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1968 (9) TMI 105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... hicle and was a component part of a motor vehicle. In the Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pritam Singh (Sales Tax Reference No. 486 of 1965 decided by this Bench on August 6, 1968) 1968 22 S.T.C. 414. we held that an article is a component of another when it forms a constituent part of that other and is essential for completing it. That presumes necessarily that the article as such must in its condition and functioning be capable of use in that other. The Judge (Appeals) has held that the diesel engines sold by the petitioner could ordinarily be used for other purposes, and that it was with the assistance of the conversion kits that they could be used in motor vehicles. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Judge (Revisions). In our judgment, the diesel engines sold by the petitioner cannot be said to be components of motor vehicles. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the negative. There is no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1968 (9) TMI 104 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... reasons, this petition is allowed. The order dated 18th May, 1967, of the Commissioner of Sales Tax is quashed in so far as it restricts the number of diesel locomotives, cranes, fork lifts, railway line trollies, hand trollies, trucks, coal-loaders, trailers and tractors which the petitioner can purchase after paying the concessional rate of tax and in so far as it makes the insertion of the above goods in the registration certificate effective from 18th May, 1967. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is directed to delete from the registration certificate the restriction put on the number of aforestated goods which the petitioner can purchase and to make the amendment allowed in the certificate effective from the date of the petitioner s application for amendment, namely, 10th September, 1965. The petitioner shall have costs of this application. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 150. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 103 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... has described himself as an expartner of the dissolved firm. The fact that he has so described himself cannot affect the position in any way. If the Commercial Tax Officer was under a duty to dispose of the rectification applications as if the firm had not been dissolved, the fact that the applicant called himself a partner of the erstwhile firm does not alter the position, and the description adopted by the applicant only means that the firm had been in fact dissolved, but does not mean that even for the purpose of section 15(2) of the Act, the firm must be regarded as having been dissolved. So, we allow these writ petitions and direct the Commercial Tax Officer to dispose of the applications for rectification presented by the petitioner according to law, and we further make a direction that the order of refund, if any, shall be made in favour of the dissolved firm and not in favour of the individual partner who made the applications for refund. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 102 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ken by the Commercial Tax Officer is plainly unsupportable. The composition permitted under section 17 does not obliterate the fact that the composition fee paid by him is a substitute for the tax which he would have otherwise become liable to pay. The amount paid by him in that way is nevertheless tax paid by him, and, in the cases before us the composition fee so paid by that registered dealer is in truth and reality the tax which he was liable to pay and which he paid in that form. However that may be, the fact remains that he was, notwithstanding the composition, the first purchaser, and so was liable to pay the tax. The composition does not transform the person who purchased from him into a first purchaser, and the seller continues to be the first purchaser notwithstanding the composition. So we allow these writ petitions and we set aside the orders made by the Commercial Tax Officer. The petitioner will get his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100, one set. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 101 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ery in which it is possible to accumulate such energy only once and in which such energy cannot again be stored, is not an accumulator. So, a battery which cannot again be used as a means of storing electrical energy once it gets discharged, is not an accumulator. It is undisputed that the dry battery cells sold by the petitioner could not be recharged when they got discharged. So, they were not accumulators within the meaning of that word occurring in the fifty-third item. If they do not fall within the fifty-third item, they can fall only within the residuary sixty-first item, and so, the Commercial Tax Officer could have demanded tax only at the rate specified against that item and not at the rate mentioned against the fifty-third item. So, we allow these revision petitions and direct the Commercial Tax Officer to make an appropriate modification in the orders of assessment made by him. The petitioner will get his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100, one set. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 100 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... void or still-born. It is unnecessary to consider this decision as it relates to the applicability of the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 1965, as then introduced in the Pondicherry State. In the present case it is irrelevant to consider whether the Madras General Sales Tax Act applies to the Pondicherry State or whether any other Sales Tax Act is in force in the Pondicherry State. The question that arises for consideration relates to the execution of a warrant for the realisation of the sales tax amount under section 24(2)(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. I have already pointed out that by virtue of sections 386 and 387 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there could be no objection to the procedure adopted for the recovery of the sales tax amount as fine as it is the usual procedure adopted for collecting fines from persons convicted in this State and residing in Pondicherry State. The writ petition and the criminal revision case are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 99 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ioners before us unless tax would have been payable by them under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, if those sales had in fact been made inside the State. It is not controverted that had the sales made by the petitioners been intra-State sales, they would not have been liable to pay any sales tax under the Mysore Sales Tax Act since under the seventh entry in the Third Schedule to that Act, the turnover relating to arecanut is taxable only at the point of purchase and not at the point of sale. The levy to which they were subjected was, therefore, not a good levy and they were, as pointed out by this Court in Govindaraju Chetty s case 1968 22 S.T.C. 46. , entitled to seek the rectification which they sought and to get the refund which they claimed. So, we allow these writ petitions and quash the assessments made by the Commercial Tax Officer and we direct a refund of the tax collected by him under the Central Sales Tax Act in respect of those assessments. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 98 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e order passed thereon under section 7(4) and (6) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. This application and the order passed thereon had nothing to do with the assessment proceedings regarding the return filed by the tenant. This document, in my opinion, is not covered by the provisions of section 26 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act and the objection raised by the tenant regarding the same had been correctly overruled by the court below. Besides, under the provisions of section 26 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it was the officer of the State Government who had been asked by the court to produce the document which was covered by the provisions of that section who would claim privilege, and the counsel for the petitioner could not show that the assessee also could invoke this section and ask the court to summon it from the department. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 97 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... under item 6 of Schedule III should not in any case exceed the tax at the maximum rate of 3 per cent. on the sale or purchase price in accordance with the definition, contained in the Central Act, of sale price which would also include, as we have said earlier, the purchase price, inasmuch as sale would consist of a bilateral transaction and connotes also a purchase-see Syed Mohamed and Co. v. The State of Madras(1). These directions will be applicable to two sets of cases (1) in cases in respect of which no assessments are made, the sales tax authorities will give effect to the same and (2) in other cases in respect of which assessments have already been made, on applications being filed by the concerned assessees, the sales tax authorities will re-examine and if need be, revise the assessments in the light of the directions given by us in this judgment. With these directions, these writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 25 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 96 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... . There is another reason which makes it impossible to support the view that the contract in this case involved to any extent a sale liable to sales tax. Although in its original condition granite metal may be movable property, there is nothing in the material placed before the authorities to show that the title to the metal which originally vested in the contractor passed to the Government, the other party to the contract, at any time before the same was actually spread on the road and consolidated and therefore converted into immovable property by imbedding the same in the earth. The order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal as well as the orders of the two appellate authorities are hereby set aside. As the only amount in respect of which sales tax has been imposed is the amount estimated to be the value of granite metal, this order will result in the setting aside of the entire assessment. The assessee will have his costs in this revision petition. Advocate s fee Rs. 100.
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1968 (9) TMI 95 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... d not contain a provision like section 41(4), proviso 2(a). That made all the difference, as the Supreme Court itself pointed out, because the main body of sub-section (4) of section 41, as was held by the Supreme Court, ought to be read as qualified by and in the sense of the two provisos to section 41(4). We hold that section 42(3) is unconstitutional and invalid, and strike it down. The appeals are allowed with costs throughout. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each case. We are informed that in obedience to an interlocutory order of this Court the relative bags of maida and atta have been returned to the appellant, but 20 bags of khandasari sugar, the subjectmatter of confiscation, had been sold by the department in open market. In the circumstances, this will be taken note of and the respondents will pay the sale proceeds of the khandasari sugar to the appellant. W.P. No. 1077 of 1968 This petition is not opposed by the State. This is allowed but with no costs. Appeals allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 were validly extended to the Shillong Administered Areas?
Whether the Dominion of India was entitled to exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction over the Shillong Administered Areas on April 15, 1948, which was the material date?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.The appeals against the assessments were also filed after the amendment. It is therefore not correct to say that the amending Act has been given a retrospective effect and the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes was therefore right in asking the appellant to comply with the provisions of the amended section 30 of the Act before dealing with the appeals. The expression "otherwise directed" only means that the appellate authority can ask the assessee to deposit a portion of the amount and not the whole, but the section gives no power to the appellate authority to permit the assessee to furnish security in lieu of cash amount of tax.
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1968 (9) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of the case the amount paid by the assessees and recovered by the assessees from April 1, 1949, to January 25, 1950, is liable to be deposited in the Government treasury under section 8-A(4) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act?
Were the assessees, the tax chargeable on whom in respect of the assessment year 1950-51 on the basis of the turnover of the previous year 1949-50 was Rs. 14,621-9-4, entitled in the circumstances of the case to the refund of the deposit made by them as tax?
Held that:- Section 8-A(4) of the Act being ultra vires, the answer given by the High Court to the second part of question No. 2 in the affirmative in favour of the assessee is affirmed.
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1968 (9) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Subsidiary and Winding up – Powers of tribunal on hearing petition ... ... ... ... ..... in agreement with the findings of the learned single judge that the subsidiary company was really an asset of the holding company. In the view that the learned single judge took that the subsidiary company was really a property of the holding company, his Lordship did not consider it advisable to give any definite finding as to whether or not the proposed issue of further capital was inspired by the directors of the holding company and was collusive or mala fide, being merely an attempt to get out of the control of the holding company. If the issue of further capital is not bona fide but is mala fide, different considerations may prevail. In these circumstances, I set aside the order of the learned single judge and allow the appeal. The matter will, however, go back to the learned single judge for deciding whether or not the issue of share capital is mala fide and, if so, what is its effect. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs.. Tatachari, J.- I agree.
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1968 (9) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up – Powers of tribunal on hearing petition, Cost and expenses payable out of assets in a winding-up by Court
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1968 (9) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Advertisement of petition ... ... ... ... ..... to be wound up it is patent enough that the interest of the appellant-company will be adversely affected. As to this, the learned single judge has merely observed that, although the appellant-company may be required to find another guarantor, that does not entitle it to intervene in those proceedings initiated by a creditor . The reason stated is that in such a proceeding the only question is whether a sum of money is due to that creditor and was not paid on demand as provided by section 434 of the Companies Act. In oar opinion, the intervener cannot be shut out. It should be allowed to protect its interests. It can show that the debt claimed by the Dethroning creditor was not due or that a demand was not made, or, for any other reason, the winding-up order should not be made. The appeal is allowed. The order of the learned single judge dated 28th July, 1967, is set aside. The appellant-company shall be allowed to intervene, as prayed by it. There shall be no order for costs.
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1968 (9) TMI 73 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
Court – Jurisdiction of ... ... ... ... ..... rdinarily, the directors of a company are the only persons who can conduct litigation in the name of the company, but when they are themselves the wrongdoers against the company and have acted mala fide or beyond their powers, and their personal interest is in conflict with their duty in such a way that they cannot or will not take steps to seek redress for the wrong done to the company, the majority of the shareholders must in such a case be entitled to take steps to redress the wrong. If there is no provision in the articles of association to meet the contingency, the majority of the shfireholders can sue in the name of the company . In view of what I have said above, I hold that the decision of the trial court that it had jurisdiction to try the present suit was correct. The revision petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but with no order as to costs. Parties have been directed to appear before the trial court on October 3, 1968, for further proceedings in the case.
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1968 (9) TMI 52 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, 1953 - provisional assessment under section 57 - validity ... ... ... ... ..... that account, the value of the property which according to the petitioner bears estate duty was only Rs. 26,000. So, according to that account, no estate duty was at all payable. It is true, as pointed out by Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy appearing for the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, that in the account delivered under section 53(3), the petitioner did refer to some gifts made by his father and that subsequently he stated the values of the property so gifted. But the account to which section 57 refers and which is required to be delivered under section 53(3) is the account which reflects the value of the property in respect of which estate duty is admittedly payable, and so the enumeration of other properties which, according to the account delivered, the deceased no longer owned when he died, could not form the foundation of a provisional assessment under section 57 of the Act. So, we set aside the impugned provisional assessment made by the Assistant Controller. No costs.
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1968 (9) TMI 51 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Petitions have been filed to quash the several notices issued by respondent under section 34(1)(a) of the Act for reopening assessments
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1968 (9) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Search - whether the document and goods are such as come within the scope of seizure contemplated u/s. 132 - challenge to the vires of section 132
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