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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 106 Records
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1967 (4) TMI 218 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... can be argued that the Magistrate took illegal cognizance of the charge under Section 120B as Section 196-A(2) prohibits entertainment of certain kinds of complaints for conspiracy punishable under Section 120B without the required sanction. The absence of sanction does not prevent the court from proceeding with the trial if the complaint also charges a co-conspirator of the principal offence committed in pursuance of the conspiracy or for abetment by him of any such offence committed by one of the co-conspirators under Section 109 of the Penal Code. (See Mohd. Bachal Abdulla v. The Emperor, A.I.R. 1934 Sind 4 In our view, the fact that sanction was not obtained in respect of the complaint under Section 120B did not vitiate the trial on the substantive charge under Section 409. No prejudice could be said to have resulted in view of the appellant's confession that he had in fact misappropriated Rs. 2,500 and was prepared to deposit that amount. 12. The appeal is dismissed
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1967 (4) TMI 217 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he two differing members of the division court will differ again on some offshoot, as they have differed from time to time, going by the cases some of which the books reveal. Why this needless waste of judge-hours and everybody else's time when the statute does not lay down anything of the kind? it is not difficult to visualise cases where such differences may be interminable. Why then this battledore and shuttlecock between a division court and a third Judge? D. Worse, the Judge whose opinion the third Judge does not share, will have to be a signing party to a judgment which his conscience tells him is not right. E. No special feature is here as in Section 377 where the order has to be signed by two Judges. 35. In the result, the rule must be, and is hereby made absolute. The warrant of arrest dated July 30, 1965, issued by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, against the petitioner, and all subsequent proceedings taken by him and the other respondents, be quashed.
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1967 (4) TMI 216 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no termination of service at all. But ultimately the appellate Court has only confirmed the decree of the trial Court which as stated above has assessed the figure only as damages. It cannot be said that the trial Court erred on principle in assessing the damages at the said figure. It is in perfect accord with the principles found enunciated in decided cases. 12. In the result clause 3 of the decree of the trial Court confirmed by the appellate Court awarding the plaintiff a sum of ₹ 1,472 as damages will stand confirmed. Clauses 1 and 2 of the decree of the trial Court shall stand deleted. A declaration will be given that the plaintiff's services were not terminated by the defendants rightly and in accordance with law. The second appeal is allowed to the extent above indicated and dismissed in other respects. On the question of costs, having regard to the disreputable conduct of the management the plaintiff would be entitled to his full costs throughout. No leave.
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1967 (4) TMI 215 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sts in the various States placed on the Cadre of the Indian Administrative Service. These Rules certainly do not show that the post of I. G. R. is any State was in the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service in that year; but a comparison of the various lists shows that there are some posts which, in some of the States, are borne on the Cadre of the Indian Administrative Service, where as they are not included in that Cadre in other States. Clearly, there can be no uniformity between different States in the matter of determining the strength and the composition of the Cadre of the Indian Administrative Service in all the States. The submission that we should hold the order of the Union Government as void on the ground of discrimination between different States has, therefore, no force and must be rejected. 12. The appeal, consequently, fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, we direct parties to bear their own costs. 13. R. K. P. S. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (4) TMI 214 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d of natural justice. The respondents have admitted in their reply affidavit, as suggested by Mr. Yogeshwar Dayal, that an application for destruction was made that the Inspector made remarks on the said application and that the sample was collected at that time. If these material had been made available to the petitioner he may have been in a position to meet the charge by showing that the goods originally warehoused were nto different from the goods found at the time the last sample was drawn. I am also nto uninfluenced by the fact that the authorities have proceeded to dispose of the matter in disregard of the petitioners application for destruction. It is, in the circumstances, nto necessary to deal with toher alleged violation s on the part of the authorities. I, therefore, allow the writ petition and quash the three impugned orders with no order as to costs. It will be however, open to the authority to deal with the matter afresh if they so choose. 10. Petition allowed.
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1967 (4) TMI 213 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... choice, either quarterly, half yearly or annually on a licence to be taken out by him for that quarter, half-year or year, within fifteen days from the commencement of the quarter, half-year or year, as the case may be; and if this is not done, he is liable to penalty under section 6. In these circumstances it could not be the intention of the Legislature to confer a power of withdrawal of exemption retrospectively upon the executive, which not only makes it impossible for the owner of the motor vehicle to pay tax retrospectively within 15 days from the date of the beginning of the quarter which has already gone past, but also makes him liable for penalties for something which it is impossible for him to do. In this view, the judgment of Gopalakrishnan Nair, J., requires no interference and must be confirmed. The result is that both the petitioner's appeals as well as the appeals preferred by the Government are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 50 in each.
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1967 (4) TMI 212 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ellate powers under section 33. ... The shape that the appeal would ultimately take and the decision that the Appellate Tribunal would ultimately give would entirely depend upon the view taken by the High Court." 11. A similar view was expressed by the Bombay High Court in Rajkumar Mills Ltd. v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal 1953 33 ITR 750(Bom) . 12. The High Court has held, and we agree with the High Court, that the judgment of the Tribunal is based on no reasoning and is on that account speculative. But by recording that answer, it is not to be implied that the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is confirmed. It will be the duty of the Tribunal, conformably with the judgment of the High Court, to dispose of the case after hearing the assessee and the Commissioner in the light of the evidence and according to law. 13. Subject to this direction, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the Commissioner in this appeal. 14. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (4) TMI 211 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... am unable, Therefore, to agree with the petitioner that the silk imported had not been subjected to a process of manufacture. Mr., Chadha strongly relied on the conditions of the license and said that the petitioner was there under required to re-export the textile fabrics or pieces thereof after they had been embroidered. From this he suggested that the only conclusion possible was that the same goods had been re-exported. This argument suffers from two-fold fallacies -- (1) The condition of license may be satisfied if the silk imported had been transformed into a product having a distinctive name in the commercial market and yet that transformation may amount to manufacture within the meaning of Section 43B entitling the petitioner to a lesser drawback and (2) the license was for import of textile fabrics or pieces thereof and possibly the first condition had reference to that, (5) In view of this discussion this petitioner fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1967 (4) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , the consultation must be with the interests concerned including employers and employees and should be employment by employment, for needs of every employment may not be the same. All that we may accept after considering the affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant is that the notifications in question were not issued entirely arbitrarily but we do not think that the consultation to which reference was made in the affidavit of the appellant was enough for the purpose of sub-r. (4). We are therefore of opinion that the two notifications should be struck down and we do so, but for reasons different from those which commended themselves to the High Court. We therefore partly allow the appeals and uphold the notification under sub-r. (1) except to veneer mills. The order of the High Court striking down the notifications under sub-rule (4) is upheld, though for different reasons. In the circumstances we order parties to bear their own costs in all the appeals. Appeals allowed.
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1967 (4) TMI 209 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... coercion or the like, and he had been denied a personal hearing to prove his case by evidence. I would have held that he had been materially prejudiced. But the petitioner's own case is that he obtained a Pakistani passport because he desired to see his ailing father. But, as explained above, a strong desire to see an ailing parent does not make the obtaining of a foreign passport less than voluntary. Where a person, in response to a notice under Clause I of Schedule III of lie Citizenship Rules admits that he obtained a Pakistani passport and does not place any material to establish a prima facie case that the obtaining of the passport was not voluntary, the authority concerned is bound to hold that he acquired the citizenship of the country whose passport he obtained, and he cannot plead that the denial of a personal hearing materially prejudiced him. 21. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
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1967 (4) TMI 208 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ny other suitable accommodation will provide the occasion and justification for his requiring the premises in question and will constitute the strongest evidence of the bona fides of his requirement. All that the Courts below have done in this case is to come to the conclusion that the second requirement has not been satisfied so as to entitle the landlord to an order in his favor. They have found on the basis of the evidence placed before them that the landlord in this case has other suitable accommodation, and consequently, came to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for. I do not find any improper understanding of law or an incorrect approach on a question of law with reference to the orders of the Courts below, and hence, I do not see any justification for interference with their orders under Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Under these circumstances, the Petition is dismissed with costs. 2. Petition dismissed.
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1967 (4) TMI 207 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... observed that in a case where a matter had been adjudicated upon in accordance with the provisions of the Act it might not be possible for courts to interfere by reason of the provision of s. 46 of the Act. This case therefore to some extent is in line with the view we have taken. 17. On a careful consideration therefore of the authorities cited before us, we are of opinion that generally speaking the jurisdiction of the civil or revenue court is barred under s. 46 and no such court can entertain any suit or adjudicate upon any question whether a particular property or right to or interest therein is or is not evacuee property. We therefore allow the appeal and hold that in the view we have taken the suit was not maintainable in the civil court. The matter will now go back to the Single Judge of the High Court to pass order in conformity with the view we have expressed. As the respondent has not appeared in this Court we pass no order as to costs. 18. V. P. S. Appeal allowed
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1967 (4) TMI 206 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ial orders but also to administrative orders. From what has been said above, it follows that the Central Government failed to examine the legal effect of the deed put forward. It ignored the law bearing on trusts in holding that the deed placed before it is a trust deed. Therefore its order liable to be quashed. 25. In view of our above conclusion, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the Government's power to grant an exemption under Section 89(4) had come to an end in view of its order dated 30-3-1957. To a case like the present one, Article 14 of the Constitution is in applicable. In the very nature of things, exemptions under Section 89(4) can only be granted to individual Companies. 26. For the reasons mentioned above, this petition is allowed and the impugned order, namely, the order of the Central Government dated 29-7-1957 is quashed. The petitioners are entitled to their costs in this petition from Respondent No. 3. Advocate's fee ₹ 500.
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1967 (4) TMI 205 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is clear that the State is charging from the users of motor vehicles some thing in the neighbourhood of II and IO respectively for the said two years of the cost it has to, incur in maintaining and making roads. From Annexure D to the said affidavit it appears that in some cases tax under the 1963 Act had been increased by 50 under the 1966 Act and in some cases the tax under 1963 Act has been increased by 40 under 1966 Act. It is obvious that comparatively small proportion of the general expenditure is realised through the impugned taxation. In the circumstances, we must hold that the said Acts were only regulatory measures imposing compensatory taxes for facilitating trade, commerce and intercourse. The Acts are, therefore, not hit by Art. 301 of the Constitution. in the result the order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed with costs here and in the court below. V.P.S. Appeal allowed
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1967 (4) TMI 204 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... perior officers. It is not shown that in condoning the delay the Authority acted, arbitrarily or capriciously or in excess of its jurisdiction or that it committed any error apparent on the face of the record. In the application under 20(2) some of the' employees claimed overtime wages for periods prior to January 1, 1961. The Authority declined to condone the delay in respect of claims for the period prior to January 1, 1961. On a careful consideration of the relevant materials, the Authority condoned the delay in respect of claims subsequent to January 1, 1961 only. The Court cannot interfere merely because it might take a different view of the facts and exercise the discretion differently. it is not shown that the impugned order led to grave miscarriage of justice. The High Court refused to interfere under Art. 227. We think that this is not a fit case for interference by us under Art. 136. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (4) TMI 203 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... e taxpayer, which was the ground upon which the special commissioners decided the case namely, that I. C. I. deprived itself for a period by the agreement of the right or ability or potential ability to make use and vend "agreement products" in, for example, Holland and Belgium; that this right or ability was part of its fixed capital; and that the ₹ 400,000 was expressly under the contract the consideration for this deprivation. But, as Cross J. pointed out, and indeed the Crown urged, this aspect of the case was ancillary to the whole disposition of the patent rights, and indeed a sine qua non of such disposition (especially in the possible event of the patents proving vulnerable or of a new method being discovered by I. C. I.), and, therefore, cannot affect adversely the taxpayer's contentions on the first point. I, also, would dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal refused. Solicitors Solicitor of Inland Revenue; J. S. Copp .
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1967 (4) TMI 202 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e view that the assignment, claimed by the petitioners, must be regarded only as a colourable device, for really obtaining a transfer of tenancy rights, which is otherwise prohibited by s. 15(1) of the Rent Act. We are further of the view that the transaction, in question, is not saved by clause 2 of the Notification. As the petitioners, in our opinion, cannot claim any rights on the basis of the assignment deed, either in respect of tenancy rights, or to carry on any business there, it follows that they cannot complain that any fundamental rights, under Art. 19(1), (f) or (g), of the Constitution, have been infringed. On this ground, this petition must fail. In the view expressed above, it becomes unnecessary, in this case, to consider either the scope of the decision in Sitabati Devi's case 1967 2 S.C.R. 949, or as to whether that decision requires reconsideration. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs of the respondents, one set. Petition dismissed.
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1967 (4) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . The High Court has accepted the Chief Engineer's version. The appellant does not deny that there was a meeting with the Chief Engineer after the tenders were opened at 4 p.m. on October 15, 1966. His first affidavit on this point was vague and it was only in the reply affidavit that he stated that the Chief Engineer had not asked all the tenderers whether they would be prepared to reduce rates further or withdraw conditions. Nothing has been brought to our notice which would induce us to disagree with the view taken by the High Court, namely, that the Chief Engineers assertion that he asked all the tenderers whether they were prepared to make any further reductions or withdraw any conditions is correct. If that is so and we have no difficulty in accepting the Chief Engineers assertion in that behalf there is no question of discrimination in connection with what happened on October 15, 1966. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (4) TMI 199 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oppressive manner or by force or against his wishes. He cannot claim the protection of Art. 20(3). The fact that the tape recording was done without his knowledge is not of itself an objection to its admissibility in evidence. In saying so, the Court does not lend its approval to the police practice of tapping telephone wires and setting up hidden microphones for the purpose of tape recording. The High Court rightly convicted the appellant of the offence under s. 165A of the Indian Penal, Code. Counsel pleaded for reduction of the sentence. The appellant is sixty years old. He is suffering from cardiac troubles. He was removed to jail from the hospital in an ambulance on July 29, 1963. He remained in jail until December 12, 1963 when he was released on bail. Having regard to these and other circumstances, we reduce the substantive sentence of imprisonment to the period of imprisonment already undergone by him. With this modification of the sentence, the appeal is dismissed.
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1967 (4) TMI 198 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... riminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966, particularly urged that it is unnecessary to direct further proceedings to be continued, so far as his clients are concerned. Learned counsel pointed out that the police report before the Magistrate clearly shows that the girl, in question, who is stated to be above 19 years of age, has herself stated that she bad eloped, of her own accord and that if that is so, further proceedings against his clients, are absolutely unnecessary, to be continued. We are not inclined to accept these contentions of the learned counsel. As to whether an offence is made out or whether any of the appellants or both of them are guilty of the offences with which they may be charged, are all matters which do not require to be considered, by this Court, at this stage. In the result, subject to the directions contained above, the orders of the Magistrate, directing the police to file a charge, will be set aside, and the appeals allowed, to that extent. Appeals allowed.
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