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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 64 Records
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1965 (8) TMI 87 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo in The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 20) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, its broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." Keeping this principle in view, we come to the conclusion that none of the cases relied upon on behalf of the department are of any assistance to the department and on the facts of the present case it must be held that the expenditure incurred in stowing was a revenue expenditure and, having been admittedly expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the assessee's business, was deductible under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. In view of the above discussions, the question referred for our opinion is answered in favour of the assessee, who will be entitled to its costs. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (8) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as laid down by he Court of Appeal. But the Court of Appeal was not called upon to construe a written law which brings in the inflexibility if its own language. It was not required to construe the words The communication of an acceptance is complete as against the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission to him, so as to be out of the power of the acceptor." Regard being had to the words of our statute I am compelled to hold that the contract was complete at Khamgaon. It may be pointed out that the same result obtains in the Conflict of laws as understood in America and quite a number of other countries such as Canada, France, etc. also apply the rule which I have enunciated above even though there is no compulsion of any statute. I have, therefore, less hesitation in propounding the view which I have attempted to set down here. In the result I would allow the appeal with costs. ORDER In view of the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1965 (8) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Houses of Legislature. The rules are valid from the date on which they are made under S. 26(1). It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature does not affect the validity of the rules, merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature. Granting that the provisions of sub-s. (5) of s. 26 by reason of the failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature were violated, we are of the view that sub-s. (5) of S. 26 having regard to the purposes for which it is made, and in the context in which it occurs, cannot be regarded as mandatory. The rules have been in operation since the year 1941 and by virtue of s. 64 of the Gujarat Act 20 of 1964 they continue to remain in operation. All the contentions raised by counsel for the petitioner must therefore fail and the petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 84 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m (or any person to whom he may let it) and allot the house to a Government servant later on, in view of the right conferred on the landlord by the proviso to Clause (b) of Sub-section (2). 14. For these reasons I must hold that the law laid down in the Division Bench decision in 1960 BLJR 368 (AIR 1961 Pat 254) and other Division Bench decisions, reported or imreported, to the same effect is not correct. 15. The answers to the two questions formulated at the end of paragraph 4 of this judgment are as follows (l) The failure to give fifteen days' previous notice, either to the landlord, or to the District Magistrate, or to both, will not invalidate the subsequent order of allotment made by the District Magistrate. (2) The District Magistrate is not bound to give seven days' notice to the landlord before allotting the house to the succeeding Government servant. 16. The petition is, therefore, dismissed but without costs. Sahai, J. 17. I agree. Bahadur, J. 18. I agree.
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1965 (8) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... anner as it likes. If the amendment introduced brings the case under item 2 of the Notification of July 3, 1937, the assessee shall have the liberty to put in the deficit Court fee, if any, at all. The learned Judge of the Small Causes Court shall allow the parties to adduce such evidence as they may like and then determine the cases on evidence already on record and such further evidence as may be adduced." I consider that the direction given in this paragraph should be set aside and in its place there should be an order for remanding the case to the Presidency Small Causes Court for ascertainment by itself of the annual value under the provisions of s. 127(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 after giving the parties adequate opportunity to adduce such evidence as they may like. Subject to this modification I would dismiss the appeals with costs. ORDER In accordance with the majority judgment, the appeals are allowed. Corporation will pay the costs of these appeals.
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1965 (8) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Government as prescribed by it, the suit cannot be entertained. ,On that view of the matter, it is not necessary to deal with the other question as to whether the respondents were justified in claiming absolute immunity under International Law. It is common ground that if there is a specific statutory provision such as is contained in s. 86(1) which allows a suit to be filed against a foreign State subject to certain conditions, it is the said statutory provision that will govern the decision of the question as to whether the suit has been properly filed or not. In dealing with such a question, it is unnecessary to travel beyond the provisions of the statute, because the statute determines the competence of the suit. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In view of the fact that we are affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal on ,a ground which did not succeed before that Court, we direct that parties should bear their own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vanced by him during the period his registration certificate is in force, even if at the time of advancing the loan he had exceeded the limit .of the amount mentioned in the registration certificate as the 'amount up to which he could transact money-lending business. Under the provisions of the Act it is the de facto registration of the money-/ender which entitles him to sue for the loan and not the contents of the registration certificate. We therefore allow the appeal and order that the decree of the Court below be modified to the effect that plaintiff No. 2 alone is entitled to a decree for ₹ 6,000 as against defendant No. 3 alone and that plaintiff No. 2 would be entitled to simple interest at 6% per annum from the date of institution of the suit until realisation of the amount. We further order that plaintiff No. 2 will get his proportionate costs, from defendant No. 3 of the trial Court and full costs of the High Court and this 'Court. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (8) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d power under S. 1 1 1 (3). The Central Government reversed the decision appealed from without giving any reasons; nor did the record disclose any apparent ground for the reversal. In this context, Shah, J. made the observations quoted above, and held that there was no proper trial of the appeals and the appellate order should be quashed. Hidayatullah, J. at p. 370 of the Report pointed out that there was no reason for the reversal and the omission to give reasons led to the only inference that there was none to give. There is a vital difference between the order of reversal by the appellate authority in that case for no reason whatsoever and the order of affirmance by the revising authority in the present case. Having stated that there was no valid ground for interference, the revising authority was not bound to give fuller reasons. It is impossible to say that the impugned order was arbitrary, or that there was no proper trial of the revision application. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 79 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a Court could have interfered not merely because the Court would, on its own have taken a differentw view, but only if there was something fundamentally wrong in his appreciation of the facts concerned. What the Deputy Registrar felt was that in view f his findings of fact, he was debarred from considering the other relevant facts either by themselves or even in combination with the facts as found by him, for the purpose of deciding how to exercise his discretion. This is not a case of merely a wrong appreciation of the facts before him by the Deputy Registrar. It is much stronger,. In these circumstances, therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned Judge was justified in interfering with the exercise o his descretion by the Deputy Registrar. 59. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. 60. Liberty to the respondent's attorneys to withdraw the sum of ₹ 500 deposited by the applicant as security for costs in this appeal. 61. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 78 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al income of such other person where such set-off is to be made for a loss under one head against profit under another head. In our view, neither of these two decisions can further the construction suggested by Mr. Shah and, therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal was, in our opinion, a correct view. If, as suggested by Mr. Shah, income arising under the different sub-clauses in clause (a) of section 16(3) were to be adopted and loss in one were to be set off against income from the other, it would, as already pointed out earlier, be not only contrary to the scheme of section 16(3) but also might work contrary to the provisions of section 24 in cases such as the one referred to earlier. In the view that we take of the words and the scheme of section 16(3)(a), our answers to the questions are as follows Question No. 1 in the negative. Question No. 2 also in the negative. The assessee will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Questions answered in the negative.
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1965 (8) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a) (iii) and (iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922. This Court held that the oral partition in question was not a transfer in the strict sense and should not, therefore, be said to attract the provisions of s. 1 6 (3 )(a) (iii) and (iv) of the said Act. This decision shows that having regard to the context of the provision of the Income-tax Act with which the Court was dealing it was thought that a partition is not a transfer. Considerations which weighed with the Court in determining the, true effect of partition in the light of the provisions of the said section, apply with equal force to the interpretation of s. 14(6) of the Act. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Before we part with this appeal, we would like to add that on the appellant undertaking to vacate the suit premises within three months from the date of this decision, Mr. Sastri for respondent No. 1 has fairly agreed not to execute the decree during the said period. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant was a tenant or a protected tenant on the merits?
Held that:- The view taken by the High Court in the judgment under appeal that s. 88 (1) (a) is an express provision which takes away the interest of protected tenants under the 1939-Act must be held to be correct. So far as the argument based on s. 88-B is concerned, it IS enough to say that we agree with the High Court that section will not protect the appellant for his lease had already been determined before the section came into force on April 1, 1956. Besides it may be observed that s. 4-A which takes the place of s. 31 after the amendment of 1956 still does not apply to a case of lands held on lease from a local authority and therefore what we have said with respect to s. 31 will equally apply to s. 4-A and the appellant cannot claim the benefit of that section and contend that he is a protected tenant under the 1939-Act and therefore cannot be ejected. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act would be applicable to the suit Survey Numbers ?
Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain suit in view of section 85 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act ?
Whether defendant proves that he is a permanent tenant of the suit land?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Decree passed by the High Court and the District Court is set aside and the appeal remanded to the District Court with the direction that it do restore the appeal to its original number and do proceed according to law
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1965 (8) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the power to extend time was applied. The facts in Jethmal v. AmbsinghA.I.R. 1955 Raj. 97. are distinguishable because in the instant case we are not concerned with any cause of action or a right to sue. Moreover the observation at page 103 of Modi, J., that there is overwhelming authority in favour of the principle that where a subsequent law curtails the period of limitation previously allowed, and such law comes into force at once, it should not be allowed to have retrospective effect, which it would otherwise have, so as to destroy pre-existing vested rights of suit does not, with all respect, seem to lay down the correct law. The authorities are against the view that the mere shortening of a period of limitation destroys a vested right. The statement presupposes that the law has retrospective effect otherwise which it would otherwise have would be meaningless. It was for this reason that we answered the question in the affirmative. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1965 (8) TMI 73 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erson in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be provided in any law in force in the State. 5.. In the light of the above provision we must hold that the liability to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, arises only when the sales concerned are the only sales or they constitute the first sales in a series of sales. In other words the assessments concerned have to be made in the light of section 3 of the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, read with section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. 6.. It follows that the orders impugned have to be set aside to the extent necessary for a reconsideration of the assessments made in the light of the observations made above and that the Sales Tax Officer should be directed to deal with the matter afresh. We do so. Any guidance necessary will be found in the majority decision of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Lakshminarasimhiah Setty and Sons 1961 12 S.T.C. 231. 7.. The appeals are disposed of as above. No costs.
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1965 (8) TMI 72 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts that he was required to produce. I would also like to mention in this connection that out of the documents that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes was called upon to produce before the Investigating Officer, there were the files of assessment of the firm. It may be that the files of assessment contained the other documents that were all called for. But files of assessment minus those documents are not included within the prohibition against disclosure contained in clause (1) of section 25 and in any event the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes could have had no objection for production of the files of assessment minus the documents specifically mentioned in clause (1) of section 25. As, however, the order passed by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate need not be split up in view of the order we are going to pass, the entire order should be set aside. I agree with the order passed in the case by My Lord and hold that this Rule must be made absolute. Rule made absolute.
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1965 (8) TMI 71 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ears of land revenue in the Revenue Recovery Act and the U.P.Z.A. Act are not mutually exclusive. The second submission of the learned counsel is fully met by the letter (annexure I) filed by the petitioner himself. This letter was addressed by the Sales Tax Officer to the Collector, Varanasi, to recover the arrears of sales tax from the appellant as arrears of land revenue. It was not addressed to the Tahsildar. The Collector directed the Tahsildar to take proceedings for recovery of the arrears of sales tax as arrears of land revenue and the Tahsildar issued annexure II. The Collector could issue such direction to the Tahsildar and the latter could take the various steps for the recovery of the amount under the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. Act. There is, therefore, no susbtance in the second submission of the learned counsel also. No other submission has been made before us. These appeals are devoid of all merits. They are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 70 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot circumvent the departmental remedy of appeal by invoking this Court s extraordinary jurisdiction and, therefore, this Court could not go into any of the questions that are raised in this petition. 4.. Whether the notice of assessment was validly served or not depends upon facts. The Sales Tax Commissioner has treated the service as valid, and we see no justification to go into the facts and decide for ourselves, whether it was valid or not. It is enough that his finding that it was valid is not palpably wrong. 5.. As regards the contention, that the notice of demand was illegal because it was addressed to the firm, no order passed in recovery proceedings, and no act done in recovery proceedings was challenged through the petition for certiorari, or mandamus, and it is unnecessary for us to go into the question whether the notice of demand was valid or not, and whether the recovery proceedings are legal or not. 6.. We dismiss the special appeal summarily. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 69 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at in the absence of the assessment order, I should not quash the assessment order itself. Mr. Chakravarti is right to this extent that the petition is defective in so far as it did not annex the assessment order. But since there is no dispute that an assessment was made upon the petitioner, including in the gross turnover the sale price of the goods mentioned in the notification under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, and a sum was demanded of the petitioner by way of sales tax, I do not make much of this technical defect. In the result, I quash the notice and the impugned order of assessment and restrain the respondents from giving effect thereto. Let a writ of certiorari accordingly issue. I make no order as to costs in this Rule. It is stated that the petitioner has already paid the amount assessed under the impugned assessment order. Now that I have quashed the assessment order, the petitioner is at liberty to take proceedings for the refund of the money. Petition allowed.
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1965 (8) TMI 68 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... legislation under Article 286(2) of the Constitution or only for the limited period of less than a year between the 30th day of May, 1950, and the 31st day of March, 1951. In these circumstances we think we should hold that explanation sales are not within the purview of that rule and that the first sale specified is the first intra-State sale by a dealer like the petitioner who is not exempt from taxation under section 3(3) of the Act. It follows that the petition should fail and that it is unnecessary to consider whether the amendments effected to the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, by the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1957, and by the General Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1962, subsequent to the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, are invalid and of no effect as contended by counsel for the petitioner. 6.. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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