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Showing 1 to 20 of 80 Records
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1969 (4) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Faridabad Township, with the object of converting it into a different commercial commodity, it is not liable to octroi. In the High Court I does not appear to have been appreciated that the question had to be decided on evidence whether by the process of dyeing a new commodity was brought into existence. But the parties chose to argue the case merely on the pleadings. That was not a satisfactory trial of the issue which is likely to arise frequently between the parties. 6. We direct that the order of the High Court be set aside and the proceeding be remanded to the High Court to deal with and dispose it of according to law and in the light of the evidence. It will be open to the High Court to allow the parties to lead evidence on the question whether the entry of the wool belonging to the appellant into the limits of the Notified Area Committee is with the object of converting it into a different commercial commodity. Costs in this appeal will be the costs in the High Court.
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1969 (4) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e writ petition before the High Court. 2. It seems to us that an intervener is not entitled to appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court and the High Court should not have granted certificate to them Under Article 133(1)(c). In such cases the officers who intervened before the High Court should, if they wanted to be heard, have applied to the Supreme Court for intervention in the appeal filed here. 3. In the result we discharge the certificate and dismiss the appeal. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (4) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed contrary to the admission rules and these would be converted into the general pool. Since no appeal has been filed against that part of the order we refrain from making any further observations in the matter. 13. Finally Mr. Misra attempted to agitate the question of some of the nominations being illegal as the candidates who had been nominated had not applied in time-the prescribed date being August 1, 1968. This contention cannot be entertained for two reasons. The first is that no such point appears to have been raised before the High Court when the writ petition was disposed of on December 3, 1968. It is only at the stage of review that this matter seems to have been pressed. Secondly it has been held by us that the appellants had no right to challenge the nominations which had been made by the Central Government. It was not, therefore, open to them to assail any of the nominations which had been made. 14. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1969 (4) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1950 had never been assented to by the President although it had received the assent of the Rajpramukh of the erstwhile Hyderabad State. Now the question of lack of assent of the President was never pressed before the High Court, nor have we been invited to examine it. We would, however, like to observe that, as noticed before, when Hyderabad Amending Act III of 1954 was enacted the assent of the President was duly obtained. Similarly when Bombay Act XXXII of 1958 which was meant for amending Hyderabad Act XXI of 1950 was enacted the assent of the President had been given. If the assent of the President had been accorded to the amending Acts, it would be difficult to hold that the President had never assented to the parent Act namely, Hyderabad Act XXI of 1950. Even if such assent had not been accorded earlier it must be taken to have been granted when Amending Act III of 1954 was assented to. 8. For the above reasons this appeal dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (4) TMI 126 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be with the defendants who have remained ex parte and have not chosen to produce the same. The written statement Ex. 24 filed by the defendants Nos. 4 to 10 does not even suggest any such thing and all that it says is that Natwarlal had become a partner of the firm in his individual capacity and that they were not bound by it. No such plea is raised and even there has been no material in that regard to substantiate any such argument advanced before us. In those circumstances, it is abundantly clear that the interests or shares in the joint family property so far as defendants Nos. 4 to 10 are concerned, would be liable for the claim of the plaintiff against the firm-defendant No. 1 of which Ramprasad and Chhotalal were partners and later on on Chhotalal's death Natwarlal joined the same as the head of the family. The learned Civil Judge was, therefore, right in holding accordingly . 10. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 125 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ciples should not be against the directions given by the Central Government under Section 117 of the Act. Whatever be the correct position--it is unnecessary to decide the question in these cases -- we are satisfied that what has been done by the State Government is merely the implementation of the directions of the Central Government. We do not consider that every mechanical factor such as the drawing up of the list and the publication thereof should also be done by the Central Government. There is no provision in the Act which insists that this should be so. It is the principles that should govern the drawing up of the list, that are material. The principles are the important elements in the matter of integration. The drawing up of the list etc. are only the implementation of these principles. Such implementation, we conceive, can be by the State Government. We see no force in this contention either. 86. We dismiss these petitions as well but without any order as to costs.
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1969 (4) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that on the facts the courts below should not have come to the conclusion that there was a subletting within the mischief of the Act. The buildings were let out as a lodging house and the evidence showed that one of the rooms was in the occupation of a lawyer who had been there for years and had put up his name board outside the room. Besides the name board of the lawyer, there were the name boards of other persons and the lawyer paid rent on a daily basis. The lawyer had installed a telephone in his room. In our opinion, there was sufficient evidence to hold that the lawyer was in exclusive possession of the room and although the rent was paid on a daily basis it was not a case of the grant of a licence. In any event, the finding as to sub-letting does not call for interference in this case seeing that the District Court and the High Court both accepted the evidence as conclusive of sub-letting. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ;subject -to any rules that may 'be made under this Act" in sub-s. (2) of S. 33C. Rules have been made and r. 62(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, provides "Where any workman or a group of workmen is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the workmen or the group of workmen, as the case may be, may apply to the specified Labour Court in Form K-3 for the determination of the amount due or, as the case may be, the amount at which such benefit should be computed." According to this rule an application in Form K-3 can clearly be made. In the result the appeals are allowed and the order of the Labour Court set aside insofar as the Labour Court held that the applications were barred by art. 137 of the Limitation Act. The Labour Court will now pass the final order in accordance with law. The appellants will be entitled to their costs, one hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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1969 (4) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inciples of natural justice. The order of dismissal visited him with the loss of office and involved an element of punishment for the offences committed. In the present case, the impugned order did not involve any element of punishment nor did it deprive the appellant of any vested right to any office. 11. It was next argued that the State Government blindly followed the recommendations of the High Court. We find no merit in this argument. The State government properly followed those recommendations. The High Court is vested with the control over the subordinate judiciary, see The State of West Bengal v. N.N. Bagchi (1968) ILLJ 270SC . If the High Court found that the appellant was not a fit person to be retained in service, it could properly ask the government to terminate his services. Following the advice tendered by the High Court, the government rightly terminated his services under Rule 12. 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (4) TMI 121 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ide the award, the Court below could nto remit the case back to the arbitrator, is clearly misconceived and seems to me to be contrary to the settled view, and indeed Shri Bagai, after half-heartedly pursuing it, gave up the attempt. (19) For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this revision and delete the direction from the lower Court's order that the arbitrator should implead Shri W. N. Chowdhary as a party to the arbitration proceedings. It would of course be open to the arbitrator to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties to the arbitration agreement and it would certainly be open to him to decide whether or nto the amount of ₹ 9,500.00 had been paid to Shri W. N. Chowdhary as agreed to by Shri Om Prakash Mehra and if the amount has nto been so paid, what is its effect on the rights and liabilities of the parties to the agreement and to give the necessary relief to them in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs. S.K. Kapur, J. (20) I agree
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1969 (4) TMI 119 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y because it is sold under a designation which implies that it contains a drug in its composition, when in fact it does not. In the present case, the accused himself has admitted that the substance which he sold as D. D. T. compound contained D. D. T. which is a well-known drug in the 20th century. The Oxford English Dictionary has described drug as 'an original, simple medicinal substance, organic or inorganic, whether used by itself in its natural condition or prepared by art, or as an ingredient in a medicine or medicament'. Having regard to the popular as well as dictionary meaning of the word 'drug', I have no doubt that the D. D. T. compound which was sold by the accused was a drug irrespective of whether it was notified by the Government of India or whether it contained the chemical ingredients which the Public Analyst has found or not. 5. In the result, the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ,entitled to compensation equal to thirty days wages. But we do not think that any such compensation is statutorily payable. So long as the Company was carrying on its business, it was obliged to give facility for enjoying earned leave to its workmen. But after the Company closed its business, it could not obviously give -any earned leave to those workmen, nor could the workmen claim -any compensation for not availing themselves of the leave. In the absence of any provision in the statute governing the right to compensation for earned leave not availed of by the workmen before closure, or transfer of an undertaking, we do not think that any such compensation is payable. On the view taken by us that the Labour Court was incompetent to determine the question as to liability to pay retrenchment compensation, these appeals must be allowed and the petitions under s. 6-H(2) filed by the respondents must be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1969 (4) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t the proposed, punishment, make a proper representation. The entire object of supplying a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer is to enable the delinquent officer to satisfy the punishing authority that he is innocent of the charges framed against him and that even if the charges are held to have been proved the punishment proposed to be inflicted is unduly severe. If the Enquiry Officer has also made recommendations in the matter of punishment that is likely to affect the mind of the punishing authority even with regard to penalty or punishment to be imposed on such officer. The requirement of a reasonable opportunity, therefore, would not be satisfied unless the entire report of the Enquiry Officer including his views in the matter of punishment are disclosed to the delinquent servant. We have no manner of doubt that the decision of the High Court must be upheld in the above view of the matter. The, appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Y.P. Appeal dismissed..
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1969 (4) TMI 116 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibility to submit a correct return or to suffer the consequences of an incorrect return may be a strict liability of the Master of the vessel. Notwithstanding all these, the statute provides one safeguard for the Master, namely, if he is an innocent victim of an error in a case where goods have been clandestinely imported in his vessel without his knowledge, he may be permitted, on discovery of such importation. to amend the Manifest and thereby escape the penalty. If, however, he refuses to amend then of course the consequences of filing an Incorrect Manifest must visit him. 22. In the result, I quash the Impugned order to this extent that the imposition of a personal penalty of ₹ 1,00,000/-(Rs. one lakh) upon the Master, petitioner No. 1, shall stand set aside and quashed. The rest of the order is not interfered with in any way. 23. This Rule succeeds to the extent Indicated above. I, however, make no order as to costs. 24. Let a writ of certiorari accordingly issue.
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1969 (4) TMI 115 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er in regard to the same, the Court should make that order under the prayer (f) of the petition which relates to "further and other reliefs". Mr. Taraporwalla on behalf of the respondents does not object to the order being made by me, although the same has not been specifically prayed for by the petitioner, but he desires to make it clear that he does not consent to the making of the order as such. I accordingly issue a writ, direction and order under Article 226 against the respondents directing them to return the said 75 bars of silver which are the subject-matter of this petition. Mr. Sorabjee on behalf of the petitioner agrees that his client will not call upon the respondents to return the said 75 silver bars which are the subject-matter of this petition to them for a period of eight weeks from the date on which an ordinary copy of this judgment is delivered to the respondents. The respondents must pay the petitioner's costs which I quantify at Its. 1,000.
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1969 (4) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd 6 of Art. 19(1) and cl. (b) of Art. 304. Regarding the ban against movement of old leaves contained in the order dated June 4, 1965, there can be no difficulty as it is conceded that old leaves in the context mean those which were in stock when these rules came into force and not the balance of leaves left unconsumed from year to year. So construed, the restrictions against free transport cannot be held to be unreasonable and the validity of s. 5 and rule 9 as also the order of June 4, 1965, except to the extent of its requiring a permit for distribution to the mazdoors, cannot be successfully challenged. So far as the order dated October 12, 1965 is concerned, it was a mere cancellation of a concession and such cancellation cannot be challenged as a restriction, much less as an unreasonable restriction. In the result, subject to the observations hereinabove made, the appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case we make Po order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... object intended to be achieved. The sentiments of a section of the people may be hurt by permiting slaughter of bulls and bullocks in premises maintained by a local authority. But a prohibition imposed on the exercise of a fundamental right to carry on an occupation, trade or business will not be regarded as reasonable, if is imposed not in the interest of the general public, but merely to respect the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of the people whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant. The notification issued by the State Government must, therefore, he declared ultra vires as infringing Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to consider the validity of s. 430 of the Act which was sought to be challenged in the petition or to consider whether there has been any infringement of the guarantee of the equality clause of the Constitution. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs in this Court. Petition allowed.
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1969 (4) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat Act. It would, thereaee, fall under the inclusive part (1) of the definition. Likewise, the benefit of the telephone and newspapers was allowed to the respondent not merely for the use thereof in connection with his employment or duties connected with it. Both the car allowance and the benefit of the free telephone and newspapers appear to have been allowed to him to directly reduce the expenditure which would otherwise have gone into his family budget and were therefore items relevant in fixation of fair wages. (see Hindustan anyibiotics Ltd.v.Workmen(1.S.C.R. 652 at 674, 675). That being the position, the two items could on the facts and circumstances of the present case be properly regarded as part of the respondent’s wages and -had to be taken into calculations of the gratuity payable to him. These were the only points raised before us and since in our judgment none of them can be upheld the appeal must fail and has to be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
whether, if the appellant's mark is used in a normal and fair manner in connection with the snuff LI 3Sup.CI/69- 5 and if similarly fair and normal user is assumed of the existing registered marks, will there be such a likelihood of deception that the mark ought not to be allowed to be registered.
. a mark is infringed by another trader if, even without using the whole of it upon or in connection with his goods, he uses one or more of its essential features."
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1969 (4) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ;subject -to any rules that may 'be made under this Act" in sub-s. (2) of S. 33C. Rules have been made and r. 62(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, provides "Where any workman or a group of workmen is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the workmen or the group of workmen, as the case may be, may apply to the specified Labour Court in Form K-3 for the determination of the amount due or, as the case may be, the amount at which such benefit should be computed." According to this rule an application in Form K-3 can clearly be made. In the result the appeals are allowed and the order of the Labour Court set aside insofar as the Labour Court held that the applications were barred by art. 137 of the Limitation Act. The Labour Court will now pass the final order in accordance with law. The appellants will be entitled to their costs, one hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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