revision case. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll. The paintings have to be drawn on large sized boards, suitable for appreciation by people who look at them even from a distance. It cannot be denied that in drawing such paintings, art and skill are involved and that the customers seek the services of the painter principally for his art and skill. The supply of boards is only ancillary to the contract. Because some of the customers found it inconvenient to purchase boards for themselves, the assessee to oblige them supplied boards and made an inclusive charge therefor in the bills. But that will not make the transactions sales of the finished paintings as if they were specific goods. The bargain is primarily for work and labour. The transfer of property in the shape of boards is only ancillary to the main contract. The turnover is clearly not liable to sales tax. The revision is allowed and the assessment on the disputed turnover is set aside. The penalty imposed is also set aside. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (9) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an amendment to section 3(2) of the Act of 1939 after the Constitution came into force, that this additional levy on sugar was discriminatory and that the protection available to taxes lawfully levied before the Constitution came into force under Article 277 of the Constitution will not apply to the additional levy on sugar. Here again, we cannot agree that the levy of additional tax on sugar at a single point as defined in section 3(2), involves an unfair discrimination between goods similarly placed. The single point levy including the additional levy falls alike on all sugar in the State either at the point of first sale after production or at the point of first sale after import and from this point of view, there is no question of any discriminatory treatment of sugar as a commodity selected for sales tax levy at a single point. We, therefore, overrule the contentions of the petitioner and dismiss the revision case. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (9) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... dence to show that there was any subsequent agreement whatever between the official liquidator and the employees that they should go under a new contract similar in terms to the old one. In the absence of such evidence, the winding-up order operated as discharge of the employees as contemplated by section 445(3) of the Companies Act. Therefore, this plea also fails. Lastly, it is contended that some of the workers were given notice on 10th October, 1960, and in their case the winding-up order, which came in only on 5th December subsequent, could not have the effect of an order of discharge. But even in these cases the period of notice was extended by two months by the court and they were actually discharged only on 12th December, 1960. This shows that they were given salary for more than the notice-period after the notice on 10th October. Hence, this contention has also to be rejected. The order of Raman Nayar J. is ultimately confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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